P. v. Siacksorn

1
Filed 11/16/06 P. v. Siacksorn CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SOMEPHONE SIACKSORN,
Defendant and Appellant.
C049116
(Super. Ct. No.
03F07736)
A jury convicted defendant Somephone Siacksorn of
possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §
11351.5--count one), possession of methamphetamine for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378--count two) and possession of
marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359--count three).
In bifurcated proceedings, the court found a strike prior
(robbery) (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a
prior prison term allegation (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) to
be true.

-- 1 of 5 --

2
Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 11
years, defendant appeals, contending (1) the trial court
erroneously denied his suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5)
and (2) the trial court’s imposition of the upper term for
possession of cocaine base for sale contravenes Blakely v.
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely). We
affirm the judgment.
F ACTS AND P ROCEEDINGS
On September 10, 2003, a search of defendant’s residence
yielded 40 bags of methamphetamine totaling 10 grams, 27
individually wrapped pieces of cocaine base totaling 36 grams,
and 19 bags of marijuana totaling 13.5 grams. Officers also
found a digital scale, a razor blade, packaging material, $954
(primarily in $20 bills), and slips of paper on which were
written defendant’s name and cell phone number. The cell phone
itself was found in a shed on the property. Three surveillance
cameras were found attached to the outside of the house with
television monitors in defendant’s bedroom.
Defendant admitted to officers that he sold rock cocaine
and marijuana. He said that sometimes people knocked on his
bedroom window and he would make the sale through a hole in the
window screen. Defendant explained he was being evicted and so
he gave his drug customers the slips of paper setting forth his
name and phone number.

-- 2 of 5 --

3
D ISCUSSION
I
Knock and Announce
Defendant first contends that his suppression motion was
erroneously denied, arguing that the officers failed to comply
with knock-notice provisions. We disagree.
Given the manner in which we resolve this issue, we need
not burden this opinion with a detailed recitation of the manner
by which law enforcement officers gained entry to defendant’s
residence, except to note that it was pursuant to search
warrant, the validity of which defendant does not challenge.
The United States Supreme Court recently held in Hudson v.
Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. ___ [165 L.Ed.2d 56] (Hudson) that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable as a remedy for a violation of
the “knock and announce” rule because the interests protected by
the rule have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence. (Id.
at p. ___ [165 L.Ed.2d at p. 66].) Under the California
Constitution (art. I, § 28, subd. (d)), federal constitutional
law governs our law of search and seizure. (In re Lance W.
(1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887; see also People v. Camacho (2000)
23 Cal.4th 824, 830.) Given the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hudson, defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied.
(See also In re Frank S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145.)

-- 3 of 5 --

4
II
The Sentence to the Upper Term
In sentencing defendant to state prison, the trial court
imposed 10 years on count one, that is, the upper term of five
years, doubled for the strike prior, finding in aggravation:
defendant’s conviction of other crimes for which a consecutive
sentence could have been imposed; defendant’s planning and
sophistication; defendant’s parole status as a parolee at the
time of the offenses; and defendant’s prior unsatisfactory
performance while on probation or parole. The court imposed
concurrent six-year terms (upper terms of three years, doubled)
for counts two and three. The court imposed a one-year
enhancement for the prior prison term.
Defendant contends the imposition of the upper term on each
count contravenes Blakely. He acknowledges that the California
Supreme Court decided contrary to his claim in People v. Black
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238 (Black) but argues Black was wrongly
decided and that this court should follow Blakely. This court
is bound by Black (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455). We reject defendant’s contention.
In any event, we point out that not only does the holding
in Black defeat defendant’s claim of error, that claim fails
because the trial court imposed the upper term due to the fact
that defendant had been “convicted of other crimes which could
result in consecutive sentencing.” The rule of Blakely does not
apply to the use of prior convictions to increase the penalty
for a crime. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490

-- 4 of 5 --

5
[147 L.Ed.2d 435, 455].) Since one valid factor in aggravation
is sufficient to expose defendant to the upper term (People v.
Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433), the trial court’s
consideration of other factors, in addition to defendant’s prior
convictions, to impose the upper term did not violate the rule
of Blakely.
D ISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL , J.
I concur:
MORRISON , J.
I concur in the opinion except for part II, where I concur in
the result.
SIMS , Acting P.J.

-- 5 of 5 --