Martha Hughes v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 179
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-22-269

MARTHA HUGHES Opinion Delivered March 13, 2024
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 30CR-19-43]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE EDDY R. EASLEY,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Martha Hughes appeals her convictions from the Hot Spring County Circuit Court.

This case is before us for the second time. It was first filed as a no-merit appeal along with a

motion to withdraw; we denied the motion and required rebriefing in merit format. See

Hughes v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 316.

A jury convicted Hughes of one count of possession of methamphetamine with

purpose to deliver and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. She was acquitted of

the simultaneous-possession-of-drugs-and-firearms charge. Hughes was sentenced to

consecutive sentences totaling forty-six years’ imprisonment. As her sole claim for reversal

here, Hughes claims the circuit court violated her right to due process by denying her motion

to remove juror Candace Stricklin and replace her with an alternate juror. We affirm.
At trial, after the first witness’s testimony, the circuit court recessed for lunch. During

the recess, Stricklin was sitting with other jurors in the jury room when she received a

Facebook notification that Caleb Hughes had sent her a friend request and the following

message: “I’ll love you long time if you could help my mom out on being wrongfully tried.”

Upon seeing it, juror Stricklin stated out loud, “I think her son tried to message me,”

and she stepped outside of the jury room to notify the bailiff. After being told of Hughes’s

son’s message to Stricklin, the court conducted an in camera hearing in which it and counsel

for both parties questioned her. Stricklin testified that Caleb Hughes played on her fiancé’s

softball team; however, she did not know him well, had never socialized with him outside of

the softball games, and did not know that he was Hughes’s son until she received the

Facebook friend request and message.

Stricklin testified that neither the receipt of the friend message nor the discovery that

Caleb Hughes was Hughes’s son affected her ability to be impartial. She was uncertain as to

whether any of the other jurors heard her state that she had received the message but

confirmed that she would comply with the court’s instruction to not discuss the matter

further and to notify the court if anyone attempted to discuss the matter with her.

After questioning Stricklin, the court and counsel for both parties questioned each

of the other jurors individually, including the two alternate jurors, in chambers to determine

whether they knew about the message and, if so, the extent of their knowledge and the effect

it had on their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Each of the jurors who was aware

of the message testified that it did not affect their ability to be a fair and impartial juror, and

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all the jurors confirmed that they would comply with the court’s instruction not to discuss

the matter further. The circuit court found that Hughes’s allegations of bias were purely

speculative, and it denied her motion to remove juror Stricklin for cause.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of two law enforcement officers and a

forensic chemist. In 2018, Agent Roy Bethel with the Clark County Sheriff’s Department

began an investigation after receiving a “steady” stream of complaints that narcotics were

being sold from the camper trailer where Hughes lived. During the months-long

investigation, Officer Dillon Ledbetter with the Hot Spring County Sheriff’s Department

conducted surveillance on Hughes’s residence and recovered methamphetamine from four

vehicles leaving Hughes’s trailer.

When the officers executed the search warrant for Hughes’s trailer on January 18,

2019, two other adults and a child were present inside the trailer. After Agent Bethel

informed Hughes that the officers were there to search for narcotics and paraphernalia, she

responded, “Well, I don’t need you tearing up my whole place, I’ll tell you where it’s at.”

Upon searching the inside of the trailer, the officers seized five clear plastic bags and a plastic

container suspected of containing methamphetamine, a clear plastic bag suspected of

containing marijuana, five used methamphetamine glass pipes, three syringes, two sets of

scales with white residue suspected to be methamphetamine, and a loaded shotgun.

A notebook with Hughes’s name on the front of it, which appeared to be used as a

business ledger to record drug sales, also was seized. Forensic chemist Quinton Bryant with

the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that the white crystalline substance contained

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in the baggies that were tested was methamphetamine, and it weighed more than two grams.

The jury found Hughes guilty of one count of possession of methamphetamine with the

purpose to deliver and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, but it acquitted her

on the count of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms.

On appeal, Hughes argues that the circuit court violated her right to due process by

denying her motion to remove juror Stricklin and replace her with an alternate juror. The

Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a

criminal defendant “a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence

before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine

the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982);

see also, e.g., Finch v. State, 2018 Ark. 111, at 6–7, 542 S.W.3d 143, 147.

If a juror’s impartiality and, therefore, the integrity of jury proceedings is jeopardized

by an unauthorized invasion, the remedy “is a hearing in which the defendant has the

opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith, 455 U.S. at 216. Due process is satisfied when the

circuit court “determine[s] the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and

whether or not prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.”

Id. (quoting Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S. 227, 230).

This is precisely the remedy accorded by the circuit court in this case. Taking into

consideration the circumstances surrounding Hughes’s son’s improper midtrial contact with

juror Stricklin and its impact on her and the other jurors, the circuit court found that

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Hughes’s allegations of prejudice were purely speculative, and it denied her motion to

remove juror Stricklin for cause.

Further, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to

remove Stricklin from the jury. A juror is presumed to be unbiased and qualified to serve.

E.g., Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 567, 39 S.W.3d 739, 748 (2001). The burden is on the

appellant to prove that a juror was prevented by any circumstance from acting impartially,

and as a result, there is a reasonable probability of prejudice. E.g., id. Whether a juror is

impartial is addressed to the sound discretion of the circuit court. E.g., id.

“In matters involving impartiality of jurors, we have consistently deferred to the trial

court’s opportunity to observe jurors and gauge their answers in determining whether their

impartiality was affected.” Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 991, 936 S.W.2d 509, 548 (1996);

see also, e.g., Strickland v. State, 74 Ark. App. 206, 210, 46 S.W.3d 554, 557 (2001) (“The trial

court has much latitude and discretion in passing on the qualifications of jurors, and unless

abused, its action will not be reversed on appeal.”). The abuse of discretion standard “is a

high threshold that does not simply require error in the trial court’s decision, but requires

that the trial court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Grant

v. State, 357 Ark. 91, 93, 161 S.W.3d 785, 786 (2004).

Under these standards, we must affirm. The circuit court did not act thoughtlessly,

improvidently, or without due consideration in denying Hughes’s motion to remove the

juror. The court conducted a thorough and careful voir dire of each juror. As required, it

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considered the circumstance of the external contact, and asked the jurors to assess the extent

and the effect it had on their ability to act impartially. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 216.

Having heard the testimony, the court found that Stricklin could remain impartial.

The circuit court was in the best position to determine whether Stricklin’s impartiality was

affected, and our court defers to the circuit court’s determination that she could remain fair

and impartial. See, e.g., Echols, 326 Ark. at 991, 936 S.W.2d at 548.

Hughes’s contention that Stricklin was unable to remain impartial is speculative, and

her arguments do not cite any legal authority to support her position. The circuit court found

that Stricklin came into the case with a clear mind and had no knowledge or bias against any

party or witness who testified in the matter. Stricklin, appropriately and promptly, reported

the message. Stricklin assured the court that she could fulfill her obligation to decide the

case fairly and impartially solely on the evidence presented at trial. See Childs v. State, 2010

Ark. App. 675, at 4–5 (holding that due to juror’s ultimate assurance to the court that she

could be objective, the circuit court did not err by refusing appellant’s midtrial motion to

remove a juror due to her belated realization that she knew the mother of one of the victims).

Given our standard of review and the record presented before us, we affirm the circuit

court’s denial of Hughes’s motion to remove Stricklin from the jury after finding that the

message she received from Hughes’s son did not affect her ability to perform her duties as a

fair and impartial juror. As such, Hughes’s convictions are affirmed.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and THYER, JJ., agree.

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Jeremy D. Wann, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Rebecca Kane, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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