Jeffrey Aaron Vaneyck v State of Alaska

In the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska
Jeffrey Aaron Vaneyck, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-13201
Appellant, )
v. ) Order
)
State of Alaska, )
)
Appellee. ) Date of Order: 10/9/2018
)
Trial Court Case # 4FA-17-01948CR
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, and Wollenberg, Judges
This case comes before us a second time on bail appeal. The defendant,
Jeffrey Aaron Vaneyck, is charged with several felonies: attempted first-degree murder,
kidnapping, first-degree robbery, second- and third-degree assault, and two counts of
third-degree weapons misconduct. He has prior convictions for driving under the
influence, various felony drug and weapon convictions, and two prior convictions for
failure to appear.
Because the current charges against Vaneyck arose prior to January 1,
2018, the former version of AS 12.30.011 applies to Vaneyck’s case.
In Vaneyck’s first bail appeal, we vacated the superior court’s “no bail”
order and remanded Vaneyck’s case to the superior court for clarification of the superior
court’s bail ruling, as well as further litigation of the constitutionality of a “no bail” order
under former AS 12.30.011(d)(2).
On remand, the superior court vacated the “no bail” order in Vaneyck’s
case and set bail as follows: 24-hour GPS electronic monitoring through a private
electronic monitoring company, a separate 24-hour live third-party custodian, a $50,000
performance bond, and a $10,000 appearance bond.

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
10/09/18 – p. 2
Vaneyck now appeals this new bail order, raising three separate arguments.
First, Vaneyck argues that he is entitled to the application of the current version of
AS 12.30.011 (i.e., the version that took effect on January 1st of this year), and that
failure to apply this new bail statute to his case violates equal protection. Second,
Vaneyck argues that the superior court’s requirement of a $50,000 performance bond is
both unconstitutional and excessive. Lastly, Vaneyck asks this Court to modify his
$10,000 appearance bond. Currently, under the superior court’s order, this $10,000 bond
must be deposited in full, either in cash or by corporate surety. Vaneyck argues that he
should be allowed to post only 10% of this bond in cash, in accordance with a provision
of the new bail statute, AS 12.30.011(f)(2)(A).
For the reasons explained here, we reject Vaneyck’s constitutional
arguments, and we further conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
when it set the conditions of Vaneyck’s release. We therefore affirm the court’s bail
order.1
Vaneyck’s equal protection claim
In 2016, the Alaska legislature modified Alaska’s bail statutes to implement
a more evidence-based approach to bail decisions.2
Among the changes enacted by the legislature was the creation of a new
pre-trial enforcement division within the Department of Corrections.3 Under the new
1See AS 12.30.030(a); Stiegele v. State, 685 P.2d 1255, 1256 n.1 (Alaska App.
1984).
2See SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 59; see also the sponsor statement of Senator John
Coghill, available at http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=29
&docid=63794.
3See AS 33.07.010; see also Fiscal Note 39, Senate Bill 91, 2016 House Journal
2 6 0 6 a v a i l a b l e a t

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
10/09/18 – p. 3
bail system, a pre-trial officer conducts a risk assessment of every defendant within 24
hours of their arrest, and then provides that risk assessment and bail recommendations
to the trial court.4 The pre-trial enforcement division also assists in monitoring
individuals while they are on pre-trial release.5
Because of the administrative and financial costs involved in setting up this
new system, the legislature delayed the effective date of the new bail statute until January
1, 2018.6 The legislature also limited the number of defendants who would be initially
served by this new program by expressly providing that the new bail statute would apply
only to defendants charged with offenses alleged to have been committed on or after
January 1, 2018.7
Vaneyck acknowledges that his offenses are alleged to have occurred
before the effective date of the new bail statute. However, Vaneyck argues that he is
entitled as a matter of equal protection to the benefits of the new bail statute. According
to Vaneyck, no legitimate government interest is served by the legislature’s decision to
limit the new bail statute to defendants whose offenses were committed on or after
January 1, 2018.
In response, the State argues that Vaneyck has waived his equal protection
claim by failing to adequately brief his equal protection claim and failing to obtain a
direct ruling on this constitutional question from the trial court. We agree with the State
that Vaneyck has failed to adequately preserve or brief this issue.
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/29/F/SB0091-30-2-040816-DPS-N.PDF.
4AS 33.07.030(a); see also AS 12.25.150(a).
5AS 33.07.030(f).
6SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 192.
7See SLA 2016, ch. 36, §§ 59, 185(o), and 192.

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We note that Vaneyck has not addressed the legislature’s administrative and
financial reasons for limiting the application of the new bail statute. The record does not
contain any statistics regarding the number of defendants in Vaneyck’s position — i.e.,
defendants currently being held in custody for offenses committed before January 1,
2018, who would arguably gain their release if their bail conditions were re-evaluated
under the new statute. Nor does the record contain any information that would allow this
Court to meaningfully assess the administrative and financial costs that would result if
these defendants were included in the new bail system.
Additionally, Vaneyck has not meaningfully briefed the legal standard that
would govern our evaluation of this classification under the equal protection clause —
nor has he provided any analysis of the legal authority that he cursorily cites in his
pleadings.
In any event, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is violated
only when similarly situated defendants are treated differently.8 Here, it is not clear that
application of the new bail statute to Vaneyck’s case would make any material difference
to his bail, now that the superior court has rescinded its “no-bail” order and has set
conditions of release.
Vaneyck points out that, under the new bail statute, he would be entitled to
release under the “least restrictive condition or conditions that will reasonably ensure the
appearance of the person in court and the safety of the victim, other persons, and the
community.”9 But this is essentially the same standard that applies under the former bail
statute, once the “no-bail” presumption of subsection (d)(2) has been rebutted — as it has
been in Vaneyck’s case. Under the former statute, once the presumption against bail
release has been rebutted, the court is required to impose “the least restrictive condition
8See State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Alaska App. 1998).
9See AS 12.30.011(j).

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
10/09/18 – p. 5
or conditions that will reasonably assure the person’s appearance and protect the victim,
other persons, and the community.” Former AS 12.30.011(b).
We further note that, under the new statute, Vaneyck would likely be
subject to the same kinds of bail restrictions as under the pre-2018 statute. He is charged
with violent felonies, and he does not claim that he would be classified as a “low risk”
offender under the current bail statute’s risk assessment tool. Nor does it appear likely
that Vaneyck would receive this classification, given his criminal history — which
includes several felonies and two prior convictions for failure to appear. Thus, even
under the new statute, Vaneyck’s bail conditions would be governed by
AS 12.30.011(f)(2) — a provision that authorizes the trial court to impose the same sorts
of bail conditions that Vaneyck currently faces.10
For these reasons, we reject Vaneyck’s equal protection arguments.
Vaneyck’s challenge to the $50,000 performance bond
After this Court remanded Vaneyck’s case to the superior court (following
his first bail appeal), Vaneyck proposed that he be released on 24-hour GPS electronic
monitoring, together with a third-party custodian (who had already been approved), and
a $10,000 appearance bond, of which 10% would be posted in cash (and no performance
bond). When the prosecutor asked the superior court to impose a $150,000 cash
performance bond, Vaneyck argued that performance bonds are per se unconstitutional,
and he further argued the $150,000 performance bond requested by the State would be
equivalent to an impermissible “no-bail” order in his case.
Based on Vaneyck’s prior criminal history, and based on what the superior
court’s finding that Vaneyck had not been candid about that history, the superior court
10Compare AS 12.30.011(f)(2)(A)-(C) with former AS 12.30.011(b)(2017); see
also AS 12.30.011(j).

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
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concluded that Vaneyck was a “danger to the public” and that his bail proposal was
insufficient to reasonably assure Vaneyck’s future court appearances and the continued
safety of the victim and the community. The court concluded that Vaneyck needed a
“substantial financial incentive” to comply with his conditions of release. The court then
set a $50,000 performance bond “for the simple purpose that, given his record, only a
substantial amount of posting will inspire [Vaneyck], in the court’s view, to actually
follow court orders.”
On appeal, Vaneyck challenges this $50,000 performance bond as
excessive, and he also renews his argument that performance bonds are per se
unconstitutional. In response, the State argues that Vaneyck has waived his constitu-
tional challenge to performance bonds because he failed to obtain a ruling on this issue
from the superior court, and because he has inadequately briefed this issue on appeal.
Again, we agree with the State that Vaneyck has failed to adequately
preserve his constitutional challenge. We therefore only address Vaneyck’s argument
that his $50,000 performance bond is excessive.
Vaneyck argues that the superior court’s decision to require a $50,000
performance bond is unreasonable, given the fact that Vaneyck’s compliance with his
bail conditions will be directly monitored, both by the private electronic monitoring
company and by his court-approved third-party custodian. Vaneyck also points out that
he already has a significant incentive to abide by his conditions of release, since any
violation of those conditions could result in new criminal charges. Lastly, Vaneyck
asserts that, given his financial situation, a $50,000 performance bond is the equivalent
of a “no-bail” order.
We agree with Vaneyck that, even without the performance bond, his
behavior on bail release will be heavily monitored and controlled. We also presume that
Vaneyck will be bearing the financial costs of the private electronic monitoring that was
ordered in his case. But the determination of appropriate bail conditions in a given case

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
10/09/18 – p. 7
is, in large measure, a discretionary function, and the trial court is in the best position to
make this determination. Accordingly, when the record is clear that the trial court has
considered the relevant factors and has applied the correct law, our review of the trial
court’s decision is governed by the deferential abuse of discretion standard.11
Here, the superior court considered the relevant factors and made explicit
findings in support of its decision to impose a performance bond in Vaneyck’s case. The
superior court also explained its reasoning for including this additional monetary
condition. Given the seriousness of the current charges, and given Vaneyck’s past
criminal history, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to impose a
performance bond.
We also find no abuse of discretion in the amount of the performance bond.
A court may set the monetary component of bail in an amount that imposes a financial
strain on the defendant if the court finds that this amount of money is actually necessary
to either protect the public or ensure future court appearances.12 Although the goal of
incentivizing a defendant’s compliance with bail conditions is not served by setting bail
in an amount so high that it is financially impossible for the defendant to secure release,13
we have reviewed the record in Vaneyck’s case and it appears that the superior court
reasonably believed that Vaneyck would be able to afford the $50,000 performance
bond. Although Vaneyck now claims that it is wholly unreasonable to think that he
could deposit the $50,000 or secure a corporate bond to cover this amount, there is
11AS 12.30.030.
12See Pisano v. State, A-13089, at *8 (Alaska App. May 24, 2018) (unpublished);
West v. State, A-11993, at *4 (Alaska App. Aug. 18, 2014) (unpublished).
13See Camara v. State, 916 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. App. 2005) (recognizing that
monetary bail that exceeds the financial resources of the defendant “is tantamount to no
bond at all” and requiring evidence of the defendant’s financial resources to be heard and
considered before bond is set).

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
10/09/18 – p. 8
nothing in the record currently before us to directly support Vaneyck’s claim.
In his trial court pleadings, Vaneyck asserted that the $150,000
performance bond requested by the State would operate as a “no-bail” order. But he did
not indicate what amount of performance bond would be within his ability to pay. And,
as we have explained, the superior court did not impose the $150,000 performance bond
requested by the State. Instead, the court imposed an amount that was closer to the
monetary bail originally proposed by Vaneyck.
To the extent that the superior court may have been wrong in its estimation
of Vaneyck’s ability to pay, it was incumbent on Vaneyck to object to the $50,000 bond
on that basis, and to provide the superior court with sufficient financial information to
allow the court to assess Vaneyck’s argument. Without this kind of record, we will not
second-guess the superior court’s reasons for imposing the $50,000 bond, nor will we
assume that this amount is truly outside Vaneyck’s ability to pay.
Vaneyck’s challenge to the $10,000 appearance bond
As we have already explained, the superior court imposed a $10,000
appearance bond, and the court ordered that 100% of this bond had to deposited with the
court, either in cash or through corporate surety. On appeal, Vaneyck argues that the
superior court should have accepted a deposit of only 10% of this bond.
The primary focus of Vaneyck’s argument is his assertion that, under the
new bail statute, any appearance bond can be satisfied by posting 10% of the bond
amount. But Vaneyck’s assertion is based on a misreading of the new bail statute.
Alaska Statute 12.30.011(f)(2)(A) authorizes courts in certain circum-
stances to impose “an appearance bond with a posting not to exceed 10 percent of the
specified amount of the bond[,] with the condition that the deposit be returned upon the

Vaneyck v. State, A-13201
10/09/18 – p. 9
appearance of the person at scheduled hearings.”14 But the very next provision of the
statute, AS 12.30.011(f)(2)(B), authorizes courts to impose a different type of bond —
“a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties or the deposit of cash.”15 Thus (contrary to
Vaneyck’s argument), even under the new bail statute, trial courts retain the discretion
to require defendants to post 100% of the bond, either in cash or by surety.
The record of the bail proceedings in this case shows that the superior court
considered Vaneyck’s request that he be permitted to post only 10% of the appearance
bond, but the superior court rejected this request because it concluded that a 100%
deposit (either in cash or by surety) was required to reasonably assure Vaneyck’s future
court appearances, given his prior convictions for failure to appear.
Although a different judge may well have reached a different conclusion
on this matter, the test is abuse of discretion — and we find no abuse of discretion in the
superior court’s decision.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained here, we AFFIRM the superior court’s bail order.
Clerk of the Appellate Courts
/s/ Sarah E. Anderson
Sarah E Anderson, Deputy Clerk
cc: Judge Kauvar
Trial Court Appeals Clerk/ Fairbanks
Distribution:
Robert John
Law Office of Robert John
PO Box 73570
Fairbanks AK 99707
Eric Ringsmuth
Office of Criminal Appeals
1031 W. 4th Ave, Suite 200
Anchorage AK 99501
14AS 12.30.011(f)(2)(A).
15AS 12.30.011(f)(2)(A); see also Alaska Criminal Rule 41.