City and County of San Francisco (PERB 2691M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION LOCAL 1021,
Charging Party, 	Case No. SF-CE-1154-M
v. 	PERB Decision No. 2691-M
January 17, 2020	CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Respondent.
Appearances: Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, by Kerianne R. Steele, Attorney, for
Service Employees International Union, Local 1021; Office of the City Attorney, by Erik
A. Rapoport, Deputy City Attorney, for the City and County of San Francisco.
Before Banks, Krantz, and Paulson, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on cross-exceptions filed by the City and County of San Francisco
(City) and by Service Employees International Union Local 1021 (SEIU) to a proposed
decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The unfair practice complaint in this
matter alleged that the City violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)1 and PERB
Regulations2 by maintaining and enforcing sections A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) of the
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1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. Statutory
references herein are to the Government Code, except where otherwise specified.
2 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 31001 et seq.

2
City Charter (Charter). These provisions set forth procedures for resolving a collective
bargaining impasse via binding interest arbitration before a three-member
mediation/arbitration board (arbitration board). The challenged sections also establish
a “submission deadline” by which bargaining parties must submit a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) containing terms that are mutually-bargained, ordered by the
arbitration board, or a combination thereof.3 If parties submit no MOU whatsoever by
the deadline, the Charter imposes a penalty, viz., a delay in the implementation of new
economic enhancements. The ALJ found that the Charter submission deadline and
associated penalty are inconsistent with the MMBA, both facially and as applied in this
case, because they tilt bargaining toward the employer’s priorities and prevent the
bargaining parties from devoting sufficient time to good faith negotiations and impasse
resolution. The City filed 63 exceptions to the ALJ’s findings, while SEIU excepted to
several specific findings, as well as to alleged omissions from the ALJ’s proposed
remedy.
Having reviewed the record in this matter and considered the parties’
arguments, we depart somewhat from the ALJ’s analysis and conclusion. We uphold
SEIU’s as-applied challenge. We do not uphold SEIU’s facial challenge, because the
City can in the future lawfully interpret Charter sections A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) to
harmonize them with the MMBA, consistent with our explanation in today’s decision.
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3 The Charter provisions at issue use the term “agreement” interchangeably
with the phrase “collective bargaining agreement.” We mainly opt to use the more
standard phrase in California public sector labor relations, which is “memorandum of
understanding” (MOU). MOU has the same meaning as “agreement,” “collective
bargaining agreement,” and “contract.” Accordingly, when we use the term “mid-
contract” throughout our decision, this means the same as “mid-MOU.”

3
Thus, these sections are facially valid but susceptible to further as-applied challenges
unless they are interpreted lawfully. These sections must be interpreted to require
good faith negotiations by the parties over an adequate length of time. They must
also be interpreted to allow the parties to agree upon, or an arbitration board to order,
an MOU provision providing for mid-contract negotiations and associated mid-contract
interest arbitration proceedings that may lead to a full range of mid-year or retroactive
MOU adjustments.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
SEIU initiated this action by filing an unfair practice charge against the City on
January 8, 2014. PERB’s Office of the General Counsel (General Counsel) issued a
complaint against the City on September 26, 2014. The City filed its answer to the
complaint on October 17, 2014, denying the material allegations and raising a number
of affirmative defenses. The parties engaged in a formal hearing before the ALJ on
May 6-7 and August 24-25, 2015. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs in
January 2016, and the ALJ issued a proposed decision on January 27, 2017. The
parties filed timely cross-exceptions, leading to this decision.4
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4 The parties made three procedural requests as part of their exceptions briefs.
First, SEIU requested oral argument. We typically deny such requests when the
record before us is adequate, the parties availed themselves of the opportunity to brief
all pertinent issues, and the briefs are sufficiently clear as to make oral argument
unnecessary. (County of Santa Clara (2018) PERB Decision No. 2613-M, p. 6, fn. 3.)
Applying this standard here, we deny SEIU’s request for oral argument. Second, we
grant the City’s request to file a reply brief regarding its exceptions, as we find that
SEIU raised new matters in its responsive briefing. (City of San Ramon (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2571-M, p. 2, fn. 1 (San Ramon).) Finally, we decline to resolve the
parties’ numerous disagreements regarding the City’s request that we take
administrative notice of certain records and documents, as none of our findings would

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FACTUAL FINDINGS
I. 	The Parties
SEIU is an “employee organization” within the meaning of MMBA section 3501,
subdivision (a), and an “exclusive representative” within the meaning of PERB
Regulation 32016, subdivision (b). SEIU represents a unit of approximately 11,000
City employees who are classified under the Charter as “miscellaneous” employees.
SEIU also represents a unit of over 500 employees at the City’s Municipal
Transportation Agency (SFMTA) who are classified under the Charter as “service-
critical” employees. SEIU and the City bargain separate MOUs for the two units at
partially separate bargaining tables, but the parties typically choose to merge certain
elements of their negotiations, particularly on common issues such as wages, health
insurance, and retirement benefits.
The City, which is both a charter city and a county under California law, is a
public agency within the meaning of MMBA section 3501, subdivision (c). The City’s
highest governing body is its Board of Supervisors. At the time of trial, the City had
over 28,000 employees.
City voters approved Proposition E in 1999, thereby adding Article VIIIA to the
Charter and establishing SFMTA as a City agency governed by a Board of Directors.
SFMTA replaced the former supervising authority, the Public Transportation
Commission. SFMTA Directors are appointed by the City’s Mayor and confirmed by
the Board of Supervisors. In this decision, we follow the parties’ practice in that we
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differ based on the outcome of the City’s request. (County of Santa Clara (2019)
PERB Decision No. 2629-M, p. 6, fn. 5.)

5
intend references to the City to include SFMTA, except where context dictates
otherwise.
II. 	The Charter Provisions at Issue in This Case
Appendix 8 to the Charter, commonly referred to as “A8,” governs City
employment. Section A8.409-4 provides for binding interest arbitration when the City
reaches an impasse in collective bargaining with a union that exclusively represents
one or more established bargaining units. Subpart (k) of this section contains the
primary Charter provision challenged in this case, as follows:
“[A8.409-4(k)] An agreement reached between the
designated representatives for the City and the
representatives of a recognized employee organization that
is submitted to the Board of Supervisors on or before
May 15, or a decision of the Arbitration/Mediation Board
that is submitted to the Board of Supervisors on or before
May 10, or May 15 if the parties waive the 10-day period
between the Board's decision and public disclosure of the
decision, shall be effective on July 1 of the same calendar
year upon adoption by the Board of Supervisors. An
agreement submitted to the Board of Supervisors after May
15, or a decision of the Arbitration/Mediation Board that is
submitted to the Board of Supervisors after May 10, or May
15 if the parties waive the 10-day period between the
Board's decision and public disclosure of the decision, shall
become effective no earlier than July 1 of the next calendar
year upon approval of the Board of Supervisors. But an
agreement reached during the term of an existing
memorandum of understanding that results in a net
reduction, or results in no net increase, in the cost to the
City, during the current fiscal year, of existing economic
provisions in the existing memorandum of understanding
may become effective at any time upon approval by the
Board of Supervisors. Economic provisions include, but are
not limited to, wages, premium pay rates, overtime, any

6
employer pickup of the employees’ retirement contribution,
paid time off, and other compensation.”5
The second Charter provision at issue in this case, which pertains to SEIU’s
labor relations with SFMTA, arises under Charter Article VIIIA. The parties typically
refer to Article VIIIA as “8A.”6 Section 8A.104 provides that the impasse resolution
provisions set forth in section A8.409-4 apply to SFMTA and the unions representing
its service-critical employees, with several SFMTA-specific adjustments. One of those
adjustments, at issue here, is an SFMTA-specific timing provision appearing in section
8A.104(n), as follows:
“[8A.104(n)] . . . Notwithstanding the timelines described in
Section A8.409-4, to be effective the beginning of the next
succeeding fiscal year, all collective bargaining agreements
must be submitted to the Board of Directors no later than
June 15 for final adoption on or before June 30.”
Notably, although the submission deadline applicable to unions representing SFMTA
employees is later than the deadline for unions representing other City employees, it is
functionally analogous. In this decision, we refer to the submission deadline in the
singular, while recognizing that in reality it includes more than a single date.
Under these Charter provisions, the arbitration board consists of one member
appointed by the City, a second member appointed by the union, and a neutral third
member. The neutral third member is typically a labor arbitrator, and it is almost
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5 Impasse resolution procedures for public safety employees are governed by a
comparable submission deadline set forth in Charter section A8.509-5(h). SEIU did
not challenge that provision.
6 Charter nomenclature can be confusing, particularly in this case, where the
two provisions at issue arise under parts of the Charter commonly referred to as A8
(also known as Appendix 8) and 8A (also known as Article VIIIA).

7
invariably his or her vote that matters on any disputed topic, since the arbitration board
members appointed by the parties are not neutral and generally vote in favor of the
party that appointed them. For this reason, the parties often refer to “the arbitrator” as
an accurate shorthand for what is technically a three-member arbitration board. We
largely follow suit in this decision by referring to the arbitrator and the arbitration board
interchangeably, except where context dictates otherwise.
The arbitrator has discretion to resolve disputes by mediation and/or arbitration,
and the arbitrator may hold hearings and receive evidence from the parties. (Charter,
§ A8.409-4(c).) The arbitrator “may also adopt other procedures designed to
encourage an agreement between the parties, expedite the arbitration hearing
process, or reduce the cost of the arbitration process.” (Ibid.) “If no agreement is
reached prior to the conclusion of the arbitration hearings,” the arbitrator “shall direct
each of the parties to submit, within such time limit as the Board may establish, a last
offer of settlement on each of the remaining issues in dispute.” (Id., § A8.409-4(d).)
Each disputed issue shall be resolved by majority vote of the arbitration board
members, based on a lengthy list of factors set forth in the Charter. (Ibid.) The Charter
thereby permits parties to submit an MOU in which some provisions have been agreed-
upon and others have been directed by the neutral arbitrator.
After the arbitrator issues a decision, the parties may not disclose it publicly for
ten days, unless the parties waive the ten-day cooling off period. (Charter, § A8.409-
(e).) As noted above, if the parties choose to waive the cooling off period, then the
Charter relaxes the submission deadline by five days. (Id., § A8.409-(k).)

8
III. 	Chronology of Ballot Measures Impacting the City’s Impasse Resolution
Provisions
The City first adopted interest arbitration as a dispute resolution method in
1991, when City voters approved Proposition B. The City had placed Proposition B on
the ballot after negotiating with affected unions pursuant to the requirements of People
ex rel. Seal Beach Police Offices Association v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d
591 (Seal Beach).7 After completing those negotiations, SEIU’s predecessor, Local
790, publicly supported the eventual Proposition B ballot measure.
Proposition B established optional collective bargaining, ending in interest
arbitration, for most unions interested in permanently opting into these mechanisms as
a replacement for the City’s traditional salary survey methodology. City Negotiator
Jonathan Holtzman (Holtzman) testified the City was concerned that in other
jurisdictions with interest arbitration, the process often took two or three years, and
moreover, the City had many bargaining units and unions. Holtzman testified that in
Seal Beach negotiations, the City therefore insisted on drafting Proposition B to
establish a deadline for submitting MOUs involving most bargaining units.
Proposition B initially codified the submission deadline in Charter section
A8.409-4(e), a predecessor to the later-adopted Charter provisions challenged in the
instant case. At that time, the Charter’s submission deadline read as follows:
“To be effective the beginning of the next succeeding fiscal
year, an agreement shall be reached or the board shall
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7 As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, Seal Beach requires such
negotiations whenever a local agency or one of its agents proposes a ballot measure
impacting terms or conditions of employment. (Boling v. PERB (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898,
914-919 (Boling).) There is no allegation in this case that the City at any point violated
its duties with respect to Seal Beach negotiations.

9
reach a final decision no later than sixty days before the
date the Mayor is required to submit a budget to the board
of supervisors, except by mutual agreement of the parties.”
In 1994, City voters approved Proposition F, which eliminated, for most City
unions, any option to continue using the City’s legacy salary survey methodology in
lieu of collective bargaining.
As noted above, in 1999 City voters approved Proposition E, a measure
principally aimed at reforming service delivery within the municipal transportation
system. Proposition E provided that the impasse resolution provisions in section
A8.409 applied to SFMTA and the unions representing its service-critical employees,
with certain SFMTA-specific adjustments.
In 2007, City voters approved a ballot measure known as Proposition A.
Among other changes, the 2007 ballot measure amended section 8A.104(n) to add
the above-noted language providing that absent agreement to the contrary, an MOU
covering SFMTA service-critical employees must be submitted to the SFMTA Board of
Directors by June 15 in order to take effect at the beginning of the following fiscal
year.8 Following Seal Beach negotiations, SEIU publicly endorsed the 2007 ballot
measure.
Prior to 2009, the Charter contained no submission deadline for bargaining
units comprised of public safety employees. However, in March 2009, City Controller
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8 Section 8A.104(n) thereby extends the submission deadline for SFMTA units
by one month. Although section 8A.104(n) does not repeat the full penalty provision
found in section A8.409-4(k), it appears to incorporate that penalty provision by
reference, in that section A8.409-4(k) generally applies to SFMTA units except in
those respects that the Charter explicitly includes distinct SFMTA-specific provisions.

10
Ben Rosenfeld (Rosenfeld) worked with the Board of Supervisors on possible changes
to the then-existing impasse resolution procedures. Rosenfeld and others at the City
hoped, among other goals, to establish a deadline for public safety employee
negotiations. Rosenfeld believed that having a submission deadline helped the City
avoid “exceptional and unsustainable fiscal methods, such as mid-year spending cuts,
hiring freezes, voluntary labor concessions, delays in capital improvements, and other
one-time stopgap measures.”9
In June 2009, the City notified SEIU and other unions that the Mayor and
several supervisors intended to propose an initiative measure to amend the Charter.
The eventual 2009 ballot measure was coincidentally also labeled as Proposition A,
like the 2007 ballot measure. The 2009 ballot measure replaced the Charter’s primary
submission deadline with the reworded provision at issue here, in section A8.409-4(k).
Another part of the 2009 ballot measure created an identical submission deadline for
public safety MOUs, within Charter section A8.509-5(h). SEIU declined to support the
2009 measure, although an SEIU representative present during the Seal Beach
negotiations over the 2009 measure did not specifically object to the proposed
language in Charter section A8.409-4(k). City voters approved the measure.
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9 The City’s fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30. At any time in the
midst of a fiscal year, the City can approve a supplemental budget request adding to
the items initially approved. If such a supplemental budget request seeks monies that
the Mayor previously rejected when the budget was first adopted, then the Board of
Supervisors must approve the request by a two-thirds margin. If a fiscal year ends
with a surplus, the Controller transfers unused funds to the general fund. If during the
fiscal year funds are insufficient to meet authorized expenditures, the Controller is
authorized to transfer monies to the general fund, from funds available for such
purposes.

11
In 2010, City voters approved Proposition G, which made additional SFMTA-
specific changes to the City’s dispute resolution procedures. Those changes are not
at issue in this case. A coalition of unions (including SEIU) filed unfair practice
charges alleging that selected provisions added by Proposition G conflict with the
MMBA, leading to a PERB decision that we discuss post at pages 32-34.
IV. 	The Parties’ 2014 Negotiations
At the time of trial, the City was party to approximately 30 MOUs covering 59
bargaining units. This is an unusually high number, though not necessarily the most
of any California public entity.10 The City created this unit structure, pursuant to its
authority under the Charter, even though the Charter directed the City to consider unit
proliferation when making unit decisions, and despite advice from experts to reduce
such proliferation.11
The parties’ MOUs covering the miscellaneous and service-critical units were
due to expire on June 30, 2014, necessitating the 2014 negotiations between SEIU
and the City. In total, the City needed to negotiate successor MOUs covering 38 of its
59 bargaining units during approximately the same timeframe. At least eight of these
units had fewer than fifteen full-time equivalent employees. To handle these
simultaneous negotiations, the City used a mix of in-house and contracted negotiators.
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10 Neither party excepted to the ALJ’s finding that the County of Los Angeles
has 61 bargaining units, the City of Los Angeles has 42 bargaining units, and the
State of California has 21 bargaining units. We therefore accept those findings as true
for purposes of this case, while recognizing them as approximations that may be
subject to change from time to time.
11 Holtzman testified that the City had permitted such unit proliferation because,
under the pre-1991 salary survey methodology, the City did not bargain wages.

12
On November 21, 2013, less than six months prior to the May 2014 submission
deadline, City Employee Relations Director Martin Gran (Gran) wrote to SEIU Field
Director David Canham (Canham) regarding the upcoming negotiations. Based on the
parties’ prior experience of needing as much time as possible to conclude
negotiations, Gran proposed that the parties could slightly extend the Charter deadline
(from May 10 to May 15) by agreeing, pursuant to section A8.409-4(k), to waive the
Charter’s ten-day cooling off period. SEIU eventually agreed to the City’s proposed
waiver and the associated five-day extension, although SEIU did not agree to the
extension when the City first proposed it.
The parties appointed their respective arbitration board members and mutually
selected Arbitrator Robert Hirsch (Hirsch) as the third, neutral arbitration board
member for both bargaining units.
The parties’ miscellaneous unit MOU is lengthy, in part because it covers 370
job classifications. The 2012-2014 version of the miscellaneous unit MOU consisted
of 196 pages. Covered employees perform a mix of manual, technical, and skilled
work. The miscellaneous unit has the largest total employee compensation of any
City bargaining unit. Because of the diversity of the workforce SEIU represents, its
2014 bargaining team had approximately 50 members.
Carol Isen (Isen) was the City’s chief negotiator. She reported to Gran and
Human Resources Director Micki Callahan. Josie Mooney (Mooney) and John Stead-
Mendez were co-chief negotiators for SEIU’s miscellaneous unit.
Based on previous experience bargaining with the City, in which there was not
enough time to have full negotiations before the Charter’s submission deadline, SEIU

13
asked to begin bargaining earlier and schedule more dates than in the past. The City
agreed to start somewhat earlier, but initially only agreed to about the same number of
bargaining dates as the previous cycle, which was 21 or 22. The parties began
negotiations on February 4, 2014.12 Negotiations continued, over the course of more
than 20 sessions, before mediation began on April 9.13 Between April 9 and the
beginning of interest arbitration on April 25, the parties engaged in several days of
mediation with Hirsch.
SEIU considered the 2014 negotiations as an opportunity to achieve gains after
several rounds of concessionary bargaining resulting from the 2008 recession and its
significant negative impact on the City’s budget. SEIU surveyed its chapters regarding
their goals for negotiations, generated 130 proposed improvements based on the
survey results, and later winnowed that total down to 70 proposals. SEIU identified
numerous significant issues in need of adjustment, including wages, avoiding
healthcare premium cost-sharing for employees without dependents, alternative work
schedules, equitable distribution of overtime, just cause for discipline, workload,
safety, upward mobility paths, reducing the City’s use of short-term
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12 Unless otherwise specified, all further dates refer to 2014.
13 The parties dispute the number of times that they met. Their differing counts
may turn, at least in part, on whether one should count sessions that solely involved
SFMTA issues. The number of pre-mediation sessions covering either or both units
totals at least 21, and possibly as many as 25. We find no need to establish the
number of sessions more precisely, as the exact number does not impact the outcome
of this case.

14
employees, and alleged workforce “de-skilling.”14
The City, for its part, began with 34 proposals relating to the miscellaneous unit
and 32 proposals relating to the SFMTA unit. The City’s priorities included requiring
all employees, including those without dependents, to share a portion of monthly
healthcare premium costs.
During the parties’ negotiations, Gran and Isen repeatedly reminded SEIU of
the upcoming submission deadline. However, many of the issues in dispute were
complex, and the parties made only very slow progress in exchanging views and
attempting to reach a successor MOU for each unit. Faced with this reality, in both
March and April the SEIU team asked the City to add additional released time and
bargaining dates beyond those already scheduled. We credit testimony from SEIU
that the City largely declined SEIU’s requests to add more days, except when Hirsch
eventually ordered the City to do so. Indeed, a City negotiator’s own bargaining notes
reflect this fact, acknowledging that SEIU “has expressed[ed] the concern [over] lack
of time and wanting to get more days and release time. Have told [them] I don’t have
a lot of authority at this point to do that.”
SEIU also proposed yet another potential means to increase the parties’
efficiency in making progress toward an agreement: assigning certain topics to issue-
specific committees of the parties’ respective bargaining teams, so that the parties
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14 SEIU Bargaining Team Member Larry Bradshaw testified that de-skilling
occurs when the City decides to lay off employees and hire them back in a lower
classification, performing the same work for less pay.

15
could negotiate on multiple issues simultaneously. However, the City rejected this
approach.15
Overall, the weight of the evidence supports SEIU’s contentions that the 2014
negotiations were “rushed” and “truncated,” and that there was insufficient time for
good faith negotiations over the many complex and important issues at stake.16
With the May 15 submission deadline in mind, the parties scheduled interest
arbitration to begin on April 25, but the parties also calendared earlier dates with
Hirsch to allow him opportunities to act as a mediator. On April 3, Hirsch attended the
parties’ negotiations for a preliminarily check-in on the parties’ progress. The parties
explained that they had not, as of yet, made much progress. Isen referenced 91
unresolved issues that SEIU had initially raised and 33 more unresolved issues that
the City had initially raised. This amounted to substantially all the significant
proposals and the vast majority of the other proposals as well. The City had
withdrawn six proposals at that point, while SEIU had withdrawn two proposals. The
parties had only achieved one minor and non-substantive tentative agreement,
regarding the City’s “clean-up” proposal.
Also on April 3, SEIU stated that there was insufficient time remaining to
address the many outstanding proposals. SEIU noted that the City had not yet made
even a single wage proposal, which meant that the parties had barely addressed
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15 In its exceptions, the City suggests the parties could have broken up into
smaller groups for greater efficiency. However, the City rejected this idea when SEIU
proposed it.
16 We also credit testimony from SEIU that the City asserted that there was not
enough time to discuss certain issues.

16
compensation, and it was difficult for SEIU to evaluate its position on many other
issues without also addressing compensation. Isen acknowledged that the City had
not yet presented a wage proposal, but she promised that the City would do so later
that same day. The City followed through and presented its opening wage proposal
on April 3. This opening offer provided for 1.0 percent increases on January 3, 2015,
June 30, 2015, January 2, 2016, and June 30, 2016, plus a mid-contract reopener for
the third year of the proposed MOU (fiscal year 2016-2017).
On April 7, SEIU reported to Hirsch that 59 union proposals were still
outstanding. On the same day, SEIU agreed to the City’s earlier proposal to waive the
ten-day cooling off period, thereby extending the submission deadline for the
miscellaneous unit from May 10 to May 15.
On April 9, the parties engaged in an initial day of mediation with Hirsch. As of
this date, the parties had not reached agreement as to any matters of substance,
though they had achieved a second minor tentative agreement, this time on SEIU’s
proposal for certain language strike-outs.
On April 10, the City made its second wage proposal. This offer included wage
increases of 2.0 percent on January 3, 2015 and 2.0 percent on January 2, 2016, plus
an MOU reopener for the 2016-2017 fiscal year. The proposal was therefore roughly
equivalent to the City’s opening offer, except that it eliminated the six-month
staggering of increases, instead consolidating the same aggregate 4.0 percent of
wage increases into annual 2.0 percent adjustments in each of the first two years.
On April 12, SEIU presented an amended wage proposal and an amended
healthcare proposal. In its wage proposal, SEIU sought increases corresponding to

17
inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), plus an additional 3.0
percent, 2.5 percent, and 2.25 percent, respectively, in the proposed MOU’s three
years.
On April 22, Isen declared that the parties were at impasse in their negotiations.
She expressed the City’s view that after three days of mediation, the parties were
sufficiently far apart to declare impasse. She acknowledged the parties were still
exchanging proposals, but said that they were at a point where they were “not going to
see a lot of movement,” and interest arbitration was quickly approaching. SEIU
disputed the parties were at impasse, reiterating that there had not been enough time
to discuss many important issues. Isen conceded some progress could still be made,
but claimed the parties would need Hirsch’s help to make progress on economic
issues. Hirsch was present and told the parties they could decide whether or not they
were at impasse. He also initially stated he would limit the parties to eight proposals
from each side during interest arbitration, citing the Charter’s broad grant of authority
permitting an arbitrator to expedite the process and reduce costs. The City agreed
with this limit, but SEIU did not. In the face of SEIU’s opposition, Hirsch withdrew the
limit.17
The parties commenced interest arbitration for the miscellaneous unit on
April 25, with additional days on April 28, and May 3 and 7.
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17 Hirsch had consulted with Arbitrator Barry Winograd (Winograd). Winograd
had handled the parties’ 2012 negotiations, during which he had ordered the parties
each to submit no more than five issues to him. Isen testified that Winograd’s ruling
was unusual in that he ordered the parties to comply. Isen explained that in her
experience arbitrators try to limit the number of issues—so they can give more
detailed attention to them—but usually do not require compliance.

18
On April 25, SEIU amended its wage proposal. The new proposal sought
increases corresponding to the CPI plus 2.0 percent in each of proposed MOU’s three
years. In subsequent days, SEIU made revised healthcare proposals. On April 28,
SEIU informed Hirsch that it had reduced to 12 its total number of outstanding
proposals for the miscellaneous unit, including wages and healthcare.
On or about May 1, the City made a revised healthcare proposal. This proposal
would cap the City’s healthcare premium contribution at 93 percent of the cost of the
second-most-expensive plan for employees who had zero dependents or a single
dependent, and at 83 percent for employees with two or more dependents. SEIU’s
final proposal was for a 100 percent contribution for employees with zero dependents,
a 93 percent contribution for employees with one dependent, and an 83 percent
contribution for employees with two or more dependents.
The City also made its final wage proposal. In this proposal, it offered
increases of 3.0 percent effective October 11, 2014, 3.25 percent on October 10,
2015, and between 2.0 and 3.25 percent on July 1, 2016, depending on the CPI.
On May 3, SEIU presented Hirsch with a list of its 12 outstanding union
proposals for the miscellaneous unit, corresponding to the topics it had referenced on
April 28.
On May 8, the day after the arbitration hearing concluded, the arbitration board
issued its findings for the miscellaneous unit. The arbitrator made awards as to six
issues in total. He agreed with the City’s final proposal offering wage increases of 3.0
percent, 3.25 percent, and between 2.0 and 3.25 percent, respectively, in the MOU’s
three years. SEIU largely prevailed on the issue of healthcare. SEIU’s arbitration

19
board member dissented on wages, use of part-time employees, and union approval
of hiring above the entrance rate. The City’s arbitration board member dissented on
healthcare, a new provision to address de-skilling of patient care assistants, and an
additional salary step for food service workers.
In subsequent bargaining for the service-critical unit, SFMTA and SEIU reached
a deal on across-the-board wages, agreeing to follow the arbitrator’s recent decision
covering the miscellaneous unit. The parties submitted three issues to the service-
critical unit arbitration board. In an award dated May 20, Hirsch sided with SFMTA as
to its proposals giving management greater flexibility in step placement. SEIU
prevailed on its healthcare proposal, as it had with respect to the miscellaneous unit.
Notably, when the parties reached their May 16 agreement on wages for
SFMTA employees, they not only agreed to submit three issues to the arbitration
board immediately, but they agreed that there had not been sufficient time to work
toward the right resolution on two other issues—break rooms and dedicated parking
spaces for station agents at SFMTA stations. Accordingly, the parties signed a side
letter stating that they would negotiate over these issues mid-contract, and if they
were unable to reach an agreement on one or both issues by February 1, 2015, then
the arbitration board would reconvene to decide the unresolved issue(s), with Hirsch
as the neutral arbitrator. The City explained that this procedure “was a way to make
sure that the MOU got submitted in time, but the parties still had additional time to
negotiate” on the two issues.

20
DISCUSSION
Under the MMBA, a local agency may adopt reasonable rules and regulations
pertaining to resolution of collective bargaining disputes. (MMBA, § 3507, subd.
(a)(5).) In order to be lawful, such rules and regulations may not undercut or frustrate
the MMBA’s policies and purposes. (Internat. Federation of Professional & Technical
Engineers, Local 21 v. City & County of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1300,
1306 (IFPTE); Huntington Beach Police Officers’ Assn v. City of Huntington Beach
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 492, 500-502 (Huntington Beach).) Therefore, whether a local
agency has adopted its rules, regulations, or charter provisions via a vote of its
electorate, a vote of its governing board, or through any other means, the resulting
policies must be consistent with the MMBA. (Internat. Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. City of Gridley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 191, 202; Voters for Responsible
Retirement v. Bd. of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 781 (Voters for Responsible
Retirement) [MMBA restricts the local electorate’s power to legislate through the
initiative or referendum process]; IFPTE, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306, citing Los
Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 63 [“Local
regulation is permitted only if ‘consistent with the purposes of the MMBA.’”].) We start
from a position of presuming that an employer’s rule is reasonable, which means that

21
the burden of proof is on the party challenging such a rule. (San Bernardino County
Sheriff’s Assn. v. Bd. of Supervisors (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 602, 613.)18
SEIU challenges Charter sections A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) both facially and
as-applied. A facial challenge is based only on the text of the rule. (Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.) The California Supreme Court has noted
that there are at least two possible standards for evaluating a facial challenge.
(Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1126.) Under the stricter standard,
we should reject a facial challenge to a rule unless it totally and fatally conflicts with
________________________
18 In its 63rd and final exception, the City raises an argument that it did not brief
to the ALJ, and which the ALJ accordingly did not consider: Whether the “home rule”
doctrine bars SEIU’s claims in this case. While the City waived this argument by not
raising it before the ALJ, it is also untenable on its merits. The home rule doctrine
does not alter the fact that a city’s charter must be consistent with the MMBA. (Boling,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 913, citing Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 600 [“[G]eneral
law prevails over local enactments of a chartered city, even in regard to matters which
would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal affairs, where the subject matter of
the general law is of statewide concern.”]; Huntington Beach, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at
p. 500 [“With respect to matters of statewide concern, charter cities are subject to and
controlled by applicable general state law if the Legislature has manifested an intent to
occupy the field . . . . Labor relations in the public sector are matters of statewide
concern.”]; San Leandro Police Officers Assn v. City of San Leandro (1976) 55
Cal.App.3d 553, 557 [“[L]ocal legislation may not conflict with statutes such as the
[MMBA] which are intended to regulate the entire field of labor relations of affected
public employees throughout the state.”]; City of San Diego (2015) PERB Decision
No. 2464-M, pp. 28-35 [discussing interplay between the home rule doctrine and the
MMBA]; accord United Public Employees, Local 390/400, SEIU, et al. v. City and
County of San Francisco (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 419, 423 [while salary structures are
strictly local affairs and not preempted by general law, “the procedure by which such
compensation is determined is subject to the provisions of the MMBA.”]; Professional
Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 289-295 [A city’s
charter must comply with provisions in the Labor Code]. See also post at pp. 50-52,
analyzing the unlawful delegation principles explained in County of Riverside v. Super.
Ct. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 286-89 (County of Riverside) and County of Sonoma v.
Super. Ct. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 322, 340-348.)

22
the MMBA. (Ibid.) Courts often follow a more lenient standard, however. Under the
more lenient standard, we can sustain a facial challenge to a rule if it conflicts with the
MMBA “in the generality or great majority of cases.” (Ibid.) Under either test, a party
alleging a facial violation cannot prevail merely by suggesting that the challenged rule
may run afoul of the law in “some future hypothetical situation.” (Beach & Bluff
Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 244, 264, citing other
authority; Zuckerman v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32, 39.)
The difference between the above standards is often immaterial to facial
challenges alleging that an employer’s rule or policy conflicts with California labor law.
This is true primarily because a facial challenge is an appropriate means to challenge
an employer rule or policy that is alleged to have a chilling effect on employees or a
union, or otherwise to interfere with or impinge on protected rights, even before being
applied. (See, e.g., Los Angeles County Federation of Labor v. County of Los
Angeles (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 905, 908 [overbroad rule against striking has chilling
effect, making facial challenge appropriate]; Petaluma City Elementary School
District/Joint Union High School District (2016) PERB Decision No. 2485, pp. 42-50
[analyzing the language of employer directive, as it would reasonably be understood
by employees, without regard to how or whether it was enforced].) There are also
other types of cases in which there may be no need to choose between the competing
standards governing a facial challenge. (See, e.g., Voters for Responsible
Retirement, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 781.)
Here, the two potential standards applicable to facial challenges lead to the
same outcome. SEIU’s facial challenge asserts that the submission deadline and

23
associated penalty provision unfairly tilt bargaining toward the City’s priorities and
leave insufficient time for good faith negotiations, in most or all instances. Under
either standard for facial challenges, Charter sections A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) are
facially valid if but only if they are interpreted to avoid tilting the playing field in the
City’s favor and to allow adequate time for good faith negotiations and good faith
impasse resolution. In explaining how the Charter must be interpreted in order to
comport with the MMBA, we begin by reviewing prior cases involving these issues.
I. 	The Duty to Devote Adequate Time to Good Faith Negotiations
The MMBA’s “centerpiece” is its requirement that every local agency “meet and
confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment” with unions representing the agency’s employees. (Boling, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 913; Voters for Responsible Retirement, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 781.)
This central requirement is spelled out at MMBA section 3505, which requires
that the parties should meet and confer
“for a reasonable period of time in order to exchange
freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to
endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope
of representation prior to the adoption by the public agency
of its final budget for the ensuing year. The process should
include adequate time for the resolution of impasses where
specific procedures for such resolution are contained in
local rule, regulation, or ordinance, or when such
procedures are utilized by mutual consent.”
(MMBA, § 3505, emphasis supplied.)
In urging employers and unions to “endeavor” to reach agreement prior to when
the agency adopts its budget, the MMBA is “only hortatory” rather than binding.
(Dublin Professional Fire Fighters, Local 1885 v. Valley Community Services Dist.

24
(1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 116, 118 (Dublin).) This hortatory urging “contrasts starkly with
the statute’s other, obligatory mandates, such as the duty to continue bargaining for a
reasonable and adequate amount of time to allow for good faith negotiations.” (San
Ramon, supra, PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 11, fn. 12, citing Dublin, supra, 45
Cal.App.3d at p. 118.) For this reason, an employer cannot use its budget cycle as a
reason for shortening negotiations, if doing so does not permit sufficient time for good
faith negotiations. (Id. at p. 10 [employer may not contend that its upcoming budget
deadline constitutes exigent circumstances allowing the employer to insist on
accelerated negotiations].) Therefore, like the ALJ, we note that an employer may not
insist on completing negotiations in time to adopt or implement its budget. While the
ALJ wrote without the benefit of San Ramon, he reached the same conclusion based
on prior precedent. (City of Selma (2014) PERB Decision No. 2380-M, pp. 21-22
(Selma) [city violated MMBA when it asserted need to conclude bargaining prior to
budget adoption] and County of Riverside (2014) PERB Decision No. 2360-M
(Riverside), p. 15 [employer with “a fixed deadline by which it needed to conclude
negotiations” violated MMBA’s duty to bargain in good faith for an adequate time].)
Thus, one question at issue is whether the challenged Charter provisions
facially violate the MMBA because, in all or most instances, they cut short bargaining
after an insufficient opportunity for good faith negotiations and good faith dispute
resolution. A related question is whether the Charter had that effect in this case,
which would be sufficient to sustain SEIU’s as-applied challenge.

25
II. 	Prior Litigation Involving Interest Arbitration under the City’s Charter
In chronological order below, we summarize one precedential appellate
decision, two unpublished and non-precedential appellate decisions, and four
precedential PERB Board decisions, all relating to the City’s interest arbitration
procedures. We give the full citation to each case and adopt a shorthand
nomenclature for ease of reference thereafter. In our shorthand, we will refer to the
PERB decisions as CCSF I, II, III, and IV, and we will refer to the appellate decisions
by their abbreviated captions: Fire Fighters v. CCSF , SFPOA v. CCSF, and CCSF v.
PERB, respectively.19
A. The Court of Appeal’s Published Decision in Fire Fighters v. CCSF
In San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 653 (Fire Fighters v. CCSF), the Court of Appeal found that the City
was not required to engage in interest arbitration over a change in promotional
standards needed to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination laws. The question at
issue was therefore quite different from any question before us in this case. Fire
Fighters v. CCSF is relevant, however, in one respect: The Court of Appeal noted that
the Charter’s interest arbitration mechanism is intended to apply after the parties have
reached impasse. (Id. at pp. 661, 662, 670, & 674.) As discussed below, the City
later acknowledged, in subsequent PERB proceedings, that the definition of impasse
under the Charter is the same as under traditional labor relations law.
________________________
19 While the two unpublished decisions are non-precedential, we nonetheless
review them carefully for their persuasive value, particularly as one of these
unpublished appellate decisions involved a facial challenge to the Charter’s
submission deadline.

26
B. CCSF I
City & County of San Francisco (2007) PERB Decision No. 1890-M (CCSF I)
arose out of 2006 negotiations between the City and Stationary Engineers Local 39
(Local 39), in which the union refused to comply with the Charter’s mediation and
arbitration provisions. Local 39 filed an unfair practice charge alleging that the City
engaged in surface bargaining during 2006 negotiations, and further alleging that
Charter section A8.409-4 was unreasonable, facially and as applied, because it
allowed the City to begin impasse resolution procedures before the parties reached
impasse. PERB’s General Counsel dismissed the charge without issuing a complaint,
and Local 39 appealed. In that procedural posture, we had before us only a brief
factual record consisting of the unfair practice charge and the City’s position
statement. The skeletal facts available did not present a colorable as-applied
challenge, particularly given that Local 39 adamantly refused to pick an arbitration
board member or otherwise operate under the Charter’s interest arbitration framework.
(Id., p. 3; see also pp. 9-12 [finding no evidence that the City declared impasse
prematurely or otherwise engaged in surface bargaining].)20
We found no facial violation, either, and our reasoning in reaching that
conclusion is significant. We relied on the fact that the Charter restricts “the use of the
impasse procedure to situations where disputed issues remain unresolved after good
faith bargaining.” (CCSF I, supra, PERB Decision No. 1890-M, p. 9.) Our analysis
________________________
20 Not only did CCSF I involve a skeletal record, but it did not consider the
significant precedent regarding an employer’s duty to afford sufficient time to
negotiations, some of which has issued since CCSF I. For these reasons, among
others, SEIU’s facial and as-applied challenges in this case are substantially more
complex issues than may be apparent from reading CCSF I in isolation.

27
must be read to mean that the Charter, by requiring good faith bargaining, mandates
that negotiations “continue for a reasonable period of time,” a standard that we
specifically noted. (Id. at p. 8.) We did not consider whether, in all cases, there is
sufficient time for good faith negotiations and impasse resolution prior to the
submission deadline. Ultimately, then, CCSF I left open future challenges contesting
whether the City has interpreted and applied its rules to leave sufficient time for good
faith negotiations and impasse resolution, as well as whether the City has maintained
a level playing field for negotiations. Our analysis here follows this approach in finding
Charter sections A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) to be facially valid, while analyzing the
City’s interpretation of these provisions to determine whether that interpretation is
consistent with the MMBA.
C. CCSF II
City & County of San Francisco (2009) PERB Decision No. 2041-M (CCSF II)
arose as an offshoot of the same fact pattern at issue in CCSF I. When Local 39
refused to participate in the City’s interest arbitration mechanisms, the City sued Local
39 in superior court, seeking to force it to comply with the Charter. The superior court
dismissed the action because the subject matter was within PERB’s exclusive
jurisdiction, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed in a published decision. (City
and County of San Francisco v. Internat. Union of Operating Engineers, Local 39 (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 938.) Two days after the superior court dismissed the City’s lawsuit,
the City filed an unfair practice charge with PERB. The parties litigated the case
before an ALJ, who issued a proposed decision. After Local 39 filed exceptions, we

28
adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision as our own, while adding additional analysis as
to Local 39’s procedural defense. (CCSF II, supra, PERB Decision No. 2041-M, p. 2.)
Notably, we rejected Local 39’s contention that the City could not mandate
interest arbitration through its Charter. In reaching this conclusion, we confirmed our
above-described interpretation of CCSF I, interpreting that decision to mean that the
Charter “must be read so as to ‘restrict the use of the impasse procedure to situations
where disputed issues remain unresolved after good faith bargaining.’” (CCSF II, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2041-M, adopting proposed decision at p. 24, citing CCSF I,
supra, PERB Decision No. 1890-M, p. 9.) Similarly, we reiterated that the Charter
provisions are facially valid, because those provisions required good faith negotiations.
(CCSF II, supra, PERB Decision No. 2041-M, adopting proposed decision at p. 33,
citing CCSF I, supra, PERB Decision No. 1890-M, p. 9.) Rounding out this analysis,
we relied on the City’s admission that the term “impasse” under the Charter has the
same meaning as it does under PERB precedent. (CCSF II, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2041-M, adopting proposed decision at p. 34, citing CCSF I, supra, PERB
Decision No. 1890-M, p. 9.)
CCSF II clarified that if the City declares impasse in bad faith, or the parties are
not at a true impasse, then a union can decline to participate in the impasse resolution
procedures and raise an as-applied challenge to the City’s conduct. (CCSF II, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2041-M, adopting proposed decision at pp. 34 & 38-39.) Critically,
we adopted the ALJ decision noting this understanding as the basis for finding the
Charter to be facially valid: “[T]he traditional meaning of impasse is the meaning
incorporated in the Charter. It should be noted that PERB’s conclusion that impasse

29
must be reached after good faith bargaining also serves to confirm the reasonableness
of the requirement of mandatory interest arbitration.” (Id., adopting proposed decision
at p. 39.) On the facts before us in CCSF II, Local 39 was not able to establish an as-
applied violation, especially given that Local 39 that had acted in bad faith by refusing to
operate under the Charter’s mediation and arbitration provisions from the outset, even
before it could possibly have known whether the parties would reach a good faith
impasse. (Id., adopting proposed decision at pp. 9-10 & 42.)
The ALJ in the instant case also issued the proposed decision that we adopted in
CCSF II. While this affords the ALJ’s decision in this case no special weight, it is
noteworthy that the ALJ was particularly aware of the factual differences between the
cases when he found that in the instant case there was insufficient time for good faith
negotiations. We, too, note that significant difference, which forms part of the basis for
upholding SEIU’s as-applied challenge. Unlike the ALJ, however, we find that factual
difference does not render the Charter facially invalid.
D. The Court of Appeal’s Unpublished Decision in SFPOA v. CCSF
The Court of Appeal issued an unpublished decision regarding the Charter’s
submission deadline, in a case that arose after the City’s 2009 ballot measure first
applied the submission deadline to public safety employee bargaining units. The San
Francisco Police Officers’ Association (SFPOA) sued the City in superior court,
alleging that the submission deadline set forth in section A8.590-5(h)—which is
identical to the deadline set forth in A8.409-4(k)—facially violated the MMBA. The trial
court rejected this facial challenge. SFPOA appealed and the First Appellate District
affirmed, interpreting the submission deadline as facially consistent with the MMBA.

30
(San Francisco Police Officers' Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 24, 2014, No. A137684) 2014 WL 4731879 (SFPOA v. CCSF).)
To begin, the court found that the submission deadline is procedural rather than
substantive. (SFPOA v. CCSF, slip op., p. 5.) Turning to the crux of the matter, the
court found no facial infringement on good faith negotiations given that the Charter
allows parties to begin negotiations early, and/or to bargain even after the submission
deadline, and/or to implement economic enhancements “retroactive to any date.”
(SFPOA v. CCSF, slip op., p. 7.)
Thus, several common principles emerge from CCSF I, CCSF II, and SFPOA v.
CCSF. From this trio of cases, we learn that the submission deadline is facially valid
because it requires good faith negotiations in compliance with MMBA precedent;
parties must afford adequate time for negotiations; and in order to do so, parties may
need to begin negotiations early and/or submit an MOU by the deadline but resume
negotiations thereafter and work toward enhancements “retroactive to any date.”
These cases left the door open to future as-applied claims that would necessarily
clarify how to interpret the facially valid submission deadline in a lawful manner if, as
will inevitably happen in some negotiations, parties approach the deadline without
having had sufficient time to complete good faith negotiations and/or without being at
a legitimate impasse. While PERB subsequently decided two other cases touching on
the City’s interest arbitration framework (CCSF III and CCSF IV), and we recount
those decisions below, neither related to the as-applied questions left open in CCSF I,
CCSF II, and SFPOA v. CCSF.

31
The instant case, in contrast, reaches these open questions regarding how to
apply the Charter when the parties approach the submission deadline but have not
had enough time to complete good faith negotiations. Our full analysis, set out post at
pages 35-50, is consistent with several critical lessons from prior precedent. First, the
Charter’s purpose is to provide for good faith mediation and interest arbitration if
parties bargain in good faith but nonetheless reach a true impasse as that term of art
is defined by labor relations precedent. (CCSF II, supra, PERB Decision No. 2041-M,
adopting proposed decision at p. 34; accord Fire Fighters v. CCSF, supra, 38 Cal.4th
at pp. 661, 662, 670, & 674.) Depending on the specific facts of a given negotiation,
parties may not have adequate time to reach a good faith impasse and complete
interest arbitration regarding all issues by the submission deadline. This creates a
tension within the Charter, as well as a tension between the Charter and the MMBA.
Precedent requires us to harmonize the Charter with the MMBA if possible.
(Building Material & Construction Teamsters’ Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651,
665 [noting important goal of harmonizing the San Francisco City Charter with the
MMBA, if possible].) We do so by reasonably and necessarily interpreting the
Charter’s penalty provision to have no impact so long as the parties submit some type
of MOU by the deadline, and by noting that what the parties submit by that deadline
may take a variety of forms. For instance, we find that the Charter does not proscribe
the submitted MOU from including provisions that provide for mid-contract
negotiations and mid-contract interest arbitration allowing potential economic
enhancements to take effect mid-year and/or retroactive to any date. Such MOU
provisions may be agreed-upon or ordered by the arbitrator, and may be included for

32
any reason, including if there was insufficient time to complete good faith negotiations
or good faith interest arbitration before the deadline.
E. CCSF III
In City & County of San Francisco (2017) PERB Decision No. 2536-M
(CCSF III), we found that the City Charter violated the MMBA to the extent it banned
sympathy strikes and unfair practice strikes, because such strikes cannot be resolved
by binding interest arbitration. (Id. at pp. 25-26 & adopting proposed decision at
p. 20.)21 Thus, although the case touched on several aspects of the Charter’s
impasse resolution procedures, CCSF III did not involve any facial or as-applied
challenge to the submission deadline or its associated penalty provision.
F. CCSF IV and the Court of Appeal’s Unpublished Decision in CCSF v. PERB
In 2017, we issued a decision regarding challenges to certain aspects of the
interest arbitration mechanism that are unrelated to the submission deadline. (City &
County of San Francisco (2017) PERB Decision No. 2540-M.) The Court of Appeal, in
________________________
21 The majority opinion “reserved for another day” the question whether the
Charter’s prohibition was unlawful even as to primary, economic strikes, while citing
PERB and appellate precedent suggesting that the City acts “at its peril” if it seeks to
enforce such a strike prohibition. (CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision No. 2536-M, p. 26,
fn. 24.) The majority noted that the Board had previously left open the same question.
(Id. at p. 26, citing CCSF II, PERB Decision No. 2041-M, adopting proposed decision
at p. 33, fn. 19.) Member Banks, concurring and dissenting in CCSF III, averred that
the Board should decide the open issue and find that the Charter’s prohibition on
strikes is entirely unlawful. (CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision No. 2536-M, pp. 48-64.)
In his concurrence today, Member Banks observes that the events described in CCSF
IV, as well as those at issue in the instant case, provide a further basis for questioning
the City’s claim that its interest arbitration framework justifies it in purporting to require
employees and unions to forego their statutory right to call a primary economic strike.
This question necessarily remains unsettled in the wake of today’s decision, as the
instant case involved no strike of any type.

33
an unpublished decision, partially affirmed and partially set aside our decision. (City
and County of San Francisco v. PERB (Cal. Ct. App. July 22, 2019, No. A152913) 2019
WL 329647 (CCSF v. PERB).) After the court’s unpublished decision became final, we
issued a brief decision noting which of our earlier conclusions remain precedential and
which were set aside. (City & County of San Francisco (2019) PERB Decision
No. 2540a-M.) In the below analysis, we refer to decision numbers 2540-M and
2540a-M, collectively, as CCSF IV, though we disaggregate the two cases when citing
to specific pages numbers. All references to PERB Decision No. 2540-M are to
precedential parts of the decision that the Court of Appeal did not set aside.
In CCSF IV, five unions brought purely facial challenges to newly enacted
language in Charter sections 8A.104(o) and (q), relating to interest arbitration
provisions for SFMTA bargaining units. Charter section 8A.104(o) provided as
follows:
“The voters find that for transit system employees whose
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment are
set by the Agency, the Agency’s discretion in establishing
and adjusting scheduling, deployment, assignment, staffing,
sign ups, and the use and number of part-time transit system
personnel based upon service needs is essential to the
effective, efficient, and reliable operation of the transit
system. In any mediation/arbitration proceeding under
Section 8.409-4 with an employee organization representing
transit system employees, the employee organization shall
have the burden of proving that any restrictions proposed on
the Agency’s ability to exercise broad discretion with respect
to these matters are justified. To meet this burden, the
employee organizations must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the justification for such restrictions
outweighs the public’s interest in effective, efficient, and
reliable transit service and is consistent with best practices.
The mediation/arbitration board shall not treat the

34
provisions of MOUs for transit system employees adopted
prior to the effective date of this provision as precedential in
establishing the terms of a successor agreement. The
mediation/arbitration board’s jurisdiction shall be limited to
matters within the mandatory scope of bargaining under
state law.”
(CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540, pp. 3-4, emphasis added.)
While we initially found several sentences in this section to violate the MMBA
on a facial basis, after review by the Court of Appeal, CCSF IV holds that only the third
sentence, italicized above, is facially invalid. (CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2540-M, p. 24 & Decision No. 2540a-M, p. 2.) The “clear and convincing
evidence” standard and the “best practices” standard, both found in that sentence,
each independently violate the MMBA because they serve as a “one-way ratchet” that
impacts unions more than the City, thereby “tilting” labor relations toward
management’s priorities. (CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, pp. 15 & 17-
18, affirmed, CCSF v. PERB, supra, slip op., p. 17 [affirming PERB, noting that an
interest arbitration process “must maintain its neutrality,” but the City enacted a
provision that “unreasonably hampers a union’s leverage.”].) We found that the City
can raise public interest concerns before the interest arbitrator, but the City cannot put
its thumb on the scale by directing the arbitrator that the union has a greater burden
than management in litigating such issues. (Id. at p. 17.) Therefore, we concluded
that the City, by turning “what should be a level table into a warped surface,” would
likely alter the balance of power at the bargaining table “long before the parties reach
impasse and arbitration,” as the unlawful provision would reduce incentives for
management to reach agreement in negotiations. (Id. at p. 23.) In sum, CCSF IV
clarified that rules for collective bargaining and dispute resolution “must be faithful to

35
the premise of equal leverage in the process to fulfill the purposes of the statute.” (Id.
at p. 8, internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)22
III. 	The Facts of this Case Reflect an As-Applied Violation
The above-described cases involving the City leave no doubt that adopting an
interest arbitration framework does not immunize the City from MMBA compliance. In
CCSF IV, for instance, the City noted that if it had not adopted an interest arbitration
mechanism, it would have the right to impose its last, best, and final offer (LBFO)
following impasse, and the City therefore argued that it should be permitted to adopt
an interest arbitration mechanism favoring its priorities over union priorities. (CCSF
IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, p. 18 & fn. 10.) Rejecting this argument, we
noted that City voters adopted interest arbitration procedures, thereby giving up the
City’s right to impose an LBFO, and that those procedures must be neutral and
compliant with the MMBA, even if the City was not required to adopt them in the first
place. (Ibid.)
Applying CCSF IV to the instant case, we cannot adopt a Charter interpretation
that permits cost savings to take effect at any time during the course of an MOU,
irrespective of the submission deadline and associated penalty provision, while strictly
________________________
22 CCSF IV also analyzed newly added Charter section 8A.104(q) and found
that the final sentence of that section, mandating that all side letters shall expire no
later than the MOU, is facially invalid because it conflicts with the City’s duty to
maintain the status quo following an MOU’s expiration, pending negotiations and
interest arbitration. (CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, adopting proposed
decision at p. 30.) Furthermore, because CCSF IV involved a purely facial challenge
(CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, p. 19), it left open whether additional
parts of Charter sections 8A.104(o) and (q) might be applied in a manner that violates
the MMBA.

36
limiting the extent to which mid-contract negotiations or interest arbitration may lead to
new economic terms that add to the City’s cost, immediately or retroactively. Such an
interpretation would constitute exactly the type of “one way ratchet” that unlawfully tilts
labor relations toward management’s priorities. (CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2540-M, pp. 15-18, affirmed, CCSF v. PERB, supra, slip op., p. 17.) This principle
forms part of the basis for finding that the Charter does not foreclose reopener
provisions that may require mid-contract negotiations and interest arbitration as to
certain issues, with the possibility of enhancements that take effect mid-year or are
retroactive to any date. As discussed below, our interpretation also draws support
from numerous other sources, including but not limited to the language of the Charter
itself, the parties’ practice thereunder, and the MMBA’s requirement that there be
sufficient time for good faith negotiations.
Just as adopting an interest arbitration mechanism does not immunize the City
from a claim that its framework tilts the playing field, it also does not allow the City to
evade the rule that an MMBA employer must devote sufficient time to negotiations and
dispute resolution. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 10; Selma,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2380-M, pp. 21-22; Riverside, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2360-M, p. 15.) This principle—that the submission deadline must be applied in a
manner that preserves good faith negotiations—was the bedrock principle on which
we decided CCSF I and CCSF II. Indeed, we found the Charter facially valid so long
as the parties apply it to comport with the MMBA’s good faith bargaining requirement,

37
which is the law’s “centerpiece.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 913; Voters for
Responsible Retirement, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 781.)23
Neither the City’s budget process nor its high number of bargaining units is
sufficient to exempt the City from any MMBA requirements. As the ALJ pointed out in
the proposed decision, the State of California provides a useful analogy, as it also has
a complex and time sensitive budget process, plus numerous bargaining units
represented by many unions. The State is governed by a separate labor relations
statute that PERB enforces, the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act).24 Interpreting that
statute, we have held that “collective bargaining has no necessary linkage with the
State budgetary process.” (State of California (Department of Personnel
Administration) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1067-S, adopting proposed decision at
p. 9.) Rather, “[t]he two activities can take place at the same time and no resolution of
collective bargaining is required before introduction or approval of the budget.” (Ibid.)
Interpreting federal labor law, the National Labor Relations Board has similarly found
that an employer cannot insist on a firm deadline for negotiations. (Newcor Bay City
Division of Newcor, Inc. (2005) 345 NLRB 1229, 1239-1240.)
________________________
23 The Legislature did create one MMBA exemption for employers like the City
that have adopted interest arbitration. As set forth in MMBA section 3505,
subdivision (e), such employers need not also comply with the MMBA’s factfinding
procedures. The Legislature thus recognized that interest arbitration is a worthy
substitute for factfinding. The limited nature of this exemption further demonstrates
that interest arbitration procedures are governed by all MMBA principles except to the
extent the Legislature has adopted specific exemptions for interest arbitration.
24 The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq.

38
Substantially all public employers of which we are aware sign multi-year MOUs
while knowing that the near future could bring unforeseen costs and changes in
revenue streams due to fluctuations in tax revenues or other sources of income.
Scheduled or unscheduled cost increases and decreases in revenue, or, alternately,
positive fluctuations arising from increased revenue or salary savings, commonly
occur during a single fiscal year and repeatedly in the course of a multi-year MOU.
For this reason, any public employer must rely on the best projections it can and then
make adjustments thereafter as needed, knowing that an economic downturn could
occur in virtually any year, and that some variance from projections is almost certain.
Public entities facing unforeseen mid-MOU deficits typically must either tap into
reserves, implement one-time or ongoing measures to raise revenue or cut costs, or
notify the unions with which they bargain that there is a need to lay off employees if
the parties cannot negotiate mid-MOU cost savings.
Moreover, the City can explain these matters to the interest arbitrator. Under
the Charter, the arbitration board must take into account, among other factors: the
City’s financial resources, revenue projections, and budgetary reserves; “other
demands on the City and County’s resources including limitations on the amount and
use of revenues and expenditures;” the City’s “ability to meet the costs of the
decision;” and reports from the Controller, Mayor, and Board of Supervisors regarding
the City's projected financial condition for the next three fiscal years. (Charter, §
A8.409-4(d).) For all these reasons, we find nothing in the Charter that warrants a
change from the principle underlying all of California’s public sector collective
bargaining law: While “budget exigencies may have consequences” for bargaining,

39
they “do not suspend the duty to meet and confer in good faith.” (Selma, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2380-M, p. 22.)
Thus, our expertise in the practical realities of California public sector collective
bargaining leads us to continue interpreting state labor relations law to prohibit an
employer from declaring impasse merely because a particular deadline is
approaching. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 10; Selma, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2380-M, p. 21; Riverside, supra, PERB Decision No. 2360-M,
p. 20.) Furthermore, in assessing SEIU’s as-applied challenge to determine if the City
prematurely declared impasse in this case, we rely on the City’s acknowledgement
that the term “impasse” under the Charter has the same meaning as it does under
PERB precedent. (CCSF II, supra, PERB Decision No. 2041-M, adopting proposed
decision at p. 34.)
A bona fide impasse exists if parties’ differences are so substantial and
prolonged that further meeting and conferring is futile, despite good faith negotiations
that were free from unfair labor practices. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2571-M, p. 6; Riverside, supra, PERB Decision No. 2360-M, p. 13.) A party
evidences bad faith if it rushes to impasse or issues an impasse declaration that is
premature, unfounded, or insincere. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision No. 2571-M,
p. 10.) If an employer declares impasse without reaching a bona fide impasse after
good faith negotiations, but the employer neither changes employment terms nor
refuses to continue bargaining, we consider that evidence under the totality of conduct
test. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 7, fn. 9; Riverside, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2360-M, p. 12.) In contrast, if the employer in those circumstances

40
refuses to bargain further or proceeds to change employment terms, that constitutes
further evidence of bad faith under the totality test, and it also constitutes a per se
violation. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 7, fn. 9; Riverside,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2360-M, p. 12.)
The “reasonable period of time” that the MMBA requires for good faith
negotiations will vary greatly from negotiation to negotiation, depending on many
factors. (City of San Jose (2013) PERB Decision No. 2341-M, p. 41.) In determining
the existence of impasse on a given date, PERB focuses on numerous factors,
including: the number and length of negotiation sessions; the extent to which the
parties have exchanged information and thoroughly discussed proposals and
counterproposals in good faith; and the nature of the unresolved issues and the
parties’ discussions of such issues to date. (San Ramon, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2571-M, pp. 9-12; Riverside, supra, PERB Decision No. 2360-M, pp. 13-14.)
Continued movement on minor issues will not prevent a finding of impasse if the
parties remain deadlocked on one or more major issues. (Regents of the University of
California (1985) PERB Decision No. 520-H, p. 17.) However, both parties must
believe they are at the “end of their rope,” which is typically negated if one party
displays continuing movement, or if the other party references a deadline for
completion of negotiations and acts in accordance with that deadline. (Riverside,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2360-M, p. 13.)

41
Based on these principles, we find that the City and SEIU were not actually at
impasse when the City declared impasse on April 22.25 The parties’ negotiations
involved numerous proposals, many of them complex. The City did not make its first
wage proposal until April 3, merely 19 days before it declared impasse. Testimony at
the hearing confirmed what is self-evident: the absence of a wage offer made it
difficult to assess or make progress overall, especially given that there is an integral
connection between wages and other key issues, including health care.
Normally, an impasse occurs when both parties indicate that they have no more
material movement to make on the key issues, at least temporarily. As of April 22,
neither party had asserted an inability to make such movement. Both parties
continued to make movement before and after the City declared impasse. Some
continuing resolution of differences is typical in the course of post-impasse dispute
resolution procedures, but in this case it was striking that the parties were not close to
the final stages of bargaining when the City declared impasse. Indeed, the parties
had not even reached the point in negotiations in which one or both parties make
package proposals, offering concessions on certain issues in exchange for advances
on others. It is evident that the parties were not legitimately at impasse on April 22,
and that the City declared impasse mainly due to the upcoming submission deadline.
(See, e.g., Riverside, supra, PERB Decision No. 2360-M, pp. 14-16 [noting
________________________
25 The record is not clear as to whether this declaration of impasse explicitly
included the parties’ SFMTA negotiations. As a practical matter, the SFMTA
negotiations largely trailed the main negotiations, with an assumption that many
significant terms in the new successor MOU for the SFMTA unit would simply follow
from an eventual resolution at the main table. As a result, there is no doubt that the
City’s premature impasse declaration impacted both sets of negotiations.

42
contemporaneous movement and narrowing of issues, in context of pressure for
completion of negotiations by a deadline, coupled with insubstantial justification for
impasse declaration].)
Our finding that the City relied on the Charter’s submission deadline to declare
impasse prematurely is significant evidence that the submission deadline, as applied
in this case, prevented the parties from devoting sufficient time to hear and reflect on
one another’s positions and endeavor in good faith to reach a mutual accommodation.
Other significant evidence also supports this conclusion. For instance, as noted in our
factual findings, we credit evidence showing that bargaining was rushed and there
was insufficient time for the process to play out. An SEIU witness summed up the
situation by observing that the lack of sufficient time before the submission deadline
made it too difficult to “actually talk about what our members’ concerns were and try to
explain to management and see if we could, you know, engage management in a
conversation.” The 2014 negotiations, then, were entirely antithetical to the MMBA’s
core purpose of promoting “full communication” between public employers and
employees’ chosen organizations, through a robust duty to meet and confer in good
faith for a reasonable period of time. (MMBA, § 3500, subd. (a).)
For all of these reasons, we find in SEIU’s favor on its as-applied challenge.
IV. 	The Challenged Sections Can be Interpreted in a Lawful Manner
The above facts also raise the possibility that Charter sections A8.409-4(k) and
8A.104(n) are facially invalid, notwithstanding our precedential decisions in CCSF I
and CCSF II, as well as the nonprecedential decision in SFPOA v. CCSF. We do not
so find. Instead, we build on prior precedent that found the Charter facially valid

43
because it restricts “the use of the impasse procedure to situations where disputed
issues remain unresolved after good faith bargaining,” which includes the requirement
that negotiations “continue for a ‘reasonable period of time.’” (CCSF I, supra, PERB
Decision No. 1890-M, pp. 8 & 9.) To do so, we necessarily answer the questions that
prior precedent left open regarding how the Charter should be interpreted in cases
such as the instant one.26 In answering these questions, our focus is to harmonize the
Charter with the MMBA. (Building Material & Construction Teamsters’ Union, Local
216, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 665; CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, p. 15,
fn. 7.)
As discussed ante at pages 35-36, adopting an interest arbitration mechanism
does not immunize an employer from ensuring that such procedures comply with the
MMBA. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the neutral interest arbitrator
holds substantial power to make both substantive and procedural rulings, including to
direct the parties to schedule further dates for negotiations, mediation, and interest
arbitration, both before the submission deadline and as part of any mid-contract
reopeners that the arbitrator may find warranted. Such reopener provisions may
require mid-contract negotiations and interest arbitration as to certain specified
unresolved issues, with the possibility of enhancements that take effect mid-year or
are retroactive to any date. The arbitrator may order the parties to include such
provisions in their MOU for any number of reasons, including if the arbitrator finds that
there was insufficient time for full good faith negotiations or interest arbitration prior to
________________________
26 As noted above, CCSF I, CCSF II, and SFPOA v. CCSF left open future as-
applied challenges, including the issue of how to square the submission deadline with
the need for adequate time for good faith negotiations.

44
the submission deadline. This arbitral power has the potential to help keep the parties
in compliance with the MMBA.
Our interpretation draws support from the City’s argument that the submission
deadline does not impose an absolute cutoff on meeting and conferring. Specifically,
the City acknowledged to the ALJ that the MMBA imposes a duty to bargain for a
reasonable period of time, but the City argued that the submission deadline does “not
affect this MMBA mandate in any way,” as the Charter does not dictate when
negotiations begin, and bargaining can continue even after the parties comply with the
submission deadline.
The City is correct that parties can mutually agree to begin bargaining early, but
that possibility alone does not necessarily lead to enough time for bargaining given
that negotiations are a fundamentally unpredictable process that typically takes more
time than anticipated, particularly when complex issues are at stake. For that reason,
the more critical aspect of the City’s argument is its acknowledgement that
negotiations can continue as to certain issues, or resume later, even after the parties
submit an MOU by the submission deadline and thereby avoid triggering the penalty
provision. The ALJ dismissed this contention as “chimerical,” and the City excepted to
that finding, arguing that “if the parties fail to reach agreement on certain issues by
[the submission deadline], they can agree to continue the meet and confer process on
those issues in the body of a timely-submitted successor MOU.” “For example,” the
City continues, “the parties agreed to defer binding interest arbitration to resolve
proposals regarding SFMTA Station Agent parking and breakrooms.” A City witness

45
explained that this “was a way to make sure that the MOU got submitted in time, but
the parties still had additional time to negotiate” on the two issues.
The City’s argument therefore further confirms that the submission deadline is
not necessarily a hard cutoff for all bargaining. Rather, when the deadline arrives, the
parties can submit an MOU containing any mix of agreed-upon and/or arbitrator-
ordered provisions, including language specifying that one or more remaining issues
will be subject to later, mid-contract bargaining and interest arbitration, thereby
allowing further time for good faith negotiations and impasse resolution as to those
issues shortly after the MOU is in place. During such mid-contract negotiations and
interest arbitration, enhancements may be agreed upon, or ordered, to be “retroactive
to any date” (SFPOA v. CCSF, supra, slip op., p. 7), because the parties will have
satisfied the submission deadline by submitting an MOU as of that date.
Significantly, the opportunity for a neutral arbitrator to order such mid-year or
retroactive enhancements, on an equal basis with mid-year cost savings, saves the
Charter from being a “one-way ratchet” that unlawfully tilts labor relations toward
management’s priorities. (CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, pp. 15-18,
affirmed, CCSF v. PERB, supra, slip op., p. 17.) Should the parties disagree as to
whether mid-contract negotiations and interest arbitration are warranted, the arbitrator
has the final say, meaning the balance of power is not necessarily tilted to one side or
the other. Absent the arbitrator’s ability to carve out time for mid-contract negotiations
and interest arbitration proceedings, and to order mid-year or retroactive
enhancements, the challenged Charter sections would prematurely end negotiations

46
by a set deadline and would tilt labor relations in the City’s favor by disallowing mid-
year enhancements while allowing mid-year cost savings.
Thus, the challenged Charter provisions would be facially invalid, but for the
necessary interpretation we explain herein: the submission deadline’s language
merely establishes a cutoff by which the parties must submit those portions of their
next MOU that have been agreed-upon or ordered by that date, together with any
needed reopener provisions covering those issues that have not yet been fully
negotiated or ordered. The parties or the arbitrator may decide that such further
negotiations and/or arbitration proceedings are appropriate because there was
insufficient time prior to the submission deadline, or because external factors or other
arguments suggest that one or more specified terms and conditions of employment
should be addressed in the months to follow.27
In SFPOA v. CCSF, supra, the court noted that irrespective of whether parties
satisfy the submission deadline, the Charter permits them to continue or resume
bargaining at any time, and to agree to enhancements “retroactive to any date.” (Id.,
supra, slip op. at p. 7.) The court’s non-precedential decision does not explain
precisely why this is the case. The most logical way to give meaning to this holding is
________________________
27 In this case, the parties reached that conclusion on their own as to the
parking and break room issues. It is not difficult to imagine the parties or the arbitrator
taking into account pending legislation potentially impacting employment terms (such
as the Affordable Care Act), or likely changes in available revenues or market
conditions, and determining that mid-contract proceedings, with the possibility of mid-
year changes, would be the most rational and appropriate process. In our discussion
post at page 49, we give further examples of external factors that might cause the
parties or the arbitrator to find such further proceedings to be appropriate.

47
to note the following two critical principles.28 First, as discussed above, the penalty
provision applies only if parties submit no MOU whatsoever by the submission
deadline, meaning the penalty provision has no impact on mid-contract reopener
provisions submitted before the deadline. Moreover, even if parties in a future
negotiation were to miss the deadline altogether and submit no MOU terms by that
date, if MOU terms are ultimately agreed-upon or ordered after the submission date
for one year, that is by definition prior to the submission deadline of the next year. We
therefore find persuasive the conclusion in SFPOA v. CCSF, supra, that if parties
submit their entire MOU following one fiscal year’s submission deadline, the Charter
nonetheless allows any or all MOU terms to be retroactive to any date.29
In the instant matter, the parties’ side letter regarding parking and break rooms
well illustrates these principles. As described ante at page 19, SEIU and SFMTA
signed a side letter providing for mid-contract negotiations over break rooms and
parking, ending in interest arbitration if the parties had not reached agreement as of
the following February 1, seven months into the new MOU. Testimony left little doubt
that providing break rooms and parking spaces to certain employees would cost
money. In the words of a management witness, “these stations are like 40 years old.
________________________
28 We find SFPOA v. CCSF, supra, to be persuasive to the extent it appears to
be consistent with these principles.
29 Were the City to delay making any required retroactive payments until the
following July 1, this would arguably violate the MMBA’s prohibition against an
unlawful one-way ratchet. Those facts are not before us, however, so we need not
decide that issue. Those facts are also unlikely to arise, as most parties are likely to
moot out the penalty provision altogether by submitting an MOU by the submission
deadline, even if that MOU carves out certain issues for further negotiations and/or
arbitration.

48
A lot of work had to be done. . . .” The parties’ side letter indicated that the MOU
would be amended to incorporate the result of any subsequent agreement or interest
arbitration award on these topics, and the side letter did not require that
implementation of such terms await the following fiscal year. The parties thus
contemplated the possibility of mid-contract interest arbitration leading to mid-contract
and mid-year enhancements having an economic cost. The side letter was not subject
to the Charter’s penalty provision, because it was part of an MOU submitted by the
deadline.
Several discrete strands of Supreme Court precedent also support interpreting
the Charter to grant the arbitrator discretion to include in the parties’ MOU terms
providing for mid-contract negotiations and interest arbitration. First, a city charter’s
interest arbitration provision must be interpreted to “require arbitration on the full range
of negotiable issues.” (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608,
623.) More generally, an arbitrator has broad remedial authority, subject only to any
express limitations on that authority. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 383 (Advanced Micro Devices).) Notably, Advanced Micro
Devices interpreted a provision of the California Arbitration Act, codified in the
California Code of Civil Procedure, section 1283.4, and the City’s Charter incorporates
by reference that Civil Procedure Code section. (Charter, § A8.409-4(c).) The Charter
further confirms the arbitrator’s substantial authority, authorizing the arbitrator to “adopt

49
other procedures designed to encourage an agreement between the parties, expedite
the arbitration hearing process, or reduce the cost of the arbitration process.” (Ibid.)30
These authorities further confirm that, if warranted, one possible element of an
arbitrator’s award is to order that the parties’ new MOU must include a reopener
provision calling for resumed negotiations on certain unresolved issues, plus mid-
contract interest arbitration as to those issues in the event there is no agreement, and
the possibility that the arbitrator could direct any economic terms to be retroactive to
any date. The arbitrator thus can help assure good faith negotiations consistent with
the MMBA and the Charter. In some of the more unfortunate possibilities on the
continuum of possible circumstances, parties could face shortened time due to a
natural disaster in or near San Francisco (earthquake, wildfire, flooding, etc.), an
illness of a critical participant or his or her family member, or other such occurrences.
However, no such unfortunate circumstances must occur for the parties or an
arbitrator to establish such mid-contract proceedings. Rather, the type of mundane
reasons the parties cited for establishing mid-contract proceedings—over parking and
break rooms—are fully sufficient to lead the parties or the arbitrator to establish
appropriate mid-contract proceedings.
Even where there is a plausibly valid interpretation of an employer rule, a facial
challenge will still succeed if the rule has a chilling effect on employees or unions or
otherwise interferes with or impinges on protected rights even before being applied.
(See, e.g., Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 908.)
________________________
30 Reflecting this broad authority, the parties’ letter to the arbitrator authorized
him “to hear any outstanding disputes that may be remaining from negotiations.”

50
There is reason for concern that the challenged Charter sections could have a chilling
effect on free and productive negotiations. However, either party can ask the
arbitrator to order the parties to devote more time, with or without a slight delay in
interest arbitration allowing the parties to negotiate, mediate, and determine whether
they are at a legitimate impasse. The arbitrator can also include in the parties’ new
MOU terms providing for an earlier start date for bargaining in the next cycle, as well
as the aforementioned mid-contract negotiations and interest arbitration over any
matters for which there may have been insufficient time for negotiations. As noted
above, such mid-contract proceedings can lead to new economic or noneconomic
terms that are effective mid-year or retroactive to any date.
Thus, while no PERB or court decision could possibly assure any particular
date by which the parties will always be at impasse, the neutral interest arbitrator’s
procedural and substantive decisions can aid in assuring that the parties make good
faith efforts to meet and confer as the MMBA requires.31 Because the parties must
comply with the arbitrator’s orders, neither has a unilateral right to “run out the clock,”
for instance by unilaterally refusing to agree to an MOU reopener provision. We
therefore find there is no chilling effect only because a neutral third party—the
arbitrator—can check the employer and ensure a balanced process.
________________________
31 With the interest arbitrator’s assistance, most parties should be able to
submit an MOU by the deadline while assuring adequate opportunity to negotiate (and
if necessary, arbitrate) all disputed issues, either before or after the submission
deadline, consistent with our explanation in this decision. Failure to do so could lead
to allegations of bad faith levied against one party or the other, depending on the
circumstances, but any such violation would normally be litigated on an as-applied
basis.

51
For the foregoing reasons, our remedy in this case requires the City, in future
negotiations with SEIU, to interpret the Charter consistently with this decision, and to
cease and desist from failing or refusing to devote a reasonable and adequate amount
of time to good faith negotiations, mediation, and interest arbitration. In the unique
circumstances of this case, however, we find that ordering the parties to reopen their
2014 negotiations, or ordering any other retrospective remedy, would not effectuate
the MMBA’s purposes.32
V. 	Discussion of Waived Defenses
The City waived several defenses by failing to raise them at one or more stages
of PERB proceedings. Nonetheless, we briefly address their merits, since they tend to
recur repeatedly in cases involving the City’s Charter and other agencies’ local rules.
First, the City contends that SEIU’s charge asks PERB to extend, unlawfully,
the City’s delegation of authority to an interest arbitrator. This contention, an element
of the home rule argument that the City failed to raise before the ALJ, relies on County
of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 286-89 and County of Sonoma, supra, 173
Cal.App.4th at pp. 340-348. Had the City not waived the argument, it would be
collaterally estopped by virtue of having litigated and lost the issue before PERB in
CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision No. 2540-M, p. 17, as well as before the Court of
Appeal on review of that decision.
________________________
32 One such retrospective remedy is to order reimbursement of bargaining costs
to remedy a party’s bad faith. A charging party has the right to file a bad faith
bargaining unfair practice charge and seek reimbursement of costs, including but not
limited to costs of bargaining, mediation, or interest arbitration. (City of Palo Alto
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2664-M, p. 8, fn. 6.)

52
The argument is also substantively untenable. As discussed in CCSF IV as
well as ante at footnote 18, the MMBA addresses a matter of statewide concern, and a
local agency’s charter or rules accordingly may not undercut or frustrate the MMBA’s
policies and purposes. (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 913; IFPTE, supra, 79
Cal.App.4th at p. 1306; Huntington Beach Police, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 500-
502.) In requiring parties to afford sufficient time for good faith negotiation and dispute
resolution, and in requiring that an employer’s interest arbitration rules do not tilt the
playing field toward the employer’s priorities, the MMBA therefore provides valid
guardrails for local dispute resolution mechanisms.
If a county has not adopted an interest arbitration framework on its own, the
Legislature may not require the county to delegate wage determinations to an interest
arbitrator, but any interest arbitration mechanism adopted by the county must comply
with the MMBA. (See County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 286-89
[distinguishing a local agency that has voluntarily adopted interest arbitration from one
that has not done so].) Notably, County of Riverside, as well as County of Sonoma,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 322, both involved newly enacted legislation requiring the
counties, involuntarily, to adopt an interest arbitration mechanism. Here, in contrast,
the City has long since agreed to such an approach, and the MMBA requires that the
parties be afforded sufficient time for bargaining and dispute resolution, and that those
processes must occur on a balanced playing field. (CCSF IV, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2540-M, p. 17 [noting that the Supreme Court’s County of Riverside decision, and
related precedent, do not bar PERB from ensuring that the City’s interest arbitration
procedures are fair and neutral].) In other words, given that City voters determined to

53
amend the Charter to delegate authority to an interest arbitrator, interpreting the
Charter to comply with the MMBA does not constitute an unlawful delegation. (See
also Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 384 [unlawful delegation is found only in
exceptional circumstances].)
Turning to the six-month statute of limitations that applies to all unfair practice
charges, even had the City not waived this defense, it would bar neither SEIU’s facial
challenge nor, a fortiori, SEIU’s as-applied challenge. As noted in CCSF III, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2536, p. 8, “it is not the ‘act’ of adopting the policy, but its
‘existence’ continuing to the time of the hearing that constitutes the offending
conduct.” CCSF III therefore followed the rule set forth in Long Beach Unified School
District (1987) PERB Decision No. 608, p. 12 (Long Beach), namely, that the date an
employer adopts or revises a set of regulations has “no legal significance in deciding
whether the regulations violate [EERA],” because a rule’s continued existence
qualifies as a continuing violation.
CCSF III modified two of our prior holdings. CCSF III first modified the
continuing violation doctrine as explained in County of Orange (2006) PERB Decision
No. 1868-M (County of Orange) and overruled that case to the extent it suggests only
interference cases fall within the rule of Long Beach, supra, PERB Decision No. 608.
(CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision No. 2536-M, pp. 14-15 & fn. 12.) Based on
CCSF III, the continuing violation doctrine applies to most challenges to local rules,
with just one exception: The statute of limitations bars a facial challenge filed more
than six months after a new rule is adopted, if but only if a union or employee can
violate the rule without risking any adverse consequence, as in that case we require

54
the union or employee to either bring the facial challenge within six months or else to
test the rule and bring its charge within six months after doing so. (Ibid.) CCSF III
also modified County of Riverside (2011) PERB Decision No. 2176-M and limited it to
its unique facts. Specifically, we held that even in those instances in which the
continuing violation doctrine does not apply pursuant to County of Orange, a charging
party may normally file a charge within six months of any independent instance in
which an employer applies a rule. (CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision No. 2536-M,
pp. 15-16) The only exception is in the unusual circumstance in which an employer
applied a rule to a set of facts more than six months prior to the union’s charge, and
the union asserts its charge is timely solely because, within the six-month period, the
employer merely reiterated its position as to the same set of facts. (Ibid.)
Thus, a charging party timely challenges a local rule by filing a charge within six
months of any independent instance in which the employer has applied the rule, or,
alternatively, at any time under the continuing violation doctrine, if a union or
employee would risk an adverse consequence by violating the rule. These rules make
particular sense in the realm of labor relations, because, as a matter of labor policy, it
is reasonable to allow bargaining parties the opportunity to operate under a rule and
attempt to work out adjustments or accommodations if possible, rather than requiring
a charge at the earliest possible stage in response to every rule change.
SEIU’s challenge was timely under both theories. First, SEIU risked an adverse
consequence under the Charter’s penalty provision, should SEIU have missed the
submission deadline. Second, SEIU filed its charge early in the 2014 negotiations,
just as the City was beginning to apply its Charter provisions. The 2014 negotiations

55
qualify as an independent application of the Charter, which triggers a new statute of
limitations.
Finally, we turn to the doctrines of waiver and laches. Even if the City had not
waived these defenses, there is insufficient evidence that SEIU acquiesced to the
challenged Charter sections, delayed in bringing the instant challenge, and/or
prejudiced the City. We have weighed the available evidence and do not find the City
to have met its burden as to any of these factors.
Even if there were greater evidence supporting a waiver or laches defense, we
would reject these equitable defenses here as a matter of sound labor relations.
When an employer approaches a union to initiate Seal Beach negotiations over a
proposed ballot measure, the union has little choice but to bargain in an attempt to
mitigate potential negative impacts to employees or unions and gain what
improvements it can. In doing so, and in concluding those negotiations based upon
the best mitigations it can negotiate, a union should not normally be found to have
waived its right to later challenge the resulting rules to the extent they violate the
MMBA, either facially or as-applied. Such a rule would strongly suggest that no union
could or would reach an agreement in Seal Beach negotiations, as it would convert
such negotiations from their current goal—providing an opportunity for input from
employees’ chosen representative—to the very different goal of providing the
employer with a safe harbor from an otherwise illegal rule. Moreover, as noted above,
it is reasonable to allow bargaining parties the opportunity to operate under a rule, see
how it works in application, and attempt to work out adjustments or accommodations if

56
possible, rather than requiring a charge at the earliest possible stage in response to
every rule change.
Finally, in this case, SEIU’s successful as-applied challenge to the Charter
provisions flows naturally and logically from CCSF I, CCSF II, and SFPOA v. CCSF,
which upheld the Charter as facially valid only so long as it is interpreted in a manner
that permits, rather than frustrates, good faith negotiations. The City has been on
notice for over a decade that it must interpret and apply its Charter in such a manner,
and it was appropriate for SEIU to have brought the instant case addressing the
questions left open in those earlier cases.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing factual findings and legal analysis, and the entire
record in this case, we find that the City interpreted and applied City Charter sections
A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) in a manner that: (1) violated MMBA section 3507,
subdivisions (a) and (d), as well as PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (f); (2)
violated the City’s own rules in violation of PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (g);
(3) denied, and tended to interfere with, the right of employees to participate in an
employee organization of their own choosing, in violation of MMBA section 3506,
MMBA section 3506.5, subdivision (a), and PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (a);
and (4) denied, and tended to interfere with, SEIU’s right to represent employees in
their employment relations with the City, in violation of MMBA section 3503, MMBA
section 3506.5, subdivision (b), and PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (b).

57
Accordingly, pursuant to MMBA section 3509, subdivision (a), we hereby
ORDER that the City, its governing boards, and its representatives, including SFMTA,
shall, in future negotiations, mediation, or interest arbitration involving SEIU:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST from failing or refusing to devote reasonable and
adequate time to good faith negotiations, mediation, and interest arbitration; and
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Interpret the City Charter to require good faith negotiations by
parties in contract bargaining and impasse resolution procedures.
2. 	Interpret the City Charter to allow parties to agree, or a
mediation/arbitration board to order: (a) that the parties’ successor agreement or
contract should include reopener language providing for mid-contract negotiations and
mid-contract interest arbitration concerning certain specified unresolved economic or
non-economic issues; and (b) that any economic or non-economic MOU adjustments
resulting from such mid-contract negotiations and/or mid-contract interest arbitration
proceedings may commence mid-year or retroactive to any date.
3. 	Within 10 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post at all work locations in the City, where notices to City and SFMTA
employees customarily are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an
Appendix. The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of the City, indicating
that the City will comply with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained
for a period of 30 consecutive workdays. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the Notice shall be posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and
other electronic means customarily used by the City to communicate with City and

58
SFMTA employees in the bargaining units represented by SEIU. Reasonable steps
shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or
covered with any other material.
4. 	Within 30 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, notify the General Counsel of PERB, or his or her designee, in writing of the
steps taken to comply with the terms of this Order. Continue to report in writing to the
General Counsel, or his or her designee, periodically thereafter as directed. All
reports regarding compliance with this Order shall be served concurrently on SEIU.
Member Paulson joined in this Decision.
Member Banks’ concurrence begins on page 59.

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BANKS, Member, concurring: In view of the relevant precedents, I concur with
my colleagues’ conclusion that Respondent City and County of San Francisco (CCSF)
violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) by interpreting and enforcing sections
A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n) of the City Charter (Charter), governing interest arbitration,
in a manner that interfered with the statutory rights of Service Employees International
Union, Local 1021, and its members. I write separately to renew my concerns with the
argument that mandatory interest arbitration in perpetuity is an equitable quid pro quo
for the forfeiture of the critical right to strike. Indeed, this case, in combination with
several other recent decisions, illustrates my belief, first articulated in my concurrence
and dissent in City & County of San Francisco (2017) PERB Decision No. 2536-M
(CCSF III), that the City’s mandatory interest arbitration procedure should not be
interpreted to forfeit the rights of employees and employee organizations to engage in
strike activities.33
Because the majority’s Decision describes in detail the historical evolution of
the City’s mandatory interest arbitration procedures, it is unnecessary to repeat it here.
However, in summary, it may be observed that, since first mandating its use in 1994,
the City has successfully introduced through successive ballot initiatives a host of
substantive changes to the original interest arbitration process. Several of these
________________________
33 The holding of CCSF III exempts sympathy strikes and unfair practice strikes
from the Charter’s otherwise broad prohibition on strike activities and suggests “that
the City enforces the penalty provisions of its Charter (A8.346) against employees
who engage in a lawful primary strike at its peril.” (CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2536-M, p. 26, fn. 24.) But in my view, it did not go far enough and should have
declared the categorical ban on strikes void in its entirety. (Id., concurrence and
dissent at p. 48.)

60
changes resulted in unfair practice charges, the most recent of which we decided in
City & County of San Francisco (2017) PERB Decision No. 2540-M (referred to here
as CCSF IV, consistent with the Decision). In that case, it was determined that
Proposition G, which amended the Charter to impose, inter alia, a heightened “clear
and convincing” evidence standard for the arbitration panel to weigh employee
organizations’ bargaining proposals, constituted an impermissible “one-way ratchet”
that substantially disadvantaged employees and their organizations. (CCSF IV, supra,
PERB Decision 2540-M, p. 16, affirmed in relevant part, City and County of San
Francisco v. PERB (July 22, 2019, A152913).)
In this case, we conclude that the City again misused the voter-backed
amendments to its Charter to thwart the purposes of the MMBA. In my view, the City
has once more availed itself of the ballot process to introduce new rules to the interest
arbitration process, which it then applied in a manner that violated its duty to bargain
in good faith. Such machinations call into question the City’s commitment to a fair and
neutral process for resolving bargaining impasses and promoting labor peace.
Indeed, whether referred to as the application of unreasonable local rules or simply
bad faith bargaining, this sustained pattern of misconduct suggests the City has
converted the whole of the Charter’s impasse resolution procedures into a one-way
ratchet to confine and limit the effectiveness of collective bargaining. Stated another
way, the City has chiseled the original deal that interest arbitration was supposed to
represent, while employees and their organizations must always adhere to the
Charter’s original interdict against the right to strike under pain of termination. Such a

61
one-way shifting quid pro quo is, in my view, completely inconsistent with our
precedent and the animating purposes of the MMBA.
In CCSF III, I urged that the Board squarely reject the legal fiction that
employees and their organizations could be compelled to forfeit their right to strike in
exchange for interest arbitration in perpetuity. (CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2536-M, pp. 62-63 [Banks dissenting].) That is, “PERB precedent expressly
recognize[es] a qualified, but nonetheless statutorily-protected rights of employees
and employee organizations to strike,” which no public employer can permanently
extinguish. (Ibid., italics in original.) I stated there, and reiterate here, my conviction
that the City Charter facially and irreconcilably conflicts with the MMBA to the extent it
purports to permanently prohibit employees from striking in exchange for mandatory
interest arbitration.
In this case, like CCSF IV, we are confronted with the reality of this so-called
quid pro quo: not only does the City maintain through its Charter the power to
extinguish permanently the right of its employees and their organizations to strike and
replace that right with the mandatory duty to participate in the interest arbitration
process, it also claims the authority to reengineer the arbitration process whenever it
sees fit, and without regard to its obligations under the MMBA. While in my dissent in
CCSF III, I identified the facial illegitimacy of the Charter’s permanent forfeiture of the
right to strike, I now question whether the City’s unlawful application of its evolving
interest arbitration procedures undermines the basic legitimacy of the entire quid pro
quo bargain.

62
And while I concur fully in our conclusion that the City violated the MMBA
through its application of the newest additions to the increasingly complex Charter
rules governing interest arbitration, I remain concerned that the entire quid pro quo
scheme is, in theory and practice, an unlawful theft of the basic right to strike.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER MATERIAL.
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-1154-M, Service Employees
International Union, Local 1021 v. City & County of San Francisco, in which the parties
had the right to participate, it has been found that the City and County of San
Francisco (City) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code
sections 3503, 3506, 3506.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), and 3507, subdivisions (a) and
(d), as well as PERB Regulation 32603, subdivisions (a), (b), (f) and (g), in the manner
in which the City, as well as its San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency,
interpreted City Charter sections A8.409-4(k) and 8A.104(n).
We have been ordered to post this Notice and we will, in future negotiations,
mediation, or interest arbitration involving Service Employees International Union,
Local 1021:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST from failing or refusing to devote reasonable and
adequate time to good faith negotiations, mediation, and interest arbitration; and
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Interpret the City Charter to require good faith negotiations by
parties in contract bargaining and impasse resolution procedures; and
2. 	Interpret the City Charter to allow the parties to agree, or a
mediation/arbitration board to order: (a) that the parties’ agreement or contract should
include reopener language providing for mid-contract negotiations and mid-contract
interest arbitration concerning certain specified unresolved economic or non-economic
issues; and (b) that any economic or non-economic adjustments resulting from such
mid-contract negotiations and/or mid-contract interest arbitration proceedings may
commence mid-year or retroactive to any date.
Dated: _____________________ 	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent