David Odom v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 148
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-24-179

Opinion Delivered March 5, 2025

DAVID ODOM APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
WESTERN DISTRICT
V. [NO. 16JCR-22-1758]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE SCOTT A.
APPELLEE ELLINGTON, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant David Odom was convicted by a Craighead County jury of one count of

internet stalking of a minor, one count of computer child pornography, and thirty counts of

possession of matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child. On appeal, he

argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the charges of possession of child

pornography or internet stalking of a child. He also argues that the circuit court erred in

denying his motion to sever the charges. We affirm.

The facts at trial established that on August 6, 2021, a Facebook account for a

fictitious child named “Kaylee Jackson,” run by the Jonesboro Police Department, received

a friend request from a “David Freakshow Odom.” Odom began chatting with an officer

who Odom thought was Kaylee. That August, Kaylee told Odom she was fourteen.

Thereafter, a gap of time elapsed without chatting due to the lead detective’s other duties.
The parties began chatting again in September 2022, and the conversations turned sexual in

nature. On September 28, 2022, Kaylee said she did not have a driver’s license and would

not be able to take the test for a year. On November 6, 2022, Odom drove to the Motel 6 in

Jonesboro under the impression he would meet Kaylee there. He was arrested. Inside his car

was a phone, a laptop, a laptop bag, a box of condoms, a CVS receipt for the condoms, a

container of Vaseline, and a paddle. The paddle had the words “board of correction” on it.

Odom’s phone was passcode protected, so officers used a program to gain access to it. On it,

officers found a picture of Odom, two pictures of the fictitious Kaylee Jackson, and several

images and videos depicting sexually explicit conduct involving children. Similar materials

were found on Odom’s laptop.

I. Motions for Directed Verdict

We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Wilcoxon v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 458, at 5–6, 655 S.W.3d 686, 692. When

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We

will affirm a judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial

evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty,

compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture.

Jurors do not and need not view each fact in isolation; rather they may consider the evidence

as a whole. Id. The jury is entitled to draw any reasonable inference from circumstantial

evidence to the same extent that it can be from direct evidence. Id. The jury may resolve

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questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence and may choose to believe the

State’s account of the facts rather than the defendant’s. Id.

A. Internet Stalking of a Child

A person commits internet stalking of a child

if the person being twenty-one (21) years of age or older knowingly uses a computer
online service, internet service, local bulletin board service, or any means of electronic
communication to[ s]educe, solicit, lure, or entice an individual that the person
believes to be fifteen (15) years of age or younger in an effort to arrange a meeting
with the individual for the purpose of engaging in [s]exual intercourse; [s]exually
explicit conduct; or [d]eviate sexual activity[.]

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-306 (Repl. 2024).

Odom argues that there was no proof that he knew the age of the person on the

computer. He explains that Kaylee’s Facebook profile had her birthday as September 18,

2005, and she would have been sixteen when the chat turned to a sexual nature. Odom’s

arguments are similar to those made by the appellant in Todd v. State, where we explained

that

the jury had sufficient evidence from the chat logs that appellant was informed that
the other person was a fifteen-year-old girl who was on summer break after her
sophomore year in high school. The person identified herself as a fifteen-year-old girl
in the first moments of conversation. . . .Appellant attempts to pinpoint moments in
the chat that showed Stacy’s age might be sixteen or older. This ignores our standard
of review—we review only the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict.

2012 Ark. App. 626, at 6–7, 425 S.W.3d 25, 30.

Here, as in Todd, Odom points to evidence that showed Kaylee’s age could have been

sixteen or older. But we have evidence that supports the jury’s verdict: she told Odom in

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August 2021 she was fourteen, and in September 2022 she told Odom she did not have a

driver’s license, and it was a year until she could take the test. We affirm this point.

B. Possession of Child Pornography

Odom next argues that there was no proof that he knowingly possessed child

pornography. He contends there was no proof he knowingly possessed the phone or the

laptop containing the images because there was no proof that he downloaded the images or

that they were not downloaded by a third party.

A person commits the crime of possessing or viewing matter depicting sexually explicit

conduct involving a child if he “knowingly[ p]ossesses or views through any means, including

on the Internet, any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, computer-

generated image, video game, or any other reproduction that depicts a child or incorporates

the image of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-602(a)(2)

(Repl. 2024).

The following evidence supports the jury’s finding that Odom knowingly possessed

matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child. First, the phone and laptop on

which the explicit images were found were in Odom’s car. No one else was in the car. The

phone was passcode protected. In addition to the images at issue here, two were images of

“Kaylee” that she had sent to him. There was an image of Odom on the phone and also an

image of Odom on the laptop. In Taliferro v. State, we explained that we look to see if there

was any ownership, dominion, or control over the material itself or dominion over the

premises in which the material was found. 2020 Ark. App. 68, at 12, 597 S.W.3d 58, 63–

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64. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to tie Odom to both the premises in which the

material was found and the material itself.

II. Motion to Sever

The decision whether to grant a defendant’s motion to sever two or more offenses

lies within the circuit court’s discretion, and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of

discretion. Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, at 8, 461 S.W.3d 368, 374. Where,

however, the offenses are joined solely on the basis that they are of the same or similar

character, a defendant has an absolute right to their severance. Id. Rule 22.2 of the Arkansas

Rules of Criminal Procedure provides further that the circuit court should grant a motion

to sever if necessary for a fair trial of each offense. A severance motion may be denied if the

two offenses were part of a single scheme or plan or if both offenses required the same

evidence. Rankin v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 481, at 3, 588 S.W.3d 379, 381.

Odom argues that the offenses charged were not of a similar nature and asserts that

the circuit court failed to consider the undue prejudice he suffered by having the jury

consider the child-pornography and internet-stalking charges together. Generally, the test for

whether joinder is proper involves weighing the possible prejudice to the defendant against

the public interest in avoiding duplicitous, time-consuming trials in which the same factual

and legal issues must be litigated. Clay v. State, 318 Ark. 550, 555, 886 S.W.2d 608, 611

(1994). Where the facts necessary to prove the offenses would almost all be required in each

trial if a severance were granted and the evidence would be used in both trials to prove a

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plan, scheme, motive, or state of mind, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever

the cases. Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 119, 123, 835 S.W.2d 852, 854 (1992).

Here, even if the charges had been separated, much of the same evidence would have

been required in both trials. Of the four witnesses who testified, all were necessary to

establish possession of child pornography, and at least three were critical to proving internet

stalking. Detective Bill Brown and Sergeant Shane Fox testified about the day of Odom’s

arrest, the circumstances surrounding and leading up to it, and the items found in his car.

These items included his phone and laptop—which contained child sexual-abuse material—

as well as a paddle, condoms, and petroleum jelly. Odom sent Detective Brown, who had

posed as “Kaylee” in the chat exchanges with Odom, photos of Odom’s car and the paddle

via Facebook Messenger. Brown had also provided the images of “Kaylee” that were later

found on Odom’s phone. Detective Varner testified about the forensic analysis of the phone,

while Detective Pigg testified about the forensic analysis of the laptop. Both devices

contained child pornography and were discovered in Odom’s car alongside other items that

further supported the internet-stalking charges.

In Rankin, we affirmed a denial of severance, in part, because the offenses were

factually intertwined. We emphasized that the same witnesses would have testified in both

trials and that the evidence presented for one charge was also relevant to the other. Here,

the charges involved overlapping witnesses, timelines, and evidence. Moreover, evidence of

either charge would be admissible to establish, at a minimum, Odom’s state of mind for the

other. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 485, 647 S.W.2d 419, 423–24 (1983) (“Evidence

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of the Pizza Hut robbery was found in appellant’s car. This evidence would be used in both

trials, as would other acts and evidence, to establish a plan, scheme, motive or state of

mind.”). We affirm the denial of the motion to sever the charges.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

Terry Goodwin Jones, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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