Sacramento City Unified School District (PERB 2597E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION LOCAL 1021,
Charging Party,
v.
SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CE-2732-E
PERB Decision No. 2597
November 19, 2018
Appearances: Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld by Anthony Tucci, Attorney, for Service
Employees International, Local 1021; Lozano Smith by Gabriela Flowers, Attorney, for
Sacramento City Unified School District.
Before Winslow, Shiners, and Krantz, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions to a proposed decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ).
Charging Party Service Employees International Union Local 1021 (SEIU) alleges that
Respondent Sacramento City Unified School District (District) violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act (EERA),1 section 3543.5 subdivisions (a), (b) and (c), in
responding to SEIU’s requests for information (RFIs). Specifically, SEIU contends that the
District violated its duty to meet and negotiate in good faith when it asserted that (1) SEIU
requested documents that were not relevant and necessary to the union’s role as the exclusive
representative of certain District employees, and (2) the District would assess and answer
1 The EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise
specified, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

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SEIU’s RFIs as if they were exclusively public records requests under the California Public
Records Act (CPRA).2
The ALJ correctly noted that an employer may not interpose a CPRA exemption as a
defense to an RFI under a labor relations statute. The ALJ found, however, that the District
considered the RFIs under EERA, or, alternatively, that the District sufficiently complied with
its duties under EERA when it raised privacy concerns and provided SEIU with redacted
copies of the requested documents. The ALJ accordingly concluded that SEIU’s charge should
be dismissed. SEIU excepted to the proposed decision. The District filed no exceptions and
urges us to affirm the proposed decision.
We have reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments in light of
applicable law. For the reasons we explain below, we find that the District failed to meet and
negotiate in good faith when it denied that the RFIs were relevant and necessary to SEIU’s role
as an exclusive representative under EERA, and when it proceeded to analyze and respond to
the RFIs exclusively under the CPRA.
BACKGROUND
In 2013, the District terminated an SEIU-represented custodian, Ramon Bernabe
(Bernabe), for allegedly placing a piece of tape on a student’s mouth. SEIU Field
Representative Ian Arnold (Arnold) represented Bernabe in appeal proceedings challenging the
termination pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between SEIU and the District.
Arnold learned that in 2012 the District had sent a termination notice to a teacher,
Catherine Nowlin (Nowlin), for similar conduct, and that Nowlin eventually returned to work.
Arnold asked the District’s Human Resources Director, Carol Mignone Stephen (Mignone
Stephen), whether the District was treating Bernabe disparately in comparison to Nowlin.
2 The CPRA is codified at section 6250 et seq.
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According to Arnold, Mignone Stephen answered that an arbitrator had returned Nowlin to
work over the District’s objection.
On October 31, 2013, Arnold learned that the District actually had reinstated Nowlin
pursuant to a settlement agreement (Agreement). That same day, Arnold e-mailed District
Assistant Superintendent Cancy McArn (McArn), voicing displeasure at having received
incorrect information about Nowlin’s case and requesting that the District provide SEIU with a
copy of the Agreement by November 4, 2013, as the parties were scheduled to commence
Bernabe’s termination appeal hearing on November 7, 2013 and to complete the hearing on
November 8, 2013. McArn responded on November 2, 2013, as follows:
Hi,
Thanks for the email. I’m not sure if this is meant as a RFI or as
something else; however, our legal representatives will respond,
once they’ve reviewed the request and the facts.
Take Care,
Cancy
On November 5, 2013, SEIU counsel Anthony Tucci (Tucci) wrote to District counsel
Gabriela Flowers (Flowers), reiterating SEIU’s request for the Agreement as well as its
relevance to Bernabe’s appeal and, in particular, his disparate treatment defense. Tucci cited
Piedmont Gardens (2012) 359 NLRB 499 (Piedmont Gardens) for the proposition that an
employer’s duty to meet and negotiate in good faith can require it to provide requested
documents relevant to a grievance even when the documents may contain arguably confidential
information. Also on November 5, 2013, Flowers wrote to Nowlin’s attorney, notifying her of
SEIU’s request, informing her that the District planned to disclose a copy of the Agreement
with all names redacted, and giving her until November 11, 2013 to object to the District’s
planned disclosure.
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On November 7, 2013, Flowers wrote to Tucci. Flowers first denied that the
Agreement was necessary and relevant for SEIU’s representation of Bernabe, arguing that the
Agreement involved a different employee classification in a different bargaining unit and
therefore was not relevant to Bernabe’s case. Flowers further argued that Piedmont Gardens
was distinguishable because it involved arguably private information found in witness
statements rather than in a settlement agreement. Having thus implicitly denied that EERA
required the District to provide SEIU with the Agreement, Flowers proceeded to notify Tucci
as follows:
Nevertheless, your request for information is also being regarded
under the [CPRA]. The District intends to comply with the
request, but shall redact the names of any individuals from the
agreement. We notified the certificated employee’s legal counsel
of the District’s intent to comply with SEIU’s request pursuant to
Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District (2012)
202 Cal.App.4th 1250 [Marken].3 We will provide the redacted
agreement in the event that the certificated employee/counsel
expresses no intent to object to the disclosure. If we receive
notice that the employee intends to object, we will notify you.
Bernabe’s termination appeal hearing commenced, as scheduled, on November 7, 2013.
The hearing did not, however, continue the following day as planned. Instead, the hearing
officer indefinitely postponed the second scheduled hearing date in order to allow further time
for the District to provide SEIU with a copy of the Agreement.
On November 13, 2013, Flowers wrote to Tucci, notifying him that Nowlin had no
objection to disclosing the Agreement. Flowers enclosed a copy of the Agreement with all
names redacted.4
3 Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1265 holds that a third party may bring a so-called
“reverse-CPRA” action seeking to preclude a public agency from answering a CPRA request
by disclosing records that arguably contain private information about the third party.
4 The District blacked out Nowlin’s name, the name of a District employee who would
serve as a reference for Nowlin, and the name of the District employee who signed the
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Agreement. The Agreement did not include student names, witness names, or any other
names.
Tucci responded to Flowers on November 13, 2013. In addition to thanking Flowers
for producing the Agreement, Tucci made three main points. First, Tucci informed Flowers
that while Marken applies to CPRA requests, SEIU has broader rights under EERA, and Tucci
enclosed a PERB Decision supporting his point, City of Redding (2011) PERB Decision
No. 2190-M (Redding). Second, Tucci disputed Flowers’ contention that information
pertaining to Nowlin’s case was not relevant and necessary; on this issue, Tucci noted that the
hearing officer had agreed that SEIU could make a disparate treatment argument irrespective
of the fact that Bernabe was a classified employee and Nowlin was a certificated employee.
Third, Tucci requested all information and documents pertaining to both the Nowlin and
Bernabe matters.
On November 18, 2013, Flowers responded to Tucci. Flowers noted that under the
Redding decision PERB does not necessarily presume that information pertaining to non-
bargaining unit employees is relevant, meaning that an exclusive representative may need to
demonstrate relevance.
On November 21, 2013, Tucci wrote Flowers. Tucci indicated that SEIU had, in the
interim since his letter of November 13, 2013, requested four specific items regarding the
Nowlin case: (1) the charging document; (2) any internal District reports; (3) any police
reports; and (4) the name of the District official who signed the Agreement. Tucci reiterated
that these items were relevant to understanding the extent to which the District may have
treated Bernabe disparately.
On December 10, 2013, Flowers wrote to Nowlin’s attorney, notifying her that SEIU
had requested the charging document, informing her that the District planned to disclose it with
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all names redacted, and giving her until December 17, 2013 to object to the District’s planned
disclosure. Flowers did not mention SEIU’s request for internal reports and police reports.
On December 11, 2013, Flowers wrote to Tucci. Flowers provided the name of the
District official who signed the Agreement and told Tucci that the District had no internal
reports or police reports. Flowers then addressed SEIU’s request for the charging document,
as follows:
Regarding the remaining item, consistent with the District’s
response to the SEIU’s initial RFI for Ms. Nowlin’s settlement
agreement, the RFI is also being regarded under the [CPRA].
The District intends to comply with the request, but shall redact
the names of any individuals from responsive documents. We
notified Ms. Nowlin’s legal counsel of the District’s intent to
comply with SEIU’s request pursuant to Marken . . . We will
provide the responsive redacted records in the event that the
certificated employee/counsel expresses no intent to object to the
disclosure. If we receive notice that the employee intends to
object, we will notify you.
The District did not receive any objection from Nowlin or her attorney by the
December 17, 2013 deadline the District had established. On December 19, 2013, SEIU filed
the instant unfair practice charge.
On January 15, 2014, having still not heard back from Nowlin’s attorney, Flowers
wrote again to Nowlin’s attorney, offering her a further chance to object and this time
providing no deadline for response. Nowlin’s attorney promptly responded, indicating that
Nowlin did not object to SEIU’s planned use of the charging document as evidence in the
Bernabe case. On January 16, 2014, Flowers provided Tucci with a copy of the charging
document with all names redacted.5
5 The charging document did not include any student names. Rather, it referred to the
primary student involved in the incident as “Student A,” and it referred to student witnesses
using phrases such as “one student stated” or “students reported.” The District whited out
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Nowlin’s name, the name of a teacher aide allegedly involved in the wrongdoing, the names of
adult witnesses, and the names of District officials.
Although Flowers had previously denied that the District possessed any police report
relevant to Nowlin’s case, on January 23, 2014, Flowers wrote to Tucci again, and this time
she enclosed a redacted police report. Flowers explained that the report was not in Nowlin’s
personnel file, but the District did possess a copy of it. It appears that the District did not give
Nowlin or her attorney an opportunity to object prior to disclosing the police report. The
District made different redaction choices for the police report, this time choosing not to redact
Nowlin’s name, nor to redact the name of the teacher aide who was allegedly involved in the
same improper conduct, Rene Knight. Flowers explained these new redaction choices as
follows:
[I]t has been our experience that in other jurisdictions when a
police department has disclosed police reports pursuant under
[sic] the CPRA, the names of witnesses, victims, and guardians
have been redacted along with addresses and other contact or
identifying information. Accordingly, the only names which
have not been redacted are those of the police officers involved in
the investigation, Ms. Nowlin, and Ms. Knight, the classified aide
involved in the conduct that was the subject of the police
investigation.
On March 13, 2014, Bernabe’s termination appeal hearing resumed for a second and
final day. Ultimately, the hearing officer found in favor of the District. The hearing officer
rejected SEIU’s disparate treatment argument, finding it significant that Nowlin disputed the
factual allegations against her, while Bernabe’s conduct was caught on video. The hearing
officer also found it significant that teachers are responsible for maintaining order in the
classroom, while custodians have no such responsibility.
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DISCUSSION
Although the Board reviews exceptions to a proposed decision de novo, the Board need
not address alleged errors that have no bearing on the outcome. (Los Angeles Unified School
District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2432, p. 2; Regents of the University of California (1991)
PERB Decision No. 891-H, p. 4.) Here, SEIU filed three exceptions. We address SEIU’s
exception to the ALJ’s finding that the District considered the RFIs under EERA, as well as
SEIU’s exception to the ALJ’s alternative finding that the District sufficiently complied with
its duties under EERA when it raised privacy concerns as part of its CPRA analysis and
provided SEIU with redacted copies of the requested documents. We do not address SEIU’s
final exception, which concerns an ALJ finding on a witness’s testimony, as it has no bearing
on the outcome.
Under EERA and the other statutes that PERB administers, an exclusive representative
is entitled to all information that is necessary and relevant to discharge its representational
duties. (Petaluma City Elementary School District/Joint Union High School District (2016)
PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 17 (Petaluma).) The terms “necessary” and “relevant” are
interchangeable, and a charging party union meets its burden by showing that it has requested
relevant information, without also having to show, separately, that the information is
“necessary” to fulfilling the union’s representative function. (Id. at p. 21.) PERB uses a
liberal, discovery-type standard, similar to that used by the courts, to determine relevance.
(Id. at p. 16.)
When a union requests relevant information, the employer must either fully supply the
information or timely and adequately explain its reasons for not doing so, and the employer
bears the burden of proof as to any defense, limitation, or condition that it asserts. (Petaluma,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2485, pp. 19, 24.) A party answering an RFI must exercise the
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same diligence and thoroughness as it would “in other business affairs of importance,” and a
charging party need not show that it suffered harm or prejudice as a result of a responding
party’s lack of care. (Ibid.) In applying these principles, the Board has held that an employer
violates its duty to bargain in good faith if its delay in providing information is unreasonable
under the circumstances, even if the delay causes no prejudice. (Id. at p. 20.)
The documents related to Nowlin’s case were relevant to SEIU’s representation of
Bernabe in his termination appeal. While the District told SEIU that the documents were
irrelevant because Nowlin was a certificated employee and Bernabe was a classified employee,
the District does not stand behind that argument in its response to SEIU’s exceptions, and in
any event we disagree with that contention. No two instances of alleged misconduct ever
involve precisely the same circumstances. It is within a hearing officer’s purview to determine
the significance of such distinctions as part of his or her overall assessment of the challenged
discipline, but a hearing officer cannot do so unless the union is permitted to investigate and
present the evidence. In the instant case, for example, the hearing officer considered all facts
and ultimately rejected SEIU’s disparate treatment argument based on several distinctions
between Nowlin’s case and Bernabe’s case. The hearing officer’s opinion does not lessen our
conclusion that SEIU had a right to obtain, evaluate, and introduce evidence that arguably may
have supported a disparate treatment argument. The District was therefore mistaken in
asserting that information pertaining to Nowlin was not relevant to representing Bernabe.6
6 The District correctly noted that information pertaining to non-bargaining unit
employees is not presumed relevant, and the exclusive representative thus bears the burden of
demonstrating that such information is relevant and necessary to its representational duties.
(Redding, supra, PERB Decision No. 2190-M, p. 14) We continue to follow this principle.
We clarify, however, that a union may demonstrate relevance where it has requested
information that may help it compare the disciplinary circumstances relevant to a bargaining
unit employee, including the allegations and any resulting discipline, with prior circumstances
involving non-bargaining unit employees. We find that SEIU clearly explained the requested
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documents’ relevance in its letters of November 5, 2013 and November 13, 2013. To the
extent that the District expected SEIU to respond to the District’s letters with further
explanation of the Agreement’s relevance, the District wrongly ignored SEIU’s prior
explanation of the requested documents’ relevance. (Cf. Los Angeles Unified School District
(2015) PERB Decision No. 2438 (LAUSD), p. 16 [union had no duty to re-assert or clarify
information request where union’s position was “sufficiently clear”].)
Having determined that the requested information was relevant, we next consider
whether the District complied with its obligations under EERA. It is settled that an employer,
as part of its duty to fully answer a union’s request or else timely and adequately explain a
valid defense to disclosure, may not rely upon a CPRA exemption in place of a defense
recognized under PERB precedent. (Redding, supra, PERB Decision No. 2190-M, adopting
proposed decision at p. 17; State of California (Department of Veterans Affairs) (2004) PERB
Decision No. 1686-S, pp. 5-6; Trustees of the California State University (2004) PERB
Decision No. 1591-H, p. 3; accord, County of San Bernardino (Office of the Public Defender)
(2015) PERB Decision No. 2423-M (San Bernardino), p. 40, fn. 22.) The instant case presents
a closely related issue: Did the District violate EERA when it failed or refused to respond to
SEIU’s valid request for information under EERA and instead responded to the request under
the CPRA? We hold that the District violated EERA, as it failed to acknowledge its duty to
bargain in good faith and SEIU’s right to information, altered the procedures and standards that
govern information requests, and frustrated SEIU’s ability (as well as PERB’s ability) to assure
that the District complied with the law. We explain.
The CPRA provides rights to all members of the public, including unions. In contrast,
labor relations statutes provide only the bargaining parties—employers and unions—with a
right to request information and documents from one another. Given that unions are entrusted
with representational duties and granted corresponding rights that permit them to carry out
such important functions, PERB-administered statutes provide unions with more expansive
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access to information and records beyond that available under the CPRA. (State of California
(Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, PERB Decision No. 1686-S, p. 6 & fn. 4.) Thus, we
have noted that a union’s unique representational functions gives it a right to arguably private
information such as employee contact information, workplace complaint investigation reports,
employee rating sheets, lists summarizing employee retirement elections, names of reassigned
employees, and disciplinary records, including, in certain circumstances, unredacted
disciplinary records. (LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438, pp. 8-9 [collecting and
summarizing cases]; accord, Redding, supra, PERB Decision No. 2190-M, adopting proposed
decision at pp. 16-18 [ordering disclosure and rejecting employer defenses that requested
documents implicated “constitutionally significant privacy rights of third parties, managers and
non-unit employees, whom the union does not represent,” and that these parties “have
confidentiality rights also protected by the [CPRA]”].)
Furthermore, the CPRA allows members of the public to access existing public records,
but an agency is not necessarily required to create a new set of public records in order to
answer a CPRA request. (See, e.g., Fredericks v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 209,
217 & 227 [while in certain cases a public agency is required to extract information from
requested records, in other instances creation of new records may exceed agency’s duties under
CPRA].) A union’s RFI, in contrast, may cover both public records and information that may
not be found in any existing record. Thus, an employer responding to an RFI may be required
to compile information from multiple records, management agents, and other sources, unless it
can prove that doing so would be unduly burdensome. (Regents of the University of California
(Davis) (2010) PERB Decision No. 2101-H, pp. 33-34; Chula Vista City School District (1990)
PERB Decision No. 834, p. 56 (Chula Vista).)
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By the same token, a responding party such as the District has additional duties under a
collective bargaining statute that go beyond its CPRA duties. For example, if a union’s request
as written (or as made orally) would lead to unduly burdensome costs, infringe on legitimate
privacy interests, or otherwise pose a need for clarification or discussion, an employer must
bargain in good faith with the union and seek to negotiate an appropriate accommodation.
(San Bernardino, supra, PERB Decision No. 2423-M, p. 50; Los Rios Community College
District (1988) PERB Decision No. 670, pp. 10-14; see also Chula Vista, supra, (1990) PERB
Decision No. 834, p. 56 [employer required to take those steps necessary to provide
information in a form that best accommodates competing interests, even if not convenient to do
so].) As relevant here, this line of precedent holds that when a union’s RFI seeks disclosure of
information that would infringe on legally cognizable privacy rights, the employer must meet
and negotiate in good faith to accommodate all legitimate competing interests. (LAUSD,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2438, adopting proposed decision at p. 15 [citing County of Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905 and holding
that an employer acts in bad faith if it unilaterally adopts its preferred method for dealing with
privacy concerns]; Detroit Newspaper Agency (1995) 317 NLRB 1071 [employer has duty to
raise confidentiality concerns in a timely manner and then meet with union to seek an
accommodation]; Pennsylvania Power Co. (1991) 301 NLRB 1104, 1105 [“a party refusing to
supply information on confidentiality grounds has a duty to seek an accommodation”].)
When an employer and union meet and negotiate over privacy concerns, they can
address all aspects of the problem, including the extent to which various levels of redaction
might lessen such concerns, as well as the extent to which such redaction methods might
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frustrate the union in carrying out its representational function.7 Bargaining parties may reach
a different result in each case based on the unique circumstances at issue. (State of California
(Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, PERB Decision No. 1686-S, p. 6.)
If redaction is not the best option, the bargaining parties may alternatively negotiate an
accommodation that recognizes “that unions [can] be trusted to be discreet.” (Redding, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2190-M, adopting proposed decision at p. 17, fn. 28.) For example,
bargaining parties can negotiate arrangements pursuant to which certain materials are used
only for a given arbitration, negotiation, or other similar purpose and are not released to the
public. (LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438, p. 20.) In contrast, however, such
arrangements are not practical under the CPRA, as once a public entity discloses a document to
one party, it typically must disclose the record to any member of the public irrespective of that
person or entity’s intended use of the record. (CPRA, § 6254.5.) Thus, even though the CPRA
and EERA in certain respects protect overlapping rights and interests, and many unions make
dual requests under both statutes, an employer must separately analyze its CPRA obligations
and its obligations under the collective bargaining statutes.
Here, the District incorrectly denied that the requested information was necessary and
relevant under EERA, even after SEIU provided a clear relevance explanation. The District
further frustrated EERA’s purposes by converting the applicable procedure from a two-way
negotiation to a unilateral decision, narrowing the range of available disclosure options, and
determining that SEIU would receive a redacted copy of the Agreement only if Nowlin’s
attorney expressed no objection. (See LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2438, adopting
7 In those instances in which redaction may be warranted, the parties can bargain over
the method of redaction. For instance, an employer may need to replace redacted names with
descriptive but de-identified placeholders such as “Teacher A” and “Student 1,” thereby
permitting all parties and the hearing officer to track the important figures within a given
discipline record or across multiple records.
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proposed decision at p. 15 [employer’s unilateral adoption of opt-out procedure to address
employee privacy concerns violated its duty to bargain].) Had the District not acted
unilaterally, the parties could have discussed the District’s privacy concerns and negotiated
over whether certain redactions or other measures were appropriate. Instead, the District’s
decision to treat SEIU’s RFI exclusively as a CPRA request led the District to make its own
redaction choices at every stage, cutting SEIU out of the process.8
The District argues that its letters show that it fully considered the RFIs and responded
appropriately under both the EERA and the CPRA. This argument mischaracterizes the record.
The evidence reveals that, in fact, the District incorrectly told SEIU that EERA provided no
right to the requested documents and doggedly maintained that it was providing redacted
documents solely under the CPRA.
Finally, although the ALJ found that SEIU failed to demonstrate that it would have
received more information if the District had properly analyzed and responded to the RFIs
under EERA, the ALJ reached this conclusion without the benefit of our decision in Petaluma,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2485, where we concluded that a charging party is not required to
show that it was harmed by an employer’s failure to use adequate care, diligence, or
8 Because the District flatly denied the relevance of SEIU’s requests, this case does not
require us to consider whether the District raised legitimate privacy concerns, nor to apply the
balancing test which governs those cases in which an employer and union have met and
negotiated over legitimate privacy issues but were unable to reach an accommodation.
(Redding, supra, PERB Decision No. 2190-M, p. 2 and adopting proposed decision, pp. 13-14
[if employer satisfies its burden of demonstrating that disclosure would compromise privacy
rights, PERB engages in balancing test set forth in Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB (1979)
440 U.S. 301, 314].) Notably, courts interpreting the CPRA also balance privacy rights against
the right to information. (See, e.g., Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1274-1276 [finding that
the public’s interest in an investigatory report and disciplinary record outweighed a teacher’s
privacy interest, but upholding the redactions directed by the superior court].) In any given
instance, the balancing test applicable in CPRA cases may or may not lead to the same
outcome as that applicable in PERB cases, given the extra rights and obligations that
distinguish bargaining parties from members of the public.
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thoroughness in responding to an RFI. (Id. at p. 23.) Thus, even if the District’s actions did
not impede SEIU’s ability to represent Bernabe in his appeal hearing, this would not absolve
the District of liability.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it is found that the Sacramento City Unified School District violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act (EERA), Government Code section 3543.5, subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c), by failing to meet and negotiate in good faith concerning necessary and relevant
information requested by Service Employees International Union Local 1021 (SEIU).
Pursuant to Government Code section 3541.5, subdivision (c), it hereby is ORDERED
that the Sacramento City Unified School District (District), and its representatives, shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
Failing to provide necessary and relevant information to SEIU pursuant to the
requirements of EERA.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Within ten (10) workdays following the date this decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all locations where notices to employees represented by SEIU are
customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be
signed by an authorized agent of the District, indicating that it will comply with the terms of
this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of thirty (30) consecutive workdays.
In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the Notice shall be posted by electronic
message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means customarily used by the District to
15

communicate with employees represented by SEIU. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure
that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced, or covered with any other material.
2. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board),
or the General Counsel’s designee. The District shall provide reports, in writing, as directed
by the General Counsel or his/her designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order
shall be concurrently served on SEIU.
Members Winslow and Shiners joined in this Decision.
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APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SA-CE-2732-E, Service Employees
International Union Local 1021 v. Sacramento City Unified School District, in which all
parties had the right to participate, it has been found that the Sacramento City Unified School
District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), Government Code
section 3543.5, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), by failing to meet and negotiate in good faith
concerning necessary and relevant information requested by Service Employees International
Union Local 1021(SEIU).
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
Failing to provide necessary and relevant information to SEIU pursuant to the
requirements of EERA.
Dated: _____________________ 	Sacramento City Unified School District
By:
Authorized Agent
_________________________________
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST THIRTY
(30) CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.