P. v. Perea

Filed 1/31/17 P. v. Perea CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Respondent,
v.
JOE PEREA,
Petitioner and Appellant.
B271624
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA071979)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Salvatore Sirna, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Petitioner and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, and Paul S. Thies, Deputy Attorney
General, for Respondent.
__________________________

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In 2008, defendant Joe Perea pleaded no contest to voluntary
manslaughter. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a one-year
enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) that was based
on a prior felony drug offense. Several years later, Perea filed a petition
under Penal Code section 1170.18, enacted as part of The Safe Neighborhoods
and Schools Act (Proposition 47), to designate his prior drug offense as a
misdemeanor. After his petition was granted, Perea filed a second petition
seeking to strike the one-year enhancement that had been imposed as part of
his sentence in 2008 because the underlying drug offense was no longer a
felony. The trial court denied the petition. We affirm, concluding that the
redesignation of an offense under section 1170.18 does not apply retroactively
to invalidate a sentence enhancement that became final prior to the
enactment of Proposition 47.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2005, the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles filed an
information charging defendant Joe Perea with murder (Penal Code, § 1871)
and various additional offenses. Perea later plead no contest to voluntary
manslaughter. In January of 2008, the court sentenced Perea to an
aggregate term of 16 years in prison, which included a one-year enhancement
under section 667.5, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 667.5(b)) for a prior
drug possession conviction he had suffered in 1999.
Following the enactment of Proposition 47, which became effective
November 5, 2014 (see People v. Riviera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089
(Riviera), Perea filed a petition pursuant to section 1170.18 requesting that
the trial court designate his 1999 drug possession conviction as a
misdemeanor. (See § 1170.18, subs. (f), (g).) On February 22, 2016, the trial
court granted the petition. Shortly thereafter, Perea filed a second petition
requesting the court to strike the section 667.5(b) enhancement that had been
imposed on him in 2008 because the underlying drug offense no longer
qualified as a felony. The trial court denied the petition.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are to the Penal
Code.

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DISCUSSION
Perea argues that under the sentencing provisions set forth in
Proposition 47, the trial court was required to strike the one-year section
667.5(b) enhancement that was imposed as part of his sentence in 2008
because the offense underlying that enhancement has since been designated
as a misdemeanor.
A. Summary of Relevant Statutes and Case Law
1. Summary of sections 667.5(b) and 1170.18
This case involves the application of two statutes: the prior prison term
enhancement provision set forth in section 667.5(b), and Proposition 47’s
sentencing provision, set forth in section 1170.18.
“[S]ection 667.5(b) . . . provides a special sentence enhancement for [a]
particular subset of ‘prior felony convictions’ that were deemed serious
enough by earlier sentencing courts to warrant actual imprisonment. . . .”
(People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1148.) Imposition of the enhancement
“requires proof that the defendant ‘“(1) was previously convicted of a felony;
(2) was imprisoned as a result of that conviction; (3) completed that term of
imprisonment; and (4) did not remain free for five years of both prison
custody and the commission of a new offense resulting in a felony conviction.”’
[Citation.]”2 (People v. Abdallah (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 736, 742 (Abdallah);
see also People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 563.) “Courts sometimes refer
to the fourth requirement, which exempts from the enhancement defendants
who have not reoffended for five years, as ‘“washing out.”’ [Citations.]. . . .
‘According to the “washout” rule, if a defendant is free from both prison
custody and the commission of a new felony for any five-year period following
2 Section 667.5, subdivision (b) states, in relevant part: “[W]here the
new offense is any felony for which a prison sentence . . . is imposed[,] . . . the
court shall impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term . . . for
any felony; provided that no additional term shall be imposed under this
subdivision for any prison term . . . prior to a period of five years in which
the defendant remained free of both the commission of an offense which
results in a felony conviction, and prison custody. . . .”

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discharge from custody or release on parole, the enhancement does not apply.’
[Citation.]” (Abdallah, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.)
The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, commonly known as
Proposition 47 (hereafter Proposition 47 or the Act), “makes certain drug and
theft-related offenses misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by
certain ineligible defendants. These offenses had previously been designated
as either felonies or wobblers (crimes that can be punished as either felonies
or misdemeanors). . . .” (Riviera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1091.)
Proposition 47 also created section 1170.18, which establishes a mechanism
for resentencing and reclassifying felony convictions for offenses that are now
misdemeanors under the Act.
Under section 1170.18, subdivision (a), a person “currently serving” a
felony sentence for an offense that is now a misdemeanor under Proposition
47 may petition for a recall of that sentence and request resentencing in
accordance with the statutes that were added or amended by Proposition 47.
A person who satisfies the criteria in section 1170.18 shall have his or her
sentence recalled and be “resentenced to a misdemeanor . . . unless the court,
in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)
Section 1170.18, subdivisions (f) and (g) provide that persons who have
completed felony sentences for offenses that would now be misdemeanors
under Proposition 47 may file an application with the trial court to have their
felony convictions “designated as misdemeanors.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).)
Subdivision (k) (hereafter 1170.18(k)), in turn, provides that “[a]ny felony
conviction that is recalled and resentenced under subdivision (b) or
designated as a misdemeanor under subdivision (g) shall be considered a
misdemeanor for all purposes, except that such resentencing shall not permit
that person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any
firearm or prevent his or her conviction [for various firearm prohibitions].”
The Act further provides: “Nothing in this and related sections is intended to
diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in any case not falling within
the purview of this act.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (n).)

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2. Summary of recent decisions analyzing the effect of a section
1170.18 redesignation on a prior prison term enhancement
In Abdallah, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 736, this court considered the
effect of a Proposition 47 reclassification on a prior prison term enhancement.
The defendant in Abdallah was charged with several felony counts, including
possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.1). The information included a special allegation under section
667.5(b) asserting that the defendant had served a term of imprisonment for
a prior felony conviction in 2002, and was then convicted of a second felony in
2011 (resulting in a suspended sentence) that he had committed within five
years of completing his term on the 2002 conviction. In June of 2014, a jury
convicted the defendant of the offenses charged in the information. Prior to
sentencing, the defendant obtained an order under section 1170.18 recalling
his 2011 felony conviction, and reclassifying it as a misdemeanor. At
sentencing, the trial court imposed a one-year enhancement under section
667.5(b), concluding that the prosecution had established the defendant had
served a prior prison term for a felony conviction (the 2002 conviction), and
then committed a second felony within five years of his completion of that
prison term (the 2011 conviction).
On appeal, the defendant argued that the section 667.5(b) enhancement
was invalid based on the “washout rule.” Specifically, he argued that because
his 2011 felony conviction had been reclassified as a misdemeanor under
Proposition 47, he had not committed a felony conviction within five years of
completing his prison term for the 2002 felony conviction. The Attorney
General, however, argued that the Proposition 47 reclassification had no
effect on the section 667.5(b) enhancement because the defendant’s 2011
conviction was a felony at the time he had committed that offense.
In our analysis, we explained that “Proposition 47 borrowed the ‘for all
purposes’ language of section 1170.18, subdivision (k), from section 17,
subdivision (b), which describes the effect of a judicial declaration that a
wobbler offense is a misdemeanor. (See § 17, subd. (b)(3) [where a crime is a
wobbler, ‘it is a misdemeanor for all purposes . . . [w]hen . . . the court
declares the offense to be a misdemeanor’].” (Abdallah, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 745.) We further explained that in People v. Park (2013) 56

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Cal.4th 782 (Park), the Supreme Court had relied on this “for all purposes”
language in reversing a “prior serious felony conviction” enhancement (see
§ 667, subd. (a)) that the trial court had imposed based on an offense that
another court had previously declared to be a misdemeanor under section
17(b). “The Supreme Court held that ‘when the court in the prior proceeding
properly exercised its discretion by reducing the [felony] conviction to a
misdemeanor, that offense no longer qualified as a prior serious felony within
the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and could not be used, under that
provision, to enhance defendant’s sentence.’ [Citation.] The court observed
that . . . ‘reduction of a wobbler to a misdemeanor under . . . section 17(b)
generally precludes its use as a prior felony conviction in a subsequent
prosecution.’ [Citation.]” (Abdallah, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 745-746
[citing and quoting Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 794].)
We concluded that “the same logic applies to sections 667.5, subdivision
(b), and 1170.18, subdivision (k). [The fourth requirement of] [s]ection 667.5,
subdivision (b) excludes from the prior prison term enhancement a defendant
who has neither committed ‘an offense which results in a felony conviction’
nor been subject to [a prison term] within five years of release on parole or
official discharge from another felony conviction resulting in the defendant’s
incarceration. Once the trial court recalled [the defendant’s] 2011 felony
sentence and resentenced him to a misdemeanor, section 1170.18, subdivision
(k), reclassified that conviction as a misdemeanor ‘for all purposes.’
[Citation.] Therefore, at the time of sentencing . . ., [the defendant] was not a
person who had committed ‘an offense which result[ed] in a felony conviction’
within five years after his release on parole for his prior conviction.
[Citations.] Thus, the trial court erred by imposing the one-year sentence
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b).” (Abdallah, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 746.)
In People v. Evans (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 894 (Evans)), District Four
agreed with Abdallah’s reasoning, and concluded “that Section 1170.18(k)
prohibits a court from imposing a section 667.5(b) enhancement based on an
offense that has already been reclassified a misdemeanor.” (Id. at p. 901.)
Although Abdallah considered the effect of a Proposition 47 reclassification in
the context of section 667.5(b)’s fourth element (“the wash out” rule), Evans

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concluded the same analysis applied to section 667.5(b)’s first element, which
requires proof that the defendant “‘“was previously convicted of a
felony. . . .”’” (Abdallah, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.) Citing Abdallah
and Park, the Evans court explained that once a trial court has reclassified a
prior felony offense to be a misdemeanor, the “for all purposes” language in
section 1170.18(k) prohibits the offense from serving as the basis for any
subsequent section 667.5(b) enhancement.
B. Section 1170.18 Does Not Apply Retroactively to Invalidate a
Section 667.5(b) Enhancement Imposed in a Judgment that
Became Final Prior to Proposition 47’s Enactment
In this case, Perea argues that once a prior felony conviction has been
designated a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18, the conviction cannot
support a section 667.5(b) enhancement, even if the enhancement was
imposed as part of a sentence that became final before Proposition 47 was
enacted. Thus, Perea contends that a redesignation of a prior felony
conviction under Proposition 47 applies both prospectively, barring a court
from imposing a section 667.5(b) enhancement based on any offense that has
previously been designated a misdemeanor, and retroactively, invalidating
any section 667.5(b) enhancement that was imposed and became final before
Proposition 47 was enacted, and before the redesignation occurred.
Abdallah and Evans support Perea’s contention that once a felony
offense has been designated as a misdemeanor under section 1170.18, the
offense cannot support a section 667.5(b) enhancement in any subsequent
proceeding. Neither case, however, considered whether Proposition 47 allows
a trial court to retroactively strike a section 667.5(b) enhancement where, as
here, the enhancement was imposed in a judgment that became final prior to
Proposition 47’s enactment.3 Indeed, in both cases the courts specifically
3 The California Supreme Court has granted review in several cases that
addressed this issue, all of which concluded that a redesignation order does
not invalidate a previously-imposed section 667.5(b) enhancement that
became final prior to Proposition 47’s enactment. (See People v. Valenzuela,
review granted March 30, 2016, S232900 (lead case); People v. Carrea, review
granted April 27, 2016, S233011; People v. Williams, review granted May 11,

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noted that they were not required to address that issue. (See Abdallah,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 746-747 [explaining that defendant’s case did
not involve a retroactive application of Proposition 47 because the underlying
conviction was redesignated as a misdemeanor before the enhancement was
imposed]; Evans, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 901 [clarifying that defendant
was not challenging “whether Proposition 47 . . . allows ‘the courts to strike
prison prior enhancements imposed prior to Proposition 47 based on prior
convictions designated as misdemeanors after judgment and sentence have
become final’”].)
“In interpreting a voter initiative, we apply the same principles that
govern our construction of a statute.” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30
Cal.4th 894, 900.) “Whether a [penal] statute operates prospectively or
retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative intent.
When the Legislature has not made its intent on the matter clear with
respect to a particular statute, the Legislature’s generally applicable
declaration in [Penal Code] section 3 provides the default rule: ‘No part of
[the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.’ . . . [S]ection
3 . . . codif[ies] ‘the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an
express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively
unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must
have intended a retroactive application.’ [Citations.].” (See People v. Brown
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 319-320 (Brown).) The same principle applies to a statute
enacted through a ballot initiative. (See Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988)
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208-1209 [“in the absence of an express retroactivity
provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear
from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended
a retroactive application”].) “In applying this principle, [our courts] have
been cautious not to infer retroactive intent from vague phrases and broad,
general language in statutes. [Citations.] Consequently, ‘“a statute that is
ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be
unambiguously prospective.”’” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 320.)
2016, S233559; People v. Ruff, review granted May 11, 2016, S233201; People
v. Jones (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 221, 229, review granted Sept. 14, 2016,
S235901 (Jones).)

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Applying those principles here, we reject Perea’s assertion that a
Proposition 47 redesignation is intended to apply retroactively to invalidate
past sentencing enhancements that became final prior to its enactment.
Proposition 47 does not contain any language declaring that its provisions are
automatically retroactive. Instead, the initiative sets forth two mechanisms
that allow certain categories of offenders to seek redesignation and
resentencing on certain categories of felony convictions that have become
final. First, a defendant “currently serving” a sentence for a felony that
would now be a misdemeanor may petition for recall of the felony and
resentencing as a misdemeanor. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (b).) Second, a
defendant who has “completed his or her sentence” for a felony that would
now be a misdemeanor may petition for redesignation of that offense to a
misdemeanor. As the Fourth District explained in Jones, supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at p. 229, rev. granted, neither of these procedures provides a
mechanism to retroactively strike a previously-imposed sentence
enhancement: “The focus of these procedures is redesignation of convictions,
not enhancements. Neither procedure provides for either the recall and
resentencing or the redesignation, dismissal, or striking of sentence
enhancements. [Citations.] No similar provision provides a process for
offenders to seek to strike or otherwise redesignate sentencing
enhancements. It follows that nothing in the language of section 1170.18
allows or even contemplates the retroactive redesignation, dismissal, or
striking of sentence enhancements imposed in a final judgment entered
before Proposition 47 passed, even where the offender succeeds in having the
underlying conviction itself deemed a misdemeanor.” (Id. at pp. 228-229.)
Moreover, section 1170.18, subdivision (n) expressly states that
“Nothing in this and related sections is intended to diminish or abrogate the
finality of judgments in any case not falling within the purview of this act.”
Reading a third mechanism into Proposition 47 that allows offenders to
challenge an enhancement that became final prior to the Act’s enactment
would effectively contravene this provision. Because previously-imposed
sentence enhancements do not “fall[] within the purview” of the Act, we must
avoid any interpretation of section 1170.18 that would diminish their finality.

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Perea, however, argues that section 1170.18(k), which states that a
felony that has been designated as a misdemeanor “shall be considered a
misdemeanor for all purposes,” provides a statutory basis for retroactively
striking a section 667.5(b) enhancement. Perea appears to contend that the
phrase “for all purposes” necessarily includes retroactive relief from any
collateral effect of a redesignated offense, including sentence enhancements.
As we explained in Abdallah, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 736, the “for all
purposes” language in section 1170.18(k) was “borrowed” from identical
language in section 17(b), which describes the effect of a judicial declaration
that a wobbler offense is a misdemeanor. (Id. at p. 745.) Our Supreme
Court, in turn, has construed the phrase “for all purposes” as used in section
17(b) to operate prospectively, explaining that once a wobbler offense has
been declared a misdemeanor, “the offense is a misdemeanor from that point
on, but not retroactively.” (People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 439; see
also Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 794 [“reduction of a wobbler to a
misdemeanor under . . . section 17(b) generally precludes its use as a prior
felony conviction in a subsequent prosecution”]; Rivera, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 [under “the language [in] section 17(b), . . . the
reduction of the offense to a misdemeanor does not apply retroactively”];
People v. Moomey (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 850, 857 [misdemeanor status of a
wobbler offense is “not . . . given retroactive effect”].)
Our courts have further concluded that, given its identical language
(“for all purposes”) and its analogous subject matter (addressing the effect of
designating a felony as a misdemeanor), section 1170.18(k) should be
interpreted in the same manner as section 17(b). (Rivera, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 1100; Abdallah, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 746; cf. People
v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1269, fn. 6 [“identical language appearing
in separate statutory provisions should receive the same interpretation when
the statutes cover the same or analogous subject matter”]; In re Jerry R.
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1437 [“When legislation has been judicially
construed and a subsequent statute on a similar subject uses identical or
substantially similar language, the usual presumption is that the Legislature
intended the same construction”].) Consistent with our Supreme Court’s
interpretation of section 17(b) we “presume . . . the phrase ‘shall be

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considered a misdemeanor for all purposes’ in section 1170.18, subdivision (k)
does not apply retroactively.” (Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100.)4
In sum, we conclude that because section 1170.18 provides no
procedure for dismissing or striking sentence enhancements that were
imposed, and became final, prior to Proposition 47’s enactment, we cannot
infer voters intended the Act to apply retroactively to past sentence
enhancements. In the absence of any express language allowing the
dismissal of past sentence enhancements, we construe section 1170.18(k)’s
direction that any redesignated conviction “shall be considered a
misdemeanor for all purposes” to apply prospectively, precluding future
sentence enhancements based on felony convictions redesignated as
misdemeanors under Proposition 47.5
4 Defendant cites Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th 782 and People v. Flores (1979)
92 Cal.App.3d 461 (Flores), in support of his argument that section
1170.18(k) requires retroactive application of the Act to allow the dismissal or
striking of a sentence enhancements that was imposed before the underlying
offense was redesignated. Both cases are distinguishable, however, because
both involved a prospective application of a redesignated offense. Park held
that the defendant’s current felony sentence could not be enhanced for a prior
conviction that had been previously reduced to a misdemeanor under section
17(b). The Court explained that once a wobbler has been “reduc[ed] . . . to a
misdemeanor[,] . . . section 17(b) generally precludes its use as a prior felony
conviction in a subsequent prosecution.” (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 794.)
Similarly, the court in Flores held that the defendant’s current felony
sentence for selling heroin could not be enhanced based on a prior felony
conviction for marijuana possession because the Legislature had reduced the
marijuana offense to a misdemeanor before the defendant’s heroin conviction.
(See Flores, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 471.) In contrast to Park and Flores,
the sentence enhancement at issue in this case was imposed, and became
final, years before the felony underlying the enhancement had been
redesignated as a misdemeanor.
5 Because we conclude the plain and unambiguous language of section
1170.18 prohibits the dismissal of a sentence enhancement that became final
prior to the Act’s enactment based on the subsequent redesignation of a prior
offense, we need not consider Perea’s alternative arguments that: (1) the
analysis and arguments in the official ballot pamphlet show the voters

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3. Imposing the Section 667.5(b) Enhancement Does Not Violate
the Equal Protection Clause
Perea additionally argues that even if Proposition 47 was not intended
to retroactively invalidate any section 667.5(b) enhancement that was
predicated on an offense that has now been designated a misdemeanor, he is
nonetheless “entitled to relief under the equal protection clauses of the U.S.
and California Constitutions.” More specifically, Perea contends that
“continuing to subject those who have had their felonies reduced to
misdemeanors to the section [667.5(b)] enhancement, when going forward,
those same individuals would not be subject to the enhancement[,] violates
equal protection. There is no rational basis for treating Perea differently
than a person who has already had their prior conviction reduced to a
misdemeanor under Proposition 47, and now, should that person be
sentenced to a new offense, not have the one year enhancement applied to
him or her.”
The California Supreme Court has rejected claims that the state equal
protection clause is violated where classes of criminal defendants are treated
differently based on the effective date of a statute lessening the punishment
for a particular offense. (See People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 189
(Floyd) [“‘[a] reduction of sentences only prospectively from the date a new
sentencing statute takes effect is not a denial of equal protection”].)
intended Proposition 47 to apply to previously-imposed sentence
enhancements (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685 (Rizo) [“When the
language is ambiguous, ‘we refer to other indicia of the voters’ intent,
particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot
pamphlet”]; Moore v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 401, 406 fn. 6
[when “the language of the statute itself is clear and unambiguous, [courts]
need not concern [them]selves with the . . . ballot pamphlet”]); and (2) the
rule of liberal construction requires that we interpret Proposition 47
retroactively. (See Rizo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 684-685 [“If a penal statute
is . . . reasonably susceptible to multiple constructions, then we ordinarily
adopt the ‘“construction which is more favorable to the offender”’”]; Di Genova
v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 174 [“the legislative intent
in favor of the retrospective operation of a statute cannot be implied from the
mere fact that the statute is remedial and subject to the rule of liberal
construction”].)

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Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has held that the “[Fourteenth]
Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a
beginning, and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later
time.” (Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502, 505 (Sperry);
see also Floyd, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 191 [citing and quoting Sperry in
concluding that a statute which prospectively reduces a sentence does not
violate the federal equal protection clause].) “The same rule applies to
changes in sentencing law that benefit defendants.” (People v. Lynch (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 353, 359.) Consequently, we conclude Perea has not shown
that the trial court’s refusal to strike his sentence enhancement violated his
right to equal protection of the laws.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
ZELON, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
KEENY, J.
 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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