P. v. Williams CA2/3 filed 6/30/26

Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Williams CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TIANA WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

B340738

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA120283)

APPEAL from a judgmentof the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Blake R. Armstrong and Kenneth C. Byrne, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Tiana Williams of carjacking, fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly, and felony vandalism. On appeal, Williams challenges only her felony vandalism conviction, contending that there is insufficient evidence she maliciously damaged the car. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence and so affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The victim Visal Yeng worked as a delivery driver for DoorDash and drove a car that could be started with a keyless fob. On August 9, 2022, Yeng was at a sandwich shop to pick up a delivery order, his car parked outside. He had left the car’s key fob under the seat. When Yeng left the shop, he saw Williams getting into his car. As he tried to remove Williams, she asked Yeng, “‘Do you want to leave because insurance is going to pay for it, or do you want to die?’ ” The two struggled and eventually Williams pushed Yeng out of the car. She reversed the car, crashed into a van, and drove away. At some point, Yeng called 911.
Officer Jordan Lasch was on patrol with his partner when he received a report of a carjacking. The officers located Yeng’s car, which was being driven without its lights on. Officer Lasch turned on the police car’s lights and sirens, but Yeng’s car pulled away at 50 or 60 miles per hour, later reaching 80 miles per hour. During the pursuit, Yeng’s car ran a red light and stop signs.
Yeng’s car finally collided with a curb because it was “driving at such an unsafe speed.” The front right side tire popped, the car slowed, and finally Yeng’s car pulled over and Williams got out of the car. Officers arrested Williams.
Yeng said he had paid over $44,000 for his car, and it was now a “total loss.” The front bumper, front passenger side wheel and the “back” were damaged.
DISCUSSION
Williams’s only contention on appeal is that her conviction for felony vandalism must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of an element of the crime, namely, that she acted maliciously in damaging Yeng’s car. But there was sufficient evidence.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ‘ “ ‘ “must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’” ’….We presume ‘ “ ‘the existence of every fact the [jury] could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’”’
(People v. Jimenez (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 602, 608, citations omitted.)
Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a) definesvandalism:
Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not [their] own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: (1)Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. (2)Damages. (3) Destroys.
The term “maliciously” only requires “the intent to do the proscribed acts of defacing, damaging, or destroying property.” (People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 895.) Thus, vandalism is a general intent crime. (Id. at p. 896.)Two types of malice can support a finding of vandalism. Penal Code section 7, subdivision (b)(4) states that malice “import[s] a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” (See generally In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1028.)
The first type of malice has been termed “malice in fact” and the second has been termed “malice in law.” The People only argue that Williams acted with malice in law. That mental state may be presumed or implied from the intentional doing of the act without justification or excuse or mitigating circumstances. (People v. Royal (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1251.) The mental state may be inferred when the damage is “the direct, natural, and highly probable” consequence of the defendant’s acts. (Ibid.; In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1029.)
Williams says she never intended the damage: she obviously did not want to damage the car or blow out the tire because that would have hampered her flight from the police.
But under the “malice in law” test, that’s not the issue. The issue is whether Williams acted in such a way that the damage was a direct, natural, and highly probable consequence. It was. Williams took over Yeng’s car by force, she threw it into reverse crashing into a van behind, she fled the officers, ran a red light, failed to stop at stop signs, drove at almost 80 miles per hour, and hit a curb, blowing out a tire. Yeng’s car was totaled.
Williams notes that the police found no visible damage to the curb where the car hit it. This, she says, shows that the tire damage resulted from natural wear and tear or by “accident.” The “wear and tear” argument requires us to reweigh the evidence, which we can’t do. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1Cal.5th 838, 890.) The “accident” argument reiterates the suggestion that the requisite mental state must intend the specific damage done; but that’s not the test for malice in law.
Sufficient evidence supports Williams’s conviction of felony vandalism.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KARNOW, J.*

We concur:

ADAMS, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.