P. v. Haulcy

Filed 10/9/18 P. v. Haulcy CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ERIC ALLEN HAULCY,
Defendant and Appellant.
D072701
(Super. Ct. No. SCN348873)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Harry M.
Elias, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Kent, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Scott C.
Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Eric Haulcy of felony driving under the influence of alcohol
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1) and driving with a blood alcohol
level of .08 or greater causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 2). As to both

-- 1 of 9 --

2
counts the jury found true allegations that Haulcy personally inflicted great bodily injury
on three people (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and caused
bodily injury or death to multiple victims (Veh. Code, § 23558). Haulcy admitted a strike
prior (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), a serious felony prior conviction (Pen. Code,
§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The court sentenced Haulcy to a determinate term of 22 years in prison.
Haulcy appeals challenging only the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the
warrantless blood draw evidence. As we will discuss, the trial court found, and the
evidence supports the finding, exigent circumstances justified the police decision not to
take the additional time necessary to seek a warrant. The exigent circumstances shown
by this record are very similar to those found to exist in Schmerber v. California (1966)
384 U.S. 757 (Schmerber). Following the case-by-case analysis mandated by Missouri v.
McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141 (McNeely), we will conclude the exigent circumstances
arising from the horrendous accident, the hospitalization of Haulcy and the time required
to investigate the accident and address the needs of injured people. The evidence showed
that approximately two hours of additional time would have been required to obtain a
telephonic search warrant. Under the totality of circumstances, the warrantless seizure of
Haulcy's blood was justified.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal does not challenge the sufficiency or the admissibility of the evidence
to support the convictions except for the denial of the pretrial motion to suppress
evidence. Accordingly, we will omit a detailed description of the accident, injuries and

-- 2 of 9 --

3
evidence produced at the jury trial. Instead, we will focus on the evidence produced at
the motion to suppress evidence.
The accident causing injuries occurred in the City of Oceanside at around
5:30 p.m. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Police Lieutenant Lopez testified.
He arrived at the scene around 6:30 p.m. He described it as a "massive scene." Haulcy's
car had crossed over the median and collided head on with another car. Haulcy's car was
upside down and firefighters had cut the roof of the car to get him out. Haulcy was
severely injured and was flown to Scripps Hospital in La Jolla. The other car was
severely damaged and the occupants badly injured. At one point police thought one of
the passengers might die. There were traffic problems and debris "everywhere." Other
officers had arrived before Lopez.
Because Haulcy was badly injured and taken from the scene, officers could not
perform any sobriety tests or determine if he was impaired when he drove across traffic
into oncoming cars. Witness statements relayed to Lopez indicated Haulcy was impaired
by alcohol while driving.
Lopez testified that about 90 minutes after the accident had occurred, he directed
another officer to go to the hospital and obtain a blood draw. The blood evidence was
deemed necessary because Haulcy had been removed from the scene and there was no
opportunity to directly observe or test him. Lopez directed the officer to obtain a
phlebotomist to conduct the blood draw.
Lopez explained he did not direct the officer to obtain a warrant based on the
90-minute delay already existing and his knowledge it would take at least two hours just

-- 3 of 9 --

4
to obtain a telephonic search warrant, an estimate the trial court found to be consistent
with the court's own experience.
Lopez was also concerned that the delays would mean the blood would be drawn
more than three hours after the accident, thus depriving them of the statutory presumption
which would make it difficult to relate back to the blood alcohol level at the time of
driving. Lopez also believed the implied consent law would allow a blood draw from an
unconscious driver (who did not object).
When the phlebotomist arrived at the hospital Haulcy was being examined by
medical personnel. After about 30 minutes, she was allowed to draw blood. She testified
the blood was drawn at 7:27 p.m.
The court declined to rule on the implied consent issue because no arrest was
made before the blood was drawn. The court resolved the conflict in the evidence
regarding timing, accepting the officer's time estimate that 90 minutes had elapsed during
the initial response and investigation of the accident. The court found police had
probable cause to believe alcohol was involved and that police reasonably believed it
would have taken two hours to obtain a warrant.
The trial court concluded that there were exigent circumstances which justified
failure to seek a warrant.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, as in the trial court, the People have argued that blood may be
drawn from an unconscious driver under California's implied consent law and that police
acted in good faith in relying on the statute. The applicability of the implied consent law

-- 4 of 9 --

5
in circumstances such as this is currently before our Supreme Court in People v.
Arredondo (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186 (rev. granted June 8, 2016, S233582). Further,
the trial court declined to rule on those issues in part because there was no evidence
Haulcy was under arrest when the blood was obtained. We will also decline to address
the implied consent law's limitations or the applicability of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.
A. Legal Principles
When we review a trial court decision on a motion to suppress evidence we apply
a two-step process. First, we apply the substantial evidence standard to determine the
historical facts. Once we ascertain the factual basis for the motion we apply our
independent judgment to the legal significance of such facts. (People v. Glaser (1995)
11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) We will defer to the factual findings of the trial court if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Camacho (2000)
23 Cal.4th 824, 830.)
It is well established that searches or seizures conducted without warrants are
presumed to be invalid unless there is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
(United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224.) One of the established exceptions
to the warrant requirement exists where police are acting under exigent circumstances.
(Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 460.) One example of exigent circumstances is
where police must act quickly to prevent the destruction of evidence. (Cupp v. Murphy
(1973) 412 U.S. 291, 296.)

-- 5 of 9 --

6
In Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. 757, 770, the court recognized that the natural
dissipation of alcohol in a person's blood could be an exigent circumstance requiring
taking blood without consent or a warrant. The court accepted that alcohol in a person's
blood stream disappears at a fairly predictable rate after drinking. Thus, delays in
obtaining blood samples may result in lost evidence which is relevant to whether the
person was under the influence of alcohol while driving. (People v. Thompson (2008)
38 Cal.4th 811, 825.)
In order to determine if police acted reasonably in relying on exigent
circumstances we must look to the totality of the circumstances. (Ohio v. Robinette
(1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39.)
In McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. 141, the court revisited the question of what
constitutes exigent circumstances justifying warrantless searches in drunk driving cases.
In that case the state contended there should be a per se rule that the dissipation of
alcohol in the bloodstream should be justification for avoiding the warrant process. The
facts of McNeely involved a routine case where there was adequate time to get a warrant.
The Missouri court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, concluded alcohol dissipation
could constitute exigent circumstances in a given case, but declined to create a per se
rule. (Id. at pp. 157-158.)
The court in McNeely considered its prior opinion in Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S.
757, and again concluded it was reasonable in that case for police to act without a
warrant. The suspect there had been injured in an accident and taken to the hospital.
Delays in dealing with the accident and fact of his hospitalization, in that case justified

-- 6 of 9 --

7
the need to act without a warrant. Ultimately, the court in McNeely held that exigent
circumstances in drunk driving cases must be decided on a case-by-case basis, looking to
determine whether, in light of greater availability of search warrants for police such
circumstances justified acting without a warrant. No hard and fast rule was created by
the court. (McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 158.)
In People v. Toure (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103-1105, Division Two of our
court addressed exigent circumstances arising from a traffic accident, its investigation
and the problems with getting the defendant secured before obtaining a blood sample.
The court found the problems facing police in the processing of the suspect made it
reasonable for police to obtain a blood sample without first seeking a warrant. The court
found the warrantless search to be reasonable under both Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. 757
and McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. 141.
B. Analysis
The trial court found the police testimony to be credible and resolved any
differences in evidence of timing in favor of the officer's testimony. The facts presented
thus show substantial delays experienced by police in addressing the damage and chaos
from the accident. They had no opportunity to observe or question Haulcy at the scene
since he was air lifted to the hospital to deal with his significant injury. It took around 90
minutes for police to sort out the facts enough to acquire probable cause to suspect
Haulcy was driving under the influence of alcohol. The commander at the scene was
aware of the additional delay that would be required in San Diego County in the process
of obtaining a telephonic warrant. The court found the testimony credible. An officer

-- 7 of 9 --

8
was dispatched to the hospital to obtain a blood sample. It appears police diligently and
continuously pursued their investigation, but were delayed by the circumstances of a
difficult accident and the injury and hospitalization of the suspect.
Haulcy cites People v. Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 604 in support of his
contention police were not justified in relying on exigent circumstances. Meza is
distinguishable from the facts presented here. In that case police were able to observe
and at least briefly speak to the suspect at the scene. When the investigating officer went
to the hospital, she apparently engaged in several activities, including interviewing
witnesses and filling out paperwork. (Id. at pp. 611-613.) The appellate court concluded
she could have had other colleagues do her interviews and paperwork and would
therefore have had time to apply for a warrant. That is not the situation presented here.
In the present case the record does not show a lack of diligence by police or that
there were alternatives which would have given them time to apply for a warrant. As
best we can tell, the record in People v. Meza, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 604 does not
address the time constraints of the warrant process, as was done here.
Our case in more akin to People v. Toure, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th 1096. We
believe the court there correctly applied the totality of circumstance test to the facts
presented and correctly found police acted reasonably. We agree with the analysis of the
Toure opinion.
While there was a dispute as to the timing of various events in this case, the trial
court resolved the dispute in favor of the officer's testimony. There is sufficient
substantial evidence to support the finding. Based on the trial court's factual findings we

-- 8 of 9 --

9
are satisfied the police in this case acted properly in relying on exigent circumstances
instead of seeking a warrant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
AARON, J.

-- 9 of 9 --