Bonney Huggler and David Duncombe v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 379
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-59

Opinion Delivered June 4, 2025

BONNEY HUGGLER AND DAVID
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
DUNCOMBE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, TENTH
APPELLANTS
DIVISION
[NO. 60JV-22-953]
V.
HONORABLE SHANICE JOHNSON,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILD AFFIRMED
APPELLEES

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

Bonney Huggler and David Duncombe separately appeal the Pulaski County Circuit

Court’s order terminating their parental rights to their daughter, three-year-old MC. Huggler

argues that there was insufficient evidence to support termination because there were other

less restrictive options available and because there was no evidence she posed a risk of harm

to her child. Duncombe argues that it was erroneous to terminate his parental rights when

there was testimony that the child should continue contact with her birth relatives. We find

no error and affirm.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

In November 2022, police officers discovered then seventeen-month-old MC alone

in a car. Bonney Huggler (MC’s mother) appeared twenty minutes later and told officers that
she had left MC in the car in front of her friend’s house while she went to get gas. The house

where she parked her car was abandoned, however, and the closest gas station was at least a

ten-minute walk away. Huggler did not have money and had been unable to purchase the

gas. She also claimed to be unaware that her friend no longer lived at that location. The

police searched her and discovered marijuana and a glass pipe. Marijuana was also found in

a diaper bag sitting next to MC in the vehicle, but Huggler denied any knowledge of the

marijuana in the diaper bag. She was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia and

endangering the welfare of a minor.

After Huggler’s arrest, a report was made to the Arkansas Department of Human

Services (Department), and a seventy-two-hour hold was placed on the child due to the

Department’s determination that Huggler had not provided the supervision necessary to

protect MC from potentially dangerous harm. The Department noted that Huggler had left

MC unattended in a vehicle in front of an abandoned home and that, while in the car, MC

had access to the marijuana from the diaper bag and could have easily ingested the drug

while she was unattended. Additionally, John Huggler (MC’s grandfather) informed the

Department that this was not the first time Huggler had left MC unattended in a vehicle.

A petition for ex parte emergency custody and dependency-neglect was filed on

November 29, 2022, and listed David Duncombe as MC’s father. An ex parte order was

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granted that same day.1 That petition was later amended to change Duncombe’s party status

to that of putative father. On December 6, 2022, the court found probable cause to believe

MC was dependent-neglected and that custody should remain with the Department.

An adjudication hearing was held on January 25, 2023. The circuit court found MC

dependent-neglected and at substantial risk of serious harm due to Huggler’s neglect and

parental unfitness. Duncombe, however, was not found to have contributed to the

dependency-neglect finding or the cause of removal. The adjudication order reflected that

the Department maintained custody of MC but that Huggler’s father, John Huggler, was

MC’s foster parent at that time.

A review hearing was held on April 3, 2023. After the hearing, the court entered an

order finding that MC should remain in the Department’s custody due to safety concerns—

the existence of a no-contact order and the fact that both parents had been arrested for drugs.

The goal of the case was set as reunification with Huggler with a concurrent goal of

guardianship with a fit and willing relative. As for the Department, the court found that

although it had more than partially—but less than substantially—complied with the case plan,2

1
The ex parte order ordered the parents, in part, to submit a list of MC’s adult
relatives. Huggler complied with the order and provided a list that included her father and
MC’s maternal great aunt and uncle who later fostered MC.
2
The court found that the Department had failed to timely submit MC’s referrals and
the court report and had provided insufficient information for notifying relatives about the
case.

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it had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and to finalize a permanency plan

for MC.

As for Huggler, the court found that she also had “more than partially, but less than

substantially” complied with the case plan and orders of the court. Specifically, Huggler had

completed the hair-shaft test and had completed some parenting classes, although the exact

number of classes completed was unclear. The court noted that her referral to counseling

had been submitted but not yet commenced.

As for Duncombe, the court found that he had failed to comply with the case plan or

orders of the court. Duncombe had not yet provided his contact information to the

Department and had not yet resolved the issue of paternity.3

Another review hearing was held on June 7, 2023. The goal of the case remained

reunification with Huggler with a concurrent goal of guardianship with a fit and willing

relative. The court found that Huggler needed to complete services and expressed concern

about her inability to produce a valid sample for a drug screen that day. The court further

expressed unease about her continued relationship with Duncombe amid concerns of

domestic violence in the home. The court found that Duncombe had failed to comply with

any of the court’s orders and had not participated in the case since adjudication.

A third review hearing was held on July 26, 2023. Again, MC was ordered to remain

in the custody of the Department because of Huggler’s lack of progress in the case. The court

3
There was conflicting information as to whether Duncombe had submitted the
results of his paternity testing.

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found that the Department had substantially complied with the case plan, while Huggler

and Duncombe had only partially complied with the plan. The court noted that Huggler’s

truthfulness had been an issue since the beginning of the case and that the no-contact order

between Huggler and Duncombe had been repeatedly violated. The court was further

concerned with Huggler’s decision-making process. The court noted that while Huggler was

engaged in domestic-violence counseling and parenting classes, she had not benefited from

either as her visitation had been inconsistent, and she had attempted to bring Duncombe to

visitation while no-contact orders remained in place.

As to Duncombe, the court noted that MC could not be placed with him because

there was still a no-contact order in place prohibiting his contact with MC. As for his

compliance, Duncombe had started parenting classes and completed the DNA testing, but

his hair-shaft drug screen was positive for amphetamines and THC, and he attempted

visitation despite the no-contact orders.

The goal of the case remained reunification with Huggler with a concurrent goal of

guardianship with a fit and willing relative. The order further stated that John Huggler

continued to be an approved relative foster parent.

5
A permanency-planning hearing was conducted over four days on October 17 and

December 8, 2023;4 and January 11 and 24, 2024.5 The DNA results submitted at the

beginning of the hearing in October established that Duncombe is MC’s parent.6 The court,

in the permanency-planning order, outlined the history of the proceedings and concluded

MC could not be returned to either parent. As such, the court continued legal custody of

MC with the Department and changed the goal to guardianship with a fit and willing relative

with a concurrent goal of adoption. The court stated that it had safety concerns related to

Huggler since it did not believe she had benefited from the services she had completed. The

court stated further that it had ongoing concerns regarding Huggler’s judgment and her

continued prioritization of her relationship with Duncombe versus getting her child out of

Departmental custody. The court noted that there had been a history of domestic violence

and the violation of no-contact orders, with Duncombe claiming that Huggler was the

aggressor in these incidents. Regardless, the court was most concerned about a recent

incident in which Huggler was driving a vehicle in an unsafe manner, and Duncombe kicked

out a window. As to Duncombe, the court noted that he still has a substance-abuse problem

4
The hearing was continued in December due to Duncombe’s assertion that the case
had not been appropriately staffed as ordered by the court.
5
The permanency-planning order incorrectly lists the January dates in 2023 instead
of 2024.
6
The dependency-neglect petition was updated on December 8, 2023, to reflect
Duncombe’s status as legal father.

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and that, despite his disclosure that Huggler is the aggressor in their domestic-violence

incidents, he continued to prioritize their unhealthy relationship.

Under these circumstances, the court found that both parents had “more than

partially, but less than substantially” complied with the case plan and court orders.

A fourth review hearing was held on March 13, 2024. After hearing the evidence, the

court continued custody with the Department but provided that the parties could agree to a

trial home placement with Huggler after staffing and creation of a safety plan; however, no

such placement was available for Duncombe because he was incarcerated, and the no-contact

order remained in place. The court continued the goal of the case as guardianship with a fit

and willing relative with concurrent goals of reunification or adoption. The court found that

the Department had substantially complied with the case plan and had made reasonable

efforts to provide services and finalize a permanency plan for MC. It found that Huggler had

substantially complied with the case plan and orders of the court by continuing individual

therapy services and completing parenting classes. The court clarified that, while Huggler

had made progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes of removal, it remained to be

seen whether she had benefited fully from those services. As for Duncombe, the court found

that he had more than minimally but less than partially complied with the case plan and

orders of the court. The court noted that he had been working on his anxiety issues and had

attended some counseling visits despite his incarceration. Even so, the court found that he

had made no progress toward alleviating or mitigating the issues that prevent the placement

of MC in his home.

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A final review hearing was held on May 22, 2024. At the hearing, the court ordered

a trial home placement with Huggler to begin on May 24. The court cautioned that Huggler

needed to demonstrate that she could put MC’s needs first: there was period of time in

which Huggler was sneaking Duncombe into the home and then denying it. MC could not

be placed with Duncombe because he was incarcerated, needed a new drug-and-alcohol

assessment, and needed to be involved in therapy. The court also noted the presence of MC’s

maternal grandfather, John Huggler, at the hearing, but found that MC was well adjusted in

her current placement with “Mrs. Tish and Mr. Sam,” MC’s maternal great aunt and uncle.

On July 17, 2024, the Department and the attorney ad litem filed a joint petition for

termination of parental rights alleging that termination was in MC’s best interest. The

petition asserted the following statutory grounds as to Huggler: twelve months’ failure to

remedy; subsequent other factors; and aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of

successful reunification, see Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), (vii)(a) & (ix)(a)(3)(A)

(Supp. 2023); and as to Duncombe: twelve months’ failure to remedy by noncustodial

parent; subsequent other factors; and aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of

successful reunification. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(b), (vii)(a) & (ix)(a)(3)(A).

In the petition, the Department alleged that Huggler had advocated for Duncombe

to visit with MC at the family team meeting on June 18 despite acknowledging that

Duncombe had been civilly committed for seven days due to his mental health. Huggler also

asked for assistance in getting the no-contact order modified. The Department also alleged

that only five days after the meeting, a family service worker discovered Duncombe at

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Huggler’s home during a surprise home visit. This incident resulted in the termination of

Huggler’s trial placement. Huggler denied a continued relationship with Duncombe and

claimed he had been holding her hostage at the time of the surprise visit. The petition

acknowledged her claims but highlighted Huggler’s failure to ask for help from the family

service worker at the time, her attempts to conceal Duncombe’s presence in the home, her

leaving MC with him while she went outside to speak to the family service worker, and her

return to the home with him after MC was removed from her care. The Department noted

that her continued interactions with Duncombe were problematic: Duncombe had not yet

started his individual counseling or anger-management classes; he had continued his

relationship with Huggler despite a no-contact order being in place and his arrest in

November 2023 for domestic battery against Huggler; and he had threatened to attack

Huggler with spray paint and to “burn the whole goddamn town down” if MC was not

returned to him.

The termination hearing was held on September 18, 2024. Huggler was present at

the hearing, as were MC’s maternal great aunt and uncle—the foster parents—and MC’s

grandfather. Duncombe did not attend but was represented by counsel at the hearing.

Andrea Williams, the family service worker, testified regarding the history of the case,

including the services provided to each parent and Huggler’s recent positive THC drug

screen. She also testified regarding the problematic relationship between Huggler and

Duncombe, including the domestic-violence issues, the violations of their no-contact orders,

and the termination of the trial placement due to Duncombe’s presence in the home.

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Regarding the latter, she testified that Huggler came outside to her car to meet her; that

Huggler left MC in the home alone with Duncombe when she did so; that Huggler appeared

irritated when Duncombe stepped outside and made his presence known; and that Huggler

told her that Duncombe was there only because he wished to see MC. Huggler did not

inform Williams that she was being held hostage and returned to the home with Duncombe

when Williams left with MC. It was only later that Huggler claimed to have been held hostage

by Duncombe. Despite her claim that she had been held hostage and her subsequent report

to the prosecuting attorney’s office, Huggler still inquired into whether the Department

could supervise visits between MC and Duncombe. Williams claimed that, while Huggler

appeared to understand and wanted to rectify the issues preventing placement, Huggler’s

issues with dishonesty and the Department’s concerns regarding domestic violence

prevented reunification. As for Duncombe, she testified that he had been incarcerated off

and on for extensive periods of time during the proceedings and that his continued drug

use, undiagnosed mental-health problems, and domestic-violence issues were concerns of the

Department.

As for relative placement options, Williams testified that MC’s grandfather and her

great aunt and uncle had been very present throughout the case and that they were adamant

about wanting to maintain contact with MC. Neither was an option for placement, however.

She stated that, in the beginning, the grandfather had wanted to be a placement option, but

he had since withdrawn his request. The great aunt and uncle had stated they could not be

a long-term full-time placement option for MC because of MC’s age and their medical

10
concerns. Neither the grandfather nor the great aunt and uncle testified that they wished to

be considered as a placement option, nor did they intervene in the matter.

Mary Glenn, the adoption specialist, testified that MC is adoptable and that 125

available adoptive families matched MC’s criteria. On cross-examination, Glenn stated that

her search included a “needs to maintain contact with a birth relative” option.

Taylor Burks, a family advocate, testified that she had been working with Huggler

concerning her domestic-violence issues and that they had put in place a safety plan for

Huggler when dealing with Duncombe.

Huggler then testified on her own behalf. She testified that she was no longer in a

relationship with Duncombe and that, during the surprise home visit, she was just

implementing the safety plan; that is, to placate Duncombe until she could seek assistance.

She stated that she asked for supervised visitation between Duncombe and MC only because

she was afraid the no-contact order would be lifted, and she would be left dealing with him

herself. She acknowledged her mistakes throughout the history of the case and highlighted

the positive changes she had made.

At the close of the evidence, the Department and the ad litem asked that Huggler’s

and Duncombe’s parental rights be terminated. Huggler’s counsel argued that Huggler’s

parental rights should not be terminated. She argued that the adoption specialist had stated

that MC needed to maintain contact with a birth relative and that her mother, Huggler, was

the closest birth relative. She further argued that Huggler should be given more time because

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Huggler was the “best fit” for the child. Duncombe’s attorney presented no argument in his

defense.

After the hearing, the court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding

that the Department had proved all grounds specified in the termination petition and that

termination was in MC’s best interest. From the bench, the court noted that “[t]here’s no

relative to seek at this point, so not terminating parental rights would . . . require her to

remain in foster care and languish.”

Huggler and Duncombe separately appealed the termination of their parental rights.

II. Standard of Review

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Hall v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 4. An order forever terminating parental rights must be based on a

finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). The circuit court must consider the likelihood that the child

will be adopted if the parents’ rights are terminated and the potential harm that could be

caused if the child is returned to the parent. Id. The circuit court must also find clear and

convincing evidence of one or more grounds for termination. Id.

When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the

appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding is clearly erroneous. McGaugh v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 485, 505 S.W.3d 227. A finding is clearly erroneous

when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In resolving the

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clearly erroneous question, we defer to the circuit court because of its superior opportunity

to observe the parties and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

III. Analysis

Neither Huggler nor Duncombe explicitly challenge the court’s statutory grounds for

termination in their opening briefs. Instead, both argue that termination was not in MC’s

best interest since there was a less restrictive placement option—relative placement. Their

arguments will be addressed in turn.

A. Huggler

Huggler argues on appeal that termination was not necessary to achieve permanency

for MC. She claims that, because the evidence showed that maintaining contact with birth

relatives postadoption was part of the plan related to MC’s adoption, there was no evidence

that MC could not remain in the custody of birth relatives as she had throughout the

pendency of the case while she worked toward reunification. As such, placement with family

was a consideration and was clearly a less restrictive option than termination. Furthermore,

she contends there was no harm in leaving MC in the custody and care of her family

members, thereby allowing her more time to continue to improve her circumstances.

Huggler, however, did not make this argument below. That is, she never argued to

the circuit court that termination was not in MC’s best interest because there was a less

restrictive alternative available. She only sought to have the termination held in abeyance

and that she be given more time. The failure to raise a challenge or obtain a ruling below is

fatal to the appellate court’s consideration of an issue on appeal. Alexander v. Ark. Dep’t of

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Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 536, 679 S.W.3d 450. Even in termination cases, this court will

not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Id. Because Huggler failed to argue the

least restrictive relative-placement argument to the circuit court, her argument is not

preserved for our review. See Nelson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 444, 699

S.W.3d 393; Barnoskie v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 323, 689 S.W.3d 470

(noting that review is precluded where the appellant did not make the less restrictive relative-

placement argument to the circuit court at the termination hearing).

But even had Huggler preserved the issue for appeal, it would still fail to provide a

path to reversal of the termination of her parental rights. Specifically, to make a least-

restrictive-placement argument on appeal, there must be, at a minimum, an appropriate and

approved relative in the picture to provide custody and care for the child. Here, the

undisputed evidence presented at trial revealed no long-term relative placement available to

care for MC. Family Service Worker Andrea Williams testified that, although the maternal

grandfather stated he wanted to be a part of MC’s life and at one point stated he wanted to

be a placement for her, he later withdrew that request, informing the Department at a family

team meeting that he did not believe he was fit, medically or physically, to care for MC given

her age. Likewise, Williams testified that MC’s maternal great aunt and uncle, who were the

current foster parents, had informed the Department that, while they also wanted to be a

part of MC’s life, they could not take on that role long term. All three of the maternal

relatives at issue were present at the termination hearing, but none of them testified or

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intervened to prevent the termination. Given MC’s need for permanency, the court did not

clearly err in finding termination was in MC’s best interest.

Moreover, as to her claim that there would be no potential harm in returning MC to

her, the record is replete with instances in which Huggler prioritized her relationship with

Duncombe over her reunification with MC. While she claimed to have ended their

relationship, the court was not required to find her testimony credible, especially given her

past attempts to conceal her continued association with him. We defer to the circuit court

because of its superior opportunity to observe the parties and judge the credibility of the

witnesses. McGaugh, supra.

Finally, the Department, in its brief, suggests that Huggler also challenged the

statutory grounds for termination. It is unclear to us whether she actually did because her

arguments seem to address whether she had remedied the conditions causing removal or had

manifested an incapacity or indifference to remedy those issues or factors arising after

removal. Those factors also relate to whether termination was in MC’s best interest or

whether she should be allowed more time to improve her circumstances. However, to the

extent she challenges statutory grounds, the Department is correct that she failed to challenge

the aggravated-circumstances ground—namely, that there is little likelihood that services

would result in successful reunification. Because Huggler failed to challenge an independent

ground for termination of her parental rights, we must affirm on this point. Phillips v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 565, at 10, 567 S.W.3d 502, 508 (“When an appellant

15
fails to attack the circuit court’s independent, alternative basis for its ruling, we will not

reverse.”).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination of Huggler’s parental rights.

B. Duncombe

Like Huggler, Duncombe also challenges that circuit court’s best-interest finding. He

argues that the court cannot terminate his parental rights while also intending to maintain

and foster a relationship status with a biological relative since termination completely severs

the ties between a child and the child’s biological family. He asserts that, if the circuit court

deems it important to maintain those familial ties, it cannot then be in the child’s best

interest to sever those ties.

However, Duncombe, like Huggler, failed to make this argument below. In fact,

Duncombe was absent from the hearing, and his counsel presented no evidence or defense

to the termination and made no closing argument on his behalf. Thus, these arguments are

clearly being made for the first time on appeal. As such, his arguments have not been

preserved for our review. See Nelson, supra; Barlogie, supra.

Accordingly, we also affirm the termination of Duncombe’s parental rights.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination as to both Huggler and

Duncombe.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and WOOD, JJ., agree.

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Digby Law Firm, by: Mathew R. Ingle, for separate appellant Bonney Huggler.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant David

Duncombe.

Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

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