San Bernardino Community College District (PERB 2599E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION & ITS CHAPTER 291,
Charging Party,
v.
SAN BERNARDINO COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CE-6037-E
PERB Decision No. 2599
December 5, 2018
Appearances: Andrew J. Kahn, Chief Counsel, and Sonja J. Woodward, Attorney, for
California School Employees Association & its Chapter 291; Currier & Hudson, by Andrea
Naested, Kendall C. Swanson, and Nicole M. Denow, Attorneys, for San Bernardino
Community College District.
Before Winslow, Shiners, and Krantz, Members.
DECISION
WINSLOW, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions by San Bernardino Community College District (District) and
cross-exceptions by California School Employees Association & its Chapter 291 (CSEA) to
the proposed decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ determined that the
District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA)1 by: (1) denying a CSEA-
represented employee, Adam Lasad (Lasad), his right to be represented in an investigatory
interview; and (2) unilaterally implementing a policy of using data collected by global
positioning system (GPS) devices to assess employee misconduct.
1 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. All further statutory
references are to the Government Code.

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The District’s exceptions challenge some of the ALJ’s factual findings and most of his
legal conclusions. CSEA’s cross-exception challenges one of the ALJ’s factual findings.
Having reviewed the proposed decision and the entire record in light of the parties’
submissions, we adopt the ALJ’s factual findings and affirm his legal conclusions that the
District violated EERA as alleged in the complaint, for reasons discussed below.
BACKGROUND
The District is a “[p]ublic school employer” within the meaning of EERA
section 3540.1, subdivision (k). CSEA is an “[e]xclusive representative,” within the meaning
of EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (e), of a unit of the District’s classified employees.2
DISCUSSION
I. 	Denial of Representation
The ALJ found that the District unlawfully denied Lasad his right to union
representation in an investigatory interview. The essential facts underlying this finding are
largely undisputed.3 Sergeant Chris Tamayo (Tamayo) supervises Lasad, a community
services officer (CSO) in the District’s police department. Tamayo began questioning Lasad
regarding his whereabouts during his work shift. Lasad, after answering some of Tamayo’s
questions, requested a CSEA representative. Tamayo contacted his own boss, the District’s
police chief, Pierre Galvez (Galvez), about Lasad’s request for representation. Galvez agreed
that Lasad had a right to a representative, but directed Tamayo to have Lasad draft a written
statement before he was relieved of duty. Tamayo then told Lasad, “[W]e’re not going to
2 Because we adopt the ALJ’s factual findings but do not attach the proposed decision,
we summarize the factual findings relevant to each allegation in our discussion below.
3 Because none of the District’s factual exceptions would change the conclusion that the
District unlawfully denied Lasad union representation, we do not address them. (Hartnell
Community College District (2018) PERB Decision No. 2567, p. 3.)
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question you anymore,” but “I just need a memo from you explaining where you were.” Lasad
was then placed alone in an office to draft his statement. In the room, he had his personal cell
phone and a landline phone, and the contact information of at least one CSEA representative,
but he did not attempt to secure representation before drafting his statement.
The District does not except to the ALJ’s conclusion that Lasad had a right to
representation when he invoked it—in other words, that the District’s conduct was
investigatory and that Lasad reasonably believed that disciplinary action could result. (See,
e.g., Capistrano Unified School District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2440, p. 16 (Capistrano).)
The District argues, however, that there was no violation of Lasad’s right to representation
because the interview ended when Lasad was directed to memorialize in writing his responses
to the earlier questioning.
To the extent the District claims that the right to representation attaches only when an
employee is required to provide a verbal response, we disagree. The right to representation in
an investigatory interview is based on the following rationale:
A single employee confronted by an employer investigating
whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or
too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union
representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable
facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the
bottom of the incident occasioning the interview.
(NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. (1975) 420 U.S. 251, 262-263 (Weingarten).)4 These concerns
may be diminished slightly in the absence of direct face-to-face questioning and verbal
responses, but they are present nevertheless. Employees may be more or less precise in their
4 The Board has held that EERA guarantees employees representational rights at least
as broad those afforded private-sector employees under Weingarten. (Rio Hondo Community
College District (1982) PERB Decision No. 260, pp. 16-18.)
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written statements than in their oral ones, depending, among other things, on their facility with
written language. 	The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), for its part, has held that
employees have a right to representation before submitting written statements as part of an
investigatory interview. 	(See, e.g., Bellagio, LLC (2015) 362 NLRB No. 175, p. 2, fn. 10, enf.
den. on other grounds 854 F.3d 703 [employer’s request that employee “complete a statement
relating to an incident that could lead to discipline was part of its investigatory interview”];
Wynn Las Vegas, LLC (2012) 358 NLRB 674, 688 [refusal to allow employee to consult a
union representative before drafting a written statement disregarded employee’s rights under
Weingarten].)5 Because Lasad reasonably believed that his written statement could be used for
disciplinary purposes, the right to representation attached.
We also disagree with the District’s claim that it was foreclosed only from seeking
additional information beyond what Lasad had already provided. Once again, the policy
concerns underlying the right to representation (see Weingarten, supra, 420 U.S. 251, 262-263)
apply regardless of whether the employer is seeking additional information or merely attempting
to confirm information the employee has already provided. A subsequent statement may
contradict the earlier statement, or it may add or omit facts, thus opening up the employee to
impeachment for inconsistency. 	Even if the subsequent statement mirrors exactly the earlier
statement, confirming the information may further commit the employee to his or her previous
answers, thereby making it more difficult to change or explain those answers later. Given these
5 This rule has also been adopted by other states with collective bargaining laws. (New
Jersey Department of Corrections (2012) 39 NJPER ¶ 53; City of Reading (1995) 26 PPER ¶
26172.) Additionally, PERB has held that an employee has a right to consult a union
representative before signing documents that are potentially adverse to his or her employment,
particularly where the significance of the employee’s signature is not adequately explained.
(California State University, Long Beach (1991) PERB Decision No. 893-H, adopting
proposed decision at pp. 22-23; Placer Hills Union School District (1984) PERB Decision
No. 377, p. 37.)
4

possible outcomes, the assistance of a union representative would be no less valuable than if the
employer were seeking only new information.
The District also argues there was no violation because Lasad’s request for representation
was never explicitly denied, and, moreover, he was not prevented from contacting a
representative using either his cell phone or the land line in the office where he was writing his
statement. As the ALJ explained, an employer faced with a valid request for representation has
three options. It may: (1) grant the request; (2) discontinue the interview; or (3) offer the
employee the choice of proceeding with the interview without union representation or having no
interview at all. (County of San Bernardino (Office of the Public Defender) (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2423-M, p. 38, fn. 20.) “The employer, however, may not continue the interview
without granting the requested union representation unless the employee ‘voluntarily agrees to
remain unrepresented after having been presented by the employer with the choices’ described
above or ‘is otherwise made aware of these choices.’” (California State University, Long
Beach, supra, PERB Decision No. 893-H, adopting proposed decision at p. 20, quoting U.S.
Postal Service (1979) 241 NLRB 141.) Based on these authorities, we agree with the ALJ’s
conclusion that “it was incumbent on Tamayo to act upon [Lasad’s] request, either by granting
it or terminating the interview unless it was clear that Lasad was waiving his right to union
representation.”
State of California (Department of Social Services) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2072-S
(Social Services), cited by the District, is not to the contrary. The District correctly notes that
no violation was found in that case “because, inter alia, [the employee’s] supervisor did not
‘explicitly deny the request.’” (Statement of Exceptions, p. 17, italics in original.) But, as the
District acknowledges by using the phrase “inter alia,” the Board in Social Services actually
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relied on several factors to find no violation. More critical than the failure to explicitly deny
the request was that the employer ceased questioning after confirming that the employee was
refusing to provide any further information without a representative present. (Social Services,
supra, adopting proposed decision at p. 31.) Here, by contrast, Tamayo’s demand for a written
statement was a continuation of the interview by other means. (See Capistrano, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2440, p. 20 [“regardless of how a meeting may be characterized or envisioned by
management, if it serves to elicit incriminating evidence with the potential to impact the
employment relationship, then it is ‘investigatory’”].) As a result, Tamayo’s failure to
explicitly deny the request for representation is not dispositive.6
Nor does Lasad’s obedience to Tamayo’s directive absolve the District. Although the
refusal to obey a rule or directive that unlawfully infringes on employee or union rights is
generally protected (see, e.g., Omnitrans (2009) PERB Decision No. 2030-M, p. 30), we do not
require employees to risk discipline in order to preserve their rights to challenge unlawful
action (Long Beach Unified School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 608, p. 12 [charging
party “need not demonstrate an attempt to violate [allegedly unlawful] regulation in order to
show that the [employer] would enforce it”]). We therefore will not penalize Lasad for
complying with Tamayo’s directive, which in no way authorized Lasad to contact a union
representative. (Capistrano, supra, PERB Decision No. 2440, p. 41 [employer effectively
denied request by continuing interrogation after employee requested representation].)
6 CSEA’s lone exception concerns the ALJ’s conclusion that Tamayo did not explicitly
deny Lasad’s request for representation. There was conflicting testimony on this point. Lasad
testified that Tamayo denied the request; Tamayo denied having done so. Because we have
rejected the District’s argument concerning the failure to deny the request, we need not resolve
CSEA’s exception.
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In sum, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the District denied Lasad his right to a union
representative, and CSEA its right to represent Lasad.
II. 	Unilateral Change
The ALJ also found that the District unilaterally implemented a policy of using GPS
tracking device data to assess employee misconduct. Once again, the underlying facts are not
seriously disputed. The District originally installed a tracking device on the work vehicle of a
probationary CSO assigned to an unsupervised overnight shift at the District’s Crafton Hills
College, after receiving reports that the CSO was leaving his assigned patrol area without
authorization. After the data from the device confirmed that the CSO was in fact leaving his
patrol area, he was released on probation. The shift was then assigned to Lasad, along with the
same work vehicle with the tracking device. After data from the device reported that Lasad,
too, had been leaving his patrol area, Tamayo initiated the investigatory interview discussed
above. Lasad was ultimately terminated, based on information obtained from the tracking
device as well as Lasad’s verbal statements during the interview.7 The District discontinued
the overnight CSO shift a few months later, and with it, the use of the tracking device. There
is no evidence that the District has otherwise used GPS tracking devices or data to monitor
employees.
The District excepts to the ALJ’s determination that the District implemented a policy
with a generalized effect or continuing impact on employees. Characterizing its actions as
“limited” and “narrowly tailored,” the District relies heavily on the fact that it used the device
to address the lack of supervision on a single, temporary work shift, and only in response to
“credible” reports that the assigned CSO was leaving his assigned patrol area. But, as the ALJ
7 District witnesses testified that the District did not rely on Lasad’s written statement
due to concerns about his intervening request for representation.
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noted, the District demonstrates a sufficiently generalized effect or continuing impact by
defending its conduct as authorized by the management rights clause of its collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with CSEA. (City of Davis (2016) PERB Decision No. 2494-M,
p. 24; County of Santa Clara (2015) PERB Decision No. 2431-M, p. 19.) Even temporary
employer conduct having an immediate effect on one employee can meet this standard. (City
of Davis, supra, at pp. 24-25.) Thus, regardless of how narrowly the District attempts to define
its conduct in this case, we agree with the ALJ that the District implemented a change in policy
with a generalized effect or continuing impact.
The District also excepts to the ALJ’s conclusion that the District’s actions were within
the scope of representation. The ALJ thoroughly analyzed this question under Anaheim Union
High School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 177 (Anaheim), which held that a subject not
enumerated under EERA section 3543.2 is negotiable if:
(1) it is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages or an
enumerated term and condition of employment, (2) the subject is
of such concern to both management and employees that conflict
is likely to occur and the mediatory influence of collective
negotiations is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict,
and (3) the employer’s obligation to negotiate would not
significantly abridge [its] freedom to exercise those managerial
prerogatives (including matters of fundamental policy) essential
to the achievement of [its] mission.
(Anaheim, supra, PERB Decision No. 177, pp. 4-5.) In applying this test, the ALJ noted the
parallels between the use of GPS tracking and video surveillance for the purpose of gleaning
evidence of employee misconduct, the latter of which we found to be within the scope of
representation in Rio Hondo Community College District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2313 (Rio
Hondo).
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The District does not dispute the ALJ’s conclusions that the use of GPS for assessing
employee misconduct is: (1) logically and reasonably related to evaluation procedures, an
enumerated term and condition of employment (see EERA, § 3543.2, subd. (a)); and (2) of
such concern to management and employees that conflict is likely to occur, and the mediatory
influence of collective negotiations is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict. Rather,
the District’s exceptions focus on the third prong of Anaheim, and the District attempts to
distinguish Rio Hondo based on two arguments: (1) it claims a narrower right to use GPS
tracking data than the Rio Hondo employer did to use video surveillance; and (2) the use of
GPS data, unlike video surveillance, is a fundamental managerial prerogative that concerns the
nature and quality of public services. The District’s arguments are unavailing.
Contrary to the District’s argument, the negotiability of video surveillance of
employees in Rio Hondo did not turn on the breadth of the employer’s claimed discretion to
use video surveillance. Rio Hondo rejected the employer’s claim that its “unfettered
discretion” would be significantly abridged by a duty to negotiate, noting that if “good faith
efforts produced no agreement, the [employer] would retain discretion to implement its last,
best and final offer regarding the use of video records for discipline and evaluation of
employees to the extent otherwise permitted by law.” (Rio Hondo, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2313, pp. 16-17.) It would be anomalous, however, to conclude that the District need not
negotiate here merely because it claims only narrow discretion to employ GPS tracking data.
We also reject the District’s argument that the use of GPS tracking data for disciplinary
or other employee evaluation purposes is a fundamental managerial prerogative. We explained
in Rio Hondo that fundamental managerial prerogatives include such matters as layoffs,
statutorily required background investigations, police use-of-force polices, and police review
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procedures. (Rio Hondo, supra, PERB Decision No. 2313 at p. 16.) “In contrast, making and
using video recordings of employees for purposes of disciplining them and/or evaluating their
work performance affects wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment within
the scope of representation, not fundamental managerial or policy matters concerning the
nature and quality of public services.” (Id. at p. 16.) This rationale applies to the use of GPS
data for purposes of assessing employee misconduct.
The District seems to argue, to the contrary, that any information used to assess how
well a public safety employee is doing his or her job ultimately relates to the employer’s core
functions. This argument is defeated by the statutory text and by our precedent. As noted,
EERA expressly places evaluation procedures within the scope of negotiations. (EERA,
§ 3543.2, subd. (a).) The Board has “broadly and liberally construed the duty to bargain over
evaluation procedures” to include evaluation criteria, methods, and systems, as well as the type
of evidence an employer may use to evaluate performance or take disciplinary action. (Los
Angeles Unified School District (2017) PERB Decision No. 2518, pp. 14-28.) This is true even
where an employer wishes to implement or change evaluation policies in order to improve its
services to the public. (Ibid.) Thus, as the ALJ correctly concluded, “surveillance of
employees is not a function of the District’s core mission.” (Cf. Sutter County In-Home
Supportive Services Public Authority (2007) PERB Decision No. 1900-M [determining that
background check policy for in-home care providers is not within the scope of representation
because of employer’s specific statutory duty to screen providers “based upon their
background and qualifications”].)8
8 We acknowledge that, as the District points out, “a core function of the campus police
is to protect District property and to keep students, staff and visitors safe.” We also
acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which an employer decides to use technology
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The District further argues that the ALJ failed to analyze whether the benefit to
employer-employee relations outweighed the District’s need for unencumbered decision-
making, citing Claremont Police Officers Association v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th
623 (Claremont). We reject this argument for two reasons. First, Claremont interprets the
scope of representation under a different statutory scheme, the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
(MMBA),9 and prescribes a three-step balancing test “to determine whether management must
meet and confer with a recognized employee organization . . . when the implementation of a
fundamental managerial or policy decision significantly and adversely affects a bargaining
unit’s wages, hours, or working conditions.” (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th 623, 637.) The
District’s argument here refers to the third step of that test. But the scope of representation
under EERA is determined under Anaheim, supra, PERB Decision No. 177, which was
approved by the Supreme Court in San Mateo City School District v. Public Employment
primarily to further those safety interests or other core managerial interests, and not simply to
monitor employees while they perform public services. For instance, an employer has a
fundamental management prerogative to install video surveillance equipment if its decision is
not primarily about monitoring employees while they provide public services, and is instead
installed, for instance, to deter members of the public from committing crimes, to apprehend
such persons who do perpetrate crimes, to protect public property, or to keep staff and
members of the public safe. (Rio Hondo, supra, PERB Decision No. 2313, pp. 13-17.) In
those circumstances, the employer must provide notice and an opportunity to bargain over
negotiable effects, including whether and how such surveillance might be used in relation to
evaluating or disciplining employees. (Ibid.) It is conceivable that this approach might apply
in some cases involving GPS.
But here, the District did not act in furtherance of any legitimate managerial interests.
It installed GPS tracking equipment on its patrol car only to surveil an employee suspected of
leaving his designated patrol area. Thus, the District’s decision pertained solely to the
monitoring of the CSO’s activities on patrol and potentially using the surveillance data in
disciplinary proceedings. Because the District’s decision to install a GPS device was not
moored in any property protection or campus safety interest beyond monitoring an employee’s
performance, the District’s decision fell within the scope of representation. (See Colgate-
Palmolive Co. (1997) 323 NLRB 515, 518-519.)
9 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq.
11

Relations Board (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850 (San Mateo). Nothing in Anaheim or San Mateo
supports the application of the Claremont test to determine the scope of representation under
EERA, and nothing in Claremont casts doubt on the validity of the Anaheim test. Therefore,
we decline to apply Claremont to assess the scope of bargaining under EERA.
Second, even if Claremont were applicable to EERA, this case would not trigger
Claremont’s balancing test. That test applies to “‘decisions that directly affect employment,
such as eliminating jobs, but nonetheless may not be mandatory subjects of bargaining because
they involve ‘a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise’ or, in other words, the
employer’s ‘retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to employment’”; it does not
apply to “‘decisions directly defining the employment relationship, such as wages, workplace
rules, and the order of succession of layoffs and recalls.’” (County of Orange (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2594-M, pp. 18-20, quoting International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188,
AFL-CIO v. PERB (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 272-273.) As noted above, we have long held that
the information an employer may utilize in evaluating and disciplining employees is within the
scope of representation because it is directly related to the employment relationship.
Therefore, it would be improper to apply the Claremont balancing test in this case.
The District’s final argument is that CSEA waived its right to negotiate by agreeing to a
management rights clause giving the District the right to “direct, manage, and control its
operations,” including to “hire, classify, evaluate, promote, layoff, terminate, and discipline
employees,” and that “the use of judgment and discretion in connection therewith, shall be
limited only by the specific and express terms of this Agreement.” The ALJ rejected this
argument for two reasons: (1) the District did not establish that the CBA was in effect at the
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time the District took its action; and (2) the clause was not specific enough to show that CSEA
waived its right to bargain. We agree with the ALJ on both points.
The management rights clause entered in the record states that it was approved by the
District’s Board of Trustees on December 11, 2014; the ALJ found no evidence that it was
effective retroactively to the date of the District’s actions here. In its exceptions, the District
argues that “the District’s Position Statement contained an Internet link to the complete CBA
located on the District’s website.” But the ALJ refused to rely on the document accessible by
that link because there was “no non-hearsay representation that the document in the link is a
complete and accurate version of the CBA that was in effect at the times relevant to this case,”
no “representation, hearsay or otherwise, about whether the document in that link has been
changed or altered since the date of the position statement,” and “no representation that the
parties’ CBA is on file at PERB, pursuant to PERB Regulation 32120.”10 The District’s
exceptions and supporting brief fail to address these grounds for the ALJ’s decision, and we
therefore affirm them without further discussion. (See City of Calexico (2017) PERB Decision
No. 2541-M, p. 1 [the Board need not address arguments adequately addressed by the ALJ].)11
We also affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that, even assuming the management rights clause
was in effect, CSEA did not waive its right to negotiate. A waiver of the right to bargain must
be clear and unmistakable; a “generally-worded management rights clause” does not suffice.
(Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2518, pp. 39-40.) Rather, the
10 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.
11 PERB Regulation 32120 requires employers, upon request by the Board, to file a
written agreement or memorandum of understanding with the Board. Since the CBA was not
on file with the Board, we need not determine whether the ALJ could have considered it
regardless of whether it was properly introduced at the hearing.
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evidence must “reflect[] a conscious abandonment of the right to bargain over a particular
subject.” (Placentia Unified School District (1986) PERB Decision No. 595, p. 4.) In this
case, the management rights clause’s reference to discipline and evaluation of employees is
silent as to the types of evidence that may be used for evaluating and disciplining employees.
It therefore is not a clear and unmistakable waiver of CSEA’s right to bargain over the use of
GPS tracking data for evaluations and discipline.
Because we have rejected the District’s exceptions, and neither party excepted to the
proposed order, we affirm the proposed decision and adopt the proposed order.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in the
case, it is found that the San Bernardino Community College District (District) violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), Government Code section 3543.5,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) by denying a represented employee’s request for union
representation during an investigatory interview and by using data collected by a Global
Position System (GPS) device in assessing potential employee misconduct without providing
California School Employees Association & its Chapter 291 (CSEA) with notice and the
opportunity for bargaining.
Pursuant to EERA section 3541.5, it hereby is ORDERED that the District, its
governing board and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CSEA.
2. 	Interfering with CSEA’s right to represent its employees.
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3. 	Establishing policies within the scope of representation without
providing CSEA with notice and the opportunity to request negotiations.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Rescind the policy of using data collected by GPS devices in assessing
employees represented by CSEA for misconduct.
2. 	Within thirty (30) days after this decision is no longer subject to appeal,
(a) rescind any discipline issued to Adam Lasad (Lasad) that was based on data from a GPS
device; (b) offer Lasad immediate and unconditional reinstatement to either his former position
or a substantially equivalent position; and (c) reimburse Lasad for all salary and benefits lost
because of his termination, with interest, at a rate of 7 percent per annum, from the date he is
reinstated or declines the offer of reinstatement.
3. 	Within ten (10) workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post at all work locations where notices to employees in CSEA’s bargaining unit
customarily are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must
be signed by an authorized agent of the District, indicating that it will comply with the terms of
this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of thirty (30) consecutive workdays.
In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the Notice shall be posted by electronic
message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means customarily used by the District to
communicate with its employees. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is
not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material.
4. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board),
or the General Counsel’s designee. Respondent shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by
15

the General Counsel or his/her designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order
shall be concurrently served on CSEA.
Members Shiners and Krantz joined in this Decision
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APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. LA-CE-6037-E, California School
Employees Association, & its Chapter 291 v. San Bernardino Community College District, in
which all parties had the right to participate, it has been found that the San Bernardino
Community College District (District) violated the Educational Employment Relations Act
(EERA), Government Code section 3540 et seq., by denying a represented employee’s request
for union representation during an investigatory interview and by using data collected by a
Global Position System (GPS) device in assessing potential employee misconduct without
providing California School Employees Association & its Chapter 291 (CSEA) with notice and
the opportunity for bargaining.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CSEA.
2. 	Interfering with CSEA’s right to represent its employees.
3. 	Establishing policies within the scope of representation without
providing CSEA with notice and the opportunity for negotiations.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE EERA:
1. 	Rescind the policy of using data collected by GPS devices in assessing
employees represented by CSEA for misconduct.
2. 	Within 30 days after this decision is no longer subject to appeal,
(a) rescind any discipline issued to Adam Lasad (Lasad) that was based on data from a GPS
device; (b) offer Lasad immediate and unconditional reinstatement to either his former position
or a substantially equivalent position; and (c) reimburse Lasad for all salary and benefits lost
because of his termination, with interest, at a rate of 7 percent per annum, from the date he is
reinstated or declines the offer of reinstatement.
Dated: _____________________ 	SAN BERNARDINO COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST THIRTY
(30) CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.