P. v. Lara

Filed 9/17/15 P. v. Lara CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL JOSEPH LARA,
Defendant and Appellant.
B258181
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA072069)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Larry Paul Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Green, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerard A. Engler, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D.
Matthews and Corey J. Robins, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
___________________________________________

-- 1 of 6 --

2
INTRODUCTION
Daniel Joseph Lara was convicted on four counts of attempted murder, and
was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison. He appeals from the sentence,
contending that it violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, as he was a juvenile (17 years old) when he committed the
crimes, and by the time he is eligible for parole, he will no longer have any
“meaningful life expectancy.” He further contends the trial court failed to consider
his youth when it sentenced him. For the reasons stated below, we conclude there
was no sentencing error. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
On the evening of January 13, 2008, appellant engaged in four separate
gang-related shootings. In the first incident, appellant and his fellow gang
members were driving to a party located in a rival gang’s territory when they
noticed Lawrence Bell and several other men standing outside a house. They
stopped the car in front of the house, and yelled out their gang name. After the
other men denied being gang members, appellant, who was sitting in the right rear
passenger seat of the vehicle, pulled out a gun and fired multiple shots at them.
Bell was hit in the leg.
Appellant and his fellow gang members then drove to a location that one of
them had previously “tagged” with gang-related graffiti. Someone had crossed out
the graffiti, and the group wanted to remedy the “disrespect.” They came upon a
group of Hispanic men. After one of the men denied crossing out the graffiti,
1
Because appellant does not challenge the factual basis for his convictions
and raises only sentencing issues on appeal, we provide an abbreviated summary of
the facts and procedural history.

-- 2 of 6 --

3
appellant opened the right rear car door and fired several shots at him. Juan
Mendoza, who was standing nearby, was hit in the leg.
Appellant and his fellow gang members drove away. A few minutes later,
appellant said he wanted to “finish[] off what he started.” The group then stopped
the vehicle, exited, and ran back to the crime scene. As appellant approached the
Hispanic men, he drew his gun and fired three or four times. Hector Guzman was
hit in the right arm.
After this incident, appellant and his fellow gang members drove to Old
Town Pasadena to rob someone for money to buy food. They came upon a man
sitting alone on a bench who stared at them. A gang member exited the vehicle
and assaulted the man. Appellant also exited the car, and fired a shot at the victim.
The two gang members then got back into the vehicle and fled.
Appellant was later arrested and charged with the offenses. A jury convicted
him of the attempted premeditated and deliberate murders of Bell, Mendoza and
Guzman. It also convicted him of discharging his firearm at Mendoza from a
motor vehicle, and discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner at a
dwelling. Finally, the jury also found true the related gang and gun enhancement
allegations.
The parties briefed sentencing in light of Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S.
48 (Graham) and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero). At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court recognized that, in light of appellant’s age,
imposition of the maximum sentence – 120 years to life -- would contravene
existing United States and California Supreme Court decisions. The court
sentenced appellant to identical concurrent terms of 15 years to life on each of the
attempted murder counts, plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement, for a total of

-- 3 of 6 --

4
40 years to life. The court also imposed sentences on the remaining counts, but
stayed those terms pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses may not be sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 82.) “A State
need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life
it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before
the end of that term.” (Ibid.)
In Caballero, the California Supreme Court followed Graham and vacated a
110-year-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of attempted murder,
concluding that the sentence amounted to the functional equivalent of life without
the possibility of parole. (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 265.) The court
concluded that “sentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term
of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s
natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Although proper authorities may later determine that youths
should remain incarcerated for their natural lives, the state may not deprive them at
sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and
fitness to reenter society in the future.” (Id. at p. 268.) In examining an offender’s
“natural life expectancy,” the court noted that “‘life expectancy’ means the normal
life expectancy of a healthy person of defendant’s age and gender living in the
United States.” (Id. at p. 267, fn. 3.) Finally, the court stated that “the sentencing
court must consider all mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile’s crime
and life, including but not limited to his or her chronological age at the time of the

-- 4 of 6 --

5
crime, whether the juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator or an aider and
abettor, and his or her physical and mental development, so that it can impose a
time when the juvenile offender will be able to seek parole from the parole board.”
(Id. at pp. 268-269.)
Appellant contends his sentence of 40 years to life amounts to the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, as he will have no meaningful
life expectancy at the time he becomes eligible for parole. We disagree.
Appellant will be eligible for parole at age 57. As he acknowledges, the
United States Social Security Administration Actuarial Life Table places a 17-
year-old male’s natural life expectancy at nearly 77 years. (United States Social
Security Administration Actuarial Life Tables, 2011, available at
<http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html> [as of Sept. 16, 2015].)
Accordingly, appellant’s life expectancy will exceed his minimum parole period by
at least 19 years. Nineteen years constitutes a meaningful life expectancy.
(Compare People v. Garcia (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 666, 689 [50-year-to-life
sentence for 17-year-old offender did not violate Eighth Amendment, as
defendant’s life expectancy exceeded minimum parole period by at least 10 years]
with People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1249 [noting that parole
eligibility date five months before defendant’s natural life expectancy constituted a
de facto life sentence].)
Without citation to authority, appellant contends we should consider the
“unhealthy conditions and rigors of prison life” in determining whether he would
have a meaningful life expectancy after becoming eligible for parole. Appellant’s
contention was effectively rejected in Caballero. There, the court stated that in
determining life expectancy, the sentencing court should use the “normal life
expectancy for a healthy person of defendant’s age and gender living in the United

-- 5 of 6 --

6
States.” No allowance was made for any particular locale or living conditions. In
short, appellant’s sentence was constitutional, as it was not an actual or de facto
sentence of life without the possibility of parole.2
Finally, we reject appellant’s contention that the case should be remanded
for resentencing because the trial court failed to consider the “mitigating qualities
of youth.” The court expressly noted that it was sentencing appellant pursuant to
Graham and Caballero, indicating it had considered the sentencing factors set
forth in those opinions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MANELLA, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
WILLHITE, J.
2
Because appellant’s sentence is not unconstitutional, we need not consider
whether Penal Code section 3051 would also render the sentence constitutional.

-- 6 of 6 --