Landric Watson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 14
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-25-249

Opinion Delivered: January 14, 2026

LANDRIC WATSON APPEAL FROM THE MILLER
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 46 JV-24-9]
V.
HONORABLE BRENT HALTOM,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILD AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
APPELLEES WITHDRAW GRANTED

CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge

Appellant Landric Watson appeals the Miller County Circuit Court’s termination of

his parental rights to his minor child (MC). Pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department

of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule

6-9(j) (2024), Landric’s attorney filed a no-merit brief and a motion to be relieved as counsel.

The clerk of our court sent copies of the brief and motion to Landric informing him of his

right to file pro se points for reversal pursuant to Rule 6-9(j)(3), and he has not done so.

Having examined the record, we are satisfied that there are no issues of arguable merit to

support an appeal. We therefore affirm the termination and grant counsel’s motion to be

relieved.

I. History of the Case
On January 22, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“the

Department”) became involved with Landric Watson and Racarsha Watson pursuant to a

report of “Garrett’s Law,” or prenatal exposure of illegal substances. During the interview at

the hospital, MC’s mother, Racarsha, Landric’s wife, acknowledged to the family service

worker (“FSW”) that she had used cocaine and THC on January 19, 2024, two days before

MC’s birth.1

The FSW scheduled a team decision-making meeting for January 24, 2024, to

determine the next steps. According to the affidavit attached to the initial petition for

dependency-neglect filed on January 24, Racarsha and Landric appeared at the meeting and

revealed that they had recently moved from Louisiana to Arkansas, leaving Racarsha’s nine

children and Landric’s six children in Louisiana.2 Landric acknowledged that he did not

communicate with his underage children. The couple also acknowledged that they were

living in public housing and had no income. Landric denied drug use except for marijuana.

After the meeting, the Department offered to provide Racarsha with inpatient drug

treatment in a setting that would allow MC to accompany her. After the couple discussed

the option, Racarsha agreed to treatment. Landric stated that he would leave her if she went

to treatment, and he asked the FSW if they could put four of the underage children in

1
The court also terminated Racarsha’s parental rights, but she did not appeal the
court’s order.
2
Racarsha had another child that was the subject of a Louisiana Department of
Human Services case concerning drug use.

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Louisiana “up for adoption” to avoid Racarsha’s being placed in rehab. After the FSW told

him that was not an option, Landric left the meeting and did not return.

The FSW had set up a prescreening phone appointment with Arkansas Cares for

January 25, but Racarsha failed to call in for her intake meeting. After her failure to appear,

the Department removed MC from the custody of Racarsha and Landric and placed him in

Department custody under a seventy-two-hour hold on that same day. On January 29, the

Department filed a formal petition for dependency-neglect seeking custody. The court

entered an emergency order on the same day and set the case for a probable-cause hearing.

Landric was immediately provided court-appointed counsel. On February 7, the court

entered an agreed probable-cause order. The court found that MC’s removal from the

couple’s custody was necessary to ensure his safety, health, and welfare and that his

continued placement in Department custody was necessary pending an adjudication hearing,

which was set for March 13.

After the adjudication hearing, the court entered an order dated March 27 finding

MC dependent-neglected due to neglect and parental unfitness. The court set concurrent

goals of reunification and placement with a relative. The court ordered the couple to

complete services, including a drug-and-alcohol assessment.

During the first review hearing on June 12, the court found that while the

Department had offered reunification services, neither parent had complied with any of the

services offered, including visiting MC during the three months leading up to the hearing.

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The court maintained a goal of reunification and ordered the couple to start and complete

the services being offered.

On August 30, the Department filed a motion to terminate reunification services,

alleging that MC had been subject to aggravated circumstances and asking the court for a

finding that there was little likelihood that services would result in reunification. Specifically,

the motion stated that the parents had not had contact with MC since March 6 and had

made no progress towards remedying the situation that caused the removal of MC. The

Department asked for a finding of abandonment as the basis to be relieved of providing

further services.

On September 25, the court held a hearing on the motion, and after the hearing, at

which Landric was present and represented by counsel, the court granted the Department’s

motion, finding that MC had been subjected to aggravated circumstances for the bases

alleged in the motion. Specifically, the court found:

2. This case was thoroughly reviewed by this Court on this date and
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-365 and FINDING proof by clear and
convincing evidence, the Court GRANTS the Motion to terminate
reunification because it is in the best interest of the juvenile and upon the
following grounds and with these supporting facts:

A. The juvenile was subjected to aggravated circumstances, specifically the
juvenile(s) was abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or
repeated cruelty.

B. There is little likelihood that services to the family will result in
successful reunification.

C. The juvenile is an abandoned infant in that the juvenile is less than
nine (9) months of age and the parent, guardian or custodian left the

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child alone or in the possession of another person without identifying
information or with an expression of intent by words, actions or
omissions not to return for the infant.

As a result, the court granted the motion to terminate reunification services and

relieved the Department of providing further services. The court allowed the parents to

continue with supervised visits as long as they did not miss more than two visits.

On November 6, the court held a permanency-planning hearing, at which Landric

was present and represented by counsel. There was testimony that the parents had missed

more than two of their supervised visits since the previous hearing. The court entered an

order changing the goal to adoption and relieved the Department of providing the parents

visitation with MC.

On November 19, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights

alleging that termination was in the best interest of MC and that grounds existed because,

in part, the court had already made a finding that MC had been subjected to aggravated

circumstances. In addition, the Department alleged in the petition that MC had continued

to be out of the parents’ custody for twelve months and that the parents had willfully failed

to maintain meaningful contact with MC or provide significant material support.

On January 22, 2025, the court held a hearing on the petition to terminate parental

rights and the Department’s power to consent to adoption. Landric was present and

represented by counsel at the hearing. The FSW recited the history of the case, noting that

despite the offer of services, neither parent participated in services. She said that while the

couple had exercised supervised visitation with MC in the beginning of the case, the couple

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always tested positive for THC, they had twice tested positive for cocaine, and Landric

frequently wanted to end the four-hour visitation early. The FSW testified that neither parent

had any contact with MC after the order terminating reunification services was entered. She

reported that the couple had recently moved back to Louisiana and were living off Landric’s

SSI. On cross-examination, the FSW acknowledged that the court-appointed special

advocate had visited the home in Louisiana and found it suitable for children.

Ruthann Murphy, an adoption specialist with the Department, testified that MC’s

potential for adoption is high, and there are no factors that would prohibit adoption. She

further stated there were 238 potential matches for MC and that his foster parents had

expressed an interest in adopting MC if his parents’ rights were terminated.

Landric testified in his defense, and he noted that he had lived in the same location

in Plain Dealing, Louisiana, for around ten years. Landric testified regarding the Louisiana

DHS case involving Racarsha’s son, which occurred before MC’s birth:

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: Mr. Watson, are you sure that you were not
ordered to - - in the case in Louisiana that your
wife had, are you sure you were not ordered to do
services?

LANDRIC: No, sir. Because like I say, that was her and his
child. That wasn’t my child.

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: Well, I know it wasn’t necessarily your child, but
she was living with you; correct?

LANDRIC: Yes, but they did not order me - - they ordered
them two - - those two.

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With respect to this case involving MC and the services ordered by the court, Landric

testified that he had begun drug treatment and parenting through Active Recovery. Landric

stated that as part of the parenting class, he had to watch videos, keep a journal, discuss

parenting with other class participants, and provide three negative drug screens, all of which

he completed and provided to CASA through Active Recovery. He believed that parenting

classes helped him. He noted that he completed Active Recovery on November 14, 2024,

and said he informed CASA. He also testified that after the termination-of-reunification-

services hearing when the court made visits contingent on clean drug screens and consistent

attendance, he missed visitation due to medical appointments.3 As a result, his visits were

terminated. There was an exchange between the court and Landric regarding his missed

visitation due to the doctors’ appointments. Landric asserted that he did what was asked of

him, but he conceded he was not able to get the psychological evaluation completed after

appointments he made were canceled because “since it was court ordered they weren’t going

to be able to offer me services.” Landric’s parenting certificate was admitted into evidence

as well as proof of a negative drug screen completed on October 31, 2024. The court pointed

out that the drug-screen exhibit showed Landric was still positive for marijuana almost the

entire month of October, except for October 31. Landric acknowledged that it took him a

month to test clean due to high drug levels in his body. The court questioned whether

3
When the FSW was recalled to the witness stand, she clarified to the court that she
had not received any medical excuses from Landric. She said Landric texted her and said he
was not going to be able to make it, and there was no follow up.

7
Landric missed visitations during August and September due to sickness, considering he was

still testing positive for marijuana through most of October. Landric testified that while he

and Racarsha remained married, they had physically separated and had no recent contact,

even though she was pregnant with his baby.

The ad litem called the FSW back to the witness stand to rebut Landric’s testimony.

She testified as follows:

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: Ms. Johnson, you heard Mr. Watson’s testimony
as to not being ordered services prior to [MC]
coming here; is that the way you recall it?

FSW: No, sir.

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: And what was told to you as far as the services?

FSW: By Ms. Trinity, who is the caseworker for the case
in Louisiana - -

LANDRIC’S COUNSEL: Objection to hearsay.

FSW: - - they were - - they were.

THE COURT: I will allow it to rebut his testimony, but that is as
far as it can go.

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: Just - - what is your understanding as to what - -
well, is it your understanding he was ordered to
do services?

FSW: Yes, sir.

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: And that was based on what the caseworker in
Louisiana - -

FSW: Yes, sir.

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ATTORNEY AD LITEM: - - represented? And as part of - - and that was part
of your job in this case, was communicating back-
and-forth with the case worker in Louisiana?

FSW: Yes.

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: And that was because the services could not
necessarily be performed here because of the
limitations that they lived in - -

FSW: Yes, sir.

ATTORNEY AD LITEM: - - Louisiana?

FSW: Yes, sir.

Sarah Smolarz, the CASA representative, testified that while Landric had an

appropriate home with a sleeping space for MC, she remained concerned about Landric’s

inconsistent visitation during the case, especially since it persisted even after the court told

him he would lose the right to visit if he missed two or more visits. She said Landric had

offered various reasons for the missed visits, including being sick, attending a funeral, and

having a flat tire. The CASA recommended termination as to both parents, but she hesitated

as to Landric

SMOLARZ: I don’t - - there is a lot that I don’t know about
Mr. Watson, with him not having a psych
evaluation done or a drug assessment done I - - I
don’t feel comfortable saying that - - I don’t know
what I am trying to say here. My concerns with
Mr. Watson are largely the inconsistencies in the
visitation, and what I have known of his drug use
previously. But with - - I don’t know anything
further.

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LANDRIC’S COUNSEL: Okay. So, but for the missed assessments, and I
guess any follow-up counseling, that is the reason
for your - - your - - hesitation?

SMOLARZ: Yes, in saying that the drug use is the problem.
Now, my main concern that I have seen is the
inconsistency throughout with the visitation.

At the close of the hearing, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. In

terminating Landric’s parental rights, the court noted Landric has five children from his

previous relationship, and there was no proof Landric supported any of the children,

especially given that he lives on limited means (SSI). It found that Landric had abandoned

MC by his failing to visit MC because he was still on marijuana, the impending birth of

another child, and the “[un]reasonable[ness]” of Landric wanting to raise an infant given all

of these findings. The court found that the evidence weighed against any finding that Landric

could provide stability to MC, and because MC could find stability and permanency through

adoption, termination was in MC’s best interest. The court memorialized its findings in a

formal written order entered on February 13, 2025:

8. After considering the evidence, the Court finds that the evidence
proves the following grounds:

A. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) That a juvenile has been
adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has
continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve (12)
months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to
rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused
removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent.

B. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ii)(a) The juvenile has lived
outside the home of the parent for a period of twelve (12) months,
and the parent has willfully failed to provide significant material

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support in accordance with the parent’s means or to maintain
meaningful contact with the juvenile.

C. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) That other factors or
issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for
dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile
in the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health,
safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family
services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to
remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s
circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the
custody of the parent.

D. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(iii) The parent is sentenced in
a criminal proceeding for a period of time that would constitute a
substantial period of the juvenile’s life.

E. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a) The parent is found by a
court of competent jurisdiction, including the juvenile division of
circuit court, to:

(3)(A) Have subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances.

(B) “Aggravated circumstances: means: (i) A juvenile has been
abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated
cruelty, sexually abused, or a determination has been or is made by
a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will
result in successful reunification.

II. No Merit Appeal

A. Requirements

Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j) allows counsel for an appellant in a termination-

of-parental-rights case to file a no-merit brief accompanied by a motion to withdraw if, after

studying the record and researching the law, counsel determines that there is no meritorious

basis for appeal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1); Willingham v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark.

11
App. 74, 706 S.W.3d 761. The argument section of the brief must list all the rulings that

were adverse to the appellant “made by the circuit court on all objections, motions, and

requests made by the party at the hearing from which the appeal arose” and explain why each

ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Ark. S. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A); see also McCullar

v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 15, 683 S.W.3d 202. The statement of the case

also must contain all rulings adverse to the appellant made by the circuit court at the hearing.

Ark. S. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(B); see also Willingham, supra. In evaluating a no-merit brief, we decide

whether the appeal is wholly frivolous or whether there are any issues of arguable merit for

appeal. Willingham, supra; McCullar, supra.

On appeal, we review cases of termination of parental rights de novo but do not

reverse unless we find the circuit court’s ruling to be clearly erroneous. McCullar, 2024 Ark.

App. 15, 683 S.W.3d 202. “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Anderson, 2011 Ark. App. 791, at 9, 387 S.W.3d

at 316.

B. Termination Ruling

In order to terminate parental rights, a court must determine that the parent is unfit

and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Rogers v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2022 Ark. App. 417, 654 S.W.3d 706. Proving a parent is unfit requires the court to find

at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2023); Rogers, supra. A finding that termination of parental

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rights is in the child’s best interest requires the court to consider the potential harm to the

child caused by returning the child to the parent and the likelihood of the child being

adopted if the rights are terminated. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A); Rogers, supra. The

finding that termination is in the child’s best interest must also be supported by clear and

convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). “Clear and convincing evidence is

defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the

allegation sought to be established.” Anderson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App.

791, at 9, 387 S.W.3d 311, 316.

The circuit court based its order of termination on a multitude of grounds, including

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A), which allows for termination if the parent

is found by the court to have subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. The court

made the finding of aggravated circumstances in the October 1, 2024 order terminating

reunification services. Counsel correctly notes that Landric is procedurally barred from

challenging termination of his parental rights under the ground of aggravated circumstances

because that finding was originally made in the order terminating reunification services.

While a termination-of-parental-rights order may bring up all intermediate orders, including

an unappealed order terminating reunification services, the intermediate order must be

designated in the notice of appeal. Thomas v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 457,

610 S.W.3d 688. Landric failed to designate the order terminating reunification services in

his notice of appeal and, by failing to do so, effectively waived the right to appeal the ground

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of aggravated circumstances. Horton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 633, at 22,

537 S.W.3d 740, 753.

Regarding best interest, there was uncontroverted evidence that MC was likely to

achieve permanency through adoption. The Department’s adoption specialist, Ruthann

Murphy, testified that MC’s potential for adoption is “very high” and that there were no

barriers to adoption. The likelihood that MC would achieve permanency through adoption

was not challenged. This evidence was sufficient for the circuit court to find that factor of

the best-interest analysis had been proved. See Brabon v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 Ark.

App. 2, 388 S.W.3d 69; Reed v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 416, 288 S.W.3d

69; Cobbs v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 87 Ark. App. 188, 189 S.W.3d 487 (2004). Likewise,

regarding potential harm, the circuit court had sufficient evidence to find that MC would be

subject to potential harm if returned to Landric’s custody.

Potential harm must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and in broad terms.

Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, 314 S.W.3d 722. The court is not

required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm.

Lee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277 (2008).

In this case, with respect to the potential-harm prong of the best-interest analysis,

there was substantial evidence of potential harm if Landric’s parental rights were not

terminated. Landric failed to complete the services offered by the Department, he failed to

comply with the visitation orders, and he made no effort to support MC. Throughout the

case, Landric never appealed any finding that it would be contrary to MC’s welfare to be

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placed in his custody. Therefore, these findings are conclusively established for purposes of

appeal. Taylor v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 264 (citing Contreras v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510).

C. Adverse Evidentiary Ruling

In the present case, there was one adverse ruling other than the termination of

parental rights. During his testimony, Landric denied that he was ordered by the state of

Louisiana, in which some of Racarsha’s children were in protective custody, to participate in

services as a part of Racarsha’s reunification plan because he was living in the home with

her. To impeach Landric, the ad litem called the FSW back to the stand and asked her about

Landric’s testimony. The FSW began to rebut what Landric asserted by stating that she had

spoken to the Louisiana caseworker, which prompted Landric’s counsel to object on the

basis of hearsay. The court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony for rebuttal

purposes only. The caseworker then testified that the Louisiana caseworker told her that

Landric was ordered to complete services in the Louisiana case.

We review evidentiary rulings under a manifest abuse-of-discretion standard, and we

will not reverse absent a demonstration of prejudice. Joslin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019

Ark. App. 273, 577 S.W.3d 36. The FSW’s testimony about her conversation with the

Louisiana caseworker was hearsay because the ad litem was attempting to prove the truth of

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that statement.4 Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls under one of the recognized

exceptions to the hearsay rule. In Arkansas, hearsay is defined as a statement made outside

of the current trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ark. R. Evid.

801(c). However, there was no prejudice in allowing the FSW’s testimony, given that the

other evidence overwhelmingly supported the circuit court’s findings of aggravated

circumstances and best interest. Stedman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 805;

Day v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 411, 653 S.W.3d 812.

Having carefully examined the record and the no-merit brief, we hold that Landric’s

counsel has complied with the requirements for a no-merit termination-of-parental-rights

appeal and that the appeal is wholly without merit. We affirm the termination of Landric’s

parental rights to MC and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

ABRAMSON and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

One brief only.

4
The only exceptions to hearsay where the availability of the declarant is immaterial
(as opposed to unavailable) are listed in Ark. R. Evid. 803—none of which pertain to the
statement at issue here.

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