Jonathan Fitzgerald Lockett v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court:CC-21-347, CC-21-377, CC-21-378, CC-21-1004, CC-21-1005, CC-21-1006, CC-21-1331, CC-21-1332, CC-21-1466, CC-21-1467, and CC-21-1468).

Rel: August 22, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
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may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CR-2024-0103
_________________________

Jonathan Fitzgerald Lockett

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CC-21-347, CC-21-377, CC-21-378, CC-21-1004, CC-21-1005, CC-21-
1006, CC-21-1331, CC-21-1332, CC-21-1466, CC-21-1467, and CC-21-
1468)

ANDERSON, Judge.
CR-2024-0103

Jonathan Fitzgerald Lockett 1 appeals his convictions for first-

degree rape, first-degree sodomy, sexual torture, first-degree robbery,

and second-degree theft of property. On appeal, Lockett asserts 2

arguments: (1) that the Jefferson Circuit Court abused its discretion

when it consolidated 12 charges against him that were brought in

separate indictments and related to 5 different victims and (2) that the

circuit court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to show the

jury footage depicting his sodomizing an unidentified victim, for which

he was not charged. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we find no

merit to either claim.

However, even though Lockett does not challenge his two

convictions for first-degree robbery of C.P., for the reasons set forth below

we reverse and remand as to case number CC-21-347. Because Lockett's

convictions for first-degree robbery were based on different methods of

proving the same criminal act of robbery committed against the same

victim, those convictions violate double-jeopardy principles. In Ex parte

1The indictments returned against Lockett indicated multiple
aliases, including "Master Antonio Lockett," "Master Antonio Jay
Ramsey Lockett," "Jonathan Lockett," "John Lockett," and "Master
Lockett." (C. 104-07.)
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Rice, 766 So. 2d 143, 152 (Ala. 1999), the court found that it was not "an

acceptable option to merely vacate one … conviction[] and its

corresponding sentence" because such an action by the appellate court

"would have the effect, albeit unintended, of nullifying a part of the jury's

verdict." On remand, therefore, the circuit court must enter a new order,

one that adjudges the defendant guilty of the single offense first-degree

robbery as to C.P. and "sentences him for that single offense." Id. at 152-

53.

Facts and Procedural History
A Jefferson County grand jury indicted Lockett and charged him

with several sex and theft crimes committed against different victims:

• In case number CC-21-347, two counts of first-degree robbery
as to victim C.P.;

• In case number CC-21-377, one count of first-degree rape as
to victim C.P.;

• In case number CC-21-378, one count of first-degree sodomy
as to victim C.P.;

• In case number CC-21-1004, one count of sexual torture as to
victim S.K.;

• In case number CC-21-1005, one count of first-degree robbery
as to victim S.K.;

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• In case number CC-21-1006, one count of first-degree sodomy
as to victim S.K.;

• In case number CC-21-1331, one count of first-degree sodomy
as to victim L.S.;

• In case number CC-21-1332, one count of second-degree theft
as to victim L.S.;

• In case number CC-21-1466, one count of first-degree sodomy
as to victim J.W.;

• In case number CC-21-1467, one count of first-degree robbery
as to victim J.W.;2 and

• In case number CC-21-1468, one count of first-degree sodomy
as to victim K.R.

(C. 1177-88.) Before trial, the State moved to consolidate the charges

against Lockett, and the circuit court granted that motion over Lockett's

objection. (C. 1609-10; R. 21.)

The State's evidence showed that, in a nearly one-year period

spanning from late 2019 to late 2020, Lockett committed numerous

sexual assaults and thefts in areas close to his two Birmingham

residences. The first sexual assault and theft occurred in October 2019

and was committed against L.S., who worked as a prostitute in

2Lockett was also charged with first-degree rape against J.W. in

case number CC-21-1329, but the State voluntarily dismissed that charge
during its case-in-chief. (R. 543.)
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Birmingham. (R. 103-05.) L.S. posted online advertisements seeking

clients, and Lockett responded to one of them. (R. 105-06.) Lockett told

L.S. to meet him at an address on First Avenue South. (R. 111-12.) When

L.S. arrived, she realized the address was for a house near a church. (R.

112-13.) She carried a purse containing her cellular telephone and a

purple and black pistol. (R. 116.) Lockett eventually met L.S. at her car,

gave her some money, and led her to a laundry room located at the rear

of the house. (R. 113-16, 118-19.)

Although Lockett was initially friendly, when he and L.S. entered

the laundry room Lockett pushed her over, gripped her hair, and said,

"[b]itch, you know what we came here to do." (R. 118-19.) Lockett then

grabbed L.S.'s pistol, took the money he gave her, and forced her to

engage in nonconsensual vaginal sex and anal penetration with his

fingers.3 (R. 119-21.) According to L.S., she and Lockett discussed

engaging in oral and vaginal sex, but she never agreed to engage in anal

sex. (R. 129-30, 134.) The sexual contact was not consensual, and it did

3Additional evidence supported a finding that Lockett also
penetrated L.S. with his penis. Specifically, semen matching Lockett's
DNA was found in the rectal swab from L.S.'s sexual-assault exam, and
Lockett himself testified that he anally penetrated her with his penis. (R.
204-05, 314-15, 561.)
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not occur until after Lockett took L.S.'s pistol. (R. 134-35.) Lockett also

recorded the assault, and the footage depicted L.S. saying "oh, God,

please no." (R. 121-23.)

Lockett eventually stopped and left, but he took the pistol with him.

(R. 121.) L.S. left the scene of the attack and drove to a nearby pawn shop

and called emergency 911. (R. 123.) She then went to a local crisis center

where a sexual-assault examination was performed. (R. 126.) L.S.

reported significant pain in her back and anal area. (R. 174.) The nurse

conducting the examination observed no vaginal injuries, but she

identified an abrasion inside L.S.'s anus. (R. 179-80.) A forensic biologist

with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences (the "ADFS")

confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal, genital, and anal swabs

taken during L.S.'s exam. (R. 204-05.) A later comparison of the semen to

Lockett's DNA sample indicated it was Lockett's semen. (R. 314-15.)

The next victim, C.P., worked as a prostitute in Birmingham in

December 2019. (R. 211-14.) Lockett responded to her online

advertisement, and the two exchanged text messages over multiple days.

(R. 215-16, 220.) They eventually agreed on a price, and Lockett told C.P.

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to meet him at a different address on First Avenue South.4 (R. 222.) The

address was for a house; when C.P. arrived, she parked in an alley behind

the house, and Lockett led her into the garage. (R. 224-25.)

Lockett then paid her $100, and they started engaging in

consensual oral and vaginal sex. (R. 226-29.) At some point, they

negotiated a price for anal sex, but C.P. stopped the encounter when

Lockett exceeded his time and refused to pay additional money. (R. 229-

32.) As she attempted to leave, Lockett retrieved a pistol and told C.P.

"[y]ou're going to finish or I'll kill you." (R. 232.) Lockett then pointed the

pistol at C.P.'s head and forced her to engage in oral, vaginal, and anal

sex. (R. 232-34.) He eventually stopped, but as C.P. got dressed, Lockett

demanded she return the money he paid her. (R. 234-35.) C.P. refused,

and Lockett said he would "fucking kill [her]" before pistol whipping C.P.

in the face and rendering her unconscious. (R. 235-36.) When she came

to, her purse and cellular telephone were gone. (R. 236.) C.P.'s roommate

eventually took her to hospital for her injuries -- she was in "excruciating

pain .… [Her] tooth [wa]s busted. [Her] lip [wa]s messed up. [Her] nose

4The attacks and thefts against L.S. and C.P. both occurred within

the distance of one to two houses from Lockett's house on First Avenue
South. (R. 526-27; State's Ex. 173.)
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[wa]s broken and [her] eye was crushed." (R. 238-39, 241.) C.P. suffered

a permanently dilated pupil, complete blindness, and her eye "was

detached from the optic nerve and bleeding into [her] brain." (R. 242-43.)

About one week later, C.P. met Lockett again. C.P. was unaware

that she was meeting Lockett on this occasion, however, because he

concealed his identity. (R. 246.) When she arrived at the agreed-upon

location, Lockett again held her at gunpoint and forced her to engage in

sexual intercourse. (R. 246.)

In April 2020, J.W. used a friend's online advertisement to solicit

prostitution clients. (R. 257-59.) Lockett responded to the advertisement,

and the two scheduled a meeting at an apartment complex in the

Eastlake area of Birmingham. (R. 259-62.) When J.W. arrived, Lockett

entered her car and directed her to a nearby alley that adjoined an

abandoned house. (R. 261-63.) After J.W. parked, the two moved into the

back seat and engaged in consensual sex. (R. 263-64.) At some point,

however, Lockett retrieved a purple pistol, put it to J.W.'s head, and

forced her to engage in anal sex. (R. 264.) He photographed the encounter

using his cellular telephone. (R. 266.)

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When Lockett finished, he took J.W.'s keys and I.D. and walked

away from the car. (R. 266.) But when he heard police sirens, he threw

J.W.'s keys and I.D.; she only recovered her keys. (R. 266-67.) J.W. then

called emergency 911 and went to a local crisis center for a sexual-assault

examination. (R. 268, 291.) From the evidence collected during that

examination, the ADFS was able to generate a genetic profile from male

DNA present on J.W.'s rectal swab, and subsequent comparisons

revealed that the DNA matched Lockett's genetic profile. (R. 310-13.)

In July 2020, S.K. lived out of her car in Birmingham. (R. 318-20.)

One day, while S.K. was outside a gas station seeking a ride to an auto-

parts store, Lockett pulled up and offered her a ride. (R. 320-24.) He told

S.K. that he was an Uber driver and that she could ride in the back seat.

(R. 324.) After S.K. entered the car, Lockett told her that "his wife . . .

gives him money to get women to have anal sex." (R. 325.) Then, instead

of driving to the auto-parts store, Lockett drove them to a grass field. (R.

326.) S.K. tried to escape but could not because Lockett had activated the

child-safety locks. (R. 326.) Lockett parked his car, relocated himself to

the back seat, forced S.K. down, and anally sodomized her. (R. 327-28.)

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He eventually stopped, got back in the driver's seat, and drove to an alley

in Birmingham's Ensley neighborhood. (R. 330.)

Lockett then parked behind a house, exited the car, and removed

S.K. from the back seat. (R. 330.) Lockett took S.K.'s purse -- which

contained her keys, wallet, and I.D. -- and put them in the trunk of the

car. (R. 330-31, 333.) When S.K. resisted, Lockett retrieved a purple pistol

from the driver's side door and inserted the barrel into her anus. (R. 331-

32.) After pointing the pistol at S.K.'s head, Lockett ultimately reentered

his car and drove away. (R. 334.) S.K. walked to a nearby gas station and

called emergency 911. (R. 334-35.) She went to a local crisis center, but

she did not submit to a sexual-assault examination. Instead, S.K. asked

to be returned to her car because she thought Lockett might attempt to

steal her car. (R. 335.)

Finally, in November 2020, K.R. decided "to go on dates with guys

for money" because she was homeless and unemployed. (R. 352-53.) She

posted an online advertisement, and Lockett responded. (R. 355-56.)

They agreed to engage in vaginal sex, and Lockett picked her up where

she was staying in west Birmingham. (R. 358.) When he arrived, Lockett

told K.R. that he was an Uber driver and instructed her to get into the

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back seat of his car. (R. 359.) Lockett told K.R. they were going to his

friend's house, but he drove to an alley behind a house. (R. 360-61.)

Lockett said they could not go inside the house, so K.R. undressed behind

the car before Lockett led to her to steps running from the alley down to

the house. (R. 361-62.)

Despite agreeing to vaginal sex, Lockett inserted his penis into

K.R.'s anus, conduct to which she did not consent. (R. 357, 363, 377.) K.R.

protested, telling Lockett to "[s]top" and stating "no, it hurts." (R. 363.)

Lockett, however, continued, telling K.R. that "[i]t will just take a few

minutes." (Id.) Lockett eventually stopped, the pair reentered the car,

and Lockett drove K.R. to a nearby car wash. (R. 364-68.)

Although Lockett agreed to drive K.R. home, he left the car wash

and drove toward the location of the assault. (R. 368-69.) He eventually

pulled into the McCoy Center parking lot. (R. 370.) Lockett exited the car,

went to the back door, and dragged K.R. out of the back seat. (R. 370-71.)

K.R. screamed, and Lockett choked her while pulling her across the

parking lot. (R. 371.) People working in the McCoy Center ran to the

parking lot and told Lockett they were calling the police. (R. 372, 403.)

Lockett responded by running to the car and opening the trunk, but K.R.

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slammed the trunk down and got Lockett's tag number. (R. 372-73.)

Lockett then tried to wrestle K.R.'s phone away, so she threw it over a

nearby fence. (R. 373-74.) Lockett jumped over the fence, retrieved the

phone, and then got into his car and fled the scene. (R. 374.)

K.R. went to a local crisis center, where a sexual-assault

examination was performed. (R. 375.) K.R. reported significant pain in

her rectal area and told the examining nurse that Lockett had strangled

her. (R. 436-38.) According to the nurse, K.R.'s injuries were consistent

with being strangled. (R. 439.)

Police officers eventually arrested Lockett in November 2020. (R.

452.) Thereafter, law-enforcement officers executed a search warrant at

Lockett's house on First Avenue South. (R. 455.) There, officers

discovered a box containing cellular telephones, and a total of 36 phones

were seized at the house. (R. 458-59.) Lockett's girlfriend, with whom he

shared the residence, later provided law enforcement with an additional

10 cellular telephones. (R. 504.) Amongst the seized items were C.P.'s

Social Security card as well as C.P.'s and S.K.'s cellular telephones. (R.

509-11.)

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Lockett's cellular telephone contained images and videos depicting

him engaging in sexual acts with different women. Officers were also able

to determine that Lockett's phone was present at or near the locations of

five of the sexual assaults when they occurred. (R. 519-33.) Officers also

determined that the sexual assaults occurred near two houses associated

with Lockett – one on Seventh Street West and one on First Avenue

South. (R. 519-33.) They also discovered three videos -- one depicting L.S.,

one depicting C.P., and one depicting an unknown victim, a purple gun,

and Lockett's driver's license. (R. 35-36, 536.)

According to Lockett, all the sexual encounters in question were

either consensual or never occurred. (R. 560-64, 571-76, 589-91, 597, 606-

07.)

The jury convicted Lockett of each count in the consolidated

indictments. (R. 750-53.) The circuit court sentenced Lockett as follows:

• In case numbers CC-21-347, CC-21-1005, and CC-21-1467, to 30
years' imprisonment, with each sentence ordered to run
consecutively except for the sentences for the two robbery
convictions in CC-21-347, which the circuit court ordered to run
concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other
sentences;

• In case numbers CC-21-377, CC-21-378, CC-21-1004, CC-21-1006,
CC-21-1331, CC-21-1466, and CC-21-1468, to 99 years'
imprisonment with each sentence ordered to run consecutively; and

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• In case number CC-21-1332, to 2 years' imprisonment, with the
sentence ordered to run consecutively with Lockett's other
sentences.

(C. 68, 174, 792.) Thereafter, Lockett moved the circuit court for a new

trial, arguing that it had abused its discretion when it consolidated the

charges against him and when it allowed video footage of him sodomizing

an unidentified victim to be shown to the jury for impeachment purposes.

(C. 1676-77.) The circuit court denied his motion (C. 1683), and this

appeal followed.

Standards of Review
A trial court " 'is vested with substantial discretion in deciding

whether to consolidate cases, and its decision as to consolidation will be

reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion.' " Bester v. State, 381

So. 3d 1155, 1164 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Hinkle v. State, 86 So.

3d 441, 446 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011)).

Moreover, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is a matter

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's

determination on such an issue "will not be reversed except upon a clear

showing of abuse of discretion." Brownlee v. State, 197 So. 3d 1024, 1035

(Ala. Crim. App. 2015). This is likewise true regarding the admission of

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impeachment and rebuttal evidence. See Brand v. State, 941 So. 2d 318,

324 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to

the trial court's decision to admit certain evidence for impeachment

purposes); Tillis v. State, 469 So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)

(quoting Norris v. State, 429 So. 2d 649, 650 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982))

(" 'The admission of rebuttal evidence is within the discretion of the trial

judge.' ").

Discussion
Lockett argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by

consolidating the charges against him and that the circuit court abused

its discretion by admitting into evidence video footage depicting him

sodomizing an unidentified female victim. As explained more fully below,

there is no merit to either claim. Lockett's challenge to the consolidation

of the separate indictments fails because the consolidated charges were

of a similar character, evidence of the individual crimes would have been

admissible in each case if they were tried separately, and the evidence

could be easily separated by the jury under the circuit court's clear legal

instructions. Lockett's argument that the circuit court abused its

discretion by admitting into evidence the video depicting him in the act

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of sodomizing an unidentified victim fails because that video rebutted

Lockett's testimony that he had recorded the sexual encounters

underlying the charged offenses for the purpose of proving that they were

consensual. Moreover, the video footage contradicted his testimony that

he would end a sexual encounter if the woman indicated she was in pain

or wished to stop.

Lockett's two convictions for the first-degree robbery of C.P.,

however, violate double-jeopardy principles. Accordingly, for the reasons

set forth below, we must reverse Lockett's two convictions for first-degree

robbery in case number CC-21-347 and remand that matter to the circuit

court. On remand, the circuit court must enter a new order, one that

adjudges the defendant guilty of the single offense of first-degree robbery

as to C.P. and "sentences him for that single offense." Ex parte Rice, 766

So. 2d at 152-53.

I.

In support of his first assertion of error, Lockett argues that

consolidation of multiple indictments involving offenses committed

against five different victims for a single trial was erroneous because the

standards set forth in Rule 13.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., were not satisfied.

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(Lockett's brief at 27.) Specifically, he claims that (1) the offenses

underlying the indictments were not of the same or similar character, (2)

did not involve the same conduct and were not connected in their

commission, and (3) were not part of a common scheme or plan because

neither identity nor consent were at issue at trial. (Lockett's brief at 28-

47.) We disagree.

Before trial, the State moved to consolidate the indictments,

arguing that each of the charges against Lockett were of the same or

similar character, were based on the same conduct, were connected in

their commission, and were part of a common scheme or plan for six

reasons: (1) each of the victims had their cellular telephone stolen during

the commission of the crime, (2) each of the victims was anally sodomized,

(3) each of the victims met Lockett over an internet platform, (4) four of

the five victims were sexually assaulted in locations within blocks of each

other, (5) four of the five victims alleged that Lockett used a gun during

the assault, and three of the four identified the gun as being purple, and

(6) three of the five victims had sexual-assault examinations. (C. 1609-

10.) In his written response to the State's motion, Lockett argued that (1)

the charged crimes were not of the same or similar character because the

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separate charges would not have been admissible under Rule 404(b), Ala.

R. Evid., to show intent, motive, or identity if each victim's cases were

tried separately, (2) the charged crimes were not connected in their

commission, and (3) the charged crimes were not part of a common plan

or scheme because neither identity nor consent were an issue during

trial. (C. 1612-22.)

At the hearing on the State's motion, the circuit court observed that

"the use of a purple gun is something that is so particular. It's not just

the use of any gun, but a purple gun." (R. 18.) The circuit court further

observed that "[t]he fact that each victim here was anally sodomized by

the defendant is definitely something that makes this different." (Id.)

Additionally, the court noted "that all of their cell phones were taken"

and concluded that all of these similarities showed "a common scheme or

plan or how the defendant is alleged to have gone about committing the

crimes." (Id.) During that hearing, Lockett reiterated the arguments

presented in his written response to the State's motion to consolidate.5

5We note that in Bester v. State, 381 So. 3d 1155, 1164 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2022), this Court recognized that it "has reviewed a ruling on a
motion to consolidate when a defendant had made either a specific
objection to the motion or moved that the cases be severed pursuant to
Rule 13.4, Ala. R. Crim. P." Here, Lockett raised specific arguments
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(R. 12-14, 15-16, 19-20.) Ultimately, the circuit court granted the State's

motion and ordered that the separate indictments be consolidated for a

single trial. (R. 21.)

Rule 13.3(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., sets out the standard for

consolidation of charges that are brought in separate charging

instruments:

"If offenses … are charged in separate indictments,
informations, or complaints, the court on its own initiative or
on motion of either party may order that the charges be tried
together … if the offenses … could have been joined in a single
indictment, information, or complaint. However, the court
shall not order that the offenses … be tried together without
first providing the defendant … and the prosecutor an
opportunity to be heard."

Under Rule 13.3(a), Ala. R. Crim. P.,

"[t]wo or more offenses may be joined in an indictment,
information, or complaint, if they:

"(1) Are of the same or similar character; or

"(2) Are based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected
in their commission; or

"(3) Are alleged to have been part of a common scheme or
plan."

opposing the State's motion to consolidate in both his written response
and during the hearing regarding consolidation. Thus, the issue whether
the circuit court abused its discretion by consolidating the cases was
preserved and is properly before this Court on appeal.
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Under these rules, consolidation of charges " 'is appropriate where the

crimes are of similar character, meaning nearly corresponding,

resembling in many respects, or having a general likeness.' " Bester v.

State, 381 So. 3d 1155, 1164 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Ex parte

Hinton, 548 So. 2d 562, 566 (Ala. 1989)). " '[T]he most important

consideration in determining whether crimes are similar is whether one

offense would have been admissible in the trial of the other.' " Id. (citation

omitted). Notably, this Court "has [previously] upheld the consolidation

of cases involving rape and sexual abuse." Id. at 1165.

In these cases, the circuit court was within its discretion when it

consolidated the separate indictments for a single trial for three reasons.

First, the offenses committed against each the five victims were of the

same or similar character. At the outset, we note that because the

indictments in case numbers CC-21-347, CC-21-377, and CC-21-378 were

all based on the same conduct directed against C.P., or were otherwise

connected in their commission, consolidation of those indictments for a

single trial would have been permissible under Rule 13.3(a)(2), Ala. R.

Crim. P. Similarly, consolidation of case numbers CC-21-1004, CC-21-

1005, and CC-21-1006 for a single trial would have been permissible as

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to victim S.K.; and the same would be true as to case numbers CC-21-

1331 and CC-21-1332, charging Lockett with offenses against L.S., and

case numbers CC-21-1466 and CC-21-1467, charging Lockett with

offenses against J.W. Because those separate indictments would have

been properly consolidated under Rule 13.3(a)(2) as involving the same

conduct committed against a single victim, the relevant question before

this Court is whether the crimes committed against C.P., S.K., L.S., J.W.,

and K.P. were sufficiently similar in character to permit consolidation of

each victim's cases with the others.

In Bester, the defendant was charged with first-degree rape and

first-degree kidnapping of two separate victims, and he was charged with

first-degree sodomy of one of those victims. Aside from the fact that both

cases did not involve an act of sodomy, the facts of the separate offenses

were similar -- the defendant lured the victims into his car by offering to

drive each of them somewhere. Id. at 1159-60. Once his victims were in

his vehicle, the defendant took them to his home, held them against their

will, threatened them, physically abused them, and forced them to

engage in various nonconsensual sex acts. Id. Both victims eventually

escaped. On appeal, this Court held that consolidation of the charges

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involving both victims was proper because, as was the case in Wright v.

State, 516 So. 2d 941, 943 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), " '[t]he two offenses

were of the same or similar character and appeared to be part of a

common scheme, design, or plan. [And t]he judge suggested at trial that

evidence of each offense would have been admissible at the trial of the

other, had separate trials been held.' " Id. at 1165 (quoting Wright, 516

So. 2d at 943).

Just as in Bester, the crimes committed against Lockett's five

victims were sufficiently similar to warrant consolidation. In each

instance, Lockett engaged with his victims either through online

prostitution advertisements or by posing as an Uber driver. Once he

contacted the victims, Lockett drove them to -- or arranged for them to

meet him at -- an isolated area near one of his two houses. (R. 105-06,

111-12, 215-16, 220-22, 257-63, 320-26, 355-62, 519-33.) Once there,

Lockett forced his victims to engage in nonconsensual sexual acts, and,

each time, he anally penetrated the victims. (R. 119-21, 134-35, 232-34,

264, 327-28, 331-32, 357, 363, 377.) Lockett also used force, or threatened

to use force, at some point during each assault and theft (R. 118-21, 232-

36, 264, 327-28, 331-32, 370-71), and portions of each attack occurred

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either in the outer portions, or behind, houses near Lockett's two homes

(R. 118-19, 224-25, 261-63, 330, 360-62, 519-33). Finally, Lockett took

personal items from each victim. (R. 119-21, 236, 266, 330-33, 373-74.)

To be sure, there were nuanced differences in each of the sexual assaults

and thefts, but Lockett's crimes were nonetheless sufficiently similar to

warrant consolidation. Hinkle, 86 So. 3d at 449 (quoting United States v.

Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2002)) ("Similar does not mean

identical, and we assess similarity in terms of how the government saw

its case at the time of indictment.").

Second, evidence of the offenses charged in each of the consolidated

indictments would have been admissible in the other cases if they had

been tried separately. From Lockett's obsession with anal sex -- including

his unsolicited statement to S.K. that "his wife … gives him money to get

women to have anal sex" (R. 325) -- to his use of a purple pistol consistent

with the firearm stolen from L.S. in October 2019, the circuit court

properly considered a number of factors that supported a finding that the

evidence of Lockett's conduct toward each victim would have been

admissible in separate trials.

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In Jones v. State, 580 So. 2d 97, 97-98 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), this

Court found no error in the trial court's admission of evidence of a

collateral rape to rebut a consent defense during a trial for sexual abuse

and first-degree rape. In doing so, this Court clarified the rule regarding

the admissibility of collateral rapes:

"The case of Fisher v. State, 57 Ala. App. 310, 328 So. 2d 311
… ([Ala. Crim. App.] 1976), is cited in the A.L.R. annotation
as support for the general rule that 'while [evidence that the
defendant raped or attempted to rape another woman] is
inadmissible where the only issue involved in the case is
whether the act of intercourse was voluntary, such evidence
is admissible for the purpose of showing lack of consent or the
use of force if it also falls within one of the other exceptions to
the general rule of inadmissibility. ' "

Id. at 99 (quoting Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Admissibility, in Rape

Case, of Evidence that Accused Raped or Attempted to Rape Person

Other than Prosecutrix, 2 A.L.R. 4th 330, 374 (1980)). But we further

distilled the rule, explaining that "Fisher should not be construed as

supporting the proposition that evidence of an unrelated collateral

forcible rape of one other that the prosecutrix is admissible solely to rebut

a defense of consent." Id. at 100. Instead, evidence of a collateral rape is

" 'admissible for the purpose of showing lack of consent or the use of force

[because] it also falls within one of the other exceptions to the general

24
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rule of inadmissibility,' " such as when the " 'evidence also establishes a

common scheme or plan on the part of the accused.' " Id. at 101 (citation

omitted).

With those principles in mind, this Court held that the trial court

had acted within its discretion when it admitted evidence of the

defendant's collateral rape. Id. We reasoned that, "despite the differing

facts of each particular offense," the "connection between the offense[s]

… [was] sufficient to justify the admission of [the collateral victim's]

testimony." Id. at 101-02. In committing both offenses, the defendant

"employed the guise of going to his sister's home in order to lure a 'friend'

to an isolated and wooded area of the county." Id. at 102-03. Moreover,

the defendant used "either force or the threat of force upon both victims,"

and, "[a]fter having sexual intercourse, … attempted to make each victim

perform fellatio." Id. at 103. Given those similarities, this Court

concluded that the defendant "wanted sexual favors … [and] went about

obtaining those favors in a particular manner and pursuant to a specific

plan." Id.

Under Jones, the evidence of Lockett's attacks on the victims would

have been admissible in each case had they been tried separately.

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Initially, despite his contention that consent was not at issue (Lockett's

brief at 40), Lockett asserted a consent defense during trial. During his

testimony, he explicitly testified that his sexual encounters with L.S.,

C.P., and J.W. were consensual. (R. 558-59, 561-64, 572-76, 589-90.) And

although he denied having any sexual contact with S.K. and K.R. (R. 597,

606-08), his counsel's cross-examination of those two victims questioned

their testimony that their sexual contact with Lockett had been

nonconsensual and insinuated that both women had engaged in

consensual sex acts with Lockett in exchange for money.6 (R. 336-39,

377.) Thus, if the cases had been tried separately, evidence of the

collateral attacks and thefts against the other victims would have been

admissible to rebut Lockett's consent defense if they fell into one of the

other exceptions to Rule 404(b)'s general exclusionary rule. In Lockett's

case, the various attacks and thefts showed a common scheme or plan.

Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant's other crimes "is

admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case,

warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime

6Lockett's
counsel also took a similar approach when cross-
examining L.S. and J.W. (R. 129-30, 274-75.)
26
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… were committed … pursuant to a single plan, design, pattern, scheme

or system." 1 Charles W. Gamble, et al., McElroy's Alabama Evidence §

69.01(6) (7th ed. 2020). "This rule is applicable whether such plan,

design, pattern, scheme, or system is narrow and specific in scope or is

measurably broad and general in scope." Id. But the charged crime and

the collateral crime must have some logical connection. Jones, 580 So. 2d

at 101. In other words, "the crime charged and the collateral crime must

have ' "such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are

naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are

the individual manifestations." ' " Id. (quoting Allen v. State, 478 So. 2d

326, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), quoting in turn Mayberry v. State, 419

So. 2d 262, 268 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)).

Here, as in Jones, each of the sexual assaults Lockett committed

against the five victims shared a sufficient logical connection to establish

a common plan or scheme. Lockett lured his victims into an isolated area

before sexually assaulting them, at least a portion of each attack took

place in or behind houses close to his two houses, and he used either force

or the threat of force at some point during each encounter. Lockett anally

penetrated each victim and took at least one item of their personal

27
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property. Lockett's use of a purple handgun, likely the same handgun

taken from L.S., during the sexual assaults of J.W. and S.K., further

connected the offenses. In sum, the evidence suggested that Lockett

"wanted sexual favors … [and] went about obtaining those favors in a

particular manner and pursuant to a specific plan." Jones, 580 So. 2d at

103. Then, when he was finished with each victim, Lockett would take

some personal item from the victim.

Finally, nothing in the record suggests that Lockett suffered undue

prejudice from the consolidation of the separate indictments. The way the

State presented its case-in-chief was not convoluted. Evidence of

Lockett's conduct with each victim was presented in a straightforward

manner that overlapped very little with evidence related to the other

victims, except, for example, the evidence relating to the purple handgun.

Tariq-Madyun v. State, 59 So. 3d 744, 749 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

(quoting Summerlin v. State, 594 So. 2d 235, 236-37 (Ala. Crim. App.

1991)) ("No prejudice results where, as here, the jury could easily

separate the evidence of the separate crimes.").

Instead, the record shows that the circuit court took steps to

mitigate any potential prejudice to Lockett. Specifically, the circuit court

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twice read each indictment to the jury. (R. 693-702.) Not only that, but

the circuit court grouped the indictments together by victim (R. 694), and

the verdict forms provided by the court listed the victim to whom the

charges applied (C. 46, 152, 258, 363, 466, 569, 670, 770, 872, 974, 1081;

R. 702). Finally, the court instructed the jury that it was to consider each

case individually:

"Now we covered this a little bit in jury selection, but I will
say to you that you are to look at each case individually. You
are not to say because you have either convicted or acquitted
the defendant on one case that, that goes for all charges. You
are to take each and every case individually and make an
individual determination as to the guilt or the innocence of
the defendant for each charge."

(R. 704-05.) Given the circuit court's careful instructions, as well as its

efforts to keep the discrete cases and verdict forms separated by victim,

any risk of undue prejudice toward Lockett was avoided. King v. State,

518 So. 2d 880, 887 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) ("By the nature of the

evidence, i.e., simple and distinct, the separate verdict forms, and the

trial court's instructions, we consider that it was easy for the jury to keep

the evidence separate in their deliberations and, thus, that the danger of

the jury's cumulating the evidence was substantially reduced."); Tariq-

Madyun, 59 So. 3d at 750 (quoting Melendez, 301 F.3d at 36, quoting in

29
CR-2024-0103

turn United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 308 (1st Cir. 1991)) (noting

that the trial court's instructing the jury regarding its duty to consider

each case separately and to determine whether the State met its burden

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt " ' "minimized any possible prejudice"

from the joinder' of the separate counts"); see also Harrison v. State, 398

So. 3d 955, 974 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023) (recognizing that "we presume the

jury followed the court's instructions").

The indictments consolidated for a single trial were related to

Lockett's commission of similar offenses against five separate victims.

Lockett's crimes were indicative of his employment of a common scheme

or plan, and involved a unique purple handgun taken from L.S., and the

simplicity of the evidence presented at trial, along with the steps taken

by the circuit court, prevented any undue prejudice. Accordingly, the

circuit court acted within its discretion when it consolidated the separate

indictments, and Lockett is entitled to no relief as to this claim.

II.
Lockett next argues that a video introduced by the State during its

rebuttal case, used to rebut his testimony, should have been excluded

30
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under Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid, because its prejudicial effect substantially

outweighed its probative value. (Lockett's brief at 47-51.)

Before trial, the State notified Lockett and the circuit court of its

intent to offer video footage depicting Lockett sodomizing an unidentified

victim to establish his identity. (C. 1635-42.) The State alleged -- both in

its notice and at the motions hearing -- that the footage depicted Lockett

"anally penetrating" a woman in the back of a vehicle while the woman

continually whimpered, cried, told Lockett he was hurting her, and

repeatedly stated that she wished to stop. (C. 1635; R. 35-36.) It also

noted that the footage showed Lockett's driver's license and a purple and

black pistol lying in the car. (C. 1635-36; R. 35-36.) Lockett contended

that the video was unduly prejudicial and that there were less prejudicial

means to establish his identity. (R. 44-45, 48.) The circuit court, however,

concluded that the video was admissible under the common-plan-or-

scheme exception to establish Lockett's identity. (R. 49.)

During its case-in-chief, however, the State indicated that it would

show only a portion of the video depicting the purple and black pistol and

Lockett's driver's license and that it did not wish to admit the portion

depicting Lockett sodomizing the unidentified victim. (R. 496-98.) Later,

31
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when the video was played during the State's case-in-chief, only the

portion of the video depicting the pistol and Lockett's driver's license was

shown to the jury. (R. 539-40.)

During the defense's case-in-chief, however, Lockett testified that

he had recorded his sexual encounter with C.P. because he typically

recorded his sexual encounters to document that they were consensual:

"I recorded it for my own purposes just in case situations like
I'm going through now, as proof that I ain't do nothing out of
line. That anything that I did, it was agreed upon and
consensual. I knew I was giving them counterfeit money, but
they didn't. But I knew it was counterfeit. I knew that if
anything came back, that I would have proof to show this is
what went on. This is how it happened. It didn't go how they
said it went. I didn't force nobody to do anything. I didn't harm
no one. I had no weapons. Bearing no weapons or anything.
So that was the purpose of me recording it."

(R. 575-76.) On cross-examination, the State questioned Lockett

regarding whether he would stop a sexual encounter if a woman

protested in a manner like what was depicted on the video of the

unknown victim. (R. 641-42.) Outside the presence of the jury, Lockett's

counsel objected on the ground that the State was asking questions

related to the portion of the video that had not been admitted into

evidence. (R. 642-43.) The State clarified that it was asking this line of

questions for impeachment purposes because, "on direct examination

32
CR-2024-0103

when [Lockett's counsel] was questioning Mr. Lockett, he asked him if he

recorded these encounters. Mr. Lockett said he did … so that he could

protect himself from situations that he has found himself in currently."

(R. 643.) It continued, "[t]he State is simply asking this line of

questioning for impeachment purposes, because he's stating that the

videos on his phone depict consensual sex." (R. 643.) The circuit court

agreed with the State and allowed the line of questioning. (R. 643.)

Lockett again confirmed that he would stop if a woman protested and

that he recorded his sexual encounters for his own protection. (R. 645-

49.)

After the defense rested its case, the State informed the circuit

court that it planned to show the omitted portion of the video as rebuttal

evidence:

"[T]he State would like to put it to the Court's attention that
the State is planning to call Investigator Short in rebuttal
based on the testimony that this defendant gave on direct
examination where he stated that he records any encounters
with women. That he does that so that he wouldn't find
himself in the position that he is currently in. He stated that
I record as proof that I didn't do nothing out of line, and I
didn’t force anybody to do anything. I later asked him if he
records these encounters to prove that these are consensual
encounters to which the defendant said yes. Along with asking
the defendant, 'When a woman says no during intercourse,

33
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does he stop?' To which he confirmed and agreed on all of
those lines of questioning."

(R. 673-74.) Lockett's counsel objected, arguing, among other things, that

the video was "highly prejudicial, and the prejudicial nature far

outweighs any probative value, in that it has no probative value …

regarding an element of the charge brought by any of the [five] women."

(R. 674-75.) The State then clarified that it was "not offering [the video]

into evidence. Rather, the State is offering this … for impeachment

purposes consistent to defendant's statement that he records these

encounters to protect himself and to show that these encounters are

consensual." (R. 675.) The circuit court concluded that it would allow the

video to be shown for impeachment purposes but that it would not be

admitted into evidence because of its "graphic nature." (R. 675.) Again,

the State confirmed it was not offering the video as substantive evidence,

and the circuit court agreed to give a limiting instruction. (R. 677-78,

711.) The portion of the video depicting Lockett sodomizing the

unidentified victim was subsequently played for the jury. (R. 683.)

Under these specific circumstances, the circuit court acted within

its discretion when it allowed the State to show the footage of Lockett

34
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sodomizing the unidentified victim to rebut his testimony. This is the

case for two reasons.

First, the footage tended to show a self-contradiction in Lockett's

testimony. Self-contradiction occurs when "proof is offered that the

witness him or herself did or said something inconsistent with their own

present testimony." 2 Charles W. Gamble, et al., McElroy's Alabama

Evidence § 155.01 (7th ed. 2020). Put differently, "self-contradiction

occurs when a witness is impeached by a showing that the witness made

prior statements or performed prior acts that are inconsistent with the

witness'[s] present testimony." Id. Particularly, "[a]n act of a witness

which is inconsistent with the witness'[s] present testimony about a

material matter is self-contradiction," and it may be proven for

impeachment purposes by either asking the witness about the

inconsistent act or proving it through extrinsic evidence. Id. at §

155.02(3).

The video footage contradicted Lockett's testimony in two key

respects. Initially, the footage contradicted Lockett's repeated

statements that he would stop a sexual encounter if the woman indicated

that she was in pain or wished to stop. Contrary to his testimony at trial,

35
CR-2024-0103

Lockett did not cease anally penetrating the unknown victim despite her

constant whimpering and repeated pleas that Lockett stop. (C. 1635; R.

35-36.)

Moreover, the footage contradicted Lockett's testimony that he

recorded his sexual encounters only to prove that they were consensual.

Because the unknown victim's actions in the video suggest the encounter

was nonconsensual, and because nothing in the record suggests that

Lockett unintentionally recorded his encounter with the unknown victim,

the jury could conclude that Lockett did not record the encounter to show

that it was consensual. Instead, it could conclude that he made the

recording to memorialize his sodomizing the unknown victim, thus

contradicting his testimony. Tillis, 469 So. 2d at 1371 (quoting Sprinkle

v. State, 368 So. 2d 554 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), quoting in turn Norris,

429 So. 2d at 650) (" 'The State may, in the discretion of the trial court,

introduce in rebuttal any competent evidence which explains or is a direct

reply to or a contradiction of material evidence by the defendant.' ").

Second, the prejudicial effect of the video did not substantially

outweigh its probative value. Under Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid., relevant

evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially

36
CR-2024-0103

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." But the question "is not

simply whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by the admission of [the]

video; indeed, 'all evidence against a defendant … [is] prejudicial. ' "

Harrison, 398 So. 3d at 970 (quoting Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 812

(Ala. Crim. App. 2010)). Instead, "the question is whether there was a

danger that unfair prejudice could result from the admission of the video

and whether that danger was substantially outweighed by the video's

probative value." Id. (emphasis omitted). Prejudice is unfair if it "has 'an

undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis. ' " Id. at 971

(quoting Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92, 96 (Ala. 1999)). Finally, " '[a]ll

impeachment evidence is prejudicial to some extent. It is only when the

probative value of the impeachment evidence is substantially outweighed

by its prejudicial impact that it should be excluded. ' " Brand, 941 So. 2d

at 324 (quoting Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d

505, 516 (Ala. 2000)) (emphasis omitted). Except in rare and extreme

circumstances, " ' "a party who has brought out evidence on a certain

subject has no valid complaint as to the trial court's action in allowing

his opponent or adversary to introduce evidence on the same subject." ' "

Peterson v. State, 388 So. 3d 716, 723 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting

37
CR-2024-0103

Minor v. State, 914 So. 2d 372, 397 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), quoting in

turn Ex parte D.L.H., 806 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Ala. 2001)).

Lockett, through his own testimony, injected into the trial evidence

related to his reasons for recording his sexual encounters and whether

he would stop a sexual encounter if the woman indicated that she wished

to stop. The video footage of the unidentified victim not only bore directly

on those matters, but it explicitly contradicted his testimony related to

those matters. Given that Lockett's actions in the footage so clearly

contradicted his testimony, the footage was substantially probative for

impeachment purposes. Moreover, any risk of unfair prejudice was

properly mitigated by both the State and the circuit court. Specifically,

the State made clear that it was offering the video only for impeachment

purposes, not as substantive evidence. (R. 675, 677-78.) And the circuit

court chose not to allow the footage into evidence so as to permit the jury

to view it during deliberations. (R. 675.) Indeed, the circuit court

instructed the jury that it could consider the video footage only for

impeachment purposes. (R. 711.) For these reasons, the circuit court did

not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to present the video

footage to rebut Lockett's testimony.

38
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III.
Finally, although neither party raises the issue, we must address

the fact that Lockett's two convictions for first-degree robbery of C.P.

violate his double-jeopardy rights, a claim implicating the circuit court's

jurisdiction. See Heard v. State, 999 So. 2d 992, 1006-07 (Ala. 2007). In

case number CC-21-347, Lockett was charged with two counts of first-

degree robbery as to victim C.P. (C. 104.) The first count charged Lockett

with the robbery of C.P. while Lockett was armed with a pistol "in the

course of committing or attempting to commit a theft of one iPhone and/or

one Social Security card and/or one insurance card and/or one credit card

and/or an undetermined amount of the lawful currency of the United

States of America." (Id.) The second count charged Lockett with the

robbery of C.P., wherein Lockett caused serious physical injury to C.P.

"in the course of committing a theft of one iPhone and/or one Social

Security card and/or one insurance card and/or one credit card and/or an

undetermined amount of the lawful currency of the United States of

America." (Id.)

"It is well settled that '[a] single crime cannot be divided into two

or more offenses and thereby subject the perpetrator to multiple

39
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convictions for the same offense." Lynch v. State, 229 So. 3d 260, 265 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Ex parte Darby, 516 So. 2d 786, 787 (Ala.

1987)). In Lynch, this Court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Hurst v.

State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So. 120 (1889), "as it applies to separate items of

property taken from one victim in one act of theft." 229 So. 3d at 267. In

Craig v. State, 893 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), this Court

noted that "it is the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, against

the person that constitutes the crime" of robbery, meaning that "the unit

of prosecution is the act of violence against the person."

The Alabama Supreme Court has held that "where there are two

different methods of proving the offense charged in one statute, they [do

not] constitute separate offenses." Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159, 1162

(Ala. 1988). While this Court has recognized that "double-jeopardy

principles are not violated when multiple convictions involving multiple

victims are obtained from one criminal transaction," Burnett v. State,

155 So. 3d 304, 307 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Brooks v. State, 973

So. 2d 380, 342 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)), such is not the situation here. In

40
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this case, Lockett's first-degree-robbery charges were different methods

of proving the same criminal act of robbery committed against C.P. 7

The indictment, as well as the evidence in case number CC-21-347,

reflect that Lockett committed a single robbery of C.P. The State charged

Lockett with first-degree robbery under two different legal theories

permitting two separate evidentiary bases for a conviction -- that Lockett

committed a theft against C.P. while armed with a deadly weapon and

that he caused serious physical injury to C.P. while committing the same

act of theft. For the reasons stated above, however, we hold that Lockett

was twice placed in jeopardy by being indicted for and convicted of two

separate charges of first-degree robbery when he committed only one

crime against one victim. Consequently, we must reverse and remand as

to case number CC-21-347. On remand, the circuit court must enter a

new order, one that adjudges the defendant guilty of the single offense

first-degree robbery as to C.P. and "sentences him for that single offense."

Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d at 152-53.

7Although Lockett sexually assaulted C.P. on two different
occasions, C.P. testified that on the second occasion Lockett "didn't take
my stuff th[at] time, because he already had it." (R. 246.)
41
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court acted within its

discretion when it consolidated the charges against Lockett and allowed

the State to use the footage of Lockett sodomizing an unknown victim to

impeach him. Accordingly, Lockett's convictions and sentences for first-

degree rape, first-degree sodomy, sexual torture, first-degree robbery as

to S.K. and J.W., and second-degree theft of property are affirmed. In

case number CC-21-347, however, we must remand case number CC-21-

347 for the circuit court to vacate one of Lockett's convictions for first-

degree robbery against C.P., along with the accompanying sentence.

AFFIRMED AS TO CASE NUMBERS CC-21-377, CC-21-378, CC-

21-1004, CC-21-1005, CC-21-1006, CC-21-1331, CC-21-1332, CC-21-

1466, CC-21-1467, AND CC-21-1468; REVERSED AND REMANDED AS

TO CASE NUMBER CC-21-347.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.

42