Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., N/K/A Ameriprise Financial Services, LLC; And Doug Wilson v. Evan Connoly Bettis and Megan Marie Bettis, Trustees of the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 256
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-24-732

AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES, Opinion Delivered April 29, 2026

INC., N/K/A AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
SERVICES, LLC; AND DOUG WILSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
APPELLANTS
DIVISION
[NO. 60CV-20-4516]
V.
HONORABLE HERBERT WRIGHT,
EVAN CONNOLY BETTIS AND JUDGE
MEGAN MARIE BETTIS, TRUSTEES
OF THE VICTOR L. BETTIS LIVING
TRUST
AFFIRMED
APPELLEES

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Appellants Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., n/k/a Ameriprise Financial Services,

LLC (“Ameriprise”); and Doug Wilson (“Wilson”) bring this interlocutory appeal from the

July 22, 2024 order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court denying their countermotion to

compel arbitration. On appeal, Ameriprise and Wilson argue (1) tort claims are subject to

arbitration when the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies; (2) appellees are bound by the

arbitration provisions of a contract as third-party beneficiaries; and (3) appellees’ claims arise

from a contractual agreement and do not sound in tort. We affirm.

I. Background
On March 18, 2020, Victor Bettis established the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust. Prior

to the creation of the trust, Victor owned an Ameriprise IRA account. Gina Bettis, Victor’s

wife, was the named beneficiary of Victor’s IRA account. Pursuant to the terms of the trust,

however, Victor’s IRA was to become an asset of the trust. Victor’s children, Evan Connoly

Bettis and Megan Marie Bettis (“Trustees”) allege that a “Tax-Qualified Accounts

Designation” changed the beneficiary of Victor’s IRA from Gina to the Victor L. Bettis

Living Trust and was forwarded by Victor’s estate-planning attorney to Wilson, the

Ameriprise representative, for processing. They further allege that Ameriprise negligently

failed to timely process the beneficiary-change request before Victor’s death on July 8, 2020.

As a result of such negligence, Gina—rather than Victor’s trust—remained the beneficiary

when Victor died.

On August 17, Evan and Megan filed suit as the Trustees of the Victor L. Bettis Living

Trust against Ameriprise and Wilson. In their complaint, they allege that they are the

successor Trustees of the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust, which became irrevocable upon

Victor’s death. Appellees assert a claim against Ameriprise and Wilson for their negligence

in not timely processing the change-of-beneficiary form.

On October 29, 2020, Ameriprise filed its third-party complaint and counterclaim

for interpleader against Gina. After Victor’s death on July 8, the proceeds of Victor’s IRA

were used to fund Gina’s IRA. Ameriprise alleged that Gina’s IRA ownership conflicts with

the Trustees’ contention that Ameriprise and its representative were negligent. Even though

the Trustees assert neither a claim against Gina nor a claim to Gina’s IRA, Ameriprise

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contends that the Trustees and Gina have conflicting claims to the funds in Gina’s IRA, and

Ameriprise should therefore be permitted to interplead Gina’s IRA and be absolved from

further liability to Gina for her IRA.

On November 19, Gina filed a motion to compel Ameriprise and Wilson to arbitrate

their claims. On December 3, Ameriprise and Wilson filed a countermotion to compel

arbitration as to all parties. Following a hearing, the circuit court initially denied Gina’s

motion and did not rule on Ameriprise and Wilson’s countermotion. Gina timely appealed

that interlocutory order, and we reversed and remanded the circuit court order, finding that

there was a valid arbitration agreement between Gina and Ameriprise and Wilson. See Bettis

v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 350 (Ameriprise I).

On remand, the circuit court ordered arbitration as to Bettis’s countercomplaint

against appellants. Appellants then moved for the circuit court to require appellees to also

submit to arbitration. After requesting full briefing on the issue, the circuit court issued a

written order:

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s description of the relationship here is
correct and, accordingly, the Ameriprise Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Arbitration as to the Plaintiffs should be, and is hereby, ordered DENIED.

Ameriprise argues that Plaintiffs would be using the contract as sword
and shield—taking advantage of it to hale Ameriprise into court but ignoring
a contractual duty to arbitrate. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ claims
against the Defendants sound in tort and that they are not suing Defendants
pursuant to the terms of a contract. Plaintiffs’ case against Defendants is owing
to an allegation of breach of a duty of care by failing to properly amend a
beneficiary form. Plaintiffs deny that they are a party to any contract with
Ameriprise, and the Court agrees that their cause of action against Defendants
does not flow from a contractual duty.

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Ameriprise now brings this interlocutory appeal.

II. Preservation

An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is immediately appealable pursuant

to Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(12) (2025). We review a circuit court’s

denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo on the record. Courtyard Gardens Health &

Rehab., LLC v. Arnold, 2016 Ark. 62, 485 S.W.3d 669; Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC

v. Phillips, 2019 Ark. 305, at 4, 586 S.W.3d 624, 628–29.

It is undisputed that

this court will not consider arguments that are not preserved for appellate review. It
is incumbent upon the parties to raise arguments initially to the circuit court in order
to give that court an opportunity to consider them. Otherwise, we would be placed
in the position of possibly reversing a circuit court for reasons not addressed by that
court.

ProAssurance Indem. Co. v. Metheny, 2012 Ark. 461, at 18, 425 S.W.3d 689, 699–700 (internal

citations omitted). Failure to obtain a ruling on an issue precludes our review on appeal, and

“[w]hen a circuit court does not provide a ruling on an issue, it is an appellant’s responsibility

to obtain a ruling to preserve the issue for appeal.” Pritchett v. Spicer, 2017 Ark. 82, at 9, 513

S.W.3d 252, 257–58 (internal citations omitted); see Pines - Progressive Eldercare Servs., Inc. v.

Brock, 2025 Ark. App. 63, at 6, 706 S.W.3d 1, 4 (holding that an issue raised below but not

specifically ruled on is not preserved for review).

The Trustees argue that Ameriprise and Wilson have not preserved their first two

arguments for appeal, making their third argument irrelevant. Specifically, the Trustees note

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that Ameriprise and Wilson did not get a specific ruling on the issues of whether the FAA

encompasses tort claims, nor did they obtain a ruling as to whether the Trustees were third-

party beneficiaries. Ameriprise and Wilson argue that their arguments are preserved by both

Ameriprise I and through their attempts to get the court to issue specific findings. Both claims

are belied by the record.

Specifically, Ameriprise and Wilson allege that “[a]pplication of the FAA to the

Ameriprise Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”) is the law of the case.” In so stating, they

misrepresent our holding in Ameriprise I. In Ameriprise I, this court held that there was a valid

arbitration agreement between Ameriprise and Gina Bettis. Gina is not a party to this appeal.

This court then specifically held,

The circuit court did not rule on their countermotion to compel arbitration
as to all parties or dismiss the complaint for failure to join a necessary party.
Consequently, their countermotion is not ripe for appellate review. “Ripeness
is a jurisdictional requirement, and we lack jurisdiction to consider issues that
are not ripe for appellate review.” Howard v. Jenkins, 2019 Ark. App. 15, at 6,
568 S.W.3d 771, 776 (denying appellate review of motion not yet ruled on by
circuit court in interlocutory appeal).

Ameriprise I, 2023 Ark. App. 350, at 4 Moreover, at no point did this court even mention the

FAA in Ameriprise I. In fact, Ameriprise and Wilson readily agreed that they were bound by

an arbitration agreement with Gina. Thus, Ameriprise I did not rule on whether the Trustees

were bound by arbitration or whether the FAA applied, and it cannot be used to preserve

their current arguments in this appeal.

Ameriprise and Wilson also claim that “[a]fter remand, [they] did everything in their

power to obtain rulings on [their] own motion to compel arbitration.” Specifically, they note

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that they sent several letters to the court, requested that the circuit court rule on their

motion, and prepared their own order for the circuit court to sign. The record does not

support this finding. The mandate in Ameriprise I was filed in the case below on October 3,

2023. Since that date, Ameriprise and Wilson have filed only a single motion with an

attached order. In the motion, Ameriprise and Wilson did not discuss the appellees at all.

Yet, in their proposed order, they added the language “Defendants’ Counter Motion to

Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall submit their dispute to FINRA

arbitration.” The circuit court initially signed this order before it issued a new order holding

the following:

The second Order entered by the Court on April 1, 2024, ordering Ameriprise
and Doug Wilson to arbitrate with all parties, granting Defendants’ Counter-
Motion to Compel Arbitration with FINRA, is inconsistent with the remand
and Opinion from the Arkansas Court of Appeals. It was entered in error by
this Court and should be set aside.

Ameriprise and Wilson then submitted a new proposed order in which the only change

made was that Gina was required to arbitrate through the AAA instead of the FINRA. The

court issued an order stating it would “not entertain Ameriprise’s amended proposed order”

because it was moot. At no point, postmandate, do Ameriprise and Wilson attempt to obtain

a ruling on whether the Trustees were third-party beneficiaries. Ameriprise and Wilson also

failed to request a ruling on whether the FAA encompasses tort claims.

Therein lies the problem: the circuit court never specifically ruled on these issues. As

a result, we do not address them now. The mere fact that Ameriprise and Wilson argued

these issues below is not sufficient to preserve them for appeal now. See Mabe v. Latco Constr.,

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Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 154, at 10, 662 S.W.3d 717, 723 (“Although we agree that appellants

raised [the issue] below, albeit intermittently, the law is well settled that in the absence of a

ruling, it is not preserved for our review.”).

Thus, since we find that Ameriprise and Wilson’s first two points on appeal are not

preserved, we need not reach their third point—whether the Trustees’ claim sounds in tort

or contract—because it is irrelevant to the issue of arbitration before us. Accordingly, we

affirm the circuit court’s order denying Ameriprise and Wilson’s countermotion to compel

the Trustees to arbitrate.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

Kutak Rock LLP, by: Andrew King and McKenzie L. Raub, for appellants.

The Jiles Firm, LLP, by: Matthew K. Brown and Thomas V. Vinson, for appellees.

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