Rachel Camacho v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 580
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-25-428

Opinion Delivered December 3, 2025
RACHEL CAMACHO
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 04JV-23-456 ]
V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE THOMAS SMITH,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILDREN

APPELLEES AFFIRMED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Appellant Rachel Camacho (“Rachel”) appeals the April 21, 2025 order of the

Benton County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to the youngest five of her

nine minor children, MC1 (born 08/24/16), MC2 (born 12/09/17), MC3 (born

10/08/19), MC4 (born 11/16/20), and MC5 (born 11/03/21).1 On appeal, Rachel argues

(1) the circuit court’s label of instability is inextricably tied to poverty, which is not a legally

supportable basis for termination; and (2) the best-interest analysis failed to properly account

for the statutory protections regarding sibling relationships. We affirm.

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During the pendency of this case, Rachel gave birth to another child. This child was
never added as a party, so while Rachel has ten children, this appeal addresses the first nine
children.
I. Facts and Procedural History

On April 28, 2023, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“the Department”)

received notice that Rachel’s children were unclean, many of the children had sores on their

heads from lice, and the children reported no running water and mice in the home. The

Department went to Rachel’s home that same day and provided four lice kits as well as

assistance with an application for SNAP benefits. On May 5, 2023, Rachel informed the

Department she had to move in with her sister but did not provide an address. On May 11,

the Department had trouble reaching Rachel by phone, and the family service worker

assigned to the case went to the children’s school. Upon her arrival, she discovered the

children still had sores from the head lice and learned Rachel’s sister had asked her to leave

because there was not enough room for all the children. Rachel explained to the family

service worker that she did not have a plan for where she and the children would live, she

had no plan to take care of the children’s head lice other than to dye their hair, and she had

taken a second job in the evenings but had no one to care for the children while she was

working. During this conversation, the family service worker noticed one of the youngest

children was dirty with brown grime running down her legs and her face, and she smelled of

urine and feces. The Department contacted multiple motels for the family with no success,

so Rachel’s family took in the children while Rachel continued to seek housing.

On May 15, 2023, the Department had a meeting with Rachel and the children’s

school to go over the services that had been offered to Rachel, including therapy for Rachel,

which she declined. Rachel told the Department she had been looking for apartments but

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could not provide any applications. Rachel asked the Department to pay for a place for her

and the children to live, and the family service worker informed Rachel the Department had

provided rental assistance to her in the past and stressed she needed to stay within her

monthly budget. Multiple people within the Department attempted to discuss budgeting

with Rachel but had issues with her lack of flexibility and refusal to provide full information.

While the children were staying with family, there were allegations that the children were

overly tired and had disclosed that they weren’t eating, the adults weren’t consistently present

in the home, and the teenagers were not consistently present to provide supervision. The

Department offered Rachel daycare vouchers, and she said she would enroll the children.

However, the Department later learned Rachel never completed the paperwork.

On May 19, 2023, the children were removed from Rachel’s custody due to health

and safety concerns based on her inability to meet the children’s essential needs. The

Department was unsuccessful in its efforts to help Rachel obtain stable housing, a childcare

plan, and a reliable transportation plan to ensure the children were supervised and

transported to and from school. On May 22, the Department filed a petition for ex parte

emergency custody and dependency-neglect of the minor children, and on the same day, the

circuit court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody. On May 23, the circuit court

held a probable-cause hearing and found probable cause existed for the emergency order to

remain in place. The court found the Department had made reasonable efforts to prevent

removal of the minor children and ordered Rachel to participate in individual counseling,

parenting classes, and homemaker services as well as to provide family member contact

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information. Rachel was also ordered to submit to a head lice check, and the Department

was authorized to cut the children’s hair to address the lice problem.

On June 27, 2023, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing and made a

dependency-neglect finding based on parental unfitness. The court also ordered that the

case goal be reunification. Additionally, the court ordered Rachel to complete the

requirements set out in the case plan. Specifically, the case plan required Rachel to allow

the Department and CASA access to her home; to complete parenting classes and

demonstrate the skills learned; to visit with the minor children regularly; to obtain and

maintain stable housing, employment, and transportation; and to participate in family and

individual counseling.

On August 1, the circuit court held a review hearing. At this hearing, the circuit court

ordered the case plan goal remain reunification and that the minor children remain in the

custody of the Department. The court also found Rachel in partial compliance with the case

plan. At this time, Rachel was living at her sister’s home, but her family said she could not

have all the children there. Rachel had applied for HUD assistance and was on the waitlist.

Rachel had a minivan in working condition, but it was not large enough to legally transport

all the children at once. She had a full-time job at Sam’s Club. The court found the

Department had made reasonable efforts as well as reasonable efforts to place the minor

children together or to maintain contact. The case plan that was created June 16, 2023, with

a concurrent goal of adoption was accepted by the court and made part of the court’s orders.

This case plan required Rachel to participate in home visits, to obtain and maintain stable

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and appropriate housing for herself and the children, to participate in in-home parenting

education, to obtain and maintain appropriate access to transportation, to participate in

family time, to participate in family counseling, and to participate in individual counseling.

The court found Rachel was in partial compliance.

On October 31, 2023, and January 20 and March 4, 2024, the court held further

review hearings. At each of these hearings, the court continued the goal of reunification and

ordered the minor children to remain in the custody of the Department. At the October 31

review hearing, the court ordered Rachel to complete a budget with the Department and to

provide it with a list of relatives to discuss possible placement of the children. At the January

2024 review hearing, the court ordered the Department to determine whether a safety plan

could be established as to Rachel’s father, who had a prior true finding for sexual contact

with a minor and was named on Rachel’s apartment lease at the time. Additionally, at the

October 2023 and January 2024 review hearings, the court found Rachel partially compliant

with the case plan, and at the March 2024 review hearing, the court found Rachel

substantially compliant with the case plan. At the March 2024 review hearing, the circuit

court noted Rachel had failed to appreciate the risks related to her father, which made it

difficult to create a safety plan. The court also noted Rachel had given birth since the last

hearing.

On May 7, 2024, the circuit court held a permanency-planning hearing. At this

hearing, the circuit court continued the goal of reunification and ordered the minor children

to remain in the Department’s custody. The circuit court also found Rachel fully compliant

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with the case plan. Additionally, a trial home placement was scheduled to begin May 31,

2024, for the four eldest children. However, testimony later established that the trial home

placement was not entirely successful because Rachel failed to provide the Department with

a transportation and childcare plan. Rachel’s two eldest children were allowed to continue

with the trial home placement.

On August 6, 2024, the court held a fifteen-month review hearing. At this hearing,

the circuit court continued the goal of reunification and ordered the remaining seven minor

children to remain in the Department’s custody. Additionally, the court found Rachel in

partial compliance with the case plan and court orders. Further, the circuit court ordered

Rachel to re-engage with counseling services, complete a psychological evaluation, and

develop a safety plan regarding her father.

On October 1, 2024, the circuit court held a second permanency-planning hearing.

At this hearing, the circuit court again continued the goal of reunification and ordered the

remaining seven minor children to remain in the Department’s custody. The circuit court

specifically found the eldest two minor children were on trial home placement, but the other

minor children could not be placed with Rachel until she had a childcare and transportation

plan. Additionally, the circuit court found Rachel in partial compliance with the case plan

and court orders. Further, at this hearing, the circuit court made it clear that the minor

children could not continue to be in “limbo,” and the goal would be changed to adoption

following termination of parental rights if improvements had not been made.

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On November 19, 2024, the court held another permanency-planning hearing in

which it changed the goal of the case to adoption and set reunification as the concurrent

goal. The circuit court found the minor children could not be returned to Rachel even after

eighteen months. The court found Rachel to be in partial compliance—there were still

concerns with her lack of stable and appropriate housing, her lack of access to appropriate

transportation, and the lack of childcare.

On March 7, 2025, the Department filed a petition to terminate Rachel’s parental

rights as to the five youngest children only. The Department alleged three grounds against

Rachel: (1) that the children had been out of the home for at least twelve months, and she

failed to correct the conditions causing removal; (2) that issues arose subsequent to the filing

of the dependency-neglect petition that Rachel failed to remedy; and (3) that aggravated

circumstances existed because there was little likelihood that services would result in

reunification. The Department alleged termination was in the children’s best interest

because they would likely find permanency through adoption and because they would be

subject to potential harm if returned to Rachel’s custody because she could not find safe and

appropriate housing, transportation, or childcare and was either unable or unwilling to

remedy those issues.

On April 8, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on the Department’s petition.

Carrington Fiddle, the primary caseworker, testified first. She testified to the ongoing

barriers to Rachel’s obtaining and maintaining safe and appropriate housing, including her

limited financial resources, the number of children in her care, her prior negative rental

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history, and an outstanding balance owed to the water company. She testified that while

Rachel was able to secure housing in December 2023, the lease listed her father as a tenant,

and due to his history of sexual abuse, the Department determined it was unsafe for him to

be around the children. Although he did not reside in the home at the time of the

termination hearing, he had lived there previously, and his continued presence on the lease

gave him legal access to the residence, which made him an ongoing safety concern. She

credited Rachel with significant consistency in her employment with Sam’s Club but noted

Rachel struggled with forming realistic financial plans. Fiddle testified the Department

provided Rachel with SNAP assistance and assistance with resources for utilities. Fiddle

testified that budgeting had been an ongoing challenge for Rachel and that the Department

had worked with her on budgeting and identifying stable sources of income. Fiddle noted

that while Rachel had been able to maintain her current home, she had been splitting the

rent with her father, who was no longer contributing to rent since moving out the month

prior. Fiddle explained that while the Department had worked with Rachel on a plan for

placement of the youngest children, including transportation, safety, and supervision while

Rachel was working, the plan was ultimately not realistic. She said the person who had been

a major support to Rachel since the eldest children started the trial home placement was no

longer available to help. As a result, the Department determined the four eldest children

could remain in the home because they are old enough to be left alone. However, the

youngest children could not be placed with Rachel because of concerns about her ability to

adequately supervise them all at once and to provide basic needs for all the children. Fiddle

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testified the children would be at risk of harm if returned to Rachel due to neglect if not

appropriately supervised or provided with basic needs such as food, clothing, or shelter. She

noted the case had been open for two years, and the same concerns remained throughout

the entirety of the case.

Next, Rachel testified. She began by laying out a plan that had been formulated with

the help of Youth Villages—a resource provided by the Department. This involved a primary

plan, a backup plan, and a future school plan for the youngest children. However, much of

Rachel’s plan relied on family members who “were willing to help, but don’t want to be

responsible for the kids.” Rachel discussed her full-time employment at Sam’s Club, her

discussions with management to increase her responsibilities and income and to utilize an

employee-assistance plan, and her effort at picking up an extra job cleaning houses on her

two days off each week while the children were in school. On cross-examination, Rachel

admitted that one of the family members included in her plan had previously forgotten to

pick the children up from school. She also admitted that no one person would be solely

responsible, and the plan would change “day to day” depending on each person’s availability.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court terminated Rachel’s parental rights

to the five youngest children only, reasoning that the four eldest children were old enough

to care for themselves while Rachel was at work, and their schedules allowed them to help

around the home. In the court’s written order, it stated the grounds for termination of

parental rights as “failure-to-remedy” and “aggravated circumstances”—little likelihood that

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continued services to the family will result in successful reunification. Additionally, the

circuit court found it was in the minor children’s best interest to terminate parental rights.

II. Discussion

On appeal, we review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse

the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Dade v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 443, 503 S.W.3d 96. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a

finding is clearly erroneous, we have noted that in matters involving the welfare of young

children, we will give great weight to the circuit court’s personal observations. Jackson v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 440, 503 S.W.3d 122.

Our case law recognizes that the termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy

and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Fox v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014

Ark. App. 666, 448 S.W.3d 735. In termination-of-parental-rights matters, the circuit court

is required to follow a two-step process by finding first that the parent is unfit and second

that termination is in the best interest of the child. T.J. v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 329 Ark.

243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997); Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 753, 431

S.W.3d 364. The first step requires proof of one or more of the statutory grounds for

termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025). The second step requires

consideration of whether the termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

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Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). As a result, the Department bears a heavy burden in

seeking to terminate the relationship of parent and child. Fox, supra.

The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency

in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is

contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative;

the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her

child. Camarillo-Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 360 Ark. 240, 201 S.W.3d 391 (2005).

A. Failure to Remedy

Rachel first argues the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights because

the circuit court’s finding of “instability” is just poverty in disguise. Specifically, Rachel

argues that poverty is not a legally supportable basis for termination, so this court should

reverse the termination of her parental rights. We disagree with Rachel’s characterization of

the circuit court’s ruling and affirm.

Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. Freedman

v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 514, at 14–15, 679 S.W.3d 420, 428. We will

focus on the failure-to-remedy ground, and because the evidence is sufficient to prove that

ground, there is no need to discuss the aggravated-circumstances ground for termination.

To prevail on the failure-to-remedy ground, the Department must demonstrate (1) the child

was adjudicated dependent-neglected; (2) the child remained out of the custody of the parent

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for twelve months; (3) the parent failed to remedy the cause of removal; and (4) this failure

occurred despite meaningful efforts by DHS to rehabilitate the parent and correct the issue

that caused the removal. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i).

In this case, Rachel’s nine minor children were adjudicated dependent-neglected, and

despite the Department’s meaningful efforts, the five youngest minor children remained out

of Rachel’s custody for more than twelve months. The court heard testimony that the

Department provided services to Rachel to help remedy the issues of housing, employment,

and transportation, including things such as groceries, transportation for the children,

medical care for the children, foster-care placement for the children, and monthly home

visits. Rachel stayed with various family members until she obtained an apartment that

required her father to cosign the lease. However, Rachel previously admitted she had

concerns regarding her children’s safety around her father due to a previous true finding for

sexual touching of a child. Despite this, Rachel did not attempt to obtain housing that did

not require her father to cosign the lease or create a safety plan to protect the children in the

event her father came to the apartment while the children were unsupervised.

While the eldest four minor children had a successful trial home placement with

Rachel, the same cannot be said for the youngest five. During the pendency of this case, the

Department attempted a trial home placement for the five youngest children, but ultimately

Rachel’s failure to provide a transportation plan or a childcare plan for the children while

she was at work rendered the Department unable to move forward with the trial home

placement. Although Rachel retained the rights to her four eldest children whose ages

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ranged from ten to fifteen years—at the time of termination, Rachel continued to lack

appropriate housing and the ability to provide for the essential needs of the five youngest

children. The court reasoned the four eldest children could remain in Rachel’s custody

because they were able to stay by themselves while Rachel worked, and their schedules

allowed them to help Rachel around the house. However, when the time came, Rachel did

not demonstrate that she could meet the essential needs of the youngest five children,

including stable housing, transportation, and childcare.

The goal of termination proceedings is to provide permanency in a child’s life when

returning the child to the family home is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare,

and the evidence demonstrates that a return to the home cannot be accomplished in a

reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Meriweather v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 98 Ark. App. 328, 255 S.W.3d 505 (2007). A child’s need for permanency and

stability may override a parent’s request for more time to improve the parent’s circumstances.

Dozier v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 17, 372 S.W.3d 849. Here, this case went

on for two years without Rachel correcting her failure to provide essential needs for the

children despite the multitude of services offered to her. A stable home is one of a child’s

most basic needs. Selsor v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 182, at 6, 516 S.W.3d

314, 318. A parent’s continued inability to protect and care for his or her child and failure

to benefit from the services provided demonstrate little likelihood that further services will

result in a successful reunification. Bentley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 374,

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554 S.W.3d 285. Considering the facts before us, we hold that the circuit court did not

clearly err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the failure-to-remedy ground

supported the termination of Rachel’s parental rights.

B. Best Interest

In making a “best interest” determination, the circuit court is required to consider

two factors: (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted and (2) the potential of harm to

the child if custody is returned to a parent. Pine v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App.

781, at 9–10, 379 S.W.3d 703, 708–09. Adoptability is not an essential element; rather, it

is a factor that the circuit court must consider. Tucker v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark.

App. 430, at 7, 389 S.W.3d 1, 4–5. Likewise, the potential harm to the child is a factor to

be considered, but a specific potential harm does not have to be identified or proved by clear

and convincing evidence. Pine, 2010 Ark. App. 781, at 11, 379 S.W.3d at 709. The

potential-harm analysis is to be conducted in broad terms and in a forward-looking manner.

Shawkey v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 2, at 5, 510 S.W.3d 803, 806.

Rachel does not challenge the circuit court’s findings regarding adoptability or

potential harm. Therefore, we need not consider those issues. Easter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 441, 587 S.W.3d 604. Rather, Rachel argues the circuit court failed

to properly account for statutory protections regarding the sibling relationship while making

its best-interest determination. To make a sibling-relationship argument that supports

reversal, there must be evidence of a genuine sibling bond, which was not demonstrated in

the record here. E.g., Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 192, at 6, 596

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S.W.3d 98, 102 (holding that keeping siblings together is an important consideration but is

not outcome determinative because the best interest of each child is the polestar, and

evidence of a genuine sibling bond is required to reverse a best-interest finding on the basis

of the severance of a sibling relationship). Additionally, the statute on which Rachel relies,

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-215 (Supp. 2025), concerns the adoption of siblings, not termination

of parental rights. Because we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made, we hold the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination was

in the best interest of the five youngest children. Accordingly, we affirm the order

terminating Rachel’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HIXSON, J., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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