P. v. Hill

Filed 3/28/16 P. v. Hill CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SYDNEY JEAN HILL,
Defendant and Appellant.
B262390
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA099731)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Jack P. Hunt, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad K. Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez,
Andrew S. Pruitt and Paul S. Thies, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_______________________________________

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INTRODUCTION
Defendant Sydney Jean Hill pled no contest to a felony—receiving stolen
property—and admitted two prior drug-related felony convictions from 2000 and 2012.
Hill also admitted violating probation in connection with her 2012 drug case. Although
she was sentenced to three years and eight months in prison, her sentence was
suspended and she was placed on formal probation with various terms and conditions.
Following California voters’ passage of “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,”
commonly known as Proposition 47, Hill petitioned the trial court for reduction of her
felony conviction for receiving stolen property to a misdemeanor. After a hearing, the
court reduced Hill’s 2012 drug conviction to a misdemeanor, but denied the request to
reduce the stolen property conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hill was charged with one count of receiving stolen property in violation of
Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), a felony.1 The complaint also alleged that Hill
suffered two drug-related prior felony convictions from 2000 and 2012 within the
meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). On October 29, 2012, Hill pled no contest
to the receiving stolen property charge. Hill also admitted the two prior felony
convictions, and admitted violating probation in connection with the 2012 drug case.
The trial court sentenced Hill to three years on the receipt of stolen property case, and
eight months for the probation violation to run consecutively. However, the court
suspended imposition of the sentences in both cases and placed Hill on three years
formal probation.
After her October 29, 2012 plea, Hill’s probation was revoked in 2013, and, after
it was reinstated, revoked again in 2014. On March 12, 2014, Hill admitted to violating
probation in the stolen property case. The court then imposed the state prison term that
had been suspended on October 29, 2012.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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On January 6, 2015, Hill filed a petition for resentencing under Proposition 47
(§ 1170.18, subd. (a)). Hill’s petition did not allege any facts as to the value of the
stolen property or even allege that the value of the property did not exceed $950. On
January 26, 2015, the court held a hearing on Hill’s petition. Citing the probation
report, the prosecutor informed the court that the theft was approximately $5,000. The
court reduced Hill’s conviction in the 2012 drug case to a misdemeanor but denied the
petition for reduction of the felony stolen property conviction.2
DISCUSSION
Hill contends the trial court erroneously denied her resentencing petition
because: the prosecution had the burden of rebutting the presumption that the value of
the stolen property did not exceed $950; the court improperly relied on evidence outside
the record of conviction; and defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
court’s consideration of matters outside the record of conviction. In turn, the People
argue that Hill’s petition was properly denied because she failed to show that the value
of the stolen property did not exceed $950.
1. Standard of Review
“We review a ‘[superior] court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of
fact for substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th
129, 136 (Perkins).) Review of Proposition 47 cases involves issues of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. (See People v. Sherow (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 875, 878 (Sherow) [“our review of this appeal is based solely on our
interpretation of the statute, which we review de novo”]; see also People v. Rizo (2000)
22 Cal.4th 681, 685 [“In interpreting a voter initiative like [Proposition 47], [the courts]
apply the same principles that govern statutory construction”]; Kavanaugh v.
West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 [“the trial
court’s legal interpretation of [a statute] is subject to de novo review”].)
2 The minute order denying Hill’s petition indicates the trial court denied the
petition because “the amount of loss in this case exceeds $950.00.”

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2. Proposition 47
In November 2014, California voters enacted Proposition 47, making certain
drug and theft-related offenses misdemeanors, unless the defendants were otherwise
ineligible. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a)-(c).) “These offenses had previously been designated
as either felonies or wobblers (crimes that can be punished as either felonies or
misdemeanors).” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091.) The statute
also contains a resentencing provision, whereby persons “ ‘currently serving’ a felony
sentence for an offense that is now a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, may petition
for a recall of that sentence and request resentencing in accordance with the statutes that
were added or amended by Proposition 47.” (Id. at p. 1092.) “A person who satisfies
the statutory criteria [in section 1170.18] shall have his or her sentence recalled and be
‘resentenced to a misdemeanor . . . unless the court, in its discretion, determines that
resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109.)
Here, Hill was convicted of receiving stolen property in violation of section 496
which, as amended by Proposition 47, now specifies that “if the value of the [stolen]
property does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), the offense shall be
a misdemeanor.” (§ 496, subd. (a); see also People v. Shabazz (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
303, 308.) Absent other disqualifying circumstances, Hill would be eligible for
resentencing if the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950.
3. Hill failed to show she was eligible for resentencing
Hill contends that she was entitled to a presumption of eligibility for resentencing
under Proposition 47. That is, she argues that the court should have presumed the value
of the stolen property did not exceed $950 and that she was therefore eligible for relief.
We disagree. In fact, the existing presumption is that Hill “was validly convicted under
the law applicable at the time” of her conviction, and “[i]t is a rational allocation of
burdens if the petitioner in such cases bear the burden of showing that he or she is
eligible for resentencing of what was an otherwise valid sentence.” (Sherow, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)

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Certainly, we acknowledge that section 1170.18 is silent as to which party has
the burden of establishing eligibility for resentencing. However, it is well-established
that a party seeking relief typically carries the burden of proof as to each fact necessary
to her claim for relief, unless a different burden is specifically assigned by law. (Evid.
Code, § 500; see also Vance v. Bizek (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1163.) This
principle “places the burden of proof in any contested matter on the party who seeks
relief” because there is a “built-in bias in favor of the status quo” and a party who
“ ‘want[s] the court to do something . . . [must] present evidence sufficient to overcome
the state of affairs that would exist if the court did nothing.’ [Citation.]” (See Vance,
supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.) Appellate courts are in agreement that a defendant
seeking resentencing under Proposition 47 has the burden of showing eligibility. (See
Perkins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 136 [“Because defendant is the petitioner seeking
relief, and because Proposition 47 does not provide otherwise, ‘a petitioner for
resentencing under Proposition 47 must establish his or her eligibility for such
resentencing’ ”]; see also Sherow, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 878-879; People v.
Rivas-Colon (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 444, 449-450 (Rivas-Colon).)
Placing the burden on the petitioner to provide evidence showing eligibility is
further supported by statutory interpretation. While “[t]he trial court’s decision on
a section 1170.18 petition is inherently factual, requiring the trial court to determine
whether the defendant meets the statutory criteria for relief” (People v. Contreras
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 892), nothing in the plain language of the statute requires
a trial court to hold a hearing in order to do so. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a); see also
Rivas-Colon, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 452, fn. 4 [courts should interpret
section 1170.18 similarly to section 1170.126]; People v. Bradford (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1337 [in interpreting section 1170.126, the court noted “the
statute does not expressly require the trial court to hold a hearing” to determine
resentencing eligibility].) Rather, upon the defendant’s filing of a petition stating
a prima facie case for resentencing, supported by evidence, the trial court could

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summarily grant the petition if the prosecution poses no opposition, or hold a hearing to
address the issues in dispute. (See Perkins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 138.)
Therefore, a defendant seeking resentencing must provide evidence sufficient to
show eligibility in order to avoid a trial court summarily denying the petition. (See
Perkins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 137 [“the statute appears to assume most petitions
can be resolved based on the filings”]; see also Couzens & Bigelow, Proposition 47,
“The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (August 2015), p. 37 (Couzens &
Bigelow), at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-Information.pdf> [as of
Feb. 5, 2016] [trial courts may summarily deny facially deficient petitions].) The
petitioner must show he or she “would have been guilty of a misdemeanor . . . had
[section 1170.18] been in effect at the time of the offense.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)
To be convicted of a misdemeanor under section 496, the value of the stolen
property may not exceed $950. (§ 496, subd. (a).) Thus, “a successful petition . . . must
set out a case for eligibility, stating and in some cases showing . . . the value of the
property did not exceed $950. [Citation.]” (Perkins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 136-137.) This requires the defendant to “attach information or evidence necessary
to enable the court to determine eligibility.” (Id. at p. 137.) Here, Hill did not allege
any value concerning the stolen property. By failing to set forth a value, or even to
allege the value did not exceed $950, Hill did not state a prima facie case showing
eligibility. Because Hill failed to satisfy her burden of proving she was eligible for
resentencing, the trial court did not err in denying her petition. (See id. at p. 138 [“We
hold only that the statute required defendant to include information supporting his
petition with his initial filing. Since he did not do so, we cannot conclude the superior
court erred in summarily denying his petition”].)
Since we conclude Hill failed to satisfy her initial burden of showing eligibility
for resentencing, we need not reach the issue of whether the court erroneously relied on
evidence outside the record of conviction. It is a well-settled “principle of appellate
review that a correct decision of the trial court must be affirmed on appeal even if it is
based on erroneous reasoning.” (Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 138;

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see also People v. Dawkins (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004 [“If right upon any
theory of the law applicable to the case, [a decision] must be sustained regardless of the
considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion”].) Put another
way, since Hill did not provide any evidence in her initial petition as to the value of the
stolen property, her petition was correctly denied even if the court should not have
relied on the probation report to determine the value of the stolen property. (See
Rivas-Colon, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 453, fn. 3 [“Having reached this result [that
he did not satisfy his burden], we need not consider Rivas-Colon’s argument that the
court erred by relying on the police report and store receipt”].)
4. Hill failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective
Hill also contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
trial court’s reliance on the probation report in denying her Proposition 47 petition. We
disagree.
First, as discussed above, since Hill’s petition failed to show eligibility for
resentencing, we need not reach this issue. Second, Hill’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails because the record does not reveal counsel's reason for failing to
argue that the stolen property did not exceed $950, or that the court should not rely on
the probation report to determine the value of the property. (People v. Vines (2011)
51 Cal.4th 830, 876 [rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where record did
not establish why defense counsel failed to introduce impeachment evidence].) In fact,
given that the probation report established the value of the stolen property was $5,000,
defense counsel, an officer of the court, would have mislead the court if counsel had
argued that the value of the stolen property was less than $950. (Cal. Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 5-200(A), (B).) An attorney may choose not to object for
many reasons, and the failure to object rarely establishes ineffectiveness of counsel.
(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540.)

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Hill’s petition. However, Hill is not
precluded from filing a new petition in accordance with the views set forth in this
opinion. (Sherow, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
HOGUE, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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