Clovis Unified School District (PERB 2904E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
ASSOCIATION OF CLOVIS EDUCATORS,
CTA/NEA,
Charging Party,
v.
CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
CLOVIS UNIFIED FACULTY SENATE,
Joined Party.
ASSOCIATION OF CLOVIS EDUCATORS,
CTA/NEA,
Charging Party,
v.
CLOVIS UNIFIED FACULTY SENATE;
CLOVIS TEACHERS ORGANIZATION,
Respondent.
CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Joined Party.
Case Nos. SA-CE-3040-E
SA-CE-3047-E
SA-CE-3051-E
Case No. SA-CO-655-E
PERB Decision No. 2904
June 20, 2024
Appearances: Bush Gottlieb by Erica Deutsch and Michael E. Plank, Attorneys, and
California Teachers Association by Megan Degeneffe, Staff Counsel, for Association
of Clovis Educators, CTA/NEA; Fagan Friedman & Fulfrost by David A. Moreno,
Lynn Beekman, Katy McCully Merrill, and Brandon A. Lallande, Attorneys, for Clovis
Unified School District; Stacey Schiro and Bill Buettner for Clovis Unified Faculty
Senate.

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Before Banks, Chair; Krantz and Nazarian, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: The above-captioned four consolidated unfair practice
cases are before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) on exceptions by
Charging Party Association of Clovis Educators (ACE) to a proposed decision of an
administrative law judge (ALJ). All four cases relate to ACE’s campaign to become the
exclusive representative of certificated employees employed by Clovis Unified School
District.
ACE filed its first three charges (Case Nos. SA-CE-3040-E, SA-CE-3047-E, and
SA-CE-3051-E) against the District. The complaints in those cases allege that the
District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) and the Prohibition
on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership (PEDD) by, among
other conduct: (1) dominating and interfering with the administration of the Clovis
Unified Faculty Senate, an employee organization that is a joined party in all three
charges against the District; (2) providing the Senate with preferential treatment and
extensive, unequal support; (3) encouraging employees to support the Senate while
deterring or discouraging them from joining ACE and from authorizing ACE to
represent them; (4) surveilling employees engaged in protected activities and
otherwise interfering with such activities; and (5) retaliating against employees for their
protected activities.1
1 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq., while the PEDD
is codified at Government Code section 3550 et seq. All statutory further references
are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

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ACE filed its fourth charge (Case No. SA-CO-655-E) against the Senate and
Clovis Teachers Organization (CTO). The complaint in that case alleges that CTO is
the Senate’s “alter ego and/or successor,” and that the two respondents violated
EERA by, among other conduct: (1) soliciting and/or accepting unlawful support from
the District; (2) causing or attempting to cause the District to violate EERA; and
(3) otherwise interfering with teachers’ protected activity. 2
The proposed decision found in ACE’s favor as to most allegations in all four
cases, while dismissing other allegations. The ALJ’s proposed remedial order would
require the District, among other acts, to rescind unlawful communications and
policies and honor its duty under EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) to refrain from
dominating, interfering with the administration of, or unlawfully supporting an
employee organization, or encouraging employees to join one organization over
another. The proposed remedial order against the Senate would prohibit it from
accepting unlawful support, interfering with protected activity, and attempting to cause
the District to violate EERA.
ACE was the only party to file exceptions to the proposed decision. In its
exceptions, ACE seeks reversal on the claims the ALJ dismissed and argues in favor
of augmenting and modifying the ALJ’s proposed remedy. The main additional remedy
ACE seeks is to disestablish all relationships between the Senate and the District
having to do with teachers’ terms or conditions of employment. ACE’s proposed
2 We use the term “teachers” as a shorthand to include teachers, mental health
professionals, and other certificated educational employees at the District.

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remedy turns, in part, on assessing the nature of the District’s violation of EERA
section 3543.5, subdivision (d), meaning that certain liability issues are also before us.
The Senate did not respond to ACE’s exceptions. The District did file a
response, arguing that we should make no changes to the ALJ’s conclusions and
proposed remedial order.
For the reasons explained below, we sustain certain exceptions and reject
others. As in the parties’ briefs, a significant portion of our decision is devoted to the
remedy of “disestablishment,” a term of art that generally refers to “a complete and
permanent termination of all relationships between an employer and the affected labor
organization, and any successor[,] having to do with wages, hours, and working
conditions,” but “does not necessarily mean complete dissolution of the organization.”
(See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Compliance Manual, § 10528.6,
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/node-174/compliance-
manual-october-2020.pdf [last accessed June 20, 2024].)
We conclude the ALJ erred in failing to order disestablishment. The first reason
is that ACE proved the District dominated the Senate, and disestablishment is the
standard remedy in the infrequent cases involving domination. In the alternative, this
case requires disestablishment because other violations were egregious, recurrent,
and persistent. Indeed, this case does not stand in isolation. Forty years ago, PERB
found that similar District conduct, vis-à-vis the Senate, violated EERA section 3543.5,
subdivision (d). (Clovis Unified School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 389,
adopting proposed decision at pp. 19-22 (Clovis I).) The remedial order in Clovis I did
not order disestablishment, and instead sought to quell and remedy significant illegal

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conduct via lesser measures. Unfortunately, those measures proved ineffective in
preventing recurrence. As detailed below, to refrain from ordering disestablishment in
this case would be contrary to law and would abdicate our enforcement responsibility.
We therefore rule in ACE’s favor on this central issue.3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 1, 2021, ACE filed its first charge against the District. The gravamen of
the charge was that the District had violated EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) by
dominating and interfering with the administration of the Senate, providing unlawful
support to the Senate, and encouraging employees to support the Senate over ACE.
After ACE amended the charge and filed a request for injunctive relief, PERB’s Office
of the General Counsel (OGC) reviewed both parties’ positions and issued a
complaint.
ACE and the District filed multiple declarations and briefs concerning whether
the Board should authorize OGC to seek temporary injunctive relief to prevent
irreparable harm that might occur during PERB’s unfair practice proceedings. We
decided it was appropriate to seek such relief for the reasons explained in Clovis
Unified School District (2021) PERB Order No. IR-63 (Clovis II). OGC sought
temporary injunctive relief in the Superior Court of Fresno County over the ensuing
months, but the court denied both PERB’s application for a temporary restraining
order and PERB’s later motion for a preliminary injunction.
3 While ACE has moved to reopen the record to submit more evidence
supporting disestablishment, we deny that motion as moot given that we order
disestablishment based on the existing record.

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Meanwhile, ACE filed its second charge against the District, which made
multiple claims. To begin, ACE alleged that the District surveilled employees engaged
in protected activities. Next, ACE claimed that the District retaliated against ACE
supporter Amy Kilburn by presenting her with a less desirable option if she wished to
continue earning a stipend for teaching an extra class. Lastly, ACE asserted that the
District violated its duty to meet and discuss with ACE as a “nonexclusive
representative,” viz., an employee organization that represents certain employees but
is not an exclusive representative within the meaning of EERA section 3540.1,
subdivision (e). (Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, p. 3, fn. 3.)
The latter allegation relied on the principle that a nonexclusive representative,
whether or not it is seeking to ultimately be certified as an exclusive representative,
has the right to receive advance notice of contemplated changes in fundamental
employment terms or conditions, as well as the right to meet and discuss with the
employer before it reaches a decision on such matters. (Alliance College-Ready
Public Schools, et al. (2020) PERB Decision No. 2716, p. 20.) In such discussions, the
employer need not engage in the full breadth of bargaining as it must with an
exclusive representative, but it must listen and consider proposals in good faith. (Id. at
pp. 23-24.) Furthermore, a nonexclusive representative has the right to information it
needs to meet and discuss in good faith, to evaluate grievances, or to pursue
administrative or legal remedies on behalf of employees. (Regents of the University of
California (1999) PERB Decision No. 1354-H, adopting proposed decision, pp. 45-48;
Santa Monica Community College District (1979) PERB Decision No. 103, p. 15
(Santa Monica).)

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In September 2021, ACE filed its third charge against the District, adding more
allegations that the District had interfered with protected activity, violated EERA
section 3543.5, subdivision (d), and violated the PEDD. Among other bases for the
new allegations, the third charge alleged that the District was liable for a supervisor in
the District’s police force e-mailing ACE supporter Kristin Heimerdinger “I hope you’re
putting our kids first,” and/or the District violated the law by taking insufficient action
when Heimerdinger complained about this e-mail.
Thereafter, PERB proceedings continued apace, as follows: ACE filed its
charge against the Senate and CTO; OGC issued complaints in the remaining cases,
two of which were subsequently amended; the District and the Senate answered the
complaints pending against them; the ALJ added the Senate as a joined party in the
first three cases and the District as a joined party in the fourth case; and the ALJ
consolidated the four cases.
Furthermore, in a letter dated November 10, 2021, PERB’s Appeals Assistant
wrote the parties as follows:
“[T]he Board unanimously requests that, as part of
providing evidence and argument on both liability and
remedy issues, you address the following two questions:
“(1) Would any of the alleged violations in this matter, if
proven, more likely than not have sufficiently long-lasting
impacts that traditional remedies may be inadequate to
restore employee free choice? (See Children of Promise
Preparatory Academy (2018) PERB Order No. Ad-470,
p. 6 & adopting administrative determination at p. 4
[discussing extent to which PERB remedies, combined with
passage of time, may restore employee free choice]; see
also Regents of the University of California (2021) PERB
Decision No. 2755-H, pp. 55-56, citing Alliance College-
Ready Public Schools et. al. (2017) PERB Decision

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No. 2545, pp. 16-18 [listing circumstances potentially
warranting non-traditional remedies].)
“(2) Assuming for the sake of argument that the answer to
[Question No. 1] is ‘yes,’ which specific non-traditional
remedies may be appropriate in this case, including but not
limited to disestablishment of the Faculty Senate (see
Redwoods Community College District (1987) PERB
Decision No. 650, adopting proposed decision at pp. 63-68)
and/or a non-majority bargaining order? (See Harry Carian
Sales v. ALRB (1985) 39 Cal.3d 209, 221 [non-majority
bargaining order may be necessary or appropriate ‘in
‘exceptional’ cases marked by ‘outrageous’ and ‘pervasive’
unfair labor practices’].)”4
The ALJ held 33 formal hearings days from December 13, 2021, through
November 15, 2022. The parties then submitted post-hearing briefs, and on December
7, 2023, the ALJ issued the proposed decision that is now before us on appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. 	The Parties
The District is a public school employer within the meaning of EERA section
3540.1, subdivision (k), and it is a public employer within the meaning of PEDD
section 3552, subdivision (c). The District provides public education to approximately
43,000 students and employs more than 2,000 certificated employees.
ACE is an employee organization within the meaning of EERA section 3540.1,
subdivision (d) and PEDD section 3552, subdivision (a). ACE began organizing
District teachers in July 2020 and announced its campaign on April 5, 2021.
4 ACE has specifically disclaimed interest in a non-majority bargaining order.
We therefore express no opinion on that issue.

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It is undisputed that the Senate is an employee organization within the meaning
of EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (d) and PEDD section 3552, subdivision (a). The
record leaves no serious doubt that CTO has at all relevant times served as an alias of
the Senate. For instance, the Senate president signed the Senate’s post-hearing brief
to the ALJ on behalf of “Clovis Unified Faculty Senate aka Clovis Teachers
Organization.” Moreover, in answering the complaint in Case No. SA-CO-655-E, the
Senate stated that it and CTO were “interchangeable” during the period of October 11,
2021, through November 15, 2021. We infer that this statement did not suggest that
CTO ever existed as a separate entity, but rather meant that October and November
2021 were the only months in which CTO was active.
II. 	District Policy 0100
The policies of the District’s Board of Education (District Board) include Policy
0100, entitled “District Philosophy.” Policy 0100 states that “the District believes in the
foundational values established by our first Superintendent, Dr. Floyd B. Buchanan,
who served the District from 1960 to 1991. Those values, as stated by Dr. Buchanan,
continue throughout the District and are set forth in Exhibit No. 0100.” The exhibit to
Policy 0100 is widely known within the District as “Doc’s Charge,” based on
Buchanan’s nickname. District employees understand it as a statement of the District’s
values. Indeed, the District distributed Doc’s Charge to all newly hired teachers for
many years. Doc’s Charge provides, in part, that “professionals who work in our
district are proud that we do not have collective bargaining.” In its concluding
paragraph, Doc’s charge states: “If you are still interested in working at Clovis under
those conditions, we’d like to offer you a contract.”

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While litigating the charges at issue here, the District removed Doc’s Charge as
the exhibit to Policy 0100 and stopped distributing it to new employees at orientation
and training. The District also removed Doc’s Charge from its website. However, when
the record closed in this matter, the District still displayed Doc’s Charge in the District
boardroom, the Superintendent’s office, and other District work sites.
III. 	The Senate’s Genesis
Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389 recounted the Senate’s origin in the
context of two successive campaigns to organize District teachers in the years
following EERA’s enactment. The first organizing effort took place in 1977. Unions
affiliated with the California Teachers Association (CTA) and the California Federation
of Teachers vied to exclusively represent District teachers, while the District urged
teachers to vote for no union. (Id., adopting proposed decision at p. 31.) During that
campaign, “a proposal for the formation of a Faculty Senate was raised as an
alternative to exclusive representation and collective bargaining.” (Id., adopting
proposed decision at pp. 31-32.) “The concept of a Faculty Senate was endorsed by”
the District’s then-Superintendent, Dr. Floyd Buchanan, “in a March 11, 1977, letter to
the faculty.” (Id., adopting proposed decision at p. 32.) Buchanan, who was known as
“Doc,” disapproved of EERA and collective bargaining, as noted in an earlier PERB
decision finding that Buchanan made anti-union statements that did not amount to
unlawful interference. (Clovis Unified School District (1978) PERB Decision No. 61,
p. 2 and adopting proposed decision at pp. 9-11.)
The Senate formed after the District had convinced its teachers to vote for no
union in the 1977 election. (Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389, adopting

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proposed decision at p. 32.) In the years following its formation, “the District exercised
significant influence upon and involvement in the operations of the senate.” (Ibid.)
The second organizing campaign took place in 1983. A CTA affiliate known as
the Clovis Unified Teachers Association (CUTA) filed a representation petition, and
the District again “actively urged employees to vote for no representation.” (Clovis I,
supra, PERB Decision No. 389, adopting proposed decision at p. 7.) For example,
“Buchanan wrote and distributed among employees seven letters stating the District’s
opposition to collective bargaining.” (Ibid.) The District’s persuasion was successful a
second time, as teachers again rejected exclusive representation. (Ibid.)
CUTA challenged the 1983 election result, pursuing a charge and consolidated
election objections. That case culminated in Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389,
which found the District violated EERA in multiple respects. Among other violations,
the District provided the Senate with unlawful support and favored the Senate over
CUTA by crediting the Senate with improved grievance procedures, relieving teachers
from having to work on the final Saturday of the school year, and a salary increase
proposal. (Id. at pp. 8-10.) The decision summarized these findings as follows:
“Initially, the District established a relationship of support for
the Faculty Senate which not only exceeded its statutory
obligations, but tended to create the appearance, if not the
fact, of an ‘in-house’ or ‘company’ union. It provided the
Senate with financial support, typing and distribution of its
minutes, stationery and release time, which was not made
equally available to [CUTA], thereby facilitating the
Senate's operation and its ability to communicate with
employees. . . .Most egregiously, by meeting and conferring
exclusively with the Faculty Senate about the Saturday
workday, then eliminating that required workday, long a
matter of keen employee interest, the District clearly
encouraged employees to stay with the Senate and reject

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[CUTA]. Then, if any employee had missed the point, the
District expressly credited the Senate with having
eliminated the Saturday workday -- both in a mandatory
meeting ten days before the election and in a mailing to
teachers two weeks before the election. Finally, the
morning before the election, [a District Principal] conducted
a mandatory faculty meeting in which he urged the teachers
to vote for no representation.”
(Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389, pp. 19-20.)
The decision in Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389 also noted that it was
infeasible to remedy the District’s violations, as it would not effectuate the purposes of
EERA to order the District to withdraw the beneficial employment terms that the
District had strategically implemented and attributed to the Senate. (Id. at p. 20.)
Instead, the Clovis I remedial order focused on barring the District from providing
further preferences or uneven support to the Senate, crediting it with improvements, or
otherwise endorsing the Senate. (Id. at pp. 21-22.) Clovis I also directed a rerun
election. (Id. at p. 20.) There is no PERB decision recounting the result of the rerun
election, but it is undisputed that no union has ever become certified as the exclusive
representative of District teachers.
IV. 	The Senate’s Relationship with the District
A. 	The Senate’s Privileged Status Under District Policy 4118
Until October 2021, District Board Policy 4118 provided as follows:
“The Clovis Unified School District Faculty Senate is the
representative body for teachers of the District. When a
teacher is called to a meeting with his/her administrator(s),
irrespective of the purpose of the meeting, the teacher may
request to have a Faculty Senate representative or other
person of his/her choosing present at the meeting.”

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On October 6, 2021, four months after ACE filed its initial charge, the District
Board revised Policy 4118, removing the Senate’s privileged status as the sole
representative of teachers by rewriting the provision as follows:
“When a teacher is called to a meeting with his/her
administrator(s), irrespective of the meeting, the teacher
may request to have a representative or other person of
his/her choosing present at the meeting.”
B. 	Senate Bylaw Provisions Regarding its Partnership with the District
The Senate’s bylaws, as last amended in 2008, provide that its overall mission
is “to be an effective advocate for teachers at all levels of policy making, procedures,
and expenditures, in partnership with our administrators, fellow employees, and
community as a quality educational team.” Moreover, the bylaws define the Senate’s
core beliefs as follows:
“Chapter 2. Beliefs:
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“● We represent the voice of the teaching staff individually
and collectively and will serve as their advocate.
“● We are valued partners in the vision and operation of
the district with the school board, district administrators,
principals, parents, community members, and students
through support and maintenance of district beliefs and
goals.”
Next, the bylaws state that the Senate’s objective is to “represent all faculty
interests on matters pertaining to the performance, growth, development, and welfare
of its members.”
Senators include school site representatives elected every two years by
teachers from District schools, as well as representatives from various District

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educational departments such as music and special education. According to the
bylaws, senators’ duties include “gathering of data on issues of interest to the Faculty
Senate or District,” and administering an “annual Climate Assessment” at their school
sites, as discussed further post.
The Senate holds nine to twelve meetings a year. If meetings begin during
senators’ workday, they receive paid release time to attend, leaving their regular
duties before the end of their shifts.
Every two years, senators elect an executive board consisting of a president,
vice president, parliamentarian, secretary, and two communication positions. The
bylaws provide that these officers shall “meet and confer on a regular basis as a
group, and with the District Administration.” All Senate elected officers are subject to
the District’s Professional Conduct clause.
Under the bylaws, the Senate president’s role is to “attend all District level
meetings,” “make the initial attempt to intercede in any teacher’s job concerns,” and
“work closely with the District Administration to promote a productive working
relationship.”
C. 	The District’s Entanglement with Internal Senate Affairs
The District has had significant involvement in important internal Senate affairs,
including Senate elections, efforts to revise Senate bylaws, and misconduct
complaints against Senate officers. For example, beginning in September 2020,
District administrators investigated and took remedial actions based on two complaints
that District teacher Kristin Heimerdinger filed—one regarding conduct by the Senate’s
communications officer, and a second regarding the Senate’s decision to block

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Heimerdinger from logging into a remote Senate meeting. Regarding the first
complaint, the District investigated internal Senate practices and concluded that the
Senate’s communications officer had not met the District’s professionalism
expectations. With respect to the second complaint, the District responded to
Heimerdinger by indicating that: the Senate would establish policies and procedures
regarding attendance at Senate meetings; the District “places high expectations” on
the Senate executive board’s professionalism; the Senate treated Heimerdinger in a
manner that did not meet the District’s expectations; and as a result, the District had
addressed its expectations with Senate officers.
Soon after Heimerdinger’s initial complaint, Senator Stacey Schiro complained
to the District about internal Senate election procedures—specifically whether a recent
election for Senate vice president had been fair—and regarding the Senate
president’s communications with teachers, as well as problems with Senate bylaws
that Schiro believed warranted revision. The District began investigating Schiro’s
complaint. Even before the District finished its investigation, the Senate asked Barry
Jager, the District’s Associate Superintendent of Human Resources and Employee
Relations, to help rerun the election for Senate vice president. Jager, in turn, enlisted
Chris Edmondson, the District’s Director of Educational Technology, to use District
software to rerun the election electronically. On October 6, 2020, Jager sent an e-mail
to senators entitled “Faculty Senate Voting,” to which he attached a link allowing
senators to vote for vice president. In the e-mail, Jager identified himself by his District
title, thanked senators for their participation, and noted: “We value integrity and
morality with this very important process.” The District tabulated the election results

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and Jager announced them. Schiro prevailed in the election, becoming the Senate
vice president. Later, Schiro became the Senate president, in another Senate election
the District ran. (See post at pp. 17-18.)
In November 2020, the District finished investigating Schiro’s complaint and
issued a formal response that included the following conclusions (in which “FS”
denotes the Senate):
“• The District’s expectation for professionalism will be
thoroughly reviewed and addressed with the FS President
. . . [and] all members of the FS Executive Board as well.
“• The position of the FS President, and the important
support this person provides, would be better served by
centrally locating the President in the Human Resources
office at the District Office East building that will enable more
accountability and support for the position and other
Executive Board members with release time.
“• Clear expectations for prompt responses from the FS
President to those with inquiries will be communicated. An
expectation of a response within 24 hours should be
reasonable.
“• A thorough revision of the FS Bylaws should occur. This
should be led by the FS Vice-President, per the existing
bylaws. The process for this should be fully transparent and
include members from all Areas and teaching levels of the
District. If all Areas and levels are not represented, then
district administration can help recruit members. In addition,
the FS will have the full support of our Human Resources
Department and legal resources to assist, as needed . . .
“• Prior to the next round of elections, FS Executive Board
will work in conjunction with the Human Resources
Department to create a standard operating procedure for
elections at the site and district level.

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“• The FS Executive Board Members should thoroughly
review the procedures for District-level FS meetings. I would
encourage a committee be created of existing FS members
to provide insights on how to increase the effectiveness and
organization of these meetings from the initial planning to the
subsequent dissemination of notes from the meeting. The
FS will have the full support of our Human Resources
Department and Deputy Superintendent’s Office to assist as
needed.
“• Information shared at the Clovis Unified Governing Board
Meeting by the FS President, or any member of the
Executive Board, should reflect the viewpoints of all teachers
as best as possible. If teachers are invited to speak on an
issue, all teachers even with differing opinions, should be
extended the same privilege to speak.
“• Area Superintendents and site Principals will be
thoroughly informed of the current concerns and plans of
action. They will work diligently in their site FS meetings and
Area FS meetings to address any concerns and insights.
“• I will arrange for a joint meeting between the FS Executive
Board and the Superintendent’s Executive Cabinet to review
processes and procedures of FS and how we can best
support the FS moving forward. Concerns regarding
processes outlined in the complaint will be addressed in this
and future meetings.”
In February 2021, multiple Senate officers resigned, including its president. The
District once again ran the ensuing Senate election. Jager sent an e-mail announcing
and describing the nomination process, the timeline, and the election procedures,
while assuring senators that voting “will be completed with support from Technology
and Human Resources to ensure a fair and transparent election process.” The District
ran every part of the process, from the announcement forward. For instance, senators

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could only nominate a candidate by sending such a nomination to the District.
Furthermore, the District tabulated and announced the election results.
Soon thereafter, the District became involved in a third Senate election. On
April 28, 2021, at the request of a Senate executive board member, Jager arranged
for the Senate to use the District’s software account to run an election for senators.
The Senate’s notice of nominations and election used the District’s logo and included
the following quote from Doc’s Charge: “The professionals who work in our district are
proud that we do not have collective bargaining.”
Jager similarly offered or provided other support to the Senate in this
timeframe, such as responding to the Senate parliamentarian’s e-mail inquiry about
how to run Senate meetings.
D. 	Senate Collaboration with the District on an Annual Survey
Each year, senators work with the District to develop and administer a survey
intended to solicit teacher input about their working conditions and views on
representation, among other issues. Indeed, as noted above, the Senate bylaws
specifically state that senators “are responsible for the administration of the annual
Climate Assessment at their respective school sites.” The District works hand in hand
with the Senate to obtain teacher responses, tracking which employees have returned
the survey and periodically prompting those who fail to do so. District information
technology staff retain the anonymous results but will release them to District
administrators upon request.
The Senate receives certain results from the annual Climate Assessment.
Senate officers review the results with senators, who then meet with their school

19
principals to go over the results. Thereafter, senators discuss the results with
teachers. Senators next form Quality Improvement Teams (QIT) at each site to
address the results, especially deficiencies. From these sessions, senators bring
proposals to District administrators, and they jointly develop an action plan. In the last
step of the QIT process, the District confirms implementation of the action plan
submitted by the Senate’s executive board.
Beginning by at least the 2017-2018 school year, the survey included the
following five questions asking teachers to provide their views and opinions regarding
the Senate and how it represents teachers:
“1. Does Faculty Senate support teachers?
“2. Do I have access to Faculty Senate through my
Senator?
“3. Does my Senator represent our staff without personal
bias?
“4. Does my Senator keep our staff informed?
“5. Do I want Faculty Senate to continue as my
representative group?”
The survey asked teachers to answer to these Senate-specific questions by selecting
one of the following responses: “a great deal,” “quite a bit,” “sometimes somewhat,”
“very little seldom,” “none never,” and “not applicable.”
The five Senate-focused questions appeared on the 2020-2021 Climate
Assessment, which the District and the Senate administered in March and April of
2021. After ACE filed its charges, the District removed questions regarding the Senate
from the 2021-2022 school year Climate Assessment.

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E. 	The District’s Monetary and Non-Monetary Support of the Senate
While the above findings already describe extensive in-kind support from the
District to the Senate—including investigative services, elections management, and
other services to bring Senate practices into conformance with District policies—the
District’s support and assistance to the Senate has included other significant
elements. The District tracks certain categories of its support for the Senate—but not
all types of support—in the District’s accounting spreadsheets.
In section 1 below, we discuss the categories of support that the District does
track in its accounting spreadsheets. Notably, the District places such costs under an
accounting category labeled “0400 Superintendent.”
In section 2 below, we discuss multiple forms of in-kind support not shown
under the “0400 Superintendent” accounting category. As noted, these forms of
assistance are in addition to the above-described investigative services, elections
management, and other services to bring Senate practices into conformance with
District policies.
For all forms of support and assistance detailed in this decision, the District has
never offered to provide such support and assistance to ACE or any organization
representing teachers, other than the Senate. Nor has the Senate reimbursed the
District for any such support or assistance.
1. 	Support Shown in Accounting Category 0400
For the year spanning July 1, 2020, through June 30, 2021, the District’s
accounting shows it supported the Senate by spending $330,930. Based on the
testimony of multiple witnesses, we infer that this was consistent with District practice

21
in prior years going back a significant period. Indeed, as discussed further below, the
largest expense had been ongoing for twenty years. The last year of accounting
spreadsheets shown in the record spanned July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022,
which postdated ACE filing its first unfair practice charge on June 1, 2021. In that year,
the District’s accounting shows that it supported the Senate by spending $280,052.
We discuss below the reasons for this modest year-over-year decline in support.
The District’s biggest expenditure under accounting category 0400 is “release
time,” viz., paying teachers’ salaries and benefits even when they work for the Senate
in lieu of working for the District. That practice has been ongoing since approximately
2000. In 2020-2021, the Senate president was on full release time with no classroom
responsibilities, while the vice president and secretary were part-time teachers and
part-time Senate officers, receiving 40 percent release time from their teaching duties.
The District designates such Senate officers on release time as “teachers on special
assignment.” For the 2020-2021 school year, salary and benefits for released teachers
constituted well over half of the $330,930 shown under accounting category 0400.
After ACE filed its charges, the Senate president continued serving on full
release time. However, at one or more points during 2021-2022, the Senate vice
president and secretary made the personal choice to resume working full time in the
classroom and thereby cease accepting release time payments from the District.
These personal choices were the biggest reason the District expended less in
accounting category 0400 in 2021-2022. A District witness, analyzing the District’s
year-end statement for that year, estimated that the District paid release time for about

22
1.33 full-time equivalent teachers. That represents a reduction from the previous year,
when the District paid release time for 1.8 full-time equivalent teachers.
The District’s second biggest expenditure under accounting category 0400 is
stipends. Each year on June 30—the last day of the year—the District pays an annual
stipend to all senators and Senate executive board members. At the end of 2020-
2021, the District paid senators $889 and Senate executive board members $1,538,
amounting to a total payment of $82,780.40. In 2021-2022, the District increased its
stipend payments to $938 for senators and $1,623 for Senate executive board
members, though the District’s total expenditure on stipends reduced slightly to
$79,835.00, suggesting that there may have been fewer active senators that year. As
of the close of hearing, there was no evidence that the District had changed its
practice with respect to paying annual stipends.
The District’s accounting shows miscellaneous other expenses supporting the
Senate, including a cell phone allowance for the Senate president, food for Senate
meetings, and costs associated with copying, printing, or scanning. For both years
reflected in the record (2020-2021 and 2021-2022), the District paid the Senate
president an annual cell phone allowance of $1,080. Two other costs were lower in
2021-2022 compared to the prior year: (1) the District paid a lower amount for Senate
copying, printing, and scanning in 2021-2022; and (2) the Senate did not seek
reimbursement for food that year, though District Associate Superintendent Michael
Johnston noted this was the Senate’s choice and that the District had not changed the
Senate’s right to such reimbursement.

23
2. 	Support Not Reflected in Accounting Category 0400
The most significant examples of in-kind support from the District to the Senate,
other than those described above, are as follows.
Beginning in about 2008 and continuing through 2020-2021, the District
provided the Senate president with a District vehicle, maintenance, insurance, and
gas. The District discontinued this practice in the 2021-2022 school year.
Since at least 2000, the District has provided the Senate president with
furnished office space and phone service. Near the end of 2020, the District moved
the Senate president’s office to the District’s administration building, in the human
resources department, to improve collaboration between the Senate and District
human resources staff. At the beginning of the 2021-2022 school year, however, the
District moved the Senate president’s designated space to a classroom.
The District has also provided the Senate with extensive in-kind services
related to web hosting, e-mail, and information technology. For instance, the District
maintains a website at www.cusd.com, and through the close of the hearing, the
District’s website hosted the Senate’s web page (www.cusd.com/FacultySenate.aspx).
To access the Senate’s web page from the District’s website, a user would click on the
“Employee Representation” tab. After the close of hearing, the District replaced the
content of the Senate’s web page with a short message noting: “This page is currently
not available.” The Senate has also used District laptops, videoconference software,
and videoconference accounts to conduct and attend virtual Senate meetings. And the
District has allowed the Senate president, while on full release time and relieved of
teaching duties, to use a District-assigned laptop to conduct Senate duties.

24
The District created a Senate e-mail address, FacultySenate@cusd.com. Using
this address, the Senate had access to a District e-mail function allowing it to send
e-mails to a listserv of all senators, or to a listserv of all teachers. After ACE requested
such access in August 2021, the District provided ACE comparable access.
F. 	Further Evidence of the Senate’s Interdependence with the District
Beyond the extensive facts described above showing that the Senate has not
operated at arm’s length from the District, there is still more evidence of
interdependence. First, District organizational charts show the Senate president
reporting to the District superintendent, and the Senate president has, indeed,
consulted the District and taken direction from the District on questions about Senate
matters.
Furthermore, Senate leaders share drafts of their meeting minutes with District
administrators. Indeed, before the Senate distributes such minutes to teachers, the
District makes corrections regarding District statements as well as regarding policies
and laws. The Senate also shares its weekly updates with the District.
The Senate president, vice president, and secretary have regular access to
District administrators individually and through attendance at the following standing
meetings: (1) Executive Cabinet meetings;5 (2) superintendent staff meetings; (3) area
superintendent meetings; and (4) monthly school site meetings with principals. No
other organization enjoyed access to these meetings until the 2021-2022 school year.
5 The Executive Cabinet, also known as the Superintendent’s Cabinet, includes
the District’s superintendent, deputy superintendent, and associate superintendents of
administrative services, school leadership, instructional services, human resources,
and business services.

25
In that year, the District for the first time opened such meetings to any other
nonexclusive representative of District teachers.
The Senate also has individual access to high-level District administrators
outside of formal meetings. During these informal meetings, the Senate has
periodically shared internal Senate information with District administration, including
upcoming internal elections, officer and senator resignations, and efforts to revise the
Senate’s bylaws. As part of these consultations, the Senate has sought permission or
advice from the District on internal Senate matters, such as surveying certificated
employees about employment issues, and whether it could discuss the topic of
unionization at its meetings. In addition, Senate members sought District
administrators’ assistance to resolve internal dissension and organizational reform.
Indeed, Associate Superintendent of Human Resources Jager advised the Senate on
myriad internal Senate issues, such as conduct of Senate meetings, bylaws and
elections questions, and whether ACE membership disqualified a teacher from Senate
membership.
Moreover, changes to California law prior to 2014 created a strong incentive for
the District to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding average class
size. Specifically, to receive additional funding, the District either needed to reduce its
average class size to 24 students in early grades, or it needed to have a “collectively
bargained alternative ratio.” Responding to this funding opportunity, the District and
Senate signed an MOU on average class size, a topic that EERA explicitly identifies
as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. (§ 3543.2, subd. (a)(1).) This MOU—
which the record shows was the only historical MOU between the District and the

26
Senate—stated that the District “works collectively with the Faculty Senate which
represents the interests of the District’s teaching staff.” The MOU established a
purported “collectively bargained alternative ratio” of 27 students per class.
The Senate has also sent representatives to District committees that receive
input from multiple stakeholders. These committees, which recommend actions to the
District Board, include the employee compensation committee (ECC), the employee
health benefits committee (EBC), and the calendar committee. Before ACE filed its
charges, the committee meetings involved District administrators, individual
employees, Senate representatives, and representatives from two organizations
representing non-certificated staff: the California School Employees Association
(CSEA), which exclusively represents District classified employees in the Operational
Support Unit, and the Classified Unit/Business Support (CUBS) Senate, a
nonexclusive representative of classified employees falling outside that unit.
Even after ACE announced its organizing campaign on April 5, 2021, the
District did not immediately place ACE representatives on any of the above
committees or include ACE in committee meetings. For instance, the District invited
the Senate, CUBS Senate, and CSEA to discuss a learning recovery program at a
Local Control and Accountability meeting on April 12, 2021, and the District consulted
with those groups regarding the program. The District did not consult ACE. However,
after ACE filed its charges, starting in the 2021-2022 school year, the District allowed
other nonexclusive representatives at these meetings.
In the 2020-2021 school year, the District reserved time on the District Board’s
agenda (during the COVID-19 staff report) for the Senate and other employee groups

27
to address the school board. On April 7, 2021, the District did not afford this
opportunity to an ACE representative, who instead spoke during the public comment
period. During the 2021-2022 school year, the District discontinued the practice of
scheduling an agenda item where employee groups could report to the school board.
V. 	ACE’s Organizing Campaign and the District’s Response
ACE began organizing District teachers in July 2020 but did not officially notify
the District of its efforts at that time. On April 5, 2021, more than 70 teachers sent an
open letter to the District and the broader community in which they formally
announced they had created ACE and identified themselves as the ACE Organizing
Committee.6 The letter stated that as the District had learned of their efforts to
organize teachers over the preceding months, discussion of bonuses and other
monetary improvements for teachers had begun. The letter also asked the District to
respect their “legally protected, collective decision to unionize and to not exercise
influence, interference or intimidation around [their] efforts.”
The same day ACE announced its campaign, Schiro, who was by then the
Senate president, e-mailed Jager noting the number of teachers supporting ACE.
Jager responded one minute later to confirm receipt.
Also in April, at the Senate’s request, the District created a new e-mail list that
improved the Senate’s ability to send targeted e-mails to teachers on a regular basis,
including weekly updates. On April 16, the Senate sent a weekly wrap up to all
teachers, which informed teachers of: (1) the ECC’s recommendation that the District
6 All further dates refer to 2021, unless otherwise noted.

28
Board provide teachers with a one-time $4,000 bonus; (2) the annual stipends paid to
Senate officers and senators; (3) the fact that the Senate president had use of a
District vehicle and the District hosted the Senate webpage; and (4) the dates when
Senate officers would attend meetings with District administrators.
The Senate’s April 30, weekly wrap-up stated that ECC was actively working on
increasing teacher salaries. This e-mail also listed the numerous committees and
meetings attended by Senate officers and stated that the Senate was advocating for
class size reduction in upper and lower grades.
The Senate’s May 7 weekly wrap-up announced that teachers would receive
the $4,000 one-time bonus at the end of that month.
Meanwhile, on April 30, ACE wrote to the District that it intended to gather
support to petition PERB to become teachers’ exclusive representative. ACE also
reminded the District of its obligation to meet and discuss with ACE—as a
nonexclusive representative—contemplated changes to fundamental employment
terms and conditions prior to reaching a final decision. And ACE expressed its
concerns about the District incorrectly representing that the Senate was the
representative of Clovis educators, showing “clear favoritism” toward the Senate, and
using District resources to oppose ACE. Jager responded on May 14, stating that the
District intended to adhere to its legal obligations under EERA and that it wished to
correct the impression that it practiced “clear favoritism.” Jager stated that the Senate
“has served as advocates and representatives for teachers as a non-exclusive
representative.” Jager wrote that the District has “worked collaboratively” with the

29
Senate, just as it has with other employee organizations, and that is “simply a fact of
how business has been conducted.”
On May 19, the Senate released a public announcement stating, among other
things, that the Senate believed that it should “remain the sole representative and
negotiating body of the teachers of Clovis Unified School District.”
On May 27, District Superintendent Eimear O’Brien e-mailed all employees
announcing that they would receive a $4,000 one-time bonus.7 She also stated that
the ECC, which includes Senate representatives, was recommending a 5.5 percent
increase to salary schedules, a two-day decrease in duty days for the 2021-2022
school year, and an increase in the District’s contribution to its health benefits fund.
O’Brien credited these recommendations to the priorities identified on behalf of
“employee groups” including the “Faculty Senate, Classified Unit Business Support
Senate, and CSEA Chapter 250.”
On June 1, after ACE alleged in its initial charge that the District had unlawfully
failed to give ACE notice of the changes outlined in O’Brien’s May 27 e-mail, the
District offered to meet and discuss these changes with ACE. On June 4, ACE
responded with its meeting availability and requested that the District provide it with
“any financial information shared with the ECC and EBC that was used to develop the
recommendations” listed in O’Brien’s May 27 e-mail. On June 7, the parties met to
discuss the recommendations, including the proposed increased compensation and
teacher duty days, which were on the District Board’s June 9 meeting agenda. ACE
7 The superintendent changed her last name while this case was pending. We
refer to her as O’Brien, which was her name by the time of the hearing.

30
expressed concern that the District, having failed to comply with ACE’s earlier demand
to meet and discuss, was already far along in its process and had promoted the
Senate by crediting it (but not ACE) as having prompted the improvements. ACE also
reiterated its request for financial information shared with other employee groups.
However, the District never provided ACE with this requested information.
On June 9, the District Board approved the improvements outlined in O’Brien’s
May 27 e-mail.
Beginning on June 11, ACE sent Jager a series of e-mails to follow up on the
June 7 meeting. ACE reiterated its expectation that the District act neutrally vis-a-vis
the Senate and ACE, including providing ACE with sufficient advance notice of
proposed changes to employment terms, as well as equal representation on
committees. On June 23, Jager responded that “[t]he District plans to give ACE and
Faculty Senate the same representation at meetings once they resume,” after summer
recess.
On July 7, in preparation for a July 13 meeting with the District, ACE e-mailed
Jager. In this email, ACE sought confirmation that the District would rescind portions
of Board Policies 0100 and 4118 that violated EERA, cease providing material support
for the Senate, provide ACE equal access to District and committee meetings, and
produce the previously requested financial information. At the July 13 meeting, Jager
stated that Policies 0100 and 4118 were under review, and that the District Board
would have to approve any changes to those policies. The District also informed ACE
that it no longer provided Doc’s Charge to new employees and no longer told them
that the Senate was the sole representative of teachers. And the District agreed to

31
invite ACE to participate in committees and meetings where Senate representatives
are present, or to provide ACE with alternate meetings.8
On July 16, ACE countered the District’s positions on multiple items. With
respect to meeting access, ACE asserted that the District should not limit it to
attending only those meetings the Senate had already decided to attend, but rather
must issue simultaneous invitations to both ACE and the Senate. ACE explained that
it may be interested in attending types of meetings that the Senate had attended in the
past but had stopped attending. ACE also raised concerns over the unequal support
the District was providing the Senate, District statements that it had reached
agreements with the Senate, and the absence of clarity about changing District
Policies 0100 and 4118.
On August 11, the Senate president stated at a public meeting that “until a
majority of [District] teachers determine otherwise, we will continue to BE the legitimate
representative body for [District] teachers.” (Emphasis in original.)
On August 22, the Senate president sent senators an e-mail that, among other
things, criticized ACE for working to have “stipends taken away and the release time
of the Faculty Senate Executive Board revoked.” The e-mail also stated: “Now ACE
8 The District had not invited ACE to participate in committees and meetings in
the first three months after ACE announced its campaign. For instance, on June 15,
when the District convened an interview panel to select a new Learning Director for
one of the District’s high schools, the District designated two Senate representatives—
but no ACE representatives—to serve on the panel. Moreover, the panel used an
interview question that highlighted the Senate’s “significant role” and rated applicants
on how they would work with the Senate. The District had included a version of this
question in past interviews too. After June 15, the District stopped using the question
and included ACE representatives on at least one interview panel, together with
Senate representatives.

32
wants to have Doc’s Charge removed from all of our walls” and “stipends taken away
from our elected teacher representatives.”
On August 27, the District sent teachers an e-mail message that provided in
pertinent part:
“Earlier this year, the [CTA], on behalf of ACE, filed an
unfair labor practice charge with [PERB] that, in part,
challenged the District [for]:
“● Providing Faculty Senate resources, at its request, since
our teachers' last vote to remain self-represented,
“● Funding stipends for teachers serving on Faculty
Senate,
“● Providing the Faculty Senate President, Vice-President,
and Secretary release from full-time teaching schedules
to serve teachers, and
“● Displaying Doc’s Charge on the walls of learning spaces
in the District.
“ACE has asked PERB to get an injunction in Fresno
County Superior Court to stop the District from providing
such support to our teachers. The District believes this
action disturbs the status quo and threatens the existence
of Faculty Senate before teachers have had a full say on
whether they want to unionize.
“We understand employees have the right to seek union
representation if they have enough support. We also
understand many teachers have stated they do not support
a CTA backed union. Legally, the District is required to
remain neutral during union organizing activities. Since
CTA and ACE came forward, we have met with their
representatives and included them in meetings where other
employee groups are represented. We are doing our best to
meet our legal obligation.

33
“However, we also believe that until the issue of
representation is resolved, the status quo should remain in
place. The District has a legal right to defend itself against
unfair practice charges and to oppose CTA's and ACE's
efforts to shut down [the] Faculty Senate. In the coming
weeks and months, the District will exercise those rights.”
VI. 	CTO’s Brief History
At a Senate meeting on October 11, the Senate decided to create CTO as an
alias, successor, or alter ego that would compete with ACE in seeking certification as
an exclusive representative. The Senate issued a bulletin explaining that CTO would
be the teachers’ sole representative and function “exactly how” the Senate functioned,
including in receiving stipends from the District.
The next day, the Senate began asking teachers to sign a petition authorizing
CTO to serve as teachers’ exclusive representative. Senators sent a series of e-mails
asking teachers to sign the petition. One such e-mail, which Senator Cassidy Salinas
sent teachers on October 13, claimed that the plan was for CTO to succeed the
Senate and “continue to be the sole representative body that represents” District
teachers.
On November 15, the Senate voted unanimously to stop obtaining
authorizations for CTO, and at that point CTO’s brief history ended.
VII. 	Formation of Independent Clovis Unified Educators
After CTO disbanded, certain teachers opposed to ACE’s organizing effort
formed an employee organization called Independent Clovis Unified Educators
(ICUE). In or around December, ICUE informed the District of its formation.

34
DISCUSSION
When resolving exceptions to a proposed decision, we apply a de novo
standard of review. (City of San Ramon (2018) PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 5.)
However, we need not address arguments that the ALJ sufficiently addressed. (Ibid.)
Here, we begin by noting three claims that the ALJ dismissed and which ACE
asks us to sustain: the District’s alleged surveillance and its alleged violations
involving activists Amy Kilburn and Kristin Heimerdinger. The ALJ adequately
addressed the arguments that ACE raises in these exceptions. We therefore do not
further address the exceptions, and we affirm the ALJ’s conclusions on those issues.9
As to the claims against the District that the ALJ sustained, the central ones
were the District’s extensive violations of EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d). The
ALJ also found that the same conduct violated EERA section 3543.5, subdivisions (a)
and (b) by interfering with protected employee rights and interfering with and/or
denying ACE its organizational rights.
The District now concedes these violations. However, we nonetheless analyze
those claims at length (see post at pages 36-48) while clarifying, adjusting, and
supplementing the ALJ’s findings. We do because understanding the nature of these
violations is critical to assessing the appropriate remedy.
In contrast, there is no cause for us to extensively consider another conclusion
that the District now concedes—that it violated PEDD section 3550. The record
9 ACE proved the factual allegations underlying its surveillance claim. While
those facts do not amount to a surveillance violation, the fact that the Senate apprised
the District how many teachers engaged in protected activity for ACE further illustrates
that the Senate did not have an arm’s length relationship with the District.

35
supports this conclusion because: (1) the District’s conduct tended to deter or
discourage employees from exercising free choice in deciding whether to become or
remain members of an employee organization or authorize representation by an
employee organization; and (2) the District failed to narrowly tailor its conduct to a
business necessity and did not minimize the tendency to influence employee free
choice to such a degree that the importance of the business necessity outweighed the
likelihood of such influence. (See Regents of the University of California (2021) PERB
Decision No. 2755-H, pp. 21-25 & 34-36.)
With respect to ACE’s charge against the Senate, the ALJ sustained the central
claims but dismissed the complaint allegations regarding five communications alleged
to interfere with protected rights. We reverse the proposed decision as to four of these
allegations. We also discuss the allegations against the Senate that the ALJ upheld
(which the Senate has not appealed), because they are relevant to discerning the
proper remedy.
Accordingly, the below legal discussion has three parts. Part I discusses the
District’s central violations, which are critical background for discerning the appropriate
remedy. Part II covers two sets of claims against the Senate: violations that the
Senate now admits, plus violations that the ALJ dismissed, which ACE asks us to
sustain. Finally, Part III analyzes critical remedy issues that were the focus of the
briefs we received from ACE and the District. We issue a comprehensive remedy that
addresses the violations that the ALJ found (which the District and the Senate now
concede), as well as the additional violations found in this decision.

36
I. 	The District’s Violations of EERA Section 3543.5, Subdivision (d)
EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) makes it unlawful for an employer to
“[d]ominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any employee
organization, or contribute financial or other support to it, or in any way encourage
employees to join any organization in preference to another.” There are three ways an
employer may violate this subdivision. As discussed below, different standards apply
depending on whether a charging party alleges that an employer has:
(1) dominated or interfered with the formation or administration of an employee
organization; (2) unlawfully contributed financial or other support to an employee
organization; or (3) in any way encouraged employees to join any organization in
preference to another. As a threshold matter, however, it is important to note that the
employer’s intent is irrelevant to each of these three types of claims. (Clovis II, supra,
PERB Decision No. IR-63, p. 18; City of Arcadia (2019) PERB Decision No. 2648-M,
pp. 24-25 (Arcadia); West Contra Costa County Healthcare District (2011) PERB
Decision No. 2164-M, p. 6; Redwoods Community College District (1987) PERB
Decision No. 650, adopting proposed decision at pp. 53 & 56-57 (Redwoods); Santa
Monica, supra, PERB Decision No. 103, p. 22.)
The District does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that it violated EERA section
3543.5, subdivision (d) in all three ways noted above. Still, because these claims are
particularly relevant to the disputed remedy issues, we have independently assessed
the evidence relevant to each type of claim under section 3543.5, subdivision (d).
None of these claims presents a close question, as there is overwhelming proof
supporting each type of violation, and the three violations reinforce one another. For

37
the sake of brevity, we do not repeat all the findings noted in the Factual Background
above, much less the ALJ’s even more extensive factual findings that the District does
not dispute, and we instead explain how the law applies to those findings.
A. 	Domination of and Interference with the Senate
As described ante at pages 10-11, in advance of a 1977 representation
election, the District urged employees to vote against exclusive representation, and it
was in that context that Buchanan endorsed the Senate concept as an alternative to
exclusive representation and collective bargaining. Beyond those established facts,
the passage of time prevented the ALJ from developing a record as to the details of
the Senate’s formation. But this factual gap is of no import. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that the District was not overly involved in forming the Senate,
EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) equally bars domination and interference with
the administration of an employee organization, and the District certainly has
dominated and interfered with the Senate’s administration.
In assessing such claims, we consider whether the employer’s conduct tends to
interfere with the employee organization’s ability to maintain an arm’s length
relationship with the employer. (Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, pp. 18-19;
Arcadia, supra, PERB Decision No. 2648-M, pp. 24-25; Azusa Unified School District
(1977) EERB10 Decision No. 38, adopting recommended decision at p. 6, fn. 3
(Azusa).) The level of the employer’s involvement in the employee organization’s
internal affairs is relevant, particularly in determining whether the conduct rises to the
10 Prior to January 1, 1978, PERB was known as the Educational Employment
Relations Board or EERB.

38
level of domination or merely constitutes unlawful support or interference with internal
affairs. (Arcadia, supra, PERB Decision No. 2648-M, p. 23; Redwoods, supra, PERB
Decision No. 650, adopting proposed decision at p. 62.)
Here, even before the parties litigated this case, there was no dispute that “the
District exercised significant influence upon and involvement in the operations of the
senate” after its formation. (Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389, adopting
proposed decision at p. 32.) Four decades later, the District’s domination of the
Senate and interference with the Senate’s administration has grown, preventing
anything resembling an arm’s length relationship between the Senate and the District.
We highlight a handful of the bases for finding domination.
First, until October 2021, District Policy 4118 identified the Senate as the de
facto official representative for teachers, thereby giving it the District’s endorsement.
To state the obvious, teachers never chose the Senate to be their exclusive
representative, meaning as a matter of law this District dictate was wrong, as ACE had
equal legal rights as the Senate to represent employees.
Second, the District’s organizational chart shows that the Senate president
reports to the District superintendent. This reporting relationship would be enough,
even by itself, to prove domination, particularly because it was not just on paper.
Rather, the record reflects that the Senate president repeatedly consulted the District
on questions that arose in running the Senate and would take direction from the
District about Senate matters, including, but not limited to, proper procedures and
practices, interpreting bylaws, and acceptable discussion topics at Senate meetings.

39
Moreover, District administrators regularly attend Senate meetings, and the District
approves Senate meeting minutes before the Senate shares them with teachers.
Third, as described in detail ante at pages 14-18, the Senate repeatedly invited
the District to become enmeshed in Senate internal elections, and the District
accepted this invitation each time. This is yet another set of facts that, even if it stood
alone, would show unlawful domination and interference with the Senate’s
administration. (See Poway Unified School District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2441,
adopting proposed decision at p. 45 [“an employer must not intervene to address the
lawfulness of a union’s internal procedures affecting voting or to police the union’s
actions, lest it be held liable for interfering in the administration of the union”].)
Fourth, the District has reviewed employee complaints and conducted
investigations filed by and against senators and Senate officers in those capacities.
After investigating Heimerdinger’s complaints regarding the Senate, the District
concluded that it “places high expectations” on Senate officers, and they failed to meet
these expectations. The District noted that, as a result, it had addressed its
expectations with Senate officers. Moreover, the District promised that the Senate
would establish policies and procedures regarding attendance at Senate meetings,
thereby further underscoring the lack of an arm’s length relationship.
Then, in response to Schiro’s complaint, the District reached more than a dozen
conclusions, almost any one of which would, by itself, show domination and
interference with Senate administration. (See ante at pp. 16-17.) Among the most
egregious of these conclusions was the District’s decision to move the Senate
president’s office closer to the District’s human resources department, as well as the

40
District’s promises that: (1) “Clear expectations for prompt responses from the [Senate]
President to those with inquiries will be communicated. An expectation of a response
within 24 hours should be reasonable”; (2) “Prior to the next round of elections, [the
Senate] Executive Board will work in conjunction with the Human Resources
Department to create a standard operating procedure for elections at the site and
district level”; and (3) “Area Superintendents and site Principals will be thoroughly
informed of the current concerns and plans of action. They will work diligently in their
site [Senate] meetings and Area [Senate] meetings to address any concerns and
insights.” Taken together, the District’s November 2020 conclusions in response to
Schiro’s complaint illustrate a shocking level of domination.
The lack of an arm’s length relationship was also quite evident when the District
learned it could obtain more state funding by signing an MOU with the Senate so that it
could claim a collectively bargained class-size ratio, in lieu of having to reduce its class
size to 24. (See ante at pp. 25-26.) That this was the only MOU the District and the
Senate ever signed shows the degree to which the Senate was a quintessential
employer-dominated organization, signing a binding agreement only when useful to the
employer.
Finally, while we primarily discuss the District’s support for the Senate in
reference to another category under EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) (see post at
pp. 42-44), that support constitutes strong confirming evidence of employer
domination. Similarly, we save for later discussion below the District’s August 27

41
e-mail defending its support of the Senate and castigating ACE for trying to enforce
the law (see post at pp. 44 & 52). This evidence also supports the conclusion that the
Senate was, at all relevant times, an employer-dominated organization.
In sum, the record here reflects one of the two most extensive instances of
domination to ever come before PERB, on par with the evidence in Redwoods, supra,
PERB Decision No. 650. While there are facts in this case that are both more and less
egregious than those in Redwoods, the overall weight of evidence amounts to a
similar level of domination. Indeed, the evidence in this case is more extensive than
that recounted in Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389, where the Board warned
that providing release time and several other types of preferential support not provided
other entities created “the appearance, if not the fact, of an ‘in-house’ or ‘company
union.’” (Id. at p. 19.)
B. 	Unlawful Support
EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) bars an employer from contributing
“financial or other support” to an employee organization. To effectuate EERA’s
purposes, this provision allows an employer to “extend benefits to a labor organization
in a spirit of cooperation,” provided it does not “lend so much assistance that the
employee organization appears to become a ‘company union.’” (Arcadia, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2648-M, p. 24.)
In applying this standard, we examine the totality of an employer’s conduct to
determine whether its support for an organization would tend to inhibit employees in
their free choice regarding a bargaining representative or interfere with the
representative’s maintenance of an arm’s length relationship with the employer.

42
(Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, pp. 21-22, citing Arcadia, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2648-M, pp. 24-25.) This is an objective test. (Clovis II, supra, PERB
Order No. IR-63, p. 22.) The key question is whether the employer provides support
while engaging in preferential treatment, domination, or interference. (Id. at pp. 22-25
[explaining that EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) is not a flat ban on financial or
other support to an employee organization, but rather a nuanced one that depends on
the circumstances].)
It is helpful to consider examples. To begin, an employer offering release time
to one nonexclusive representative must offer it equally to all nonexclusive
representatives. (Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, pp. 25.) As another
example, employer support is more likely to make an organization appear to be a
company union (and therefore be unlawful) if the organization primarily draws its
financial support from the employer rather than from its members. (Id. at p. 24, fn. 15.)
In contrast, it is typically lawful for an employer to bargain release time or other
support with an exclusive representative that also has substantial other resources,
though the employer may not otherwise interfere with or dominate the organization.
And an employer that does reach such a deal with an exclusive representative
typically need not provide equal support to a nonexclusive representative seeking to
decertify the exclusive representative, as a nonexclusive representative is
definitionally not comparable to an exclusive representative. (Id. at p. 25; see also post
at p. 44 & fn. 11.) Finally, it is important to note that employer payments to a union do
not create the impression of a company union, and therefore are lawful, if a court or
governmental agency orders them to remedy legal violations.

43
Here, the District’s support to the Senate was unlawful for three independent
reasons. First, the Senate has no other source of revenue. As the ALJ found, “the
Faculty Senate is literally dependent on the District’s support and does not collect
dues.” The Senate’s lack of other resources alone defeats any defense the District
and the Senate could otherwise attempt. (Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63,
p. 24.) Significantly, this was true even without any competing organization present,
meaning it was true in the intervening decades between Clovis I and Clovis II, in which
there was no competing organization such as CUTA or ACE. Indeed, as we noted in
Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, “it may be an unfair practice to render
assistance to an employee organization even if there is no other organization in
competition with it.” (Id. at p. 22, fn. 14, quoting Azusa, supra, EERB Decision No. 38,
adopting recommended decision at pp. 6-7.)
Second, even if member dues were the predominant source of the Senate’s
resources, the District’s support would still be unlawful because it occurred in the
context of pervasive domination and interference with Senate administration. This is a
further reason that, even assuming there was a substantial period between 1984 and
2021 in which the Senate was the only organization serving as a non-exclusive
representative of teachers, the District’s support in that period was unlawful. Indeed,
the District ignores that such conduct is inherently destructive of protected rights
because it tends to chill employees from creating competing organizations.
Finally, the District’s support was unlawful because it was unequal. Every
organization at issue in this case was a nonexclusive representative, and the District

44
had to treat them equally. Yet, the District never offered ACE the support it offered the
Senate, mirroring the District’s conduct in Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389.
Even after ACE announced its organizing drive and challenged the support the
District provided the Senate, the District doubled down on the largest sources of its
unlawful support: stipends and release time. Indeed, on August 27—five months after
ACE announced its organizing drive and three months after ACE’s initial charge—the
District wrote teachers that the stipends and release time were lawful and would
continue. While the District argued this was proper because teachers had not chosen
an exclusive representative, that contravenes EERA. Indeed, the District’s unequal
support to the Senate strongly tilted employees against supporting ACE, including by
paying for a full-time Senate president to help convince employees not to authorize
ACE as an exclusive representative. Thus, the District had the law exactly backward:
while an employer typically need not provide a nonexclusive representative with the
same support it has bargained with an exclusive representative, if there are only
competing nonexclusive representatives, the employer must treat them equally.
C. 	Encouraging Employees to Join One Organization Over Another
The third way an employer can violate EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (d) is
to “in any way encourage employees to join any organization in preference to
another.” Therefore, whenever two employee organizations are competing for the right
to represent the same employees, and neither organization is certified as the
employees’ exclusive representative, the employer must remain strictly neutral.
(County of Monterey (2004) PERB Decision No. 1663-M, adopting proposed decision
at pp. 17-18; Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389, p. 7 [the appearance of a

45
competing employee organization imposes on the employer an additional affirmative
obligation of strict neutrality].)11 To establish a prima facie case that an employer
violated this duty of strict neutrality, the test is “whether the employer’s conduct tends
to influence [free] choice or provide stimulus in one direction or the other.” (Santa
Monica, supra, PERB Decision No. 103, p. 22.)
As we concluded in Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63:
“An employer that does not maintain strict neutrality in the
face of competing employee organizations is deemed to
encourage employees to prefer one organization over
another, in violation of employees' right to choose an
organization free of employer interference. (Azusa, supra,
EERB Decision No. 38, pp. 7-8.) Here, it is undisputed that
the District continues to provide financial support and other
assistance to the Senate and is not offering the same level
of support to ACE.”
(Id. at pp. 28-29.)
Indeed, Clovis II noted that the Clovis I Board had previously explained these
principles:
“‘[S]trict neutrality clearly required the District either to
discontinue these practices, . . . or, to the extent that its
conduct constituted ‘permissible cooperation,’ to
affirmatively make similar assistance available to all
employee organizations.’” Its failure to do either sends the
message that it favors the Senate over ACE, thereby
11 Because an employer has greater legal obligations to an exclusive
representative than to a nonexclusive representative, the duty of strict neutrality does
not always require an employer to afford the latter type of organization all the same
privileges as the former. (Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, pp. 22-23, fn. 14;
County of San Bernardino (2018) PERB Decision No. 2556-M, p. 10, fn. 11 &
pp. 18-19; West Contra Costa Healthcare District (2010) PERB Decision No. 2145-M,
p. 22.)

46
unlawfully tending to influence employee choice between
the two organizations.”
(Clovis II, supra, PERB Order No. IR-63, pp. 28-29, quoting Clovis I, supra, PERB
Decision No. 389, p. 9.)
The record in this case shows an uneven playing field akin to the one described
in Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389. Forty years later, despite the lessons of
Clovis I, the District once again did not act in a neutral manner, even after ACE
notified the District that it was an employee organization that represented certain
District teachers.
For example, even after ACE provided such notification, the District continued
to provide stipends and full-time paid release salary and benefits to the Senate
president. The Senate used these resources to oppose ACE, which did not receive
such benefits and therefore competed at a significant disadvantage. As the ALJ
concluded: “Both the stipend and the unreimbursed full release time guaranteed that
the Faculty Senate had a paid staff member ready to represent the Faculty Senate
and a corps of job stewards (Faculty Senators) ready to carry out its duties, while ACE
would be dependent upon volunteers and dues.” Neither the District nor the Senate
contest the ALJ’s conclusion.
While the District stopped or decreased certain monetary and in-kind support,
these adjustments did not even amount to half measures. For instance, according to
the District’s own accounting, its monetary support for the Senate decreased from
$330,930 in 2020-2021 to $280,052 in 2021-2022. And the District continued
substantial in-kind support as well, including use of District technology to perform
Senate duties.

47
In addition, after ACE’s April 5 announcement, the District failed to afford ACE
its right to receive advance notice and the opportunity to meet and discuss
fundamental employment-related changes, even as it afforded that right to the Senate.
For instance, District representatives continued to meet with the Senate about ECC
recommendations on significant changes to salaries, benefits, and schedule. While
Senate representatives participated in these decisions, the District failed to afford ACE
notice or the opportunity to participate until after the District’s May 27 announcement
that teachers would receive a $4,000 one-time bonus and that the District Board would
soon vote on the ECC’s recommended 5.5 percent increase to salaries, two-day
decrease in duty days, and increase in the District’s contribution to health benefits.
Making the District’s non-neutrality even more blatant, it explicitly credited these
advances to the priorities identified by the “Faculty Senate, Classified Unit Business
Support Senate, and CSEA Chapter 250,” but not ACE.
Furthermore, when the District did subsequently meet with ACE, it was not only
too late, but the District refused to provide ACE with the financial information provided
to other employee groups and which were fundamental to developing the
improvements listed in the District’s May 27 e-mail. The District has never backed
down from this refusal, despite ACE’s repeated requests.
Moreover, the District did not include ACE in its June 15 interview panel for an
administrator position or meetings to discuss the implementation of a learning
recovery program. Nor did it provide ACE with reserved time on the District Board’s
agenda comparable to the time allotted the Senate and other employee groups.

48
The District also did not move promptly to reconsider its Policies 0100 and
4118. It thus continued to declare that the Senate is the representative of teachers,
including for disciplinary matters, and that District professionals are proud to be non-
union. By the 2021-2022 school year, the District stopped providing Doc’s Charge to
new employees. But it was not until October 2021 that the District revised its policy
providing the Senate with exclusive authority to represent teachers in disciplinary
matters, and even then, the District continued displaying Doc’s Charge in the District
boardroom, the superintendent’s office, and other locations throughout the District.
Other evidence similarly shows how, in the 2021-2022 school year, the District
continued acting in a manner that would encourage teachers to support the Senate
over ACE, though the District moderated this conduct to a degree. For instance, while
the District began providing ACE access to the same committee meetings as the
Senate, and it canceled the allotted time at District Board meetings that the Senate
and other groups had previously enjoyed, the District publicly defended its unequal
treatment of the Senate and ACE. Indeed, in August, more than four months after ACE
announced its campaign, the District sent all teachers O’Brien’s August 27 e-mail. This
message stated that the “status quo” should remain in place, criticized ACE for
enforcing the law, and vowed to oppose ACE’s efforts to bring the District in
compliance with its duty of strict neutrality. The e-mail chilled ACE’s protected activity
and reiterated the District’s support for the Senate. As in Clovis I, supra, PERB
Decision No. 389, the District’s “support for the Faculty Senate would have been
obvious even to the most casual observer.” (Id., adopting proposed decision at p. 67.)

49
II. 	Violations by the Senate
EERA section 3543.6, subdivision (a) bars an employee organization from
causing or attempting to cause an employer to commit an unfair practice, while
subdivision (b) bars an employee organization from interfering with rights that EERA
protects. The test for alleged interference by an employee organization is the same as
the test for alleged interference by an employer (Service Employees International
Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106, p. 13), except that in cases
involving alleged threats or coercion, we recognize that an employee organization
does not have the same power over employees as an employer (San Jose/Evergreen
Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 6157, and American Federation of Teachers,
AFL-CIO (Crawford et al.) (2020) PERB Decision No. 2744, p. 23).
To establish a prima facie interference case, a charging party must show that
the respondent’s conduct tends to or does result in some harm to protected rights.
(County of San Joaquin (2021) PERB Decision No. 2761-M, p. 23.) A charging party
need not establish that the respondent had an unlawful motive. (Ibid.) If the charging
party establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent. (Ibid.) The
degree of harm dictates the respondent’s burden. (Ibid.) If the harm is “inherently
destructive” of protected rights, the respondent must show that the interference results
from circumstances beyond its control and that no alternative course of action was
available. (Ibid.) For conduct that is not inherently destructive, the respondent may
attempt to justify its actions based on operational necessity. (Ibid.) In such cases,
PERB balances the asserted business need against the tendency to harm protected
rights; if the tendency to harm outweighs the necessity, PERB finds a violation. (Ibid.)

50
Within the category of actions that are not inherently destructive, the stronger the
tendency to harm, the greater is the respondent’s burden to show its business need
was important and that it narrowly tailored its actions or rules to attain that purpose
while limiting harm to protected rights as much as possible. (Ibid.)
The ALJ found—and the Senate no longer contests—that the Senate violated
EERA by: (1) accepting unlawful support and assistance from the District as set forth
in detail above; and (2) creating CTO and gathering signatures in support of a petition
to have it recognized as the teachers’ exclusive representative, thereby intending to
replicate itself or replace itself with an alias that would serve as an exclusive
representative but while still being funded and dominated by the District.
The ALJ made no finding as to whether the Senate’s acceptance of unlawful
support and its sponsorship of CTO was “inherently destructive” of employee rights.
We find that it was, as the Senate was complicit with the District in a transparently
unlawful scheme to continue using the Senate as a means of discouraging
unionization by occupying the field with an employer-funded, employer-dominated
organization. In the alternative, even if the Senate’s conduct were not inherently
destructive, there is no operational necessity that could justify an employee
organization in serving as an employer-dominated employee organization.
The ALJ dismissed allegations that the Senate violated EERA section 3543.6,
subdivision (b) via five statements in which the Senate held itself out as the teachers’
sole representative, even though it was not an exclusive representative. We affirm in
part and reverse in part, finding one of the statements to have been lawful and four to

51
have interfered with protected employee rights in violation of EERA section 3543.6,
subdivision (b).
The challenged statement we find lawful appears in Article II, Chapter 2 of the
Senate Bylaws: “We represent the voice of the teaching staff individually and
collectively and will serve as their advocate.” This was merely an aspirational
statement of goals and beliefs, rather than an unlawful declaration that the Senate
constitutes the sole representative of District teachers, and we therefore distinguish it
from the following four unlawful statements:
(1) On May 19, the Senate released a public announcement stating, among
other things, that the Senate should “remain the sole representative and negotiating
body of the teachers of Clovis Unified School District.” (Emphasis supplied.) By use of
the word “remain” the statement falsely stated that the Senate was at that time the
sole representative of District teachers, when in fact there were two nonexclusive
representatives (ACE and the Senate), each with equal rights under the law.
(2) On August 11, the Senate president stated at a public meeting that “until a
majority of [District] teachers determine otherwise, we will continue to BE the legitimate
representative body for [District] teachers.” (Emphasis in original.) This statement was
false as well, and it illustrated how the Senate’s untruthfulness parroted the District’s
illegal position vis-à-vis the Senate and ACE. Specifically, according to the District’s
approach, unless and until teachers established an exclusive representative through
PERB procedures, the District would continue discouraging such activity via a wide
range of one-sided support and preferential treatment toward the Senate, an
employer-dominated nonexclusive representative.

52
(3) On August 22, the Senate president sent senators an e-mail that, among
other things, criticized ACE for working to have “stipends taken away from our elected
teacher representatives” and “the release time of the Faculty Senate Executive Board
revoked.” The e-mail also stated: “Now ACE wants to have Doc’s Charge removed
from all of our walls.” While this statement ignored that another way for the District to
equalize support would be to offer support to ACE rather than remove it from the
Senate, the e-mail was unlawful primarily for its other pernicious elements. Indeed, by
publicly denigrating ACE for insisting on equal treatment as the law requires, the
Senate added to the District’s campaign to discourage union activity, preserve an
employer-dominated employee organization, and maintain the lie that this was a lawful
status quo unless and until employees chose an exclusive representative. Indeed, just
five days later, on August 27, the District borrowed this line of attack against ACE, in
an e-mail that castigated ACE for “threaten[ing] the existence” of the Senate through
its unfair practice charge.
(4) On October 13, a Senator e-mailed teachers urging them to support CTO to
succeed the Senate and “continue to be the sole representative body that represents”
District teachers. Like the Senate’s May 19 public announcement, this e-mail falsely
asserted to teachers that the Senate was the sole representative of teachers, again
matching the District’s approach.
While the falsity of the above statements is one factor to consider in our
interference analysis (City of San Diego (2020) PERB Decision No. 2747-M, p. 37),
the most important reason we find the statements unlawful is that they were far from
isolated falsehoods. Rather, they were part and parcel of a synergistic effort by the

53
District and the Senate, spanning many years but accelerated once ACE began
organizing, to: (a) create the perception of a single, exclusive employer-dominated
employee organization, without being certified or recognized as an exclusive
representative; and (b) grant that body preferential rights and support that would
forestall unionization. This effort became a reality not only through the preferential
treatment and employer domination, interference, and support discussed ante, but
through repeated false statements to teachers and attacks on ACE for pointing out the
illegality of the scheme. The entire stratagem was inherently destructive of protected
rights, and, in the alternative, there was no operational necessity justifying it.
III. 	Remedy
The Legislature has vested PERB with broad authority to decide what remedies
are necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies of EERA and to take any action
the Board deems necessary to effectuate the Act’s purposes. (EERA, § 3541.5, 1st
par. & subd. (c); City of San Diego (2015) PERB Decision No. 2464-M, p. 42, affd. sub
nom. Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 920; Mt. San
Antonio Community College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 178, 189.) A “properly designed remedial order seeks a restoration of the
situation as nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair
labor practice.” (Modesto City Schools (1983) PERB Decision No. 291, pp. 67-68.) An
appropriate remedy therefore should make whole all injured persons or organizations
for the full amount of their losses and should withhold from the wrongdoer the fruits of
its violation. (City of Pasadena (2014) PERB Order No. Ad-406-M, p. 13.) In addition
to serving restorative and compensatory functions, a Board-ordered remedy should

54
also deter misconduct, so long as the order is not a patent attempt to achieve ends
beyond the law’s purposes. (State of California (Correctional Health Care Services)
(2021) PERB Decision No. 2760-S, p. 35; Sacramento City Unified School District
(2020) PERB Decision No. 2749, pp. 10-11; City of Palo Alto (2019) PERB Decision
No. 2664-M, p. 3.)
Non-customary remedies are appropriate in a variety of circumstances,
including where conduct was egregious, intentional, systematic, or repeated; or
whenever customary remedies are insufficient, including but not limited due to the
nature or duration of the conduct. (Regents of the University of California, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2755-H, pp. 55-56.) Such circumstances notably include PEDD
and EERA violations that have such long-lasting impacts on employee free choice that
traditional remedies may be inadequate to restore such free choice. (Ibid.; Children of
Promise Preparatory Academy (2018) PERB Order No. Ad-470, p. 6 & adopting
administrative determination at p. 4.)
Here, the District and the Senate accede to the proposed remedial order, while
ACE asks us to augment and modify it in three ways. First, ACE challenges the ALJ’s
refusal to disestablish all relationships between the Senate and the District having to
do with matters related to terms and conditions of employment of the District’s
teachers within the meaning of EERA section 3543.2. Second, ACE asks us to modify
the ALJ’s order that the District “authorize and support” an extended period for ACE
and ICUE to obtain sufficient proof of support. Specifically, ACE excepts to the
provision of this remedy to ICUE, a non-party. Third, ACE asks us to modify the ALJ’s
order that the District conduct three spoken notice readings of the Appendix to this

55
decision. ACE requests that we provide more specific instructions regarding the
spoken notice readings and direct the Senate to conduct spoken notice readings as
well. We address each issue in turn.
A. 	Disestablishment
Thirty-seven years ago, PERB established the standard for when
disestablishment is proper, in part based on federal law governing private sector labor
relations.12 Specifically, in Redwoods, supra, PERB Decision No. 650, PERB held that
disestablishment is the appropriate remedy if a school district dominated a
nonexclusive representative, whereas a cease-and-desist order is sufficient if the
school district provided the nonexclusive representative with unlawful support or
interfered with its formation or administration. (Id., adopting proposed decision at
p. 62; cf. Ventura Community College District (1994) PERB Decision No. 1073,
adopting proposed decision at pp. 31-32 [cease and desist order appropriate where
employer provided unlawful support, but domination not proven].) Because the school
district’s conduct in Redwoods amounted to domination of a nonexclusive
representative (the Classified Employees Council), PERB disestablished the Council
as a representative of employees while leaving it free to engage in social, recreational,
12 California public sector labor relations precedent frequently protects
employee and union rights to a greater degree than does federal precedent governing
private sector labor relations, and we accordingly consider federal precedent only for
its potential persuasive value. (The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision
No. 2855, pp. 20-31; Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (Wagner et al.) (2021)
PERB Decision No. 2782-M, p. 9, fn. 10; accord County of San Joaquin v. Public
Employment Relations Bd. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1073; Social Workers’ Union,
Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382, 391.)

56
or other non-representative functions. (Id. at p. 5 & adopting proposed decision at p.
66.) Thus, disestablishment is a customary remedy for domination in the public sector,
but it is very uncommon, because it is almost unheard of for a California public entity
to engage in such conduct.13
Cases involving employer domination arise more commonly in the private
sector, and disestablishment remains the NLRB’s customary remedy for such a
violation. In fact, earlier this year, a federal appellate court affirmed an NLRB decision
ordering disestablishment. (T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2022) 372 NLRB No. 4, at p. 9, enfd.
T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 2024) 90 F.4th 564 (T-Mobile).) There, the
NLRB ordered disestablishment even though the labor organization, called T-Voice,
looked less like a labor organization than the Senate in this case, since T-Voice did
not deal with the employer on core issues such as wages, health care, or retirement
benefits. Rather, T-Voice solicited customer service representatives to raise customer
or employee concerns and discuss potential solutions with management. (T-Mobile,
supra, 372 NLRB No. 4, at pp. 1-2.) Notably, when the employer (T-Mobile) took
exceptions to the NLRB ALJ’s proposed decision, it did not contest the determination
that it had engaged in unlawful domination. This left T-Mobile little basis to contest the
need for disestablishment. (Ibid. [“Respondent does not contest, and we adopt, the
13 The support the employer provided in Redwoods, supra, PERB Decision No.
650 was less than the support at issue here, yet it was nonetheless robust evidence of
domination. (Id., adopting proposed decision at p. 65 [noting that “assistance in
conducting elections, and in providing photocopying, stationery, mail service, release
time, meeting rooms and even money points to domination” and that “one gets the
definite impression that, but for this considerable amount of support at almost every
level of operation,” the Council would not have “the necessary machinery to operate”].)

57
judge’s determination that the Respondent dominated T-Voice. Accordingly, we will
follow more than 70 years of [NLRB] precedent and order [disestablishment].”])
Here, the procedural posture resembles, to a degree, that in T-Mobile. Neither
the District nor the Senate filed exceptions, thereby acceding to the ALJ’s findings.
This includes the ALJ’s conclusions that the District’s violations were “extensive,” that
the Faculty Senate “is literally dependent on the District’s support,” and that paying
senators a stipend—just one among many violations—“is antithetical to the socio-
economic construct of EERA.” These concessions leave at most a narrow path for
arguing against disestablishment, as the District and/or the Senate must claim that the
now-conceded violations did not amount to domination. The Senate makes no such
argument, as it has failed to respond to ACE’s exceptions. Instead, the Senate relies
on the District to do so. The District takes on this role—in keeping with its close
partnership with the Senate—but its argument is untenable.
To oppose a disestablishment order, the District argues that “although Charging
Party’s blunderbuss argument refers to its evidence of the District’s dominance and
support as ‘extensive’ [citation omitted], many of these so-called categories of support
have very limited evidence that was supported at hearing; most amount to nothing
more than anecdotal one-time examples which were refuted by the District as much as
they were supported by Charging Party at hearing.” The District ignores that the ALJ
twice found the violations to be “extensive” and that the District filed no exceptions and
therefore waived any challenge to those findings. But even were the argument not
waived, the record overwhelmingly shows extensive domination and interference for
the reasons analyzed at length above.

58
Along the same lines, the District’s argument against a disestablishment order
asserts: “As presented during legal arguments related to Charging Party’s request for
injunctive relief, as well as throughout the hearing in this matter, the District repeatedly
demonstrated that it had ceased many of the activities raised by Charging Party as
violative of the law. There is absolutely no evidence that the District intends to re-
initiate any of the actions identified by Charging Party as problematic.” Our above
discussion again illustrates that this is simply not true. The District ceased certain
violations while continuing other, significant ones, including stipends and release time
that together amount to the largest share of its financial support for the Senate. And
rather than ceasing all “activities raised by [ACE] as violative of the law,” the District
wrote to teachers defending its continued preferential treatment toward the Senate
and pointing the finger at ACE as the reason that preferential treatment and support
was in jeopardy.
Moreover, these arguments miss the point of a disestablishment order. Such an
order is proper when a cease-and-desist order—even assuming the respondents
would honor it—would be insufficient to overcome years (or in this case decades) of
advantages given to an employer-dominated organization. This is exactly such a case.
The ALJ nonetheless postulated that a “surgical” prohibition on illegal support
would be sufficient to restore employee free choice and “healthy competition among
nonexclusive representatives.” This amounts to a suggestion that we should modify
Redwoods and find that it is possible to remedy domination, in certain cases, without
disestablishment. To the contrary, however, this case further illustrates why the NLRB
and PERB long ago concluded that disestablishment is the only means to effectively

59
remedy domination. (See, e.g., Jack Smith Beverages, Inc. (6th Cir. 1953) 94 NLRB
1401, 1404 (1951), enfd. 202 F.2d 100, 101 [“The [NLRB] continues to be of the
opinion that the only effective remedy for a situation in which an employer is found to
have unlawfully dominated a labor organization is to order the employer to disestablish
the union.”])
Absent disestablishment, to place ACE on an equal footing with the Senate
would require providing ACE with “company union” benefits equivalent to what the
Senate received, including hundreds of thousands of dollars in public taxpayer money
each year for decades and equally critical in-kind support, policy choices, and
favorable communications. To do so would simply replace one employer-dominated
employee organization with another. Indeed, doing so would not only deprive
employees of free choice, but would prejudice ICUE or any other future organization
seeking to compete with ACE. Thus, while support ordered by PERB does not
constitute unlawful support, ordering massive support to ACE to level the playing field
would not effectuate EERA’s purposes in this case.14
The ALJ noted that the Senate’s current leadership “inherited a culture violative
of EERA,” a point which, if anything, shows how engrained the long-standing District
preference, domination, and illegal support for the Senate had become, further
confirming why disestablishment is proper in cases involving domination. In this
regard, we clarify one point in Redwoods, supra, PERB Decision No. 650, which noted
14 ACE has not requested any financial remedy, waiving any of the monetary
remedies that might otherwise be available. (See County of Santa Clara (2024) PERB
Decision No. 2900-M, pp. 27-36 [reviewing monetary remedy principles], judicial
appeal pending on other grounds.)

60
in passing that disestablishment may be less disruptive if the dominated organization
is a “young” one without “stronger historical ties to employees or the [employer].” (Id.,
adopting proposed decision at p. 66.) That statement, while tautological, does not
mean that disestablishment and the attendant disruption becomes improper if the
dominated organization is more established, with stronger ties. We find quite the
opposite to be true and clarify Redwoods to the extent it suggests otherwise.
While the ALJ found that the long-standing culture excused the current Senate
leadership—by leading them to misunderstand the magnitude of their violations—
benign or malevolent intent is irrelevant to remedying employer domination.
(Redwoods, supra, PERB Decision No. 650, adopting proposed decision at p. 61
[“Section 3543.5(d) unqualifiedly forbids unlawful support, interference and the kinds
of actions taken by the [employer] which otherwise tend to influence employee choice,
be they benevolent or malevolent”].)
Even if intent were relevant, it would help neither the District nor the Senate.
Over decades, the District and the Senate created a system of domination, unlawful
support, and interference with the Senate’s administration, built on the foundation of
the District’s explicitly anti-union policies that established the Senate as teachers’ sole
representative, even though the teachers were not, as a matter of law, exclusively
represented by any entity. The District incorporated the Senate into its administrative
structure, with the Senate president reporting to the District’s superintendent. When
teacher dissatisfaction and problems in the Senate arose, the District responded by,
among other things, running the Senate’s elections, moving the president’s office

61
closer to human resources, and promising to make sure the Senate complied with the
District’s expectations, as well as to clean up the Senate’s rules and practices.
When ACE came on the scene, the District promptly credited the Senate for
improvements in employment terms while leaving ACE out of the process, much as it
had done in Clovis I, supra, PERB Decision No. 389. While the District cites changes it
made after ACE filed its first charge on June 1, these were half measures. For
example, as discussed above, the District continued to provide hundreds of thousands
of dollars annually in stipends and release time, and publicly attacked ACE for filing
charges that threatened the District’s preferential support for the Senate. The Senate
followed a similar playbook in attacking ACE for enforcing the law. In August 2021, the
Senate president decried, in an e-mail to all teachers, that through the PERB process,
ACE was trying to take away senators’ stipends and have release time for Senate
officers revoked. In short, even if PERB’s analysis of domination cases turned on
benign or malevolent intent—a factor that, to be clear, remains irrelevant—the
outcome would be the same.
Accordingly, the “good faith” arguments upon which the ALJ relied are
untenable. As a factual matter, the District and the Senate, far from fully complying
with the law after April 5, continued to violate EERA and attacked ACE for asking
PERB to enforce the law. Legally, intent is irrelevant to the violations at issue. And
realistically, compliance after April 5 would not have erased decades of entrenched
favoritism and the resulting severely tilted playing field.
The ALJ therefore erred in finding there could be fair competition between an
organization that was employer-funded and employer-dominated for decades and a

62
nonexclusive representative such as ACE that has maintained lawfully required
separation from the District. As the NLRB noted in Electromation, Inc. (1992) 309
NLRB 990, disestablishment is proper “even if a concededly employer-dominated
organization were altered to remove the elements of unlawful domination,” because
removing such ongoing illegality does not transform the organization into a lawful one.
(Id. at pp. 995-996, fn. 24, citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. (1939) 308 U.S. 241.) Thus, to secure free choice in the
District for the first time since EERA’s passage almost five decades ago, we must
break the ties between the District and the Senate. (Redwoods, supra, PERB Decision
No. 650, adopting proposed decision at pp. 63-64.)15
Disestablishment does not clear the field for ACE, as employees are free to
establish, on their own initiative, organizations which function as nonexclusive
representatives, and/or to seek to establish such an organization as an exclusive
representative. ACE and ICUE are two such organizations. And as discussed below,
contrary to ACE’s exception, we afford ICUE the same prospective rights as ACE.
15 In Antelope Valley Community College District (1979) PERB Decision No. 97
(Antelope), the ALJ may have partially misunderstood the meaning of
disestablishment, believing it was impossible to issue such an order if the employee
organization was not a party. (Id., attached proposed decision at p. 25.) Any such
notion would be error, because it is possible to break the ties between two
organizations by ordering one of them to break off ties. Indeed, both the Board and the
ALJ in Antelope took steps toward doing so. (Id. at p. 27 & attached proposed decision
at p. 25 [noting that disestablishment was “essentially accomplished” by ordering
employer to cease dealing with dominated organization on matters within the scope of
representation].) Here, where both the District and the Senate are parties, we order
both parties to break off ties.

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For the foregoing reasons, we disestablish all relationships between the Senate
and the District having to do with District teachers’ terms and conditions of
employment within the meaning of EERA section 3543.2., and we extend that remedy
to any successor, alias, or alter ego of the Senate, including CTO to the extent that
CTO still exists or resumes activity. (Redwoods, supra, PERB Decision No. 650,
pp. 4-5; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. (Kansas City) (1942) 45 NLRB 1318, 1359
[for those employer-dominated organizations no longer active, NLRB orders employer
to refrain from recognizing organizations should they return to active existence].)
B. 	Extended Validity for Proof of Support
The ALJ appropriately ordered that proof of support obtained by ACE and ICUE
remain valid for longer than normal given the egregious nature of the District’s
violations. Pursuant to PERB Regulation 32700, subdivision (b) proof of support for a
recognition request or certification petition under EERA normally remains valid for one
year.16 The proposed decision extended that period to one year from the date this
decision becomes final, analogizing to PERB decisions extending the certification bar
as a remedy for unfair practices. (See, e.g., St. HOPE Public Schools (2024) PERB
Order No. Ad-511, p. 4, fn. 6.) No party has challenged this remedy as it applies to
ACE, and we affirm it as a proper means to address the District’s domination,
interference, and PEDD violations.
ACE argues that this remedy should not benefit ICUE, a nonparty. We disagree
and affirm the ALJ’s approach. Egregious violations by the District and the Senate
16 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 31001 et seq.

64
made organizing difficult for both ACE and ICUE. While it is true that Respondents’
unlawful statements targeted exclusively ACE and never ICUE, other violations
impacted both organizations, making it impracticable to obtain sufficient proof of
support within a one-year period. Accordingly, for ACE, ICUE, or any other employee
organization that may petition to exclusively represent teachers (not including the
Senate, CTO, or their successors, aliases, or alter egos), we order that proof of
support collected on or after July 1, 2020 shall remain valid until one year following the
date this decision becomes final.17
C. 	Spoken Notice
The proposed order requires the District to conduct three spoken notice
readings, but permits such readings to be in-person, by videoconference, in a hybrid
format, “or in any other manner designed to reach the greatest number of certificated
employees at the District.” The proposed order further provides that the District and
ACE mutually agree on scheduling the notice readings, and that the District provide
ACE reasonable notice of and access to the readings.
While the District accedes to this remedy, ACE seeks an order requiring that:
(1) the notice be read by the District’s superintendent and videotaped; (2) the
videotape be played at staff meetings at each school site; and (3) ACE receive a copy
of the videotape, as well as notice of and access to all school site meetings at which
the videotape is shown. ACE also asks the Board to order that the Senate conduct a
spoken notice reading, with the notice to be read by the Senate president (either live
17 As always, for proof of support from an employee to be valid, the employee
must still be employed as a District teacher on the petition’s filing date.

65
or via videotape) at a regularly scheduled meeting open to all bargaining unit
members, with ACE to receive notice of and access to the meeting and a copy of the
videotape.
PERB orders spoken notice if customary notice methods, in combination with
other remedies, are insufficient. (Mt. San Jacinto Community College District (2023)
PERB Decision No. 2865, p. 42.) We agree with the ALJ that such a remedy is
necessary here given the egregious violations. However, we modify the order to
increase the likelihood that the spoken notice will reach “the greatest number of
certificated employees at the District” as the ALJ envisioned, while reducing the
likelihood of ancillary litigation over the meaning of that phrase, which is potentially
susceptible to dispute. We do not, however, order the Senate to engage in a spoken
notice reading. It is doubtful that the Senate could accomplish such a task without
assistance from the District, and our order prohibits the two entities from having any
relationship regarding District teachers’ terms and conditions of employment. This
means that ACE’s request is impracticable.
Accordingly, we will require the District to: (1) make a video recording in which
the District superintendent reads the Appendix to this decision, verbatim, with no other
statement of any kind, and provide ACE with a true, unedited copy of the video;
(2) show the video at a regular staff meeting of certificated employees at each school
site (or at a special meeting, if and only if ACE and the District agree); and (3) provide
ACE with at least 10 days’ notice as to when the District will show the video at each
school site, and an opportunity to attend each viewing.

66
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing and the entire record in the case, the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) finds that Clovis Unified School District violated
the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), Government Code section 3540,
et seq., and the Prohibition on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union
Membership chapter (PEDD), Government Code section 3550, et seq., including by:
(1) dominating and interfering with the administration of the Clovis Unified Faculty
Senate; (2) providing unlawful support and assistance to the Senate; (3) favoring the
Senate over the Association of Clovis Educators (ACE) and encouraging employees to
join the Senate over ACE, thereby violating the District’s duty of strict neutrality;
(4) interfering with protected employee rights; (5) deterring or discouraging employees
from exercising free choice whether to join ACE or to authorize ACE to represent
them; and (6) interfering with and/or denying ACE its rights, including the right to seek
to become an exclusive representative, access rights guaranteed under EERA section
3543.1, subdivision (b), and the right to nonexclusively represent employees, which
includes the right to receive advance notice and the opportunity to meet and discuss
with the District over changes to fundamental conditions of employment before the
District reaches a firm decision about such changes.
PERB further finds that the Senate violated EERA section 3543.6, subdivisions
(a) and (b), including by: (1) claiming to be the sole and/or official and/or de facto
bargaining representative of certificated staff at the District when there was no
exclusive representative; (2) actively encouraging and assisting in the District’s
unlawful domination and interference with the Senate’s internal affairs such that it

67
became an employer-dominated representative that interfered with employee free
choice; (3) creating the Clovis Teachers Organization (CTO) as an alias, alter ego, or
successor and gathering proof of support for a representation petition to establish
CTO as an employer-funded and employer-dominated exclusive representative; and
(4) making statements that interfered with protected rights.
Pursuant to Government Code sections 3543.1, subdivisions (i) and (n),
3541.5, subdivision (c), and 3551, subdivision (a), we order as follows:
I. 	The District, its governing board, and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Dominating, or interfering with the formation or administration of,
any employee organization.
2. 	Providing support or assistance to an employee organization that
is inconsistent with the principles explained in this decision.
3. 	Issuing any communication, or engaging in any conduct, that
tends to deter or discourage employees or applicants from exercising free choice
whether to join ACE or authorize ACE to represent them, unless the communication or
conduct is narrowly tailored to a business necessity so as to minimize the tendency to
influence employee free choice to such a degree that the importance of the business
necessity outweighs the remaining likelihood of such influence.
4. 	Interfering with or denying ACE its rights, including the right to
seek to become an exclusive representative, access rights guaranteed under EERA
section 3543.1, subdivision (b), and the right to nonexclusively represent employees,
which includes the right to receive advance notice and the opportunity to meet and

68
discuss with the District over changes to fundamental conditions of employment
before the District reaches a firm decision about such changes.
5 . 	Meeting or corresponding with Senate representatives on matters
related to terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of EERA section
3543.2, or otherwise recognizing the Senate (or any successor, alias, or alter ego,
including CTO) as an employee organization representing certificated employees
regarding any such issues.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF EERA:
1. 	Disestablish all relationships with the Senate (or any of its
successors, aliases, or alter egos, including CTO) having to do with matters related to
terms and conditions of employment of the District’s certificated employees within the
meaning of EERA section 3543.2.
2. 	Cease providing any monetary, non-monetary, or in-kind support
or assistance to the Senate.
3. 	Remove from all sites of operation, and from all District postings
or documents (whether paper, digital, or electronic, on the internet or on any
computer, but excluding litigation documents or historical records necessary to show
the evolution of District Board policy) the portion of Doc’s Charge stating that
“professionals who work in our district are proud that we do not have collective
bargaining.”
4. 	Rescind the e-mail from Superintendent O’Brien to all certificated
employees dated August 27, 2021.

69
5. 	Treat all nonexclusive representatives other than the Senate
equally in all respects.
6. 	Provide statutory access rights guaranteed under EERA section
3543.1, subdivision (b).
7. 	Refrain from asserting that proof of support was not timely
collected if, within one year from the date this Order becomes final, ACE, Independent
Clovis Unified Educators (ICUE), or another employee organization (except for the
Senate, CTO, or their successors, aliases, or alter egos) presents proof of support
collected on or after July 1, 2020.
8. 	Provide ACE with the information it requested on June 4, 2021,
and on June 7, 2021.
9. 	Within 30 teacher workdays after this decision is no longer subject
to appeal, post at all locations where the District posts employee notices, copies of the
Notice attached as the Appendix to this decision. An authorized agent of the District
shall sign the Notice, indicating that the District will follow the terms of this Order, and
the District shall maintain such postings for a period of 30 consecutive teacher
workdays. The District shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the Notice is not
reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material. In addition to
physically posting the Notice, the District shall communicate it by electronic message,
intranet, internet site, and other electronic means the District uses to communicate
with certificated employees.18
18 Any party may ask PERB’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to alter or
extend the posting period, require further notice methods, or otherwise supplement or
adjust this Order to ensure adequate notice. Upon receipt of such a request, OGC

70
shall solicit input from all parties and, if warranted, provide amended instructions to
ensure adequate notice.
10. 	(a) Make a video recording in which the District superintendent reads the
Appendix to this decision, verbatim, with no other statement of any kind, within 15
days after this decision is no longer subject to appeal.
(b) Provide ACE with a true, unedited copy of the video within 24 hours
of its recording.
(c) Show the video at a regular staff meeting of certificated employees at
each school site (or at a special staff meeting, if and only if ACE and the District
agree). Such viewings shall be at the first regular staff meeting of certificated
employees at each school site scheduled for 25 or more days after this decision is no
longer subject to appeal, unless ACE and the District agree otherwise.
(d) Provide ACE with at least 10 days’ notice of each viewing and an
opportunity to attend each viewing.
11. 	Notify OGC of the actions the District has taken to follow this
Order by providing written reports as directed by OGC and concurrently serving such
reports on ACE.
II. 	The Senate, its governing board, and its representatives, as well as CTO, shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Acting as an employee organization having as a purpose the
representation of District certificated employees on matters related to terms and
conditions of employment within the meaning of EERA section 3543.2.

71
2. 	Accepting any monetary, non-monetary, or in-kind support or
assistance from the District.
3. 	Causing or attempting to cause the District to violate EERA.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF EERA:
1. 	Disestablish all relationships with the District having to do with
matters related to terms and conditions of employment of the District’s certificated
employees within the meaning of EERA section 3543.2.
2 	Notify OGC of the actions the Senate has taken to follow this
Order by providing written reports as directed by OGC and concurrently serving such
reports on ACE and the District.
Chair Banks and Member Nazarian joined in this Decision.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), in
which all parties had the right to participate, PERB found that Clovis Unified School
District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act and the Prohibition on
Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership chapter by:
(1) dominating and interfering with the administration of the Clovis Unified Faculty
Senate; (2) providing unlawful support and assistance to the Senate; (3) favoring the
Senate over the Association of Clovis Educators (ACE), and encouraging employees
to join the Senate over ACE, thereby violating the District’s duty of strict neutrality;
(4) interfering with protected employee rights; (5) deterring or discouraging employees
from exercising free choice whether to join ACE or to authorize ACE to represent
them; and (6) interfering with and/or denying ACE its representational rights and
access rights guaranteed by law.
PERB also found that the Clovis Unified Faculty Senate violated the law by: (1)
claiming to be the sole and/or official and/or de facto bargaining representative of
certificated staff at the District when there was no exclusive representative; (2) actively
encouraging and assisting in the District’s unlawful domination and interference with
the Senate’s internal affairs such that it became an employer-dominated
representative that interfered with employee free choice; (3) creating Clovis Teachers
Organization (CTO) as an alias, alter ego, or successor and gathering proof of support
for a representation petition to establish CTO as an employer-funded and employer-
dominated exclusive representative; and (4) making statements that interfered with
protected rights.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post and read this Notice,
and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Dominating, or interfering with the formation or administration of,
any employee organization.
2. 	Providing support or assistance to an employee organization that
is inconsistent with the principles PERB explained in its decision.
3. 	Issuing any communication, or engaging in any conduct, that
tends to deter or discourage employees or applicants from exercising free choice
whether to join ACE and whether to authorize ACE to represent them, unless the

2
communication or conduct is narrowly tailored to a business necessity while
minimizing the tendency to influence employee free choice to the greatest degree
possible.
4. 	Interfering with or denying ACE the right to seek to become an
exclusive representative, access rights guaranteed by law, or the right to represent
employees, which includes the right to receive advance notice and the opportunity to
meet with us to discuss changes to fundamental conditions of employment before we
reach a firm decision about such changes.
5. 	Meeting or corresponding with Senate representatives on matters
related to terms and conditions of employment, or otherwise recognizing the Senate
(or any successor, alias, or alter ego, including CTO) as an employee organization
representing certificated employees regarding any such issues.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:
1. 	Disestablish all relationships with the Senate (or any of its
successors, aliases, or alter egos) having to do with matters related to terms and
conditions of employment of our certificated employees.
2. 	Cease providing any monetary, non-monetary, or in-kind support
or assistance to the Senate.
3. 	Remove from all our sites of operation, and from all our postings
or documents (whether paper, digital, or electronic, on the internet or on any
computer, but excluding litigation documents or historical records) an illegal portion of
Doc’s Charge.
4. 	Rescind entirely an August 2021 e-mail from Superintendent
Eimear O’Brien to all certificated employees that criticized ACE for attempting to
enforce the law.
5. 	Treat employee organizations as specified in PERB’s decision.
6. 	Provide employees, employee organizations, and organizational
representatives with access rights guaranteed by law.
7. 	Honor employee authorizations as specified in PERB’s decision.

3
8. 	Provide ACE with the information it requested from us in June
2021.
Dated: _____________________ 	CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE TEACHER WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH
ANY OTHER MATERIAL.