HAISLIP v. AL-SHAWABKEH, Et Ai.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MATTHEW HAISLIP, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

NIZAR J. AL-SHAWABKEH, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0631

FILED 05-14-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-052057
The Honorable Melissa Iyer Julian, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Lento Law Group, Inc., Phoenix
By John Bain
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

WilkiePuchi, LLP, Scottsdale
By Blake Wilkie
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Parker Schwartz, PLLC, Phoenix
By Ira M. Schwartz, Byron H. Forrester
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
HAISLIP, et al. v. AL-SHAWABKEH, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Matthew Haislip appeals from the superior court’s order
awarding damages, attorney’s fees, and costs to Nizar Al-Shawabkeh. We
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Haislip and Al-Shawabkeh orally agreed to purchase two
businesses together. In August 2022, they purchased Sugar Daddy Smoke
Shop, LLC (“Sugar Daddy”). In September 2022, they purchased Oh Baby
Smoke Shop, LLC (“Oh Baby”).

¶3 Haislip and Al-Shawabkeh agreed that they would jointly
own the businesses and share profits equally. Al-Shawabkeh would be
responsible for operating the businesses, with Haislip responsible for
capital contributions and working in the stores as needed.

¶4 The businesses operated informally. Al-Shawabkeh and
Haislip opened a joint bank account, but at times the joint account did not
have enough funds to cover business expenses, so Al-Shawabkeh would
cover the costs then later reimburse himself from the joint account. The
businesses did not have a formal payroll system and did not document
hours worked by employees, but Al-Shawabkeh would pay employees
from the joint account. Al-Shawabkeh would also transfer funds from the
joint account to himself when there were profits. Al-Shawabkeh and
Haislip, together with a store employee, had a group text in which they
would send pictures of receipts, invoices, and inventory to document
expenses.

¶5 In January 2023, Al-Shawabkeh and Haislip decided to end
their business relationship and agreed to divide the businesses. Their
separation agreement resulted in Al-Shawabkeh wholly owning Oh Baby
and Haislip wholly owning Sugar Daddy. To equalize distributions they
had received from the businesses, Haislip wrote two separate checks to Al-

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Decision of the Court

Shawabkeh for $2,001 and $2,000, but Haislip asked Al-Shawabkeh to wait
a month before cashing the check for $2,000.

¶6 The first check cleared, but the second bounced when Al-
Shawabkeh tried to deposit it. Haislip stated that he cancelled the second
check because a forensic accounting showed more than $70,000 in
unauthorized payments to Al-Shawabkeh.

¶7 Haislip sued Al-Shawabkeh for breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of a statutory
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Al-Shawabkeh
counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging Haislip breached the
separation agreement by cancelling the $2,000 check.

¶8 In his complaint, Haislip alleged that a forensic accounting
would show the improper transfer of funds to Al-Shawabkeh’s personal
account. But in January 2025, Al-Shawabkeh moved to exclude the
referenced forensic accounting. Haislip did not object to that motion, and
the court granted it.

¶9 At a March 2025 bench trial, Haislip and Al-Shawabkeh
testified. Haislip asserted that Al-Shawabkeh did not provide enough
receipts to demonstrate the $70,000 he took was for business expenses. Al-
Shawabkeh testified in response that he left the receipts with Haislip after
the businesses were divided.

¶10 After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court
found that Haislip did not provide sufficient evidence to prove his claims,
and that he breached the agreement with Al-Shawabkeh by cancelling the
$2,000 check. The court entered judgment for Al-Shawabkeh on all claims,
awarding $2,000 in damages, $53,217.50 in attorney’s fees (in part as a
sanction and in part under A.R.S. § 12-341.01), together with $369.61 in
costs.

¶11 Haislip timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Haislip asserts that the superior court erred by: (1) entering
judgment for Al-Shawabkeh on all claims, and (2) awarding attorney’s fees
and costs to Al-Shawabkeh.

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I. Judgment on All Claims.

¶13 Haislip argues the superior court erred by finding that he
failed to establish any of his claims. We review the court’s factual findings
after a bench trial for clear error. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

¶14 Haislip asserted various contract and fraud claims, as well as
conversion and unjust enrichment. These claims are all premised on
Haislip’s allegation that Al-Shawabkeh stole money from their businesses.

¶15 The plaintiff has the burden of proving their case. Yeazell v.
Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 116 (1965). The trial evidence here supports the court’s
findings. Haislip conceded that the full amount of $70,000 pleaded in the
complaint was not established at trial. And although Haislip referenced a
forensic accounting, he did not oppose Al-Shawabkeh’s pretrial motion to
preclude it, and the accounting was never placed in evidence.

¶16 Al-Shawabkeh testified that the business funds transferred to
his personal account could have been from paying himself wages,
distributing profits, or reimbursing himself for purchasing business
inventory. He testified that the parties did not maintain formal records of
business profits or expenses but that the receipts for purchases were often
documented in their mutual group chat. Al-Shawabkeh also testified that,
after the business relationship ended, he left receipts for these purchases
with Haislip. Haislip had access to all business accounts and the group chat
messages during the parties’ joint ownership.

¶17 Haislip’s argument on appeal primarily attacks Al-
Shawabkeh’s credibility, asserting that his testimony explaining why the
funds were transferred should not have been accepted. But we do not
reweigh the evidence presented to the superior court and defer to that
court’s determinations of witness credibility. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246
Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019).

¶18 Haislip also argues the superior court erred by entering
judgment for Al-Shawabkeh without making findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to the basis of the judgment. But Haislip did not
request findings of fact; thus, the superior court was not required to make
specific findings. See Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 494–95, ¶ 10 (App.
2014). And when no findings and conclusions are requested, we assume
the superior court “found every fact necessary to support its [ruling] and
must affirm if any reasonable construction of the evidence justifies the
decision.” Horton v. Mitchell, 200 Ariz. 523, 526, ¶ 13 (App. 2001) (alteration

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in original) (citation omitted). Here, given Al-Shawabkeh’s testimony, the
court’s ruling is supported by the evidence.

II. Attorney’s Fees.

¶19 Haislip challenges the superior court’s award of attorney’s
fees in favor of Al-Shawabkeh, arguing the fees were excessive and that the
court misapplied the factors set forth in Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner,
143 Ariz. 585 (App. 1983), for assessing an attorney’s fees request.1

¶20 We review the superior court’s decision to award attorney’s
fees for an abuse of discretion. Radkowsky v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 196 Ariz. 110, 113, ¶ 18 (App. 1999). We view the record in the light
most favorable to sustaining the decision and will not disturb that decision
if it is supported by any reasonable basis. Rowland v. Great States Ins. Co.,
199 Ariz. 577, 587, ¶ 31 (App. 2001).

¶21 “In any contested action arising out of a contract, express or
implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney
fees.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). “[I]n determining whether attorney’s fees
should be awarded under the statute,” Warner identified the following
factors to apply: (1) the merits of the unsuccessful party’s claim; (2) whether
the claim could have been avoided or settled and whether the successful
party’s efforts were completely superfluous in achieving the result; (3)
whether assessing fees would cause an extreme hardship; (4) whether the
successful party prevailed on all relief sought; (5) whether the matter
presented a novel question; (6) whether such claim had previously been
adjudicated in this jurisdiction; and (7) whether the award would
discourage other parties with tenable claims from litigating. Warner, 143
Ariz. at 570.

¶22 Haislip only challenges the application of the first four Warner
factors, contending the court should have reached a different outcome for
each of them.

¶23 Haislip’s argument is unpersuasive. First, the court
considered whether Haislip’s contract and fraud claims had merit and
found he did not provide any supporting evidence. Haislip argues that the

1 Although both parties reference the 1983 decision by this court in
Warner, the attorney’s fees portion of that decision was vacated by the
Arizona Supreme Court in 1985. See Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143
Ariz. 567, 571 (1985). Accordingly, we apply the 1985 Arizona Supreme
Court decision here.

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Decision of the Court

court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding witness credibility
when it relied on Al-Shawabkeh’s testimony that the allegedly stolen funds
were used for business expenses. But because Haislip never requested
findings of fact or conclusions of law, specific findings were not required,
and we presume the court found every fact necessary to support its ruling.
See Horton, 200 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 13.

¶24 Second, the court considered whether the claim could have
been avoided or settled and whether the successful party’s efforts were
completely superfluous in achieving the result. Although Haislip argues
he should not be faulted for his counsel’s conduct, he conceded this factor
weighed in favor of Al-Shawabkeh in his objection to Al-Shawabkeh’s
application for attorney’s fees in superior court.

¶25 Third, in rejecting Haislip’s assertion that a fee award would
be an extreme hardship, the court noted that Haislip did not adequately
support his claims because argument made in an unsworn filing, without
supporting evidence, did not show hardship. On appeal, Haislip again
argues that the fee award would cause extreme hardship, stating his income
was below the federal poverty level in 2022 and 2023. But Haislip did not
provide evidence to support his hardship argument when he objected to
Al-Shawabkeh’s application for fees. See Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 167 Ariz.
412, 420 (App. 1990) (“[T]he party asserting financial hardship has the
burden of coming forward with prima facie evidence of financial
hardship.”).

¶26 Finally, the superior court found that Al-Shawabkeh had
prevailed with respect to the relief sought. And as detailed above, this court
has affirmed the judgment in favor of Al-Shawabkeh.

¶27 Because there is a reasonable basis in the record for the
superior court’s findings on these factors, the court did not abuse its
discretion by awarding attorney’s fees.

III. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal.

¶28 Both parties request attorney’s fees on appeal. Haislip cites
no authority for his request, so it is denied. See ARCAP 21(a)(2). Al-
Shawabkeh requests attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Because he is
the successful party on appeal, and in an exercise of our discretion, we
award him reasonable attorney’s fees upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
See A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Al-Shawabkeh is also entitled to taxable costs on
appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

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Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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