Stoney Point Landing Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Gary T. Lee and Rebecca Wilson

Rel: June 12, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
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Stoney Point Landing Homeowners Association, Inc.

v.

Gary T. Lee and Rebecca Wilson

Appeal from Winston Circuit Court
(CV-24-900039)

EDWARDS, Judge.

In June 2024, Stoney Point Landing Homeowners Association, Inc.

("the HOA"), filed in the Winston Circuit Court a complaint against Gary

T. Lee and Rebecca Wilson, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 35-20-12, to

enforce the HOA's lien against real property in the Stoney Point
CL-2025-0881

subdivision, specifically described as Lot 200, which the HOA contended

was owned by Lee and Wilson. The complaint alleged that Lee and

Wilson had failed to timely pay to the HOA the 2024 assessment imposed

under the Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and

Restrictions of Stoney Point Landing ("the amended declaration"). The

amended declaration requires an "owner" to pay an annual assessment

to the HOA by January 31 of each calendar year and defines the term

"owner" as

"any contract buyer and/or the record owner, whether one or
more persons or entities, of a fee simple title to any lot which
is a part of any of the [p]roperty made subject to this
[d]eclaration but excluding those having such interest merely
as security for the performance of an obligation."

Lee and Wilson filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for

a summary judgment in which they argued that, because Lot 200 had

been sold twice for the nonpayment of ad valorem taxes, they no longer

owned any interest in the property and were therefore not an owner

required to pay the HOA assessments under the amended declaration.1

Lee and Wilson attached to their motion for a summary judgment, among

1Lee and Wilson admitted that they had not paid the 2024
assessment to the HOA and that they were subject to the amended
declaration.
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other things, a tax deed to Gene Lynn dated May 11, 2015, and a tax deed

to Brenda Steele, dated May 15, 2020. The HOA responded to the motion

for a summary judgment, attaching to its response, among other things,

answers to discovery indicating that Lee had never been named a party

to, or been served a summons in, any action to quiet title to Lot 200.2 On

May 29, 2025, after a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered a

summary judgment in favor of Lee and Wilson. The HOA filed a

postjudgment motion, which was denied by operation of law, see Rule

59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., and the HOA filed a timely notice of appeal.3

2The HOA did not argue that the term "owner" included both "any

contract buyer" and "the record owner," regardless of whether those
persons were one and the same.

3On May 30, 2025, the day following the entry of the summary
judgment in favor of Lee and Wilson, the HOA filed an amended
complaint in which it named both Lynn and Steele as defendants and
asserted a claim seeking a judgment declaring the ownership of Lot 200.
An attorney for Lynn's estate appeared in the action and filed both a
suggestion of Lynn's death and a motion to dismiss the claim against
Lynn's estate, which the trial court granted. However, because the trial
court never set aside the May 29, 2025, summary judgment, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to accept the amended complaint, and it is a
nullity. See Ex parte Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 31 So. 3d 661, 665
(Ala. 2009) (explaining that, after the entry of a final judgment,
"[a]lthough the trial court may have retained jurisdiction to alter its
judgment by an appropriate postjudgment motion," when "no such
motion was granted by the trial court," a "trial court lack[s] jurisdiction
to accept ... [an] amendment purporting to add new claims and a new
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Our review of a summary judgment is de novo; that is, we apply the

same standard as was applied in the trial court. Ex parte Ballew, 771

So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Ala. 2000). Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that

a motion for a summary judgment is to be granted when no genuine issue

of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law. Generally, a party moving for a summary judgment

must make a prima facie showing "that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." Rule 56(c)(3); see Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So. 2d 1036, 1038

(Ala. 1992).

In its brief on appeal, the HOA argues that the trial court erred in

entering a summary judgment in favor of Lee and Wilson because, it says,

Lee and Wilson failed to support their motion for a summary judgment

with evidence indicating that they were not the record titleholders of Lot

200. According to the HOA, although Lot 200 was sold for the

party"); Faith Props., LLC v. First Com. Bank, 988 So. 2d 485, 490 (Ala.
2008) (stating that "a trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion
to amend a complaint to add new claims or new parties after a final
judgment has been entered, unless that 'judgment is first set aside or
vacated' pursuant to the state's rules of civil procedure"). Thus, the
amended complaint does not impact the finality of the May 29, 2025,
summary judgment.
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nonpayment of ad valorem taxes on two occasions, neither tax-deed

holder had taken possession of the property nor had they timely sought

to quiet title to Lot 200, and, as a result, the title to Lot 200 had reverted

back to Lee and Wilson, the original record titleholders. The HOA

appears to be correct.

Our supreme court explained in Reese v. Robinson, 523 So. 2d 398,

400 (Ala. 1988), that Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-82,

"has been held to bar an action by the tax purchaser to recover
property sold for the payment of taxes, unless the tax
purchaser brought the action within three years from the date
he was entitled to demand a tax deed. Grayson v. Muckleroy,
220 Ala. 182, 124 So. 217 (1929). Also, if the
taxpayer/landowner has remained in possession of the
property for three years after the date when the tax purchaser
became entitled to demand a tax deed, this statute would vest
title in the taxpayer/landowner and protect him from any
action brought by the tax purchaser to recover the property.
Johnson v. Stephens, 240 Ala. 419, 199 So. 828 (1941); and
Sherrill v. Sandlin, 232 Ala. 389, 168 So. 426 (1936)."

(Emphasis added.)

Put another way, when the holder of a tax deed is not in possession

of the property and has failed to file an ejectment action during the three

years following the date that he or she was entitled to demand a tax deed,

title to the property reverts to the tax debtor. Rioprop Holdings, LLC. v.

Compass Bank, 256 So. 3d 674, 679 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). Furthermore,

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" 'where there is no real occupancy of the land, constructive possession

follows the title of the original owner and can only be cut off by adverse

possession of the tax purchaser.' " Id. at 679 (quoting Gulf Land Co. v.

Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 1987)). Nothing in the record

indicates that either Lee or Wilson have ever occupied Lot 200, and the

record suggests that neither Lee nor Wilson occupied Lot 200 at the time

the complaint was filed because, according to the complaint, Lee lived in

Bremen, which is located in Cullman County, and Wilson lived in

Tennessee.4

The record reflects that Lynn was issued a tax deed for Lot 200 on

May 11, 2015. The record contains no information indicating that Lynn

ever took possession of Lot 200. Thus, he had until May 11, 2018, to

commence an action to quiet title to Lot 200 before title reverted to Lee

and Wilson; the record contains no evidence indicating that he did so.

The record further reflects that Lynn failed to pay ad valorem taxes,

resulting in another tax sale of Lot 200 in 2017, this time to Brenda

Steele, who received her tax deed to Lot 200 on May 15, 2020. The record

4A court can take judicial notice that a city is located in a particular

county. Armstrong v. State ex rel. Embry, 249 Ala. 40, 43, 29 So. 2d 330,
332 (1947).
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contains no indication that Steele ever took possession of Lot 200 or ever

commenced an action seeking to quiet title to that property before May

15, 2023. If, in fact, she failed to do so, title to Lot 200 would again have

reverted to Lee and Wilson, the original record titleholders.

Based on the evidence contained in the record, Lee and Wilson

failed to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding

whether they remained the owners of Lot 200 such that they were

required to remit the 2024 assessment due to the HOA under the

amended declaration. The record contains no evidence indicating that

either Lynn or Steele ever took possession of Lot 200 or took any action

to recover possession of Lot 200 during the three years following the

issuance of their respective tax deeds, raising the question whether the

title to Lot 200 has been revested in Lee and Wilson by operation of § 40-

10-82. See Reese, 523 So. 2d at 400. The trial court therefore erred in

entering a summary judgment in favor of Lee and Wilson. Accordingly,

we reverse that summary judgment, and we remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

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