P. v. Collins

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Filed 2/4/19 P. v. Collins CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CARLA ROSE COLLINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
E069430
(Super.Ct.Nos. RIF1701190 &
BAF1700728)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Johnson, Judge.
Affirmed in part, remanded with directions in part.
Linda M. Cuny, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B.
Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Carla Rose Collins challenges a number of her
probationary terms and conditions, arguing they are unconstitutionally vague, overbroad,
and violate the separation of powers and the rights to travel and association. The People
agree that the condition requiring defendant to report contact with law enforcement
should be modified, but argue defendant’s remaining claims are without merit. We agree
with the parties that the condition requiring defendant to report contact with law
enforcement must be modified and remand the matter to allow the trial court to modify
the condition. We reject defendant’s remaining contentions and otherwise affirm the
judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Case No. RIF17011901
On January 4, 2017, with a blood alcohol content of 0.249 percent, defendant
repeatedly drove into a closed gate in order to gain access to a fenced-in property.
Defendant caused approximately $2,000 in damages to the fence.
1 The factual background in case No. RIF1701190 is taken from the preliminary
hearing transcript as the parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript for the
factual basis for the plea.

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On April 5, 2017, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with felony
vandalism (Pen. Code,2 § 594, subd. (a); count 1), driving a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 2), and driving a vehicle while
having a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b);
count 3). As to counts 2 and 3, the complaint also alleged that defendant’s blood alcohol
content was 0.20 or greater (Veh. Code, § 23538, subd. (b)(2)). The complaint further
alleged that defendant had suffered one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667,
subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On June 21, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to counts 1
and 2, and admitted her blood alcohol content was 0.20 or greater, with the agreed-upon
maximum sentence of three years six months. In exchange, the remaining charge and
enhancement allegations were dismissed, and defendant was placed on probation for a
period of 36 months on various terms and conditions of probation, including serving
180 days in the county jail. Defendant did not object to the terms and conditions of her
probation, and explicitly agreed to accept her probationary terms and to follow all of
them.
On June 30, 2017, defendant was placed in the Riverside Alternative Sentencing
Program. In connection with the program, she was placed on home detention and
required to wear an ankle bracelet monitor.
2 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

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B. Case No. BAF17007283
On July 3, 2017, defendant escaped from home detention.
On July 5, 2017, while on probation in case No. RIF1701190, a felony complaint
was filed charging defendant with escaping from home detention in violation of
section 4532, subdivision (b)(1). The felony complaint was amended on August 1, 2017,
to include defendant’s five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and one prior strike
conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
On September 25, 2017, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike her
prior strike conviction pursuant to section 1385.
On September 28, 2017, defendant pled guilty to escaping from home detention in
violation of section 4532, subdivision (b)(1). On that same day, defendant also admitted
to violating her probation in case No. RIF1701190. In return, the remaining enhancement
allegations were dismissed, and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of
three years on various terms and conditions of probation, including serving 335 days in
county jail, to run concurrent with case No. RIF1701190. Defendant did not object to the
terms and conditions of her probation, and explicitly agreed to accept all of her
probationary terms and conditions. In case No. RIF1701190, the trial court reinstated
defendant on probation with the same terms and conditions, with the exception of serving
an additional 185 days in county jail, to run concurrent with case No. BAF1700728.
3 The factual background in case No. BAF1700728 is taken from amended felony
complaint as the parties stipulated to the complaint for the factual basis for the plea.

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On October 30, 2017, defendant filed a notice of appeal in both cases.
III
DISCUSSION
At the September 28, 2017 sentencing hearing in case Nos. BAF1700728 and
RIF1701190, the trial court imposed the following challenged probation conditions:
(1) “Participate and complete at your expense any counseling, rehabilitation/treatment
program deemed appropriate by probation officer; and authorize release of information
relative to progress” (hereafter Treatment Condition); (2) “Report any law enforcement
contacts to Probation Officer within 48 hours” (hereafter Police Contact Reporting
Condition); (3) “Inform the probation officer of your place of residence and reside at a
residence approved by the probation officer”; “Give written notice to the probation
officer 24 hours before changing your residence and do not move without the approval of
the probation officer” (hereafter Residency Approval Conditions); (4) “Submit to
immediate search/property including all residence/premises/storage units, containers and
vehicles under your control; by Probation Officer or law enforcement officer; with or
without cause” (hereafter Search Condition); and (5) “Do not associate with any
unrelated person you know to be on either probation, parole, mandatory supervision, post
community supervision or a gang member”; “Do not associate with any unrelated person
you know to be a possessor, user or trafficker of controlled substance” (hereafter No-
Contact Conditions).

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Defendant argues that the above-noted probationary terms and conditions are
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and/or violate the separation of powers doctrine and
her rights to travel and association. She, therefore, believes the challenged conditions
must either be stricken or modified. The People agree that the Police Contact Reporting
Condition must be modified, but otherwise urge the court to reject defendant’s remaining
claims.
A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
“When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law
authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are ‘fitting
and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society
for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach,
and . . . for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.’” (People v. Moran
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402-403, quoting § 1203.1, subd. (j).) Thus, “a sentencing court
has ‘broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public
safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.’” (Moran, at p. 403, quoting People v.
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 (Carbajal).) “If a probation condition serves to
rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may ‘impinge upon a constitutional
right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is “not entitled to the same degree of
constitutional protection as other citizens.”’” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1351, 1355 (O’Neil), quoting People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624 (Lopez).)

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Judicial discretion in selecting the conditions of a defendant’s probation “is not
unlimited.” (O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) A probation condition is
unreasonable and will not be upheld if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the
defendant was convicted, (2) relates to conduct that is not criminal, and (3) requires
or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. (People v.
Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380 (Olguin); O’Neil, at p. 1355.) “This test is
conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a
probation term.” (Olguin, at p. 379.) Thus, as a general rule, “even if a condition of
probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and
involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition
is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (Id. at p. 380.)
However, “[j]udicial discretion to set conditions of probation is further
circumscribed by constitutional considerations.” (O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1356.) Under this second level of scrutiny, if an otherwise valid condition of probation
impinges on constitutional rights, the condition must be carefully tailored so as to be
reasonably related to the compelling state interest in the probationer’s reformation and
rehabilitation. (Ibid.; People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 942 (Bauer); In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.); In re Victor L. (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) “The essential question . . . is the closeness of the fit between the
legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s
constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is

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impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)
Challenges to probation conditions ordinarily must be raised in the trial court or
appellate review of those conditions will be deemed forfeited. (People v. Welch (1993) 5
Cal.4th 228, 234-235 (Welch) [extending the forfeiture rule to a claim that probation
conditions are unreasonable, when the probationer fails to object on that ground in the
trial court].) On the other hand, the forfeiture rule does not apply, and a defendant who
did not object to a probation condition at sentencing may do so on appeal if the appellate
claim “amount[s] to a ‘facial challenge’” that challenges the condition on the ground its
“phrasing or language . . . is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad” and the
determination whether the condition is constitutionally defective “does not require
scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract
and generalized legal concepts—a task that is well suited to the role of an appellate
court.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, 887.) Thus, a challenge to a probation
condition on the ground it is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague “that is capable of
correction without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial
court can be said to present a pure question of law” (id. at p. 887, italics omitted), and
such a challenge is reviewable on appeal even if it was not raised in the trial court (id. at
p. 889).
Defendant raised no objection in the trial court with respect to the above
challenged conditions. Nevertheless, to the extent defendant raises a facial challenge to

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the constitutional validity of the challenged probation conditions, the claims are not
forfeited by defendant’s failure to raise it below and we will reach the merits of
defendant’s claims. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 888-889.) We, however, focus
solely on the constitutionality of the challenged conditions, not whether they are
reasonable as applied to defendant. (See People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 [test
for reasonableness of probation conditions].) By failing to object below, defendant has
forfeited all claims except a challenge “based on the ground the condition is vague or
overbroad and thus facially unconstitutional.” (Sheena K., at p. 878.)
Trial courts must fashion precise supervision conditions so the probationer knows
what is required. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) A condition is invalid if it is
“‘“‘so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.’”’” (People v. Quiroz (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1128.)
Nor may a court impose overbroad supervision conditions. Where a condition impinges
on a constitutional right, it must be carefully tailored and reasonably related to the
compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. (Ibid.; Sheena K., at p. 890.)
A “court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many
details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the
court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.” (O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1358-1359 [probation condition forbidding defendant from associating with all
persons designated by his probation officer was “overbroad and permit[ted] an
unconstitutional infringement on defendant’s right of association”].) “If a probation

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condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may ‘impinge
upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is “not entitled to
the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.”’” (Id. at p. 1355, quoting
Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.)
“Generally, we review the court’s imposition of a probation condition for an abuse
of discretion.” (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143, citing Carbajal,
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) However, we independently review constitutional
challenges to a probation condition. (In re Shaun R., at p. 1143.) Based on the
foregoing, we address the merits of defendant’s arguments post.
B. Treatment Condition
Defendant contends that the Treatment Condition requiring her to “participate and
complete at [her] expense any counseling, rehabilitation/treatment program deemed
appropriate by probation officer” is vague because it does not provide her notice as to the
type, scope, and conditions of treatment she would be required to attend. Specifically,
she argues that the condition did not “sufficiently apprise [her] of the burdens she was
assuming, and did not sufficiently fix a standard to determine whether she has satisfied
the condition.” She also asserts the condition is overbroad because it is not narrowly
tailored and reasonably related to her rehabilitation. For the reasons explained below, we
reject these contentions.
Subdivision (a) of section 1202.8 states that “[p]ersons placed on probation by a
court shall be under the supervision of the county probation officer who shall determine

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both the level and type of supervision consistent with the court-ordered conditions of
probation.” Subdivision (a) of section 1203 provides in part, “‘probation’ means the
suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and
revocable release in the community under the supervision of a probation officer.”
Taken together, these statutes provide that the court orders conditions of probation
and the probation officer supervises compliance with them. The conditions do not
constitute a delegation of the court’s authority to order probation conditions; rather, the
court has already ordered the conditions. Where a court-ordered probation condition
provides it applies if “deemed appropriate” by the probation officer, the court has merely
vested the probation officer with the power to set the time and place for administration of
these court-ordered probation conditions based on the probation officer’s statutory
authority to “determine both the level and type of supervision consistent with the court-
ordered conditions of probation.” (§ 1202.8, subd. (a); People v. Kwizera (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240 (Kwizera) [“When the clear words of Penal Code
sections 1202.8 and 1203 are applied, the trial court has authority to empower the
probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions.”].) As our
high court observed in Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 375, the probation department’s
authority to supervise compliance with the conditions of probation does not empower the
department to engage in irrational conduct or make irrational demands. (Id. at p. 383.)
Thus, we reject defendant’s claim that “[w]hile this court may anticipate that
[defendant’s] probation officer would act competently and require enrollment in a

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program related to alcohol treatment, such a hope and expectation that a probation officer
act reasonably in making its decisions does not save facially overbroad language of a
probation condition.”
For those if “deemed appropriate” or “if directed” conditions requiring
participation in court-ordered programs, another court has noted that “[t]he trial court is
poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a program, both because it lacks the ability
to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more fundamentally, because
entry into a particular program may depend on mercurial questions of timing and
availability.” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308 (Penoli).) Even if the
court could be more specific in its order, that does not necessarily render a condition
overbroad. (Ibid. [“Desirable as such a narrowing of the probation officer’s discretion
might be, however, we are not prepared at this time to hold that its absence constitutes
prejudicial error.”])
As the Penoli court noted, “[a] defendant who is concerned about particular risks
can bring those concerns to the court’s attention at or prior to sentencing, asking it (for
instance) to approve or disapprove specific programs identified by the defense. Failing
that, the defendant can seek judicial intervention—by moving to modify the probation
order, if nothing else—if and when the probation officer seeks to exercise the delegated
authority. (See § 1203.3.)” (Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)
The if “deemed appropriate” or “if directed” conditions are not unconstitutionally
vague. As previously noted, to avoid a challenge of vagueness, the condition “must be

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sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for
the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” (People v. Reinertson
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320, 324-325.) The Penoli court found that notice was satisfied if
the probationer’s trial attorney had actual knowledge of what the program ordered by the
court would typically entail in terms of treatment and duration. (Penoli, supra, 46
Cal.App.4th at p. 309.) Such an order also does not have to be specific regarding how
compliance with the program will be assessed since it is ultimately up to the sentencing
court to determine compliance with conditions of probation, not the probation officer.
(Id. at p. 310.)
Defendant’s reliance on Penoli is misplaced. The court in Penoli did not find a
treatment condition to be facially unconstitutional. Rather, the Penoli court explained
that the probationer was not “completely at the mercy of the probation department”
because the probationer could seek judicial intervention by moving to modify the
probation order, if, and when, the probation officer seeks to exercise that authority.
(Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308, citing § 1203.3; see In re Moriah T. (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1367, 1375, 1377.) The Penoli court recognized that probation officers
possess some discretion in deciding when a probationer would participate in a residential
treatment program and in program selection. (Penoli, at p. 308.) As noted, the trial court
retains ultimate control over exercise of the probation conditions. (See §§ 1203.2,
subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a).)

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We view the if “deemed appropriate” conditions in light of Olguin and presume a
probation officer will not interpret them in an irrational or capricious manner. (Olguin,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 383.) If the probation officer interprets the if “deemed
appropriate” conditions in any arbitrary manner, defendant could file a petition for
modification of her probation condition. (See §§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a);
see People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to
review probation officer’s actions].)
Defendant further asserts that the Treatment Condition “fails to specify the
character” of the program or specify “what type of conduct the program is designed to
facilitate or curtail.” To the extent defendant attempts to argue the Treatment Condition
was unreasonable, which is an as-applied challenge, we find defendant’s argument
waived because she failed to object to the reasonableness of the condition below.
(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) A timely objection would have allowed the
court to explain why the Treatment Condition was necessary in this case. (See Welch,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235; Sheena K., at p. 889.)
Notwithstanding, we note that the Treatment Condition is listed under the
“Drug/Search/Test Programs Terms” section of the probation condition document.
Though it does not state that the treatment program would be for drug and alcohol
treatment, its placement under the drug section clearly conveys to defendant and the
probation officer that the purpose of the Treatment Condition is to treat drug and alcohol
addiction. (See Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th 298 [court found contested condition was

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not overly broad or vague because it specified that the treatment was for drug abuse].)
Defendant’s convictions stemmed from crimes she committed after consuming enough
alcohol to reach a 0.249 blood alcohol content. At sentencing, the court suggested that
“maybe you ought not be drinking [alcohol]” because it resulted in defendant making bad
decisions. With the agreement of the prosecution and defense, the court referred
defendant to the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program, or “RSAT.” The
undisputed facts in the record show that defendant struggled with alcohol abuse. Thus,
the Treatment Condition was neither vague nor overbroad.
Defendant also relies on People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353 to argue
that the Treatment Condition violates the separation of powers doctrine. Cervantes is
distinguishable from the present case. In Cervantes, the court placed the defendant on
probation “on condition that he ‘pay restitution in an amount and manner to be
determined by the Probation Officer.’” (Cervantes, at p. 356.) The Cervantes court
further stated “[w]e find no statutory provision sanctioning a delegation of unlimited
discretion to a probation officer to determine the propriety, amount, and manner of
payment of restitution.” (Id. at p. 358.) In Cervantes, unlike this case, the trial court had
allowed probation officers to make a final determination (of probation conditions)
without any ensuing judicial review. (Id. at pp. 355-359.) We therefore reject
defendant’s assertion that the separations of powers doctrine was violated when the court
imposed the Treatment Condition or that judicial authority was delegated to the probation
officer to determine a treatment program if “deemed appropriate.” The treatment

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program was listed under the drug terms portion of the probation document. Moreover,
the parties discussed a specific residential treatment program. Thus, defendant had notice
that she could potentially be directed to complete a residential treatment program during
her probationary period.
Based on the foregoing, we find the Treatment Condition is neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad, and it does not improperly delegate power to the
probation department or violate the separation of powers.
C. The Police Contact Reporting Condition
Relying on People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 (Relkin), defendant
contends that the probation condition requiring her to report “‘any law enforcement
contacts to probation officer within 48 hours’” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
She asserts the condition is vague because it does not delineate “what type of contact
with law enforcement would necessitate reporting.” She further argues that the condition
is overbroad because reference to “‘any law enforcement’” is too broad and should be
limited to incidents involving police officers. The People agree that the type of contact
that requires reporting should be modified, but that the term “‘law enforcement’” is
commonly understood to mean sworn officers and is not overbroad.
In Relkin, as here, a condition of probation required that the defendant report “‘any
contacts with or incidents involving any peace officer.’” (Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1196.) The court found the condition overbroad, explaining: “[T]he portion of the
condition requiring that defendant report ‘any contacts with . . . any peace officer’ is

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vague and overbroad and does indeed leave one to guess what sorts of events and
interactions qualify as reportable. We disagree with the People’s argument that the
condition is clearly not triggered when defendant says ‘hello’ to a police officer or
attends an event at which police officers are present, but would be triggered if defendant
were interviewed as a witness to a crime or if his ‘lifestyle were such that he is present
when criminal activity occurs.’ The language does not delineate between such
occurrences and thus casts an excessively broad net over what would otherwise be
activity not worthy of reporting.” (Id. at p. 1197.) Accordingly, the Relkin court
remanded the case to the trial court with directions to modify the condition to more
clearly inform the defendant of what contacts must be reported.
Here, the condition imposed on defendant suffers from the defect identified in
Relkin: by requiring that defendant report any contact with law enforcement, it does not
differentiate between casual contact unrelated to any criminality, or even suspicion of
criminality, and contact which might warrant some further investigation by a probation
officer. The People concede that the police contact reporting condition in this case is
nearly identical to Relkin, and agree the matter should be remanded. The People assert
that they are also “not opposed to modified language specifying that [defendant] must
report contacts related to criminal activity and arrests.” We agree that such a limitation
on the condition would cure its overbreadth defect by giving defendant unambiguous
guidance with respect to what events she must report. However, rather than providing
this limitation on the condition by way of interpretation in an appellate opinion, as a

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practical matter in order to fully protect defendant’s rights, this limitation on the
condition should be expressly modified by the trial court. Accordingly, we will remand
with directions that the Police Contact Reporting Condition be expressly modified.
D. The Residency Approval Conditions
Defendant argues the Residency Approval Conditions are unconstitutionally
overbroad and not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Specifically,
she asserts that requiring the probation officer’s “approval” as to her choice of residence
and her ability to relocate is overbroad and violates her rights to travel and association
because it does not advance her rehabilitation or public safety. Accordingly, defendant
asks this court to strike the approval language.
A restriction requiring that a probation officer approve a defendant’s residence
clearly imposes a burden on that defendant’s constitutional rights to associate and his or
her right to intrastate and interstate travel. (Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 944
[probation condition requiring that probation officer approve of residence “impinges on
constitutional entitlements—the right to travel and freedom of association”].)
Nonetheless, a probation condition may restrict these rights as long as it reasonably
relates to reformation and rehabilitation. (In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 146.)
Defendant relies on Bauer to argue that a probation condition that grants a
probation officer unfettered discretion to approve or disapprove of a probationer’s
residence is facially unconstitutional. Bauer involved a probationer’s challenge to a
condition nearly identical to the one here, which requires that defendant obtain his

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probation officer’s approval of his place of residence. (Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 943-945.) The Bauer court struck the condition, concluding that any requirement that
the defendant obtain his probation officer’s approval of his residence was an “extremely
broad” restriction, and was not “narrowly tailored to interfere as little as possible” with
the constitutional right of travel and to freedom of association. (Id. at p. 944.) Such a
condition gave the probation officer the discretionary power to prohibit the defendant
from living with or near whomever the probation officer chose—i.e., it gave the
probation officer “the power to banish him.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, nothing suggests
the Residency Approval Conditions were designed to banish defendant from a particular
neighborhood or stop her from living where she desires. (People v. Arevalo (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 652, 657 (Arevalo); see People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 995
(Stapleton) [distinguishing Bauer because “residence condition imposed here is not a
wolf in sheep’s clothing; it is not designed to banish defendant”].)
To the extent that defendant’s argument may be considered to be an as applied
challenge to the Residency Approval Conditions on overbreadth grounds, we reject the
challenge. First, the Bauer court did not explain whether it was considering a facial or an
as-applied challenge to the residency approval condition. Second, there is no mention in
Bauer whether the defendant had raised an objection to the condition in the trial court.
Although the Bauer court utilized broad language, including language often used in the
context of a facial overbreadth analysis, to conclude that the residency approval condition
was unconstitutional in that case, it appears from the court’s analysis that it made this

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determination only after a particularized assessment of the application of this condition to
the specific circumstances of that defendant. In fact, the Bauer court’s conclusory
constitutional analysis followed discussion of the fact that there was “nothing in the
probation report or otherwise a part of the record in this case suggesting in any way that
appellant’s home life (which is exemplary compared to that of most convicted felons)
contributed to the crime of which he was convicted.” (Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at
p. 944.) We are unconvinced that the Bauer court was truly considering whether a
residency approval condition was unconstitutional in every potential application, as
opposed to determining that it was unconstitutional under the unique facts of that case.
For this reason, we read Bauer to hold, narrowly, that a residency approval condition may
not be constitutionally applied to a defendant where the record demonstrates that the
defendant’s rehabilitation would not be served by placing restrictions on his or her
residency, given the specific nature of the offender and the nature of his or her offense.
Furthermore, to the extent that defendant is arguing that a residency approval
probation condition is unconstitutional as applied to her, we conclude that she has
forfeited such an argument by failing to raise it below. (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th
at p. 889.) Because we conclude that Bauer is not persuasive with respect to determining
whether the challenged probation conditions are facially overbroad, we next consider
whether review of the Residency Approval Conditions in the abstract reveals that it is not
narrowly tailored to the state’s legitimate purpose in imposing it. (See Sheena K., at
p. 885 [appellate claim that the language of a probation condition is unconstitutionally

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vague or overbroad “does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but
instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts”].) We cannot say
that the Residency Approval Conditions are facially overbroad based on its language and
legal concepts.
Even where a court does not provide an individualized assessment of a particular
probationer’s needs with respect to his or her living circumstances, the grant of
discretionary authority to a probation officer includes an implicit requirement that the
discretion be exercised reasonably. (See Stapleton, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-997
[“A probation officer cannot issue directives that are not reasonable in light of the
authority granted to the officer by the court. Thus, a probation officer cannot use the
residence condition to arbitrarily disapprove a defendant’s place of residence.”].) We
agree with our decision in Stapleton. A residency approval condition “does not grant a
probation officer the power to issue arbitrary or capricious directives that the court itself
could not order.” (Ibid., citing Kwizera, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1240-1241
[probation condition requiring a probationer to obey directions from his probation officer
does not give probation officer “power to impose unreasonable probation conditions”].)
We therefore reject the suggestion that the Residency Approval Conditions must include
probationer specific criteria in every case in order to avoid being unconstitutionally
overbroad.
Further, in considering the “nature of the case,” (Stapleton, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 993-994) based on the undisputed facts and defendant’s rehabilitation and public

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safety, it is apparent that the Residency Approval Conditions reasonably relate to
defendant’s reformation and rehabilitation. As our Supreme Court has observed,
“Imposing a limitation on probationers’ movements as a condition of probation is
common, as probation officers’ awareness of probationers’ whereabouts facilitates
supervision and rehabilitation and helps ensure probationers are complying with the
terms of their conditional release.” (Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 406.) Moreover, in a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a probation condition, it is not clear that a court
is required to consider the individual defendant’s rehabilitative needs. (Stapleton, at
pp. 993-994 [distinguishing between degree of specificity required in facial versus “‘as
applied’” challenge to probation condition as constitutionally overbroad].) It may be
sufficient to consider “the nature of the case and the goals and needs of probation in
general,” considering, generally, the type of crime involved. (Ibid.) Additionally, it is
important to recognize, “probation is a privilege and not a right, and that adult
probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their
constitutional rights . . . . [Citations.]” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384.) “If a
defendant believes the conditions of probation are more onerous than the potential
sentence, he or she may refuse probation and choose to serve the sentence. [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 379; Stapleton, at p. 997.)
The Residency Approval Conditions here are reasonably necessary to rehabilitate
defendant and protect the public. Moreover, as our Supreme Court stated in Olguin, “A
probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable,

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objective reader.’ [Citation.]” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382.) And we presume a
probation officer will not withhold approval under the Residency Approval Conditions
for irrational or capricious reasons (id. at p. 383) and will appreciate there are limited
housing options. (Arevalo, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 658.)
E. The Search Condition
Defendant also argues that the Search Condition, requiring her to “[s]ubmit to
immediate search of person/property including at residences/premises/storage units,
containers, & vehicles under your control” is overbroad because it “appears to permit
unfettered governmental access to [defendant’s] cell phone, computer, electronic devices,
and digital media.” Defendant does not challenge the actual language of the condition
but asserts the condition is “overly inclusive,” presuming it applies to cell phones,
computers, and other electronic storage devices,4 and infringes on her “rights of freedom
from unreasonable searches and right to privacy.”
Assuming, without deciding, that the Search Condition in this case includes
searches of electronic devices (compare In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 262
4 The constitutionality of including electronics in probation search conditions is
currently pending before the California Supreme Court. (See In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923; In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243
Cal.App.4th 556, review granted Mar. 9, 2016, S232240; In re Mark C. (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 520, review granted Apr. 13, 2016, S232849; In re A.S. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 758, review granted May 25, 2016, S233932; In re J.E. (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 795, 800-802 (J.E.), review granted Oct. 12, 2016, S236628; People v.
Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1130, review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S238210;
People v. Trujillo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 574 (Trujillo), review granted Nov. 29, 2017,
S244650.)

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[Fourth District, Division One held that standard search conditions authorizing searches
of a probationer’s person, property, and vehicle only apply to tangible physical property
and not to electronic data] to People v. Sandee (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 294, 306 [Fourth
District, Division One later declined to follow I.V. because (1) its search condition was
imposed after the Electronics Communications Privacy Act or ECPA became effective,
and (2) I.V. relied on a federal case that is not controlling in California]), we reject
defendant’s contention that the Search Condition is unconstitutionally overbroad.
In Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. __, [134 S.Ct. 2473] (Riley), the court held
that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to
searches of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee. (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at
p. 2485].) Riley explained the ordinary justifications for searches incident to arrest were
to prevent harm to officers and destruction of evidence, but there were “no comparable
risks when the search is of digital data.” (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 2484-2485].)
“Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an
arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. Law enforcement officers remain
free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a
weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and
its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical
threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one.” (Ibid.)
Riley weighed the government’s interests against the heightened privacy interests
that people have in their cell phone data. Riley compared cell phones to

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“minicomputers,” and noted both the volume of sensitive data they contain and the
pervasiveness of cell phone usage. (Riley, supra, 573 U.S. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at
p. 2489].) Cell phone data is “qualitatively different” from physical records and could
include information like location data or Internet browsing history, that would “typically
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house . . . .”
(Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 2490-2491].) “Modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for
many Americans ‘the privacies of life,’ [citation]. The fact that technology now allows
an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any
less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question
of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple—get a warrant.” (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 2494-2495].) Riley
reversed and remanded the case but emphasized that its holding was only that cell phone
data is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, “not that the information on a cell phone
is immune from search.” (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2493].) “[E]ven though the search
incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions
may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone,” such as the exigent
circumstances exception. (Id. at p. __ [134 S.Ct. at p. 2494].)
In People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, the defendant was charged
with sex offenses committed on a minor that he met on social media. He later pleaded
guilty to false imprisonment by means of deceit and was placed on probation. (Id. at

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pp. 720-721.) One of the probation conditions was for his electronic devices to be
subject to “‘forensic analysis search for material prohibited by law. . . .’” (Id. at p. 721.)
Appleton held the search condition was valid under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 because it
was reasonably related to his crime. However, the Appleton court, relying on Riley,
supra, 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473], found the search condition was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it allowed “for searches of vast amounts of personal information
unrelated to defendant’s criminal conduct or his potential future criminality,” (Appleton,
at p. 727) such as his medical and financial records, “personal diaries, and intimate
correspondence with family and friends.” (Id. at p. 725.)
Riley does not address the constitutionality of search conditions imposed pursuant
to probation or parole. The defendant in that case had not been convicted of crimes at the
time of the search, and Riley acknowledged that there could be circumstances where a
warrantless search of electronic devices would be valid. Riley is not applicable to
defendant’s case.
“Warrantless searches are justified in the probation context because they aid in
deterring further offenses by the probationer and in monitoring compliance with the terms
of probation. [Citations.] By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation
search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to
protect the community from potential harm by probationers. [Citation.]” (People v.
Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795.)

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As relevant to this case, the balancing of equities is fundamentally different than in
Riley and favors the government, since a defendant has a significantly diminished
expectation of privacy as a probationer and the government has a greater interest to
protect the safety of the public from future criminal offenses committed by probationers.
While searches involving electronic devices may raise unique issues of privacy not
found in searches of these more traditional categories, there is no reason to depart from
the well-recognized treatment of search conditions when that condition implicates
electronic devices. Indeed, a person’s home also contains considerable personal and
confidential information and is a place where a person has the absolute right to be left
alone, but conditions which grant broad authority to search the home of a probationer or
parolee without a warrant or reasonable cause have been upheld. (People v. Reyes (1998)
19 Cal.4th 743, 746, 754; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505-506; In re Binh L.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203-205; People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 66-68;
see United States v. Mitchell (11th Cir. 2009) 565 F.3d 1347, 1352 [comparing “the hard
drive of a computer” to the “‘the digital equivalent of its owner’s home, [as] capable of
holding a universe of private information’”].)
In the absence of further guidance from the United States or California Supreme
Court, we find the Search Condition here constitutional. “‘A probation condition that
imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those
limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally
overbroad.’ [Citation.] ‘The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the

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closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it
imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that
perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.’” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346.)
Here, the record reflects some evidence of the legitimate purpose of the restriction,
as we have discussed above: preventing future criminality by promoting effective
supervision. The condition may place a burden, in the abstract, on defendant’s general
right to privacy based on the possibility of a search of her electronic devices. But, as a
defendant under probation supervision, her privacy rights are “diminished,” i.e., they may
more readily be burdened by restrictions that serve a legitimate purpose. On the current
record, we conclude the burden on defendant’s privacy right is insufficient to show
overbreadth, given the legitimate penological purpose shown for searching defendant’s
electronic devices.
Additionally, as our colleagues did in Trujillo, we reject defendant’s argument that
the Search Condition is unconstitutionally overbroad as violating her fundamental
privacy rights under Riley, supra, 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473]. In Trujillo, the appellate
court distinguished Riley, and followed authority explaining that the overbreadth analysis
is materially different from the warrant requirement at issue in that case. (Trujillo, supra,
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 587.) The court observed that probationers do not enjoy the absolute
liberty to which law-abiding citizens are entitled, and that courts routinely uphold broad
probation conditions permitting searches of a probationer’s residence without a warrant

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or reasonable cause. (Id. at pp. 587-588.) Like the defendant in Trujillo (id. at pp. 588-
589), defendant has not challenged the probation condition authorizing officers to
conduct random and unlimited searches of her residence at any time and for no stated
reason, and she has made no showing that a search of her electronic devices would be any
more invasive than an unannounced, without-cause, warrantless search of her residence.
Moreover, here, the record supports a conclusion that the Search Condition is necessary
to protect public safety and to ensure defendant’s rehabilitation during her supervision
period. Consequently, a routine search of defendant’s person, property, container, or
electronic data “is strongly relevant to the probation department’s supervisory function.”
(Id. at p. 588.)
Furthermore, the Riley court did not hold that electronic devices are immune from
search, but only that they cannot be searched incident to lawful arrest as an ordinary
exception to the warrant requirement. (See Riley, supra, 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473].)
Defendant’s case does not involve an exception to the warrant clause. Rather, it involves
a specific probation condition that restricts the exercise of a constitutionally permissible
right because defendant must be supervised for rehabilitation and prevention of crime.
Riley is therefore inapposite since it arose in a different Fourth Amendment context.
Riley also did not consider the constitutionality of conditions of probation, parole, or
mandatory supervision. As noted, persons on probation do not enjoy the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled and the court may impose reasonable conditions that
deprive an offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. (United States v.

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Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 119 (Knights) [probationers]; see In re Q.R. (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 1231, 1238, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240222 [Riley involved a
person’s “preconviction expectation of privacy”].)
While searches involving electronic devices may raise unique issues of privacy not
found in searches of these more traditional categories, we see no need to depart from our
well-established treatment of search conditions whenever the condition implicates
electronic devices. “[C]ourts have historically allowed parole and probation officers
significant access to other types of searches, including home searches, where a large
amount of personal information—from medical prescriptions, banking information, and
mortgage documents to love letters, photographs, or even a private note on the
refrigerator—could presumably be found and read. [Citations.] In cases involving
probation or parole house search conditions, we have found no instances in which courts
have carved out exceptions for the same type of information [the minor] argues could
potentially be on his electronics.” (J.E., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 804, fn. 6.) Nothing
in the record here justifies narrowing the challenged Search Condition.
F. No-Contact Conditions
Defendant claims that the No-Contact Conditions, which forbid association with
“‘any unrelated person you know to be . . . a gang member’” and “‘any unrelated person
you know to be a possessor, user or trafficker of controlled substances’” are
unconstitutionally overbroad. She further asserts that the No-Contact Conditions limit

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her First Amendment right of association because the conditions are not narrowly tailored
to a compelling state interest.
The United States Constitution generally protects freedom of association, certain
symbolic or expressive conduct, and the liberty to make certain intimate personal choices
(see U.S. Const., Amends. 1, 14; Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 617-618
[freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty
and as an aspect of the First Amendment]). Nevertheless, reasonable probation
conditions may infringe upon constitutional rights provided they are closely tailored to
achieve legitimate purposes. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384; Sheena K., supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 890; see Knights, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 119 [“Inherent in the very nature
of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen
is entitled.”’”].)
The California Supreme Court has observed that “restrictive probation conditions”
analogous to a condition of probation barring a defendant from associating with criminals
and drug users “have been upheld even though they clearly affect a probationer’s
associational rights. (See, e.g., [Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 628-629] [condition
prohibiting association with known gang members]; People v. Peck (1996) 52
Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [condition prohibiting association with known possessors, users, or
traffickers of controlled substances who were unrelated to probationer]; People v. Garcia
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-103 [(Garcia)] [condition prohibiting association with
known users or sellers of narcotics, felons, or ex-felons]; People v. Wardlow (1991) 227

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Cal.App.3d 360, 366-367 [condition prohibiting association with child molesters].)”
(Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 385, fn. 4.) Nonetheless, probation conditions restricting
constitutional rights are scrutinized for overbreadth.
In Garcia, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 97, an appellate court determined that “[a]
condition of probation that prohibit[ed] appellant from associating with persons who,
unbeknownst to him, have criminal records or use narcotics” was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it forbid “association with persons not known to him to be users and
sellers of narcotics, felons or ex-felons.” (Id. at p. 102.) The court modified the
condition to provide that he was “not to associate with persons he knows to be users or
sellers of narcotics, felons or ex-felons.” (Id. at p. 103, italics added.)
In Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 615, the defendant was subjected to the following
probation condition: “‘The defendant is not to be involved in any gang activities or
associate with any gang members, nor wear or possess, any item of identified gang
clothing, including: any item of clothing with gang insignia, moniker, color pattern,
bandanas, jewelry with any gang significance, nor shall the defendant display any gang
insignia, moniker, or other markings of gang significance on his/her person or property as
may be identified by Law Enforcement or the Probation Officer.’” (Id. at p. 622.) The
appellate court found that the probation condition was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it prohibited him “from associating with persons not known to him to be gang
members” and “from displaying indicia not known to him to be gang related.” (Id. at

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pp. 628-629.) The court modified the condition by inserting a knowledge requirement.
(Id. at p. 638.)
In O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, the terms of probation included a
condition forbidding the defendant from associating “‘with any person, as designated by
your probation officer.’” (Id. at p. 1354.) The appellate court determined that the
condition was unconstitutionally overbroad in two respects. (Id. at p. 1357.) The first
problem was that the restriction on association was not expressly limited to those persons
that the defendant knew had been designated by his probation officer. (Ibid.) The second
defect was that the condition did not “identify the class of persons with whom defendant
may not associate” or “provide any guideline as to those with whom the probation
department may forbid his association.” (Id. at pp. 1357-1358.)
Here, unlike Garcia, Lopez, and O’Neil, the No-Contact Conditions include a
knowledge requirement. The No-Contact Conditions direct defendant to not associate
with people she knows to be the type engaged in criminal activity. The conditions
prevent defendant from associating with people who are on active probation or parole,
who are in gangs, and who use and traffic in controlled substances. The No-Contact
Conditions therefore are rationally related to the state’s interest in reforming and
rehabilitating defendant. Moreover, the No-Contact Conditions do not place defendant
“completely at the mercy” of the probation officer. (Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at
p. 308.) If she is “concerned about particular risks” arising from the No-Contact
Conditions, she may “seek judicial intervention—by moving to modify the probation

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order . . . if and when the probation officer seeks to exercise the delegated authority.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.; see § 1203.3, subd. (a).)
Moreover, as defendant acknowledges, probation conditions forbidding
probationers to have contact with gang members or those he or she knows to be users of
narcotics have been found constitutional. (See Garcia, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 102-
103; Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627-628.) Defendant claims that the record
shows “no gang membership by [defendant] or her family, or any criminal history
reflecting ties to gang activity or to people possessing, using or trafficking controlled
substances.” To the extent defendant challenges the No-Contact Conditions as applied to
her, we reject defendant’s claim as she did not object to imposition of the No-Contact
Conditions. (See Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 236.)
Based on the foregoing, we find the No-Contact Conditions to be neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

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IV
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded to the Riverside County Superior Court with directions to
modify the Police Contact Reporting Condition, consistent with the views expressed in
this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment in both cases are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
SLOUGH
J.

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