Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee (PERB 2701I)

CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF
INTERPRETERS, LOCAL 39000, THE
NEWSPAPER GUILD-COMMUNICATION
WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Charging Party, 	Case No. SF-CE-11-I
v. 	PERB Decision No. 2701-I
March 16, 2020
REGION 2 COURT INTERPRETER
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMITTEE &
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURTS OF
REGION 2,
Respondent.
Appearances: Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld by Anne I. Yen, Attorney, for California
Federation of Interpreters, Local 39000, The Newspaper Guild-Communication
Workers of America; Wiley Price & Radulovich by Joseph E. Wiley and Monna R.
Radulovich, Attorneys, for Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations
Committee and California Superior Courts of Region 2.
Before Banks, Shiners, and Krantz, Members.
DECISION
SHINERS, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on exceptions by the California Federation of Interpreters,
Local 39000, The Newspaper Guild-Communication Workers of America (CFI) to the
proposed decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The complaint, as amended,
generally alleged that the Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

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Committee (Committee) and the California Superior Courts of Region 2 (collectively
Courts) violated the Trial Court Interpreter Employment and Labor Relations Act
(Court Interpreter Act or Act)1 by (1) refusing to meet and confer “regionally” over the
impact of changes by local trial courts to employee pension contributions,2
(2) unilaterally changing employee pension contribution rates, (3) refusing in
successor contract negotiations to bargain over CFI’s proposals related to employee
pension contribution increases, and (4) repudiating collectively bargained grievance
procedures.
The ALJ found these allegations lacked merit, concluding primarily that the
Committee had lawfully delegated to the local trial courts the duty to negotiate over the
impacts of changes to employee pension contributions, and thus was not required to
bargain such impacts on a regional basis. The ALJ also concluded that the
Committee had not refused to bargain over CFI’s employee pension contribution
proposals during successor contract negotiations, that the Courts had not unilaterally
changed employee pension contribution rates, and that the Courts had not repudiated
the parties’ contractual grievance procedures.
Based on our review of the proposed decision, the entire record, and relevant
legal authority in light of the parties’ submissions, we affirm in part and reverse in part
________________________
1 The Court Interpreter Act is codified at Government Code section 71800 et
seq. Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references herein are to the
Government Code.
2 Relevant provisions of the Court Interpreter Act and the parties’ collective
bargaining agreement use “impacts” to refer to the negotiable effects of a non-
negotiable decision. Additionally, section 71801, subdivision (k) of the Act defines the
individual superior court of each county as a “trial court.” For consistency, we adopt
this nomenclature for purposes of this decision.

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the proposed decision. Specifically, we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that the
Committee did not refuse to bargain over CFI’s proposals related to employee pension
contributions during the parties’ 2016-2017 successor contract negotiations. Contrary
to the ALJ, we further conclude that (1) the Committee violated its duty to meet and
confer in good faith by refusing to engage in impact bargaining in response to CFI’s
February 11, 2016 request; (2) the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County
Superior Courts violated their duty to meet and confer in good faith by unlawfully
implementing changes to interpreters’ pension contributions prior to completion of
impact bargaining; (3) the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County
Superior Courts violated their duty to meet and confer in good faith by repudiating the
parties’ contractual grievance procedure; and (4) the Santa Cruz County Superior
Court violated its duty to meet and confer in good faith when it unilaterally eliminated a
stipend that offset interpreters’ pension contributions.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Committee is a regional court interpreter employment relations committee
within the meaning of Court Interpreter Act sections 71801, subdivision (h) and 71807,
and PERB Regulation 32035, subdivision (a).3 The Courts are trial courts within the
meaning of Court Interpreter Act sections 71801, subdivision (k) and 71807,
subdivision (a)(2), and PERB Regulation 32035, subdivision (b).
________________________
3 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 31001 et seq.

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The Committee is composed of the Court Executive Officers (CEO) for each of
the constituent trial courts in Region 2.4 The Committee members select from among
themselves a Committee Chairperson and an Administrative Chairperson. The
Committee Chairperson presides over the Committee and serves as its representative
in communications with employee organizations, while the Administrative Chairperson
serves as the Committee’s labor relations liaison and supports the Human Resources
managers for each of the trial courts within the region, among other similar duties.
During the relevant time period, Michael Yuen (Yuen), CEO of the San Francisco
County Superior Court, served as the Committee Chairperson, and Kim Turner
(Turner), CEO of the Mendocino County Superior Court, served as the Administrative
Chair.
CFI is an employee organization within the meaning of Court Interpreter Act
section 71801, subdivision (c); a recognized employee organization within the
meaning of Court Interpreter Act section 71801, subdivision (g); and an exclusive
representative within the meaning of PERB Regulation 32035, subdivision (c).
At all relevant times, Mary Lou Aranguren (Aranguren), a former court
interpreter, was a CFI field representative and served as the chair of its bargaining
team, amongst other statewide responsibilities. Anabelle Garay (Garay), also a CFI
field representative, was a member of CFI’s bargaining team during successor
contract negotiations with the Committee in 2016-2017.
________________________
4 Region 2 encompasses the trial courts within the First and Sixth Appellate
Districts, except for Solano County Superior Court. (§ 71807, subd. (a)(2).) This
includes the trial courts of Alameda, Contra Costa, Del Norte, Humboldt, Lake, Marin,
Mendocino, Monterey, Napa, San Benito, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara,
Santa Cruz, and Sonoma counties.

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Background of the Court Interpreter Act
Prior to 2001, California’s trial court employees were employees of the county
in which each court was situated. In that year, the Trial Court Employment Protection
and Governance Act (Trial Court Act)5 converted court employees from county
employment to employment by the courts themselves. As part of this transition, the
Legislature determined that court employees should remain members of the county-
administered retirement plan in which they were enrolled as county employees (i.e.,
the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), a system established
under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937, or a system established by
other state law or a county charter), rather than participate in new local retirement
plans at each individual court. Typical of many public employers at the time, the trial
courts generally paid all or a portion of their employees’ required contribution toward
the cost of their pension benefits, a payment known as an employer-paid member
contribution (EPMC).
In 2002, the Legislature enacted the Court Interpreter Act to establish a
comprehensive system governing labor relations between trial courts and their
interpreters. An initial purpose was to transition the trial courts from relying on
independent contractors for interpretation services to having court employees perform
those services. (§ 71802; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 371
(2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 28, 2002.) When the Court Interpreters Act
took effect in 2003, court interpreters became members of the same county-
administered retirement plan as other employees at the same trial court.
________________________
5 The Trial Court Act is codified at section 71600 et seq.

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The Court Interpreter Act establishes four regional court interpreter employment
relations committees, including the Region 2 Committee, with authority over employer-
employee relations between each trial court within the region and the spoken
language court interpreters the trial courts employ. (§ 71807.) These regions, and by
association their regional committees, were established “[f]or [the] purposes of
developing regional terms and conditions of employment for court interpreters and for
collective bargaining with recognized employee organizations,” such as CFI.
(§ 71807, subd. (a).)
To achieve this purpose, the Legislature specifically mandated that each
regional committee shall act as the trial courts’ representative “in bargaining with a
recognized employee organization.” (§ 71809.) Any memorandum of understanding
(MOU) approved by a regional committee is binding on the trial courts within the
region. (§§ 71808, 71819.) Consequently, there is only one MOU for all court
interpreters throughout each region.
The Court Interpreter Act requires the regional committee, “or those
representatives as it may designate,” to meet and confer over subjects within the
scope of representation. (§ 71818.) The Act’s definition of “meet and confer,”
however, appears to impose a bargaining obligation on trial courts as well, explaining
“that a trial court or [regional committee] or those representatives it may designate,
and representatives of a recognized employee organization, shall . . . meet and confer
promptly upon request by either party . . . and . . . endeavor to reach agreement on
matters within the scope of representation.” (§ 71801, subd. (e), italics added.)

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Section 71816 broadly defines the scope of representation as including “all
matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations,
including, but not necessarily limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.” (§ 71816, subd. (a).) The Act excludes six specific subjects from the
scope of representation that are the province of the trial courts. (§ 71816, subd. (b).)
Though the six local topics are themselves irrelevant to the issue before us, the Act
expressly provides that “[t]he impact” of any changes to these local topics affecting the
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment “shall be within the
scope of representation” and identifies the regional committee as the sole party
“required” to meet and confer over such impacts.6 (§ 71816, subd. (c).)
Consistent with the Court Interpreter Act’s “purpose[] of developing regional
terms and conditions of employment,” section 71808 adopts uniformity as the default
position for court interpreters’ compensation and other terms and conditions of
employment. In what the parties colloquially refer to as the “uniformity requirement,”
the Act provides that “[c]ompensation shall be uniform throughout the region.”7
(§ 71808.) Section 71808 further provides that “[u]nless otherwise provided in a
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6 The Court Interpreter Act also excludes from the scope of representation a
trial court’s decision to cross-assign one or more of its court interpreter employees to
perform spoken language interpretation services for another trial court. (§§ 71801,
subd. (b); 71810, subds. (c) and (d).) However, “the impact of [non-negotiable] cross-
assignments” is similarly within the scope of representation and the Act identifies the
regional committee as the sole entity responsible to meet and confer with respect to
such impacts. (§ 71810, subd. (d).)
7 The Court Interpreter Act does not define “compensation.” As the California
Supreme Court has noted, the Legislature frequently uses “compensation” and
“wages” interchangeably. (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40
Cal.4th 1094, 1104, fn. 6.) Here, the parties have interpreted “compensation” to mean
wages, and we accept this interpretation for our purposes.

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[MOU], other terms and conditions of employment shall be uniform throughout the
region, except that health and welfare and pension benefits may be the same as those
provided to other employees of the same trial court.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Encompassed in the conversion of trial court employees from county
employment to employment by the courts themselves, the Legislature transferred
primary funding responsibilities from the counties to the state. The Judicial Council of
California participates in determining the state’s annual allocation for court interpreter
compensation across all four regions. Wages and the cost of health insurance and
retirement benefits are covered by the statewide fund. After a decision is made as to
the annual allotment for such expenditures, the trial courts submit funding requests to
the Judicial Council for reimbursement from the funding pool. If the fund is overdrawn,
the trial courts must use their own funds to cover the outstanding costs of interpreter
services.
The Parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Committee and CFI were parties to an MOU effective December 16, 2013,
through September 30, 2016. In accordance with section 71808’s uniformity
requirement, the MOU provided court interpreters with a single base rate of pay.
MOU Article 23.E describes the court interpreters’ retirement benefits. As
allowed by section 71808, it contains a “me too” or parity clause linking the
interpreters’ pension benefits to those of other employees at the same trial court:
“Each [court interpreter] of a local trial court shall be eligible
to participate in the same retirement plan at the same
benefit level as those non-management hourly represented
employees of the local trial court. [8] 	The level of benefit
________________________
8 The parties refer to this group of court employees as the “linked unit.”

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shall include but not necessarily be limited to, eligibility,
vesting, 	employee 	contribution, 	regular 	retirement 	date,
benefit formula, etc.” (Italics added.)
After describing the procedure to determine the linked unit when a trial court has two
or more bargaining units of non-management employees, Article 23.E states: “The
impact of any change in the [court interpreters’] retirement plan will be subject to meet
and confer.”9
For purposes of meeting and conferring “under this agreement,” MOU Article 4,
section 1 identifies the Committee Chairperson or his/her designee as the
Committee’s principle authorized agent for bargaining. For administering the terms
and provisions of the MOU, Article 4, section 2 identifies the CEO at each trial court,
or his/her designee, as the trial court’s principle authorized agent.
MOU Article 13, section 1 contains the following zipper clause:
“This MOU sets forth the full and entire agreement of the
parties regarding the matters set forth herein, and any other
prior or existing understanding or agreement over these
matters between the parties, whether formal or informal,
are hereby superseded or terminated in their entirety.
“Except as specifically provided herein, it is agreed and
understood that the parties hereto reserve the right, upon
mutual agreement, to meet and confer in good faith with
respect to any subject or matter covered herein or with
respect 	to 	any 	other 	matter 	within 	the 	scope 	of
representation, during the term of this MOU.
________________________
9 MOU Article 23.D similarly links the court interpreters’ health, vision, dental,
and other insurance benefits to linked units at each trial court and states that the
impact of any changes to those insurance benefits will be subject to meet and confer
requirements, further demonstrating the parties’ efforts to incorporate section 71808
into the MOU.

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“Unless otherwise permitted by this MOU or required by
law, 	no 	agreement, 	alteration, 	understanding, 	variation,
waiver, or modification of any of the terms or provisions
contained herein shall in any manner be binding upon the
parties hereto unless made and executed in writing by all
parties hereto and, if required, approved and implemented
by the Region.
“The waiver of any breach, term or condition of this MOU by
either party shall not constitute a precedent in the future
enforcement of all its terms and provisions.”
However, the parties acknowledge in Article 13, section 2 that during the term of the
MOU “it may be necessary for the [trial] courts to make changes in policies,
procedures or practices [not specifically covered by this agreement that may] affect[]
the employees of the Unit.” In such cases, the trial court must notify CFI of the
proposed change “and the Region shall meet and confer with [CFI] over the impact of
the proposed change . . . prior to implementation.”
MOU Article 33 contains a similar exception to the zipper clause’s bar on
reopening the MOU: “All proposed amendments to local policies which pertain to
interpreters and are within the scope of meet and confer . . . shall be reduced to
written form and distributed by management to [CFI]. Representatives of the
Court/Region and [CFI] shall meet and confer regarding the proposed change prior to
its adoption.”
MOU Article 9 contains a three-step grievance procedure culminating in binding
arbitration to “resolve grievances arising under this MOU.” A “grievance” is
contractually defined as a dispute by one or more employees, or CFI, over “the
interpretation, application, or enforcement of express terms of this MOU.”

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The grievance procedure recommends that an employee with a grievance first
seek resolution through informal discussions with a supervisor. If the grievance is not
resolved informally, the employee or CFI may pursue formal proceedings. Under the
first step, written grievances must be filed within 20 business days after the
occurrence or discovery of the matter on which the grievance is based for
consideration by and a written response from “the designated [trial] court
[m]anagement representative.” Under Step 1, the management representative “will”
meet with the grievant and union representative, if any, within 10 business days of
receipt of the grievance and “shall respond in writing” within 10 business days after
such meeting.
If the grievance is not resolved there, the grievant may file an appeal under the
second step with the trial court’s CEO, or the designated officer, within 10 business
days after receipt of the management representative’s written decision. Step 2
similarly requires that the parties “shall” meet within 10 business days of the appeal
and the CEO or designee must provide a written decision within 10 business days
thereafter. If the grievance remains unresolved, CFI may file a request for arbitration
under the third step within 30 business days of receipt of the CEO’s or designee’s
written decision. Alternatively, if the CEO or designee fails to provide a decision within
the specified time limit, CFI may elect to refer the grievance for arbitration. The
arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding on the parties.
Prior Arbitration Award Interpreting Article 23, Section E of the MOU
A dispute over Article 23.E arose in 2007. Labor negotiations between the
Santa Cruz County Superior Court and Service Employees International Union,

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Local 521 (SEIU) resulted in an MOU requiring, effective January 2008, that each
bargaining unit member contribute the full employee share toward the applicable
CalPERS retirement formula. In exchange, the trial court agreed to provide a one-
time wage increase “to offset the additional payment towards the employee’s share of
the CalPERS retirement contribution.”
CFI filed a grievance against the trial court in November 2007, alleging the
court interpreters were entitled to the same offset provided to SEIU—their linked unit
at the court—based on the parity clause in Article 23.E. In 2008, the court and CFI
submitted the grievance to Arbitrator William E. Riker (Arbitrator Riker) for final and
binding arbitration.
Arbitrator Riker found that Article 23.E assured CFI-represented employees
they would not pay more in pension contributions than their linked unit, and thus
ordered the court to provide them the full benefit of their parity clause, as follows:
“[T]he interpreters are to benefit from any bargain struck
between 	the 	Court and 	SEIU 	as 	related to 	health and
welfare and/or pension benefits. 	It is at the insistence of
the Employer that [CFI] is required to live with whatever the
SEIU and Santa Cruz Superior Court agreed upon in their
2007-2010 MOU.
[¶ . . . ¶]
AWARD
“The Employer shall apply that portion of the 3.75%, which
is the amount of the offset SEIU members received under
the 2007-2010 MOU in order to make the interpreters whole
for the requirement, where effective January 2008 they
have had to pay the 7% employee contribution to PERS. 	It
may not be applied to a wage increase. 	Rather, it is to be
applied to an alternative benefit such as, but not limited to,
an extra holiday, reducing the workday/week, an alternative

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schedule 	or 	similar 	beneficial 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment that are equal to the value of the applicable
percentage increase.
“At 	the 	request 	of 	the 	Union 	the 	arbitrator 	will 	retain
jurisdiction to resolve any issues relating to the decision
and award.”
The parties were unable to agree on a way to implement the award and
returned to Arbitrator Riker in accordance with his retained remedial jurisdiction. On
June 6, 2009, Arbitrator Riker awarded a retroactive monetary “pension offset leave
benefit” to continue for a period at least consistent with pension changes reflected in
the then-operative MOU between SEIU and the trial court, with bargaining between
CFI and the court to take place thereafter if either party wished to alter the pension
stipend.10 Though the MOU between SEIU and the court expired in October 2010, the
court continued to pay the stipend to court interpreters through 2017, as discussed
post.
Initial 2014-2016 Negotiations with Certain Region 2 Trial Courts over Changes to
EPMC
Napa County Superior Court
By letter to Garay on August 25, 2014, Lisa Skinner (Skinner), Chief Financial
Officer of the Napa County Superior Court, notified CFI that the linked unit had agreed
to eliminate EPMC and employees were paying the full share of their pension
contribution. Citing Article 23.E, Skinner informed CFI that, effective September 29,
the court intended to eliminate EPMC for court interpreters and offered to negotiate
the impacts of the change. By separate e-mail, Skinner provided Garay with records
________________________
10 Unless otherwise specified, all references to the “Riker arbitration decision”
herein are collectively to Arbitrator Riker’s 2008 and 2009 decisions.

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showing that the court and linked unit eliminated the EPMC on July 7, 2012, as part of
their negotiations to extend their bargaining agreement. On September 12, 2014,
Garay requested to meet and confer over the matter but, due to personal issues, she
was not able to meet before the interpreters’ increased pension contribution took
effect on September 29. On September 16, with Garay’s approval, court
representatives met with the interpreters to inform them of the change in pension
contribution amounts.
CEO Richard Feldstein (Feldstein), Skinner, and Garay exchanged additional
communications later in 2014. Garay noted that the linked unit had received a 3.5
percent cost of living adjustment (COLA) during their negotiations in 2012 and
asserted that the trial court was obligated to provide the same offset for CFI
employees, citing the Riker arbitration decision.
On December 2, 2014, Feldstein rejected CFI’s request, responding that the
COLA was not related to the elimination of EPMC but to other circumstances
surrounding trial court funding. Feldstein explained that he thought the trial court
lacked “authority to increase the compensation paid to our interpreters” because of the
uniformity requirement in section 71808. CFI did not engage in any further efforts to
negotiate with Napa County Superior Court over this issue.
In February 2017, Garay asked Feldstein and Skinner if they had negotiated a
side letter on the matter with her predecessor. Skinner responded by recounting the
history described above.

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Contra Costa County Superior Court
Prior to 2015, the Contra Costa County Superior Court had provided a 6.0
percent EPMC to its employees. On January 28, 2015, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, Local 2700 (AFSCME)—the linked unit at this
court—concluded economic reopener negotiations with the court for an agreement
that provided a two-step, 1.75 percent (3.5 percent total) base pay increase as an
offset for two 1.25 percent increases (2.5 percent total) in employee pension
contributions.
On February 13, 2015, Contra Costa County Superior Court Human Resources
Director Shannon Stone (Stone) provided a copy of the AFSCME tentative agreement
to Garay and offered to “meet and discuss” the first phase of the EPMC reduction as it
pertained to CFI based on the parity clause in Article 23.E. Garay requested
additional information, which Stone provided. On March 20, Garay requested to meet
and confer regarding the changes.
The trial court and CFI met three times in the spring of 2015. CFI asserted at
two of the meetings that regional bargaining was the proper forum to address the
changes. On April 25, the court offered to offset the increased employee pension
contributions with eight additional hours of personal holiday credit and a $100 monthly
match for employees choosing to participate in the court’s deferred compensation
plan. On May 6, CFI countered with increases in one-time and ongoing paid leave,
with a cash-out option, similar to those provided to AFSCME members. The parties
continued making movement until they executed a tentative agreement on June 24.

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On December 18, 2015, Stone notified Garay that AFSCME and the trial court
reached a subsequent tentative agreement bringing AFSCME-represented employees’
EPMC “into full compliance with [the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act], effective
the first pay date in January 2016.”11 Stone stated that the court did not intend to
apply the same pension contribution requirements to court interpreters until
February 1, 2016, to allow time to meet over the impacts of the change. CFI then
requested to negotiate over the impacts of the latest change to EPMC.
In the course of bargaining, Stone agreed on several occasions to delay
implementation of the change in EPMC. On May 25, 2016, the court proposed that
the interpreters pay increased employee pension contributions effective July 1, offset
by paid leave time with a cash-out option. The court’s proposal included separate
contingencies should the Committee and CFI reach a regional agreement before
December 31 or thereafter. The court and CFI did not reach agreement during their
local negotiations. Aranguren ultimately asserted that the interpreters should receive
a wage increase to offset elimination of the EPMC and that CFI intended to request
regional bargaining to achieve that result.
Stone testified the court was unable to offer increased wages because
compensation is negotiated regionally. When the court learned in the summer of 2016
that its funding would not be affected adversely by the failure to eliminate the EPMC
________________________
11 The Judicial Council and many trial courts interpreted an earlier signing
statement by the Governor approving the state’s budget to mean that courts which
failed to control benefit costs, including EPMC, could be adversely affected by certain
funding cuts, precipitating many trial courts’ efforts to eliminate EPMC. Sometime in
Fiscal Year 2016-2017, the courts learned their funding would not be cut if they failed
to eliminate EPMC.

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for interpreters, it agreed to postpone implementation of the second phase of the
reduced EPMC.
Marin County Superior Court
After notice of a proposed elimination of EPMC by Marin County Superior
Court, Aranguren and the court’s representative met on January 8 and February 3,
2016. CFI stated its desire to address the issue through regional bargaining and the
parties agreed to place the local bargaining in abeyance.
CFI’s Demand for Regional Bargaining over EPMC Impacts
On February 11, 2016, by letter to Region 2 Committee Chairman Yuen,
Aranguren requested “regional level” negotiations based on proposed reductions in
the EPMC at the Contra Costa and Marin County Superior Courts. Aranguren noted
that CFI had informed both courts that it would seek regional bargaining. She also
wrote that CFI had reserved its right to negotiate this same issue with Napa County
Superior Court when it implemented the change and added that similar changes were
anticipated at the San Mateo and Santa Clara County Superior Courts.
On March 9, 2016, Yuen responded that after discussing the matter with the
other CEOs, the Committee believed Article 23.E’s language, coupled with the parties’
past practice, unambiguously demonstrated the parties’ agreement that the impact of
pension benefit changes be bargained locally at each trial court. On that basis, the
Committee declined “to bargain regionally over these retirement contributions.”12
________________________
12 The Committee also agreed to meet and confer with CFI on a regional basis
over impacts related to another issue and asked CFI to contact Administrative Chair
Turner to schedule bargaining dates.

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On March 30, 2016, counsel for CFI responded that the Court Interpreter Act
requires that “terms and conditions be set and negotiated regionally, and that wages
must be uniform.” CFI also disputed Yuen’s assertion that the MOU, or any
bargaining history, demonstrated the parties’ intent that bargaining over the
“impact . . . [of] changes that occur during the term of the MOU” take place locally at
each trial court.
On June 3, 2016, Aranguren sent a second letter to Yuen requesting regional
bargaining over the proposed changes in pension contributions affecting employees in
“multiple courts,” noting the issue had arisen in additional courts since her February
2016 request.13 She explained that several trial courts had invited her to negotiate the
issue locally and she had already advised them of CFI’s intent to pursue regional
negotiations. Finally, she specified that CFI’s regional bargaining request
encompassed proposed changes at the Contra Costa, Marin, Mendocino, Napa, San
Mateo, Santa Clara, and Santa Cruz County Superior Courts. There is no evidence
Yuen responded to this request.
CFI’s EPMC Grievance
On April 1, 2016, CFI filed a grievance with Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo,
and Santa Clara County Superior Courts on behalf of “all affected employees in
Region 2 courts.”14 The grievance alleged the named trial courts had notified CFI that
________________________
13 Aranguren included, in relevant part, the CEOs of Contra Costa, Marin,
Mendocino, Napa, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Santa Cruz County Superior Courts
as carbon copy (cc:) recipients to apprise them of CFI’s continued intent to address
through regional bargaining the impact of increased pension contributions.
14 CFI also named the Region 2 Committee in its grievance allegations but did
not file the grievance with the Committee. Aranguren testified that she did not do so

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they had or were in the process of changing the interpreters’ EPMC. Citing Articles 13
and 23.E, as well as the Committee’s March 9 refusal to bargain over those changes
on a regional basis, CFI claimed it was contractually entitled to regional negotiations
and offsetting benefits equivalent to those the courts had provided to linked units.
Contra Costa County Superior Court’s Response
On April 12, 2016, Stone rejected the grievance on behalf of Contra Costa
County Superior Court, asserting it was premature due to the absence of an
implementation as to CFI unit members. Stone also noted the court’s intent to resume
impact bargaining after it earlier agreed in February 2016 to postpone negotiations so
that CFI could pursue its request to bargain over this issue with the Region 2
Committee.
Aranguren responded on April 22, noting that CFI had earlier “proposed [to
initiate the grievance] at [Step 2] and requested dates to meet” with the trial court CEO
or designee. She requested Stone clarify whether the court was refusing to meet
further on the matter and, if so, asked that the court treat Aranguren’s letter as CFI’s
“formal appeal to arbitration.” She added that the grievance had been filed to
preserve CFI’s right to protect against changes in cost-sharing until regional
bargaining could take place.
Responding by letter on May 12, Stone declined to proceed to arbitration,
expressing the court’s belief that CFI’s grievance against the Committee for refusing to
engage in regional negotiations, as it related to holding the court separately
________________________
because she generally believed Article 9 did not allow CFI to file grievances on a
regional basis, though she noted that the Committee had occasionally responded on a
trial court’s behalf where asked to do so by the court.

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responsible, was not a grievable matter. Stone stated that the court had no control
over CFI’s asserted right to meet and confer regionally with the Committee, explained
that the court had never refused to meet and confer with CFI over the impacts of
changes to employee pension contributions, and reiterated its willingness to engage in
local negotiations, proposing several dates in May 2016 for such purposes.
Santa Clara County Superior Court’s Response
On April 12, 2016, Santa Clara County Superior Court Human Resources
Director Kathryn Brooks (Brooks) rejected the grievance because the court had not
changed the interpreters’ EPMC, nor was it in the process of implementing such
changes, and the court thus denied that it had violated Articles 13 or 23.E. She
confirmed the court would comply with Article 23.E should it reach agreement with the
interpreters’ linked unit over any changes to EPMC, with whom negotiations were then
ongoing. There is no evidence that CFI responded to Brooks’ letter rejecting the
grievance.
Marin County Superior Court’s Response
On April 13, 2016, James Kim (Kim), CEO of Marin County Superior Court,
rejected the grievance, citing the trial court’s earlier negotiations with CFI and CFI’s
later suspension of local bargaining on February 3 based on its assertion of the right
to regional bargaining. Kim also noted that the court had not begun any process to
implement changes to the interpreters’ EPMC. Aranguren responded on April 22
requesting that Kim clarify whether the court was refusing to meet further over the
grievance and, if so, asked that the court treat Aranguren’s letter as CFI’s “formal

21
appeal to arbitration.”15 As she had in her letter to Stone, Aranguren added that the
grievance had been filed to preserve CFI’s right to protect against changes in cost-
sharing until regional bargaining could take place. Ultimately, the court never
implemented any of the proposed changes to the interpreters’ EPMC.
San Mateo County Superior Court’s Response
On April 13, 2016, San Mateo County Superior Court Human Resources
Director Ron Mortenson (Mortenson) rejected the grievance because the court had not
notified CFI of any change to interpreters’ EPMC. Aranguren responded on April 22,
requesting that Mortenson clarify whether the court was refusing to meet further over
the grievance and, if so, asked that the court treat Aranguren’s letter as CFI’s “formal
appeal to arbitration.”16 She again added that the grievance had been filed to
preserve CFI’s right to protect against changes in cost-sharing until regional
bargaining could take place.
Representatives of Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County
Superior Courts never held any meetings with CFI over its grievance.
Region 2 Committee’s Response
On April 13, 2016, Yuen responded to the grievance by letter. He did not
dispute CFI’s right, or lack thereof, to name the Committee in the grievance, though he
noted CFI did not present it to the Committee. Nevertheless, he rejected the
grievance on the Committee’s behalf on the ground that his March 9 letter already
________________________
15 Unlike her letter to Stone, Aranguren did not indicate whether CFI had
previously proposed that Marin County Superior Court initiate the grievance at Step 2.
16 Aranguren again did not indicate whether CFI had previously proposed that
San Mateo County Superior Court initiate the grievance at Step 2.

22
explained the Committee’s position that Article 23.E establishes that bargaining should
occur locally at each trial court and, therefore, no violation of the MOU had occurred.
Additional 2016 Trial Court Notifications to CFI Regarding EPMC Changes
Mendocino County Superior Court
Between April 27 and June 3, 2016, Mendocino County Superior Court CEO
Chris Ruhl (Ruhl) notified CFI of the court’s intent to increase pension contributions for
the one interpreter employed by the court as a result of a change in the linked
bargaining unit. The decision was to take effect during the first pay period of July
2016. Ruhl offered Aranguren several dates in June to meet and confer. In June,
Ruhl and Aranguren exchanged e-mails in which Aranguren advised Ruhl of CFI’s
outstanding request for regional bargaining and stated that CFI was reserving its right
to meet locally pending regional negotiations. During their communications,
Aranguren shared with Ruhl her June 3, 2016 letter to Yuen requesting regional
bargaining over the impact of increased pension contributions. (Ante, fn. 13.) The
court ultimately implemented the changes to EPMC in October 2016.
San Mateo County Superior Court
On May 16, 2016, Mortenson notified Garay that the court had reached an
agreement with the linked unit to eliminate the EPMC, among other issues, effective
July 3, 2016. He invited CFI to meet and confer over the impacts of the change as to
the CFI employees. CFI did not respond to the letter.
By letter dated July 26, Mortenson recounted two prior attempts on May 16 and
June 2 to arrange meet and confer sessions. He acknowledged Aranguren had
contacted him after the trial court’s second attempt to arrange a meeting and informed

23
him that CFI intended to meet and confer on a regional level. Noting that the
Committee was maintaining its position that the impacts of pension benefit changes
were not subject to regional bargaining, he reaffirmed the court’s willingness to
engage in impact bargaining before implementation in October 2016. Although they
eventually met in September 2016, CFI made no proposals and instead objected to
the court’s planned implementation of the EPMC changes while the Committee and
CFI were simultaneously engaged in negotiations for a successor agreement, through
which CFI was attempting to address the elimination of EPMC regionally. The court
ultimately implemented the changes to the interpreters’ EPMC in October 2016.
Santa Clara County Superior Court
On September 27, 2016, after the Committee and CFI commenced negotiations
for a successor MOU, discussed post, Santa Clara County Superior Court General
Counsel Lisa Herrick (Herrick) notified Garay of the linked bargaining unit’s agreement
to eliminate the EPMC and the court’s intent to apply the same change to CFI unit
members, and invited CFI to contact the court if it wanted to discuss the impacts of
those changes. Aranguren asserted in an e-mail that the impacts of the change
needed to be bargained regionally.
Herrick met with Aranguren and Garay on October 24, 2016. CFI offered no
proposals. The parties agreed to a short delay in implementation of the increased
pension contributions, which eventually occurred in two steps between November
2016 and February 2017.

24
Santa Cruz County Superior Court
Following the Riker arbitration decision and the expiration of its MOU with SEIU
in 2010, discussed ante, the Santa Cruz County Superior Court continued to pay a
“pension offset leave benefit” to court interpreters in the form of an annual monetary
stipend until approximately June 2017. At that time, the court decided to eliminate the
stipend because it determined that the stipend was no longer required under the terms
of the Riker arbitration decision and informed CFI that it would stop payment, though it
offered to meet and confer with CFI over the issue.
Court representatives and CFI met on July 11, 2017, to discuss the court’s
discontinuance of the stipend. At that time, CFI communicated its desire that the
matter be addressed through regional bargaining and, to the extent the Committee
refused to engage in such bargaining, informed the court that it intended to pursue the
matter through the grievance procedure and the instant unfair practice charge. Garay
then contacted Turner on June 21, 2017, to request bargaining at the regional level.17
On June 30, 2017, Turner reminded Garay of the Committee’s position that “the
current MOU” required that trial court benefits and retirement issues, including local
pension offsets, be bargained locally, not regionally. Aranguren responded on CFI’s
behalf, notifying Turner that CFI intended to amend its unfair practice charge to
include this issue.18 In response on July 17, Turner confirmed that the Committee had
________________________
17 At this time, the Committee and CFI had been engaged in successor MOU
negotiations for slightly less than one year.
18 At that time, the pending complaint alleged only that the Committee had
refused in February and March 2016 to meet and confer “regionally” over the impact of
changes to employee pension contributions and that the Courts had repudiated the
parties’ grievance procedures.

25
consistently rejected CFI’s assertion of any regional bargaining requirement since
March 2016, and acknowledged that PERB would resolve this question.
Aside from CFI’s communications with the Committee, there is no evidence in
the record that CFI filed a grievance against the Santa Cruz County Superior Court
itself over the elimination of the stipend.
Successor MOU Negotiations
The parties commenced negotiations for a successor MOU on August 26, 2016.
Richard Shiohira (Shiohira) was the Committee’s chief spokesperson until Turner
succeeded him in December 2016. Aranguren was the chief spokesperson for CFI;
Garay was also on the bargaining team.
On August 26, 2016, CFI’s initial proposal included a “pension equity
adjustment” for employees at the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, Mendocino, and
Santa Clara County Superior Courts, where some local negotiations over the impacts
of EPMC elimination had been attempted. The proposal was also intended to address
these impacts at the Napa and Santa Cruz County Superior Courts, where local
negotiations had not been attempted or had been abandoned. Under CFI’s proposal,
base wages would increase 7.8 percent to address the impact of the elimination of
EPMC. CFI also made a separate proposal to increase wages.
On September 19, 2016, the Committee presented a comprehensive proposal
addressing multiple issues. The Committee proposed a five-step wage scale, with
each step 2 percent above the prior step, to replace the lone existing step in the
expiring MOU. The Committee’s proposal represented, approximately, an 8 to 10
percent wage increase over the life of the proposed agreement. Shiohira explained

26
that the wage step proposal was intended to address both historical wage inequities
and the elimination of EPMC.
The Committee also proposed to amend Article 23.E to add language explicitly
waiving CFI’s rights to bargain over both a trial court’s decision to change EPMC and
the impacts thereof. The proposal would require that bargaining unit members “make
the same retirement contributions [as the linked unit but] not receive any offsetting
benefits.”19 Shiohira explained that the Committee wanted its wage step proposal to
resolve all current and future EPMC issues, thereby eliminating any bargaining
obligation over EPMC changes.20 Aranguren responded that CFI did not believe it
should have to trade resolution of EPMC issues for wage steps.
At the October 6, 2016 bargaining session, CFI reduced its proposed pension
equity adjustment to 6.0 percent, and requested to negotiate EPMC elimination
separately from successor MOU negotiations. The Committee responded it was not
amenable to carving out EPMC issues from successor negotiations. Shiohira
expressed concern that CFI’s proposed pension equity adjustment would constitute a
________________________
19 The proposal noted that it did not alter the Committee’s position that the
existing language required only local impacts bargaining.
20 Aranguren and Garay testified the Committee never expressed at the
bargaining table that its wage step proposal was intended to address the impact(s) of
EPMC elimination by trial courts. Although the ALJ did not explicitly determine
whether the Committee’s witnesses were more credible than CFI’s on this point, his
conclusion that the Committee’s wage step proposal was intended to be “a quid pro
quo in exchange for elimination of any residual impacts issues” implicitly credited the
Committee’s witnesses. We find the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion.

27
windfall to employees who had never received an EPMC.21 Aranguren disagreed,
believing those employees had suffered a historical disadvantage as a result of
lacking an EPMC. Shiohira also expressed concern that CFI had based its proposal
on the largest EPMC-related wage cut, which occurred at the Mendocino County
Superior Court, a trial court that employed only one interpreter.22
On November 10, 2016, the Committee increased the gaps between its
proposed five-step wage scale to 2.25 percent and maintained its earlier proposal
regarding Article 23.E, in which it proposed to eliminate all bargaining over changes to
EPMC. The Committee again stated the proposal was intended to address both
wages and EPMC issues.
On December 9, 2016, CFI presented an Article 23 proposal that included a
wage reopener to address impacts as to any pension contribution changes that were
yet unknown. CFI noted its interest in automatically receiving the same wage
adjustment or wage offsets granted to the linked units where increased pension
contributions were implemented.
On December 18, 2016, the Committee sweetened its wage proposal with
additional enhancements at the upper steps. Regarding Article 23.E, its proposal
stated: “Region 2 maintains the position contained in its EPMC proposal of
________________________
21 Shiohira and Turner testified that, in preparation for this bargaining session,
she estimated that more than 50 percent of the interpreters in Region 2 did not receive
an EPMC.
22 For the single court reporter in Mendocino, the trial court’s October 2016
EPMC change amounted to a pay cut of 7.8 percent, mirroring CFI’s August 26, 2016
proposal. Effects of EPMC cuts at other courts were lower, generally falling between
approximately 2 percent and approximately 6 percent.

28
November 10, 2016.” On December 20, CFI made another proposal seeking me-too
language related to wage offsets for increased pension contributions.
The parties resumed bargaining on February 6, 2017, after a brief hiatus, with
Turner now the Committee’s chief spokesperson.23 At this session, Turner reiterated
the Committee’s position that offsets to increased pension contributions must be
bargained locally, not regionally. She also orally provided the pay increase
percentages court interpreters would receive under CFI’s pension equity adjustment
proposal at the trial courts that already had eliminated EPMC. Aranguren responded
that she did not believe the numbers were accurate and would look into the issue
further.
On February 7, 2017, CFI made a proposal intended to resolve the dispute
regarding regional and local bargaining over EPMC wage offsets. The proposal would
amend MOU Article 22, containing the interpreters’ wages and other compensation, to
adopt the Committee’s proposed five-step wage scale with 5 percent increments, as
well as a new paragraph D, reading:
“The parties agree that in accordance with Government
Code 71808, uniform compensation within the Region is
established 	by 	providing 	a 	uniform 	salary 	range, 	a
maximum 	hourly 	rate, 	and 	uniform 	differentials 	and
stipends 	pursuant 	to 	this 	Agreement, 	including 	but 	not
limited to the half-day and dual language differentials.
“The parties recognize, however, that health and welfare
benefits vary from Court to Court within the Region, and
other conditions may vary, including the cost-of-living and
interpreter supply and demand.
________________________
23 During the hiatus, Shiohira had taken a position with the City and County of
San Francisco and, as a result, could no longer serve as the Committee’s chief
spokesperson.

29
“The parties agree that local courts shall have the authority
to 	make 	local 	adjustments 	above 	the 	salary 	range 	in
section A of this Article, within the uniform compensation
structure provided in this Agreement, to improve the equity
and uniformity of overall compensation, and in response to
local conditions.
“A local court may apply an across the board adjustment
above the base wage to address increases to employee
benefit costs pursuant to meet and confer, or to provide
interpreters 	a 	COLA, 	bonus 	or 	other 	wage 	adjustment
provided to other employees of a local court.
“An across the board 	recruitment and 	retention stipend
above the base wage may be applied to interpreter unit
members in a local court to assist courts in filling position
vacancies and meeting language access needs.
“Increases 	above 	the 	base 	wage 	established 	in 	this
agreement 	shall 	not 	exceed 	the 	federal 	per 	diem 	rate,
currently $52.25/per hour.”
In response, Turner asked questions and said she would present the proposal to the
Region 2 CEOs before the next bargaining session. She expressed concern that
CFI’s proposal, while creative, conflicted with the uniformity requirement in
section 71808. At some point in their exchange, Aranguren stated there would be no
violation if both parties agreed that the salary range would fulfill the uniformity
requirement.
On February 15, 2017, the Committee further enhanced its wage proposal. In
addition to increasing wages between the steps, existing employees would
immediately advance to Steps 2 or 3 based on their hiring date. Regarding
Article 23.E, its proposal again stated that the Committee would maintain its EPMC

30
proposal of November 10, 2016. Turner also said she had spoken with the CEOs and
they were not in favor of CFI’s Article 22 proposal because they believed it violated the
uniformity requirement of section 71808.
The parties met again for bargaining on February 24, 2017. During further
discussion of CFI’s February 7 proposal concerning Article 22, Turner stated that the
Committee’s position on that proposal was “immutable” because the Committee
believed that allowing individual trial courts to provide wage increases over and above
the regional wage scale would violate the uniformity requirement in section 71808.24
After engaging in mediation in July 2017, the parties were able to agree upon a
successor MOU on September 11, 2017, which ultimately provided a 21 percent wage
increase over the life of the contract. That MOU has a three-year term that expires
September 30, 2020. In the MOU, CFI explicitly reserved its right to litigate the instant
unfair practice charge.
________________________
24 CFI excepts to the ALJ’s finding that Aranguren testified Turner made her
“immutable” statement as early as the parties’ meeting on December 20, 2016. We
agree with CFI that the weight of the evidence shows Turner made the statement
during the parties’ February 24, 2017 bargaining session.
CFI also excepts to the ALJ’s finding that Turner made the “immutable”
statement in relation to CFI’s Article 22 proposal, not in reference to the Committee’s
position that pension contribution issues must be bargained locally. CFI relies on
notes by CFI bargaining team member Katy Van Sant (Van Sant) that on February 24,
2017, Turner said the Committee’s position on local impact bargaining was
“immutable.” Yet Van Sant’s notes also state that the Committee was “not interested”
in bargaining over CFI’s Article 22 proposal and that its position was supported by “the
law.” Given the context in which the evidence shows Turner used the word
“immutable,” we agree with the ALJ that Turner was describing the Committee’s
position on CFI’s Article 22 proposal.

31
DISCUSSION
The Board reviews exceptions to a proposed decision de novo. (County of
Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2629-M, p. 6.) Under this standard, we review
the entire record and are free to make different factual findings and reach different
legal conclusions than those in the proposed decision. (City of Milpitas (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2443-M, p. 12.)
A. 	Refusal to Bargain over Impacts of Changes to Employee Pension
Contributions
The amended complaint alleged that the Committee violated the Court
Interpreter Act by refusing, on March 9, 2016 and June 30, 2017, to meet and confer
with CFI over the impacts of various Region 2 trial courts’ changes to employee
pension contribution amounts.25 The ALJ found no violation, reasoning that the
Committee had designated the trial courts as its representative for impact bargaining
over employee pension contribution changes. We disagree and find that the
Committee violated the Act as alleged in the amended complaint.
To frame the issue before us, it is crucial to recognize several fundamental
points that are not in dispute. First, section 71801, subdivision (e) states, in relevant
part, “that a trial court or regional court interpreter committee or those representatives
________________________
25 The Committee’s June 30, 2017 refusal followed the Santa Cruz County
Superior Court’s decision earlier that month to eliminate a stipend it had been paying
to its court interpreters since the Riker arbitration decision. CFI contacted Turner, the
Committee’s then-chief spokesperson in successor MOU negotiations, to request
bargaining over this change at the regional level. Turner reiterated the Committee’s
position that the 2013-2016 MOU required local bargaining over pension offsets, and
she asserted this remained the case as a matter of status quo until the parties
reached a successor MOU. As a result, Turner refused to meet and confer with CFI
over impacts of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court’s decision, though the parties
had been discussing EPMC issues during ongoing successor MOU negotiations.

32
it may designate, and representatives of a recognized employee organization, shall . .
. meet and confer promptly upon request by either party . . . and . . . endeavor to reach
agreement on matters within the scope of representation.” Second, section 71808
mandates that wages “be uniform throughout the region” but allows pension benefits
to “be the same as those provided to other employees of the same trial court.” Third,
the parties agree that MOU Article 23.E allows trial courts to change court interpreters’
pension contribution amounts when those amounts are changed for the linked
bargaining unit and entitles CFI to meet and confer over the impacts of such changes.
Even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular decision,
it must meet and confer over any foreseeable effects of the decision on matters within
the scope of representation. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-
M, pp. 11-12.) In the typical case, there is no question that the employer who makes
the non-negotiable decision is also the entity that must bargain over the decision’s
negotiable effects. Here, however, the Court Interpreter Act contemplates both
regional bargaining by the regional committee and local bargaining by a trial court.
The question before us, then, is which entity—the Committee or the trial court—was
required to meet and confer over the impacts of the trial courts’ non-negotiable
decisions to reduce or eliminate EPMC?
1. 	Statutory Bargaining Obligation
We begin by ascertaining the scope of a regional committee’s statutory
obligation to meet and confer over the impacts of a trial court’s non-negotiable
decision. The fundamental task in statutory construction is ascertaining the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Long Beach

33
Community College District (2003) PERB Decision No. 1564, p. 10.) When
interpreting a statute, “we begin with its plain meaning, affording the words their
ordinary and usual meaning” and must give “meaning to every word of the statute, if
possible, [to] avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage.” (Santa Clara
Valley Water District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2349-M, p. 16 (Santa Clara District).)
If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we assume the Legislature meant what it
said. (Region 4 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee and the Superior
Court of California, County of Riverside (2008) PERB Decision No. 1987-I, pp. 9 and
20, fn. 15.) Only where the plain meaning of the statute is unclear may we turn to
other extrinsic sources to discern legislative intent, such as “maxims of construction,
. . . the legislative history, and the wider historical [context] of the statute’s
enactment.” (Santa Clara District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2349-M, pp. 16-17.)
Section 71801, subdivision (e) defines the “meet and confer” obligation as one
in which “a trial court or regional court interpreter committee or those representatives it
may designate” must negotiate with representatives of the recognized employee
organization over matters within the scope of representation. (Ibid., italics added.)
The Court Interpreter Act thus appears to contemplate that in some circumstances a
trial court will be the appropriate entity to meet and confer with CFI. Yet the Act does
not specify what those circumstances would be.
Every other reference in the Act to the bargaining obligation refers to the
regional committee alone. The four regions were established “[f]or [the] purposes of
developing regional terms and conditions of employment for court interpreters and for
collective bargaining with recognized employee organizations.” (§ 71807, subd. (a).)

34
The regional committee “shall set terms and conditions of employment for court
interpreters within the region, subject to meet and confer in good faith.” (§ 71808.)
Each regional committee acts as the trial courts’ representative “in bargaining with a
recognized employee organization,” and an MOU ratified by a regional committee is
binding on the trial courts within the region. (§§ 71809, 71819.) If the regional
committee and the recognized employee organization fail to reach agreement, they
may agree to the appointment of a mediator. (§ 71820.)
The Act also designates the regional committee as the proper entity to
negotiate the impacts of certain non-negotiable decisions by a trial court.
Section 71816, subdivision (b) excludes from the scope of representation six subjects
that are reserved exclusively to the trial courts. Subdivision (c) provides that the
regional committee—not the trial court making the decision—must meet and confer
over the decision’s impacts on subjects within the scope of representation. Similarly,
the regional committee must meet and confer over the impacts of a trial court’s
decision to cross-assign one or more of its court interpreter employees to perform
spoken language interpretation services for another trial court. (§ 71810, subd. (d).)
The Court Interpreter Act is thus, on its face, ambiguous with respect to
whether the Committee is obligated to meet and confer over the impacts of changes to
“health and welfare and pension benefits” or whether those impacts are a uniquely
local issue that must be bargained with each trial court. Likewise, the legislative
analyses of Senate Bill 371, which enacted the majority of the Act’s provisions, do not
address whether the impacts of trial courts’ changes to “health and welfare and
pension benefits” must be negotiated at the regional or local level.

35
The Committee urges us to resolve the ambiguity by finding, as the ALJ did,
that the language in section 71801, subdivision (e) allowing the Committee to
designate a bargaining representative permitted the Committee to delegate to the trial
courts negotiations over the impacts of the courts’ changes to pension benefits. While
the Court Interpreter Act appears to generally permit the Committee to delegate its
bargaining authority, a “specific delegation of bargaining [responsibility] may be
unlawful if it is found to be inconsistent with the obligation to bargain in good faith.”
(State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) (1998) PERB Decision
No. 1305-S, p. 8.) Here, because section 71808 requires that compensation be
uniform throughout the region, trial courts necessarily lack the statutory authority to
change interpreters’ wages.26 Consequently, allowing the Committee to delegate
impact bargaining to a trial court under these circumstances would extinguish CFI’s
ability to negotiate for higher wages to offset increased employee pension
contributions. Nothing in the Act indicates the Legislature intended this result.27
“When it appears the Legislature never considered the particular question
raised in litigation, courts resort to analyzing the general purpose of the statute with
________________________
26 Indeed, while the Courts were willing to negotiate alternative benefits to offset
the EPMC changes, they consistently declined to negotiate wage increases on the
basis that compensation is subject to regional control under the Act’s uniformity
requirement.
27 Even if we were to find that the Act permits delegation under these
circumstances, we do not find the Committee made such a delegation here. While the
Committee argues that it designated the trial courts as its representative to negotiate
on its behalf over the impacts of EPMC elimination from the outset, none of the
correspondence in the record indicates it did so. Rather, at the time CFI requested to
bargain impacts, the Committee unreservedly took the position that Article 23.E
required impact bargaining at the local level.

36
the goal of adopting the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.”
(Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 916, 938; see Santa
Clara District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2349-M, p. 17 [statutes should be interpreted
to promote, not defeat, the legislative purpose underlying the statutory scheme].) A
loophole foreclosing CFI’s ability to negotiate wage increases to offset increased
pension contributions is incongruous with the Legislature’s purpose in enacting a
statutory scheme granting court interpreters the right to engage in collective
bargaining over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”
Accordingly, we hold that under the Court Interpreter Act, a regional committee is
required to meet and confer over the impacts of a trial court’s change to employee
pension contributions, and it may not delegate that obligation to the trial court.
The Committee does not deny that designating trial courts to negotiate over the
impacts of EPMC reduction or elimination forecloses CFI’s ability to negotiate a wage
offset but argues this does not “rob” CFI of its bargaining rights because non-wage
offsets, e.g., deferred compensation contributions or additional leave, are available at
the local level. Section 71801, subdivision (e) generally imposes a duty to meet and
confer in good faith on all matters within the scope of representation. Thus, a party
cannot unilaterally determine that the existence of alternative negotiable benefits
eliminates its obligation to at least consider in good faith other proposals within the
scope of representation. PERB’s decisional law further supports this interpretation of
the Court Interpreter Act. (See City of San Jose (2013) PERB Decision No. 2341-M,
p. 27 [parties may not outrightly refuse to discuss a mandatory subject after another
has requested bargaining on that subject].) Nor may a party “insist on separating one

37
negotiable subject from all others . . . and thereby refuse to discuss other subjects that
may form the basis of a possible compromise.” (El Dorado County Superior Court
(2017) PERB Decision No. 2523-C, p. 12.) Consequently, a regional committee may
not designate a trial court as its bargaining representative when doing so would
preclude the employee organization from negotiating over any subject within the
scope of representation.28
Having found the Committee had a statutory obligation to meet and confer with
CFI over the impacts of trial courts’ changes to employee pension contributions, we
turn to whether the Committee violated that obligation. It is well-established that an
outright refusal to bargain over matters within the scope of representation is a per se
violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. (County of San Luis Obispo (2015)
PERB Decision No. 2427-M, p. 26; Gonzales Union High School District (1985) PERB
Decision No. 480, adopting proposed decision at pp. 39-40; Mount San Antonio
Community College District (1983) PERB Decision No. 334, pp. 10-11.) Here, it is
undisputed that, on March 9, 2016 and June 30, 2017, the Committee refused to meet
and confer with CFI over the impacts of trial courts’ changes to employee pension
contributions. By doing so, the Committee breached its obligation to meet and confer
in good faith as required by Court Interpreter Act section 71818, and thereby
committed an unfair practice under section 71825, subdivision (c) of the Act, and
PERB Regulation 32608, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c).
________________________
28 Nothing in the Court Interpreter Act bars CFI from electing to forego wage
offsets and instead negotiate with a trial court over non-wage offsets. Our holding that
a regional committee must meet and confer over the impacts of trial courts’ changes to
employee pension contributions therefore does not prohibit such impacts from being
negotiated at the local level, as CFI has done with several trial courts throughout the
state.

38
2. 	Contractual Bargaining Obligation
In addition to its statutory bargaining obligation, we find the Committee also had
a contractual obligation to meet and confer with CFI over the impacts of trial courts’
changes to employee pension contributions, and that it violated that obligation.
Although PERB lacks the authority to enforce contracts, it may interpret them when
necessary to resolve an unfair practice allegation. (San Francisco County Superior
Court & Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2609-I, p. 7.) In such cases, traditional rules of contract law guide the
Board’s interpretation:
“A contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.
Where contractual language is clear and unambiguous, it is
unnecessary 	to 	go 	beyond 	the 	plain 	language 	of 	the
contract itself to ascertain its meaning. 	The whole of a
contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every
part, 	if 	reasonably 	practicable, 	each 	clause 	helping 	to
interpret 	the 	other. 	Thus, 	the 	Board 	must 	avoid 	an
interpretation of contract language which leaves a provision
without effect. 	However, where the contract language is
silent 	or 	ambiguous, 	the policy may 	be 	ascertained 	by
examining past practice or bargaining history.”
(County of Sonoma (2012) PERB Decision No. 2242-M, pp. 15-16, internal quotations
and citations omitted.)
Article 23.E clearly ties court interpreters’ retirement benefits to the linked
bargaining unit at each trial court. When the court and linked unit negotiate a change
in the linked unit’s retirement benefits, that change automatically applies to the trial
court’s interpreters. Article 23.E then requires that CFI be afforded the opportunity to

39
meet and confer over the impacts of that automatic change. But the provision fails to
state whether the impact negotiations will occur at the regional or local level.
This question is answered more generally elsewhere in the MOU. Article 4,
section 1 states, “For the purpose of meet and confer under this agreement, the . . .
Region’s principle authorized agent shall be the Chairperson of the [Region 2
Committee] or his/her designee.”29 (Italics added.) Because Article 23.E explicitly
grants CFI the right to meet and confer over the impacts of changes to retirement
benefits, such negotiations are a “meet and confer under this agreement.” Thus,
reading the MOU as a whole, the Committee was obligated to bargain over the
impacts of EPMC elimination at the trial courts.30
We do not find the Committee’s arguments against this interpretation of the
MOU persuasive. First, the Committee argues that the Riker arbitration decision is
binding and requires pension contribution offsets to be bargained at the local level for
each of the trial courts within Region 2. However, the arbitration in that case arose
________________________
29 Notably, Article 4, section 2 designates the trial court as the party charged
with administration of the terms of the MOU.
30 We recognize that language in Article 4, section 1 permitting the Committee
Chairperson to designate a representative to meet and confer on the Committee’s
behalf could be read to allow the delegation of impact bargaining over EPMC changes
to a trial court. As in the statutory context, this reading of the MOU would allow the
Committee to eliminate CFI’s ability to negotiate wage increases to offset increased
employee pension contributions. However, nothing in the record indicates that CFI
clearly and unmistakably waived its right to negotiate over wages. (Grossmont Union
High School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 313, p. 4 [waiver of statutory rights
must be “clear and unmistakable,” and the evidence must demonstrate an “intentional
relinquishment” of a given right]; Moreno Valley Unified School District (1995) PERB
Decision No. 1106, adopting proposed decision at p. 9; California State Employees’
Assn. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 923, 937.)

40
from a grievance filed against the Santa Cruz County Superior Court and focused on
that trial court’s elimination of EPMC. Arbitrator Riker ruled that the court interpreters
were entitled to an offset for increased pension contributions under Article 23.E but
that offset could not be provided through a wage increase because of the uniformity
requirement in section 71808.
An arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract term is not binding on PERB but may
be probative of the term’s meaning. (Regents of the University of California (Davis)
(2010) PERB Decision No. 2101-H, p. 22.) We do not find the Riker arbitration
decision probative of the question before us, however, because in deciding the merits
of the grievance, Riker focused solely on the individual trial court’s obligations under
Article 23.E, finding that the trial court improperly eliminated EPMC without any offset.
The grievance was not filed against the Committee and the Committee’s obligations
were not at issue in the arbitration. Further, Riker ordered the trial court and the union
to discuss a grievance remedy to effectuate his award and return to him if they could
not reach agreement. Thus, the Riker arbitration decision did not address whether
under Article 23.E the impacts of the EPMC elimination should have been initially
negotiated at the local or regional level.
Second, the Committee argues CFI’s prior conduct evinces an agreement
between the parties that impacts of EPMC elimination are to be negotiated at the local
level. “The parties’ practical construction of a contract, as shown by their actions, is
important evidence of their intent.” (Antelope Valley Community College District
(2018) PERB Decision No. 2618, p. 19.) When the Contra Costa County Superior
Court proposed to eliminate EPMC in two steps, CFI met and conferred with the court

41
and reached an agreement on non-wage offsets covering the first step.31 But Article
13, section 1 provides: “The waiver of any breach, term or condition of this MOU by
either party shall not constitute a precedent in the future enforcement of all its terms
and provisions.” Thus, by meeting and conferring with the Contra Costa County
Superior Court over the impacts of EPMC elimination, CFI did not waive its contractual
right to meet and confer with the Committee over the impact of future changes to
employee pension contributions.
Third, the Committee argues that the MOU’s zipper clause precludes mid-term
negotiations with it (but not with the trial courts) over the impacts of EPMC elimination.
Article 13, section 1 provides that “[e]xcept as specifically provided herein,” the parties
will meet and confer during the MOU’s term only by mutual agreement over any
subject covered by the agreement. But Article 23.E clearly contemplates mid-term
negotiations over the impacts of changes to pension benefits. Thus, the zipper clause
does not apply to the impact negotiations CFI requested.
By refusing, on March 9, 2016 and June 30, 2017, to meet and confer with CFI
over the impacts of trial courts’ changes to employee pension contributions, the
________________________
31 The Committee also cites instances in 2014-2015 when CFI met and
conferred over the impacts of EPMC reduction or elimination with three trial courts
within Regions 1, 3, and 4. The trial courts reached separate local agreements with
CFI to increase specific benefits in exchange for changes to interpreters’ EPMC. CFI
did not object to local bargaining over the EPMC issues in negotiations with two of the
three courts; though, in Region 1, it clearly espoused that it was entitled to negotiate
offsets to EPMC changes either locally or regionally. Regardless of CFI’s prior
participation in local bargaining, we do not find these instances probative of the
parties’ intent under the Region 2 MOU because Article 23.E’s retirement provisions
are unlike those under the Region 1, 3, and 4 MOUs, all of which failed to address
those parties’ meet and confer obligations should a change in the retirement plans
arise during the term of the MOUs.

42
Committee breached Article 4, section 1 of the MOU, which designates the Committee
as the entity that must “meet and confer under this agreement.” A party’s repudiation
of a collective bargaining agreement provision is a per se violation of its duty to meet
and confer in good faith. (San Francisco County Superior Court & Region 2 Court
Interpreter Employment Relations Committee, supra, PERB Decision No. 2609-I, p. 7;
Regents of the University of California (Davis), supra, PERB Decision No. 2101-H,
pp. 25-26.) By this conduct, the Committee breached its obligation to meet and confer
in good faith as required by Court Interpreter Act section 71818, and thereby
committed an unfair practice under section 71825, subdivision (c) of the Act, and
PERB Regulation 32608, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c).
B. 	Refusal to Bargain Over Pension Contribution Proposals in Successor MOU
Negotiations
The amended complaint alleged that the Committee violated the Court
Interpreter Act by refusing to bargain over CFI’s February 7, 2017 proposal to allow
trial courts to adjust wages in response to, among other things, changes in employee
pension contributions. At hearing, the parties litigated whether, throughout the entire
course of successor MOU negotiations in 2016-2017, the Committee refused to
bargain over CFI’s proposals related to employee pension contributions. The ALJ
found the Committee did in fact bargain over those proposals, and we agree.
It is well settled that a blanket refusal to bargain is a per se violation of the
statutory duty to bargain in good faith. (Gonzales Union High School District, supra,
PERB Decision No. 480, proposed decision at pp. 39-40; Mount San Antonio
Community College District, supra, PERB Decision No. 334, pp. 10-11.) PERB has
found an absolute refusal to bargain when the employer failed to provide the union

43
with any rationale for rejecting its proposal. (Regents of the University of California
(2010) PERB Decision No. 2094-H, p. 20.) The record does not support finding a
refusal to bargain here, however, because after taking the position that it need not
negotiate EPMC wage offsets at the regional level, the Committee ultimately did so
during successor MOU negotiations.
The Committee and CFI exchanged numerous proposals over the course of
their negotiations, each hoping to address the EPMC issue. When the Committee
presented its first comprehensive proposal, Shiohira explained that it included a new
wage structure intended to address both wages and CFI’s EPMC concerns, adding
that if CFI agreed the proposed five-step wage scale could be used to address EPMC,
the Committee would consider additional increases to the step scale. In conjunction
with the wage steps, the Committee proposed to amend Article 23.E to add language
explicitly waiving CFI’s rights to bargain over both a trial court’s decision to change
EPMC and the impacts thereof, further showing the Committee intended its wage step
proposal to resolve all outstanding EPMC issues. Aranguren responded that CFI did
not believe it should have to trade resolution of EPMC issues for wage steps. As the
parties continued to exchange proposals into the Fall, the Committee repeatedly
sweetened its wage proposals in an effort to address all EPMC impacts issues. Based
on this evidence, we conclude, contrary to CFI’s argument, that the Committee
bargained in good faith over the impacts of EPMC changes during successor MOU
negotiations.
Nor do we find that the Committee refused to bargain over EPMC impacts
merely because the Committee stated that the specific EPMC changes already

44
completed or in progress created a bargaining obligation only for the local trial courts
involved, not for the Committee. Contrary to CFI’s contention, the evidence does not
show that Turner said the Committee’s position that impacts of trial courts’ changes to
EPMC must be bargained locally was “immutable.” Rather, when Turner stated the
Committee’s “immutable” position, she was expressing the Committee’s concern that
CFI’s Article 22 proposal violated the wage uniformity requirement of section 71808.
Contrary to CFI’s claims, Turner was not signaling an outright refusal to bargain over
EPMC impacts. As it had when Shiohira was its chief spokesperson, the Committee
continued to offer improved wage proposals seeking to address both wage and
pension inequalities with Turner as its spokesperson, ultimately resulting in a three-
year contract providing a 21 percent wage increase over the life of the contract as the
interpreters moved through the newly-created wage steps, as well as a wage re-
opener in July 2019. Though the Committee rejected CFI’s proposals regarding
pension contribution offsets and urged a different approach to address the impacts of
changes to EPMC, that does not amount to a refusal to bargain. (State of California
(Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Department of Personnel Administration)
(2010) PERB Decision No. 2115-S, p. 12.)32
________________________
32 Elsewhere in this decision we explain how the Committee and the trial courts
violated the Court Interpreter Act in several distinct ways, including by taking the
position that only the trial courts must bargain about impacts of specific EPMC
changes, thereby removing wage offsets from the table. While we remedy those
violations as explained post, we need not determine whether these violations would
have forfeited the Committee’s right to impose terms following any impasse in
successor negotiations. That issue is not before us because the parties reached an
agreement rather than an impasse.

45
Turner’s two e-mails regarding Santa Cruz County Superior Court’s decision to
eliminate a stipend rooted in the Riker arbitration decision also do not evidence bad
faith in successor MOU negotiations. Notably, neither e-mail addressed EPMC within
the context of those ongoing negotiations. The first e-mail reiterated the Committee’s
position as to CFI’s regional bargaining demands under Article 23.E of the “current”
contract, the provisions of which were still in effect as the status quo until the parties
could agree upon a successor agreement or reached impasse. The second e-mail
addressed CFI’s notification that it intended to amend its unfair practice charge and
the then-pending complaint, which at that time addressed only the Committee’s pre-
successor bargaining conduct and the Courts’ alleged repudiation of the grievance
procedures. The Committee’s position that Article 23.E required local trial courts
rather than the Committee to bargain over specific EPMC impacts during the MOU
term does not counter the evidence that the Committee actually negotiated over
EPMC impacts on a regional level during successor MOU negotiations.
Nor in this instance does the Committee’s failure to provide written support for
its expressed concern that CFI’s pension equity adjustment proposals would provide a
windfall to many interpreters demonstrate a refusal to bargain. The record does not
show that the Committee failed to respond to an information request for such written
records. In fact, the record demonstrates that Turner, in rejecting CFI’s proposals,
clearly communicated the Committee’s concerns at the bargaining table and identified
those concerns as the reason it was proposing alternative solutions. (Regents of the
University of California, supra, PERB Decision No. 2094-H, p. 20 [employer supported

46
its proposal in good faith with rational arguments that it communicated to the union
during bargaining].)
The record demonstrates the Committee made extensive good faith efforts to
address CFI’s EPMC concerns via across-the-board wage increases. That the parties
initially took different approaches to the issue before ultimately reaching agreement
does not mean the Committee failed or refused to bargain in good faith. We find that
CFI failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that the Committee refused to
bargain regionally over EPMC impacts during successor MOU negotiations.
C. 	Unilateral Changes
“A ‘per se’ violation of the duty to bargain in good faith will be found where there
has been a unilateral change in the status quo concerning a negotiable subject of
bargaining.” (Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District (2012) PERB Decision
No. 2231-M, pp. 12-13; Stockton Unified School District (1980) PERB Decision
No. 143, p. 22.) PERB has recognized three general categories of unlawful unilateral
actions: (1) changes to the parties’ written agreement; (2) changes in an established
past practice; and (3) newly created, implemented, or enforced policies. (Pasadena
Area Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2444, p. 12, fn. 6, citing
Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District (2012) PERB Decision No. 2262, p. 9; Grant
Joint Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196.) To state a prima
facie violation, the charging party must establish that: (1) the employer took action to
change policy, (2) the change in policy concerns a matter within the scope of
representation, (3) the action was taken without giving the exclusive representative
notice or opportunity to bargain over the change, and (4) the action had a generalized

47
effect or continuing impact on terms and conditions of employment. (County of Kern
(2018) PERB Decision No. 2615-M, pp. 8-9; Pasadena Area Community College
District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2444, p. 11, citing Fairfield-Suisun Unified School
District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2262.) The amended complaint alleges that
various Courts made unlawful unilateral changes to pension contributions, negotiated
grievance procedures, and a stipend. We address each allegation in turn.
1. 	Unilateral Change to Pension Contributions
As noted ante, when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular
decision, it nonetheless must meet and confer over any foreseeable effects of the
decision on matters within the scope of representation. (County of Santa Clara, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2680-M, pp. 11-12.) Once an employer makes a firm decision, it
must provide the exclusive representative with notice and a reasonable opportunity to
negotiate prior to taking action that affects matters within the scope of representation.
(County of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M, p. 5.) Once the exclusive
representative has received notice of the proposed change, it must make a valid
request to bargain any foreseeable effects of the change on negotiable matters.
(County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 30.) As a general rule,
the employer may not implement the non-negotiable decision until the parties have
reached agreement or impasse over the negotiable effects of the decision. (Id. at
p. 25; see Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 720,
pp. 14-15 [setting out limited circumstances under which employer may implement
non-negotiable decision prior to completion of effects bargaining].)

48
In 2015, the Contra Costa and Marin County Superior Courts notified CFI that
they had reached agreement with their linked units on EPMC reductions. On
February 11, 2016, Aranguren sent a letter to the Committee demanding to bargain
the impacts of the reductions at the regional level. Both Courts agreed to postpone
implementation of the EPMC changes for the interpreters.
Between April 27 and June 3, 2016, the Mendocino County Superior Court
notified CFI of its intent to increase employee pension contributions for the one
interpreter employed by the Court. The increase, matching a change in the linked
bargaining unit, was to take effect the first pay period of July 2016. CFI advised the
Court of CFI’s outstanding request for regional bargaining and stated that CFI was
reserving its right to meet locally pending regional negotiations.
On May 16, 2016, the San Mateo County Superior Court notified CFI that the
Court had reached an agreement with the linked unit to eliminate the EPMC effective
July 3, 2016. CFI declined the Court’s invitation to meet and confer over impacts at
that time but in September notified the Court of its intent to bargain impacts during
successor MOU negotiations.
On September 27, 2016, the Santa Clara County Superior Court notified CFI of
the linked bargaining unit’s agreement to eliminate the EPMC and the Court’s intent to
apply the same change to CFI unit members. Aranguren asserted in an e-mail to the
Court that the impacts of the change needed to be bargained regionally but
nonetheless met with the Court on October 24, 2016.
Meanwhile, on August 26, 2016, CFI and the Committee began negotiations for
a successor MOU. As found ante, during those negotiations the parties bargained

49
over the negotiable impacts of the Courts’ EPMC changes. Until those negotiations
resulted in an agreement or a good faith impasse, the Courts could not implement
changes to the interpreters’ EPMC. (County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2321-M, p. 30.) The Mendocino and San Mateo County Superior Courts,
however, implemented the EPMC changes in October 2016, and the Santa Clara
County Superior Court implemented the EPMC change in two steps between
November 2016 and February 2017. But impact bargaining between CFI and the
Committee did not finish until September 11, 2017, when the parties reached
agreement on a successor MOU.
Under Board precedent, the Courts could not implement the EPMC changes
prior to the completion of impact bargaining unless “the implementation date [was]
based upon . . . an immutable deadline . . . or an important managerial interest, such
that a delay in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively undermine
the employer’s right to make the nonnegotiable decision.” (Compton Community
College District, supra, PERB Decision No. 720, pp. 14-15.) No evidence in the
record shows that the Courts could not have waited until the completion of regional
impact bargaining to implement the EPMC changes, or that their decision to make
those changes would have been undermined by the delay. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts’
implementation of changes to interpreters’ EPMC prior to the completion of regional
impact bargaining in September 2017 breached the Courts’ obligation to meet and
confer in good faith as required by Court Interpreter Act section 71818, and thereby

50
constituted an unfair practice under section 71825, subdivision (c) of the Act, and
PERB Regulation 32608, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c).
2. 	Unilateral Change to Grievance Procedures
The amended complaint alleged that on April 12, 2016, certain Courts
unilaterally changed the parties’ negotiated grievance procedure by issuing written
responses to CFI’s April 1, 2016 grievances without first meeting with CFI as required
by the MOU’s grievance procedure.33 An employer may not unilaterally add new
terms to an existing collective bargaining agreement, nor repudiate its provisions.
(Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2231-M,
p. 15; Regents of the University of California (1991) PERB Decision No. 907-H, p. 24
(Regents).) PERB has long held that grievance procedures are within the scope of
representation (County of Riverside (2003) PERB Decision No. 1577-M, p. 6, citing
Anaheim City School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 364) and that an employer’s
failure or refusal to process a grievance in accordance with collectively-bargained
grievance procedures may be reviewed as a unilateral change (Omnitrans (2010)
PERB Decision No. 2143-M, pp. 6-8; County of Riverside, supra, PERB Decision
No. 1577-M, p. 6). Accordingly, there is no question that the policy at issue concerns
a negotiable matter.
In the proposed decision, the ALJ held that a charge based on repudiation of
the grievance procedure requires evidence that the employer disavowed the grievance
procedure as a means for resolving the alleged violations of the collective bargaining
________________________
33 Those grievances challenged both the Courts’ failure to provide the same
offsetting benefits provided to linked bargaining units and the Committee’s refusal to
meet and confer over the impacts of EPMC changes.

51
agreement, or unilaterally imposed changes to the procedure itself. Citing Hacienda
La Puente Unified School District (1997) PERB Decision No. 1187, pp. 2-3, adopting
proposed decision at pp. 13-16 (Hacienda), he found that the Committee did not
repudiate the grievance procedure because Yuen did not outrightly disavow its
contractual obligations under Article 9 or change the grievance procedure, but instead
denied CFI’s grievance on the grounds that Article 23.E required local bargaining at
the trial court level.
In Hacienda, supra, PERB Decision No. 1187, the employer denied two
grievances for their failure to comply with standard grievance procedures. (Id. at
pp. 2-3, adopting proposed decision at pp. 6-10.) In so doing, the employer relied on
the same interpretation of the grievance processing procedures as it had in the past,
following its standard practice to notify the union of its decision without informing the
union of the nature of the perceived deficiency. (Id., adopting proposed decision at
pp. 5-6, 10-11, and 13-16.) The Hacienda decision thus addressed whether the
employer acted consistently with an unwritten past practice, not whether it altered an
existing practice embodied in a clear and unambiguous written agreement. Because
the allegation here is that the Courts failed to follow the written grievance procedure in
the parties’ MOU, Hacienda is inapposite.
Decisions addressing an employer’s deviation from a written agreement are a
better fit here. In Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 907-H, for example, the Board
found that, given the existence of clear and unambiguous contract language setting
forth the criteria for three-year appointments of university lecturers, the university

52
violated the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA)34 when it
unilaterally applied additional criteria for making such appointments not set forth in the
agreement. (Id. at pp. 23-24.) Likewise, in Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2262, the parties negotiated a progressive discipline policy
with specific exceptions detailed in their bargaining contract. The Board held that the
employer unlawfully imposed a unilateral change when it added an additional
exception to the progressive discipline policy. (Id. at pp. 9-12.)
Article 9 clearly establishes the steps the Courts should have taken upon
receipt of the grievances: the parties must meet within 10 business days after the filing
of a grievance, and the designated court management representative may issue a
written response only after such a meeting. CFI filed its grievance with the Contra
Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts on April 1, 2016.
Without first meeting with CFI, representatives from each of the courts responded in
writing on April 12 and 13, summarily rejecting CFI’s grievance on the basis that there
had been no violation of the MOU.35 In addition to the responses received from the
Courts, Yuen responded on the Committee’s behalf, explicitly rejecting CFI’s
grievance and unambiguously noting “[s]ince no violation of the MOU has occurred, . .
. no further action will be taken on this grievance.”
________________________
34 HEERA is codified at section 3560 et seq.
35 The Courts denied the grievance on a variety of grounds, including that they
had not implemented nor were they in the process of implementing any EPMC
changes, that they intended to comply with their bargaining obligations should such
changes be announced, or that they had already initiated or were willing to commence
negotiations with CFI over the matter. We do not address the merits of these bases
for denial of the grievance as we find that the courts unilaterally implemented a
change to the grievance procedures themselves.

53
Even though the Courts clearly stated that they would not process the
grievances further, CFI nonetheless attempted once more to resolve its concerns
utilizing the parties’ negotiated grievance procedures. In letters to three of the four
Courts dated April 22, 2016, Aranguren stated:
“The 	purpose 	of 	the 	grievance 	procedure 	is 	to 	share
information and discuss disputes with the goal of resolving
issues as quickly and amicably as possible. 	Please clarify
whether you are refusing to hold a meeting to discuss this
grievance. 	If you do not wish to meet in accordance with
the grievance procedure, please consider this letter our
formal appeal to arbitration on the grievance filed on April 1,
2016.”36
The record is devoid of any evidence that the Courts responded to these letters.
Thus, contrary to the clear and unambiguous requirements of their MOU, Court
management deviated from the contractual grievance procedure by failing to meet with
CFI before issuing written responses to its grievance.37
To constitute an unlawful unilateral change in policy, a change must be more
than a mere contract breach; it must have a generalized effect or continuing impact
upon the bargaining unit. (City of Montebello (2016) PERB Decision No. 2491-M,
p. 13; Grant Joint Union High School District, supra, PERB Decision No. 196, p. 9.)
________________________
36 In her letter to Contra Costa County Superior Court, Aranguren also indicated
that CFI had previously proposed that the court process the grievance at Step 2 of the
grievance procedure. The letters to Marin and San Mateo County Superior Courts
included no such claim.
37 We do not suggest that the parties can never agree to extend the timelines or
alter a specific requirement of the grievance procedure on a case-by-case basis.
Indeed, Article 9 allows that “[a]ny level of review, or timelines established by this
procedure, may be waived or extended by mutual agreement confirmed in writing,” but
there is no evidence of any such agreement in the record.

54
The failure to properly process even a single grievance has a generalized effect or
continuing impact on bargaining unit members’ terms and conditions of employment if
“the action is based upon the employer’s belief that it had a contractual right to take
the action without negotiating with the union.” (County of Riverside, supra, PERB
Decision No. 1577-M, p. 6.) For example, in Omnitrans, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2143-M, the employer refused to process a grievance, claiming the contractual
grievance procedure did not allow the union to file grievances in its own name. (Id. at
p. 7.) The Board found an unlawful unilateral change because there was no evidence
the union had waived its statutory right to file a grievance in its own name. (Id. at
p. 8.)
Here, the Committee clearly stated in writing to CFI that its declination to
bargain regionally over the impacts of changes to EPMC was not grievable “because
Article 23.E clearly establishes the agreement between the [parties] that such
bargaining shall occur at each [trial] court.” The trial courts similarly rejected the
grievances on the basis that they had already initiated, or were willing to commence,
bargaining with CFI over the matter, implicitly indicating that they, not the Committee,
were authorized under Article 23.E to bargain with CFI. Thus, like the employer in
Omnitrans, the Courts rejected CFI’s grievances on the grounds that they were not
subject to the contractual grievance procedure. Because this rejection indicates that
future grievances over the same subjects would also be rejected out of hand, it had a
generalized effect or continuing impact on unit members’ terms and conditions of
employment.

55
We therefore find that the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara
County Superior Courts unilaterally implemented a change in policy by repudiating the
parties’ collectively bargained grievance procedures, which require that a Court
representative meet with CFI before issuing a written grievance response, without
affording CFI notice and the opportunity to bargain over that change. This conduct
breached the Courts’ obligation to meet and confer in good faith as required by Court
Interpreter Act section 71818, and thereby constituted an unfair practice under section
71825, subdivision (c) of the Act, and PERB Regulation 32608, subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c).
3. 	Unilateral Elimination of Pension Stipend
As discussed ante, PERB recognizes that a unilateral change in an established
past practice may constitute unlawful action. (Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2262, p. 9.) A binding past practice is one which is
“unequivocal, clearly enunciated and acted upon, and readily ascertainable over a
reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both
parties,” or which is “regular and consistent” or “historic and accepted.” (County of
Orange (2018) PERB Decision No. 2611-M, pp. 10-11, fn. 7, citing County of Riverside
(2013) PERB Decision No. 2307-M, p. 20.)
In 2009, as a result of the Riker arbitration decision, the Santa Cruz County
Superior Court began paying an annual monetary stipend to its court interpreters to
offset their increased pension contributions, retroactive to 2008. The decision ordered
the trial court to continue paying this benefit for a period at least consistent with the
pension changes reflected in the MOU between the court and the interpreters’ linked

56
unit, with bargaining between CFI and the trial court to take place thereafter if either
party wished to alter the stipend. When the linked unit’s MOU expired in 2010, the
court continued to provide the stipend to its interpreters for seven additional years. In
June 2017, the court decided to eliminate the stipend and informed CFI that it would
stop the payment.
We have no trouble concluding that payment of the stipend was a binding past
practice, established by the Santa Cruz County Superior Court’s consistent conduct
over the course of eight consecutive years. It also is clear that the Court changed that
past practice when it ceased paying the stipend in June 2017, and that the change
had a generalized effect and continuing impact on bargaining unit employees. (See
City of Davis (2016) PERB Decision No. 2494-M, p. 20 [“PERB has found an unlawful
policy change, as opposed to an isolated breach of contract, where an employer
unilaterally establishes a policy that represents a conscious or apparent reversal of a
previous understanding.”].) The amount employees pay toward their pension benefits
is within the scope of representation because it has a direct effect on wages. (Clovis
Unified School District (2002) PERB Decision No. 1504, p. 14.) The Court’s
elimination of the stipend resulted in interpreters paying more toward their pension
benefits, and therefore the change involved a matter within the scope of
representation. Finally, the Court offered to meet and confer with CFI over elimination
of the stipend after notifying CFI that it would stop making the payments. When the
exclusive representative first learns of a negotiable change after the decision has been
made, “by definition, there has been inadequate notice.” (City of Sacramento (2013)
PERB Decision No. 2351-M, p. 33.) Because all elements for an unlawful unilateral

57
change are established, we conclude that the Santa Cruz County Superior Court
breached its obligation to meet and confer in good faith as required by Court
Interpreter Act section 71818, and thereby committed an unfair practice under section
71825, subdivision (c) of the Act, and PERB Regulation 32608, subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c).
REMEDY
The Court Interpreter Act grants PERB broad authority to remedy violations of
the Act. (§ 71825, subd. (b), incorporating § 3541.3; Boling v. PERB (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 376, 387.) When PERB finds that an employer has committed unfair
practices, it has the power to order the employer to cease and desist its unlawful
conduct and to take such actions as are necessary to eliminate the effects of that
conduct, including making injured parties and affected employees whole. (§ 3541.5,
subd. (c); Boling v. PERB, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 387.)
Here, the Committee violated its duty to meet and confer in good faith by
rejecting CFI’s February 11, 2016 demand to bargain over the negotiable impacts of
Region 2 Courts’ proposed elimination or reduction of EPMC. A typical remedy for
such a violation includes an order to meet and confer with the exclusive representative
over negotiable effects. (Bellflower Unified School District (2014) PERB Decision
No. 2385, p. 12.) In this case, however, we have found that the Committee did in fact
negotiate over the impacts of the Courts’ EPMC changes during successor MOU
negotiations from August 2016 through September 2017. We therefore decline to
order the Committee to meet and confer over those impacts.

58
Additionally, the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior
Courts unlawfully implemented changes to interpreters’ EPMC prior to the completion
of regional bargaining over the negotiable impacts of those changes. The usual
remedy for an employer’s violation of its effects bargaining obligation is an order to
bargain with the exclusive representative over the effects, with a limited backpay
award to make employees whole for losses suffered and to mitigate as much as
possible the imbalance in the parties’ bargaining positions resulting from the
employer’s unlawful conduct. (County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2680-M, p. 14; Bellflower Unified School District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2385,
pp. 12-13.)
We decline to order bargaining for these violations for the same reason we
decline to order bargaining by the Committee, viz., the parties completed impact
bargaining as part of successor MOU negotiations. However, because the Courts
implemented changes prior to the completion of impact bargaining, interpreters
suffered a loss of wages during that time period. Accordingly, the Mendocino, San
Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts will be ordered to pay the interpreters
backpay equivalent to the amount of the EPMC reduction from the date the reduction
was implemented by each Court until September 11, 2017, the day impact bargaining
was complete. (See County of Santa Clara, supra, PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 14
[“Where an employer’s violation involved a failure to bargain effects, make-whole relief
runs from the date any impacted employee began to experience harm until” effects
bargaining is complete].)

59
Further, the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior
Courts repudiated the negotiated grievance procedure in the 2013-2016 CFI-Region 2
MOU by failing to meet with CFI prior to issuing written responses to CFI’s April 1,
2016 grievances. The proper remedy for an unlawful repudiation of a grievance
procedure includes an order to resume processing the improperly rejected grievance.
(Omnitrans, supra, PERB Decision No. 2143-M, p. 9; County of Riverside, supra,
(2003) PERB Decision No. 1577-M, pp. 8-9.) The Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo,
and Santa Clara County Superior Courts thus will be ordered to reinstate the April 1,
2016 grievances upon CFI’s request and to process them in accordance with the
grievance procedures in Article 9 of the 2013-2016 CFI-Region 2 MOU.
Finally, the Santa Cruz County Superior Court unlawfully ceased payment of
the pension stipend without providing CFI an opportunity to meet and confer over the
decision. “The standard remedy for an employer’s unlawful unilateral change usually
consists of a cease and desist order, make-whole relief for employees injured by the
change, rescission of the change, and a bargaining order.” (County of Santa Clara,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 14.) That remedy is appropriate here.
Consequently, the Santa Cruz County Superior Court will be ordered to rescind its
elimination of the pension stipend, pay affected interpreters backpay equal to the
amount of the stipend plus seven percent interest, and meet and confer upon request
by CFI over any future changes to the pension stipend.
It also is appropriate to order the Committee and the Courts to cease and desist
from the unlawful conduct found in this decision, and to post physical and electronic

60
notices of their violations. (City of Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M,
pp. 43-45.)
ORDER
The Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record
in this case, it is found that the Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations
Committee (Committee) violated the Trial Court Interpreter Employment and Labor
Relations Act (Court Interpreter Act or Act) by refusing to meet and confer “regionally”
over the impact of changes by local trial courts to employee pension contributions. By
this conduct, the Committee also interfered with the right of employees to be
represented by the California Federation of Interpreters, Local 39000, The Newspaper
Guild-Communication Workers of America (CFI) and denied CFI its right to represent
employees. This conduct violated Government Code sections 71818, 71822, and
71825(c), and Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) Regulations 32608(a), (b),
and (c). (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 8, sec. 31001 et seq.)
Pursuant to Court Interpreter Act section 71825(a), it hereby is ORDERED that
the Committee and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Failing and refusing to meet and confer in good faith with CFI over
impacts of Region 2 trial courts’ changes to employer-paid member contributions.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Committee.

61
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Committee.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Within 10 workdays following the date this decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all work locations where notices to interpreters customarily
are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be
signed by an authorized agent of the Committee, indicating that the Committee will
comply with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of
30 consecutive workdays. In addition to the physical posting of notices, notice shall
be posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site and other electronic means
customarily used by the Committee to communicate with employees in the bargaining
unit represented by CFI. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is
not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material. (City of
Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M.)
2. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order
shall be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel’s designee. The Committee shall provide reports, in writing, as
directed by the General Counsel or his designee. All reports regarding compliance
with this Order shall be concurrently served on CFI.
The Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire
record in this case, it is found that the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara
County Superior Courts unlawfully implemented changes to interpreters’ employer-

62
paid member contributions (EPMC) prior to the completion of regional bargaining over
the negotiable impacts of those changes. By this conduct, the Mendocino, San
Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts also interfered with the right of
employees to be represented by CFI and denied CFI its right to represent employees.
This conduct violated Government Code sections 71818, 71822, and 71825(c), and
PERB Regulations 32608(a), (b), and (c).
Pursuant to Court Interpreter Act section 71825(a), it hereby is ORDERED that
the Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts and their
representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Implementing changes to interpreters’ EPMC prior to the
completion of bargaining over the impacts of such changes.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Courts.
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Courts.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Make affected interpreters whole for any financial losses suffered
as a result of the Courts’ unlawful unilateral changes, with interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum. The back pay period shall run from the date the EPMC reduction
was implemented at each Court until September 11, 2017.
2. 	Within 10 workdays following the date this decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all work locations where notices to interpreters customarily

63
are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be
signed by an authorized agent of the Court, indicating that the Court will comply with
the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of 30
consecutive workdays. In addition to the physical posting of notices, notice shall be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site and other electronic means
customarily used by the Court to communicate with employees in the bargaining unit
represented by CFI. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not
reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material. (City of
Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M.)
3. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order
shall be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel’s designee. The Courts shall provide reports, in writing, as
directed by the General Counsel or his designee. All reports regarding compliance
with this Order shall be concurrently served on CFI.
The Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire
record in this case, it is found that the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa
Clara County Superior Courts repudiated the negotiated grievance procedure in the
2013-2016 CFI-Region 2 MOU by failing to meet with CFI prior to issuing written
responses to CFI’s April 1, 2016 grievances. By this conduct, the Contra Costa,
Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts also interfered with the
right of employees to be represented by CFI and denied CFI its right to represent

64
employees. This conduct violated Government Code sections 71818, 71822, and
71825(c), and PERB Regulation 32608(a), (b), and (c).
Pursuant to Court Interpreter Act section 71825(a), it hereby is ORDERED that
the Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts and
their representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Unilaterally changing contractual grievance procedures.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Courts.
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Courts.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Upon CFI’s request, reinstate the grievances filed by CFI on
April 1, 2016, and process the grievances in accordance with the grievance
procedures in Article 9 of the 2013-2016 CFI-Region 2 memorandum of
understanding.
2. 	Within 10 workdays following the date this decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all work locations where notices to interpreters customarily
are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be
signed by an authorized agent of the Court, indicating that the Court will comply with
the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of 30
consecutive workdays. In addition to the physical posting of notices, notice shall be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site and other electronic means

65
customarily used by the Court to communicate with employees in the bargaining unit
represented by CFI. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not
reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material. (City of
Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M.)
3. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order
shall be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel’s designee. The Courts shall provide reports, in writing, as
directed by the General Counsel or his designee. All reports regarding compliance
with this Order shall be concurrently served on CFI.
The Santa Cruz County Superior Court
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record
in this case, it is found that the Santa Cruz County Superior Court unlawfully ceased
payment of a pension stipend without providing CFI an opportunity to meet and confer
over the decision. By this conduct, the Santa Cruz County Superior Court also
interfered with the right of employees to be represented by CFI and denied CFI its right
to represent employees. This conduct violated Government Code sections 71818,
71822, and 71825(c), and PERB Regulations 32608(a), (b), and (c).
Pursuant to Court Interpreter Act section 71825(a), it hereby is ORDERED that
the Santa Cruz County Superior Court and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Unilaterally eliminating pension stipends paid to interpreters.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Court.

66
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Court.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Rescind the elimination of the pension stipend.
2. 	Make affected interpreters whole for any financial losses suffered
as a direct result of the elimination of the pension stipend, with interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum.
3. 	Upon request, meet and confer with CFI over any changes to the
interpreters’ pension stipend.
4. 	Within 10 workdays following the date this decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all work locations where notices to interpreters customarily
are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be
signed by an authorized agent of the Court, indicating that the Court will comply with
the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of 30
consecutive workdays. In addition to the physical posting of notices, notice shall be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site and other electronic means
customarily used by the Court to communicate with employees in the bargaining unit
represented by CFI. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not
reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material. (City of
Sacramento, supra, PERB Decision No. 2351-M.)
5. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order
shall be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel’s designee. The Court shall provide reports, in writing, as

67
directed by the General Counsel or his designee. All reports regarding compliance
with this Order shall be concurrently served on CFI.
Members Banks and Krantz joined in this Decision.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-11-I, in which all parties had
the right to participate, it has been found that:
1) The Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee
(Committee) violated the Trial Court Interpreter Employment and Labor
Relations Act (Court Interpreter Act) by refusing to meet and confer
“regionally” over the impact of changes by local trial courts to employee
pension contributions;
2) The Mendocino, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior Courts
unlawfully implemented changes to interpreters’ employer-paid member
contributions (EPMC) prior to the completion of regional bargaining over the
negotiable impacts of those changes;
3) The Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Clara County Superior
Courts repudiated the negotiated grievance procedure in the 2013-2016
Memorandum of Understanding between the Committee and California
Federation of Interpreters, Local 39000, The Newspaper Guild-
Communication Workers of America (CFI) by failing to meet with CFI prior to
issuing written responses to CFI’s April 1, 2016 grievances; and
4) The Santa Cruz County Superior Court unlawfully ceased payment of a
pension stipend without providing CFI an opportunity to meet and confer
over the decision.
By this conduct, the Committee and the above-identified trial courts also interfered
with the right of employees to be represented by CFI and denied CFI its right to
represent employees. This conduct violated Government Code sections 71818,
71822, and 71825(c), and Public Employment Relations Board Regulations 32608(a),
(b), and (c). (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 8, sec. 31001 et seq.)
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and:

2
I. 	THE REGION 2 COURT INTERPRETER EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
COMMITTEE WILL:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Failing and refusing to meet and confer in good faith with CFI over
impacts of Region 2 trial courts’ changes to EPMC.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Committee.
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Committee.
II. 	THE MENDOCINO, SAN MATEO, AND SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURTS WILL:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Implementing changes to interpreters’ EPMC prior to the
completion of bargaining over the impacts of such changes.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Court.
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Court.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE COURT INTERPRETER ACT:
1. 	Make affected interpreters whole for any financial losses suffered
as a result of the unlawful unilateral changes, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per
annum. The back pay period shall run from the date the EPMC reduction was
implemented at each Court until September 11, 2017.
III. 	THE CONTRA COSTA, MARIN, SAN MATEO, AND SANTA CLARA COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURTS WILL:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Unilaterally changing contractual grievance procedures.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Courts.
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Courts.

3
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE COURT INTERPRETER ACT:
1. 	Upon CFI’s request, reinstate the grievances filed by CFI on
April 1, 2016, and process the grievances in accordance with the grievance
procedures in Article 9 of the 2013-2016 CFI-Region 2 Memorandum of
Understanding.
IV. 	THE SANTA CRUZ COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT WILL:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Unilaterally eliminating pension stipends paid to interpreters.
2. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by CFI in their
employment relations with the Court.
3. 	Denying CFI its right to represent employees in their employment
relations with the Court.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE COURT INTERPRETER ACT:
1. 	Rescind the elimination of the pension stipend.
2. 	Make affected interpreters whole for any financial losses suffered
as a direct result of the elimination of the pension stipend, with interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum.
3. 	Upon request, meet and confer with CFI over any changes to the
interpreters’ pension stipend.
Dated: _____________________ 	Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment
Relations Committee
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
Dated: _____________________ 	_________________County Superior Court38
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.
________________________
38 Only trial courts found to have individually violated the Act need sign here.