Amro Farid v. Trustees of Dartmouth College

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1734
AMRO FARID,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Aframe, Lipez, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
Joseph L. Sulman, with whom Law Office of Joseph L. Sulman,
Esq., was on brief, for appellant.
Pierre A. Chabot, with whom Stephen Zaharias and Devine,
Millimet & Branch, P.A., were on brief, for appellee.
July 13, 2026

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DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Appellant-Plaintiff Amro Farid,
a professor employed for six years by the Thayer School of
Engineering at Dartmouth College ("Dartmouth"), brought suit under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and New Hampshire's employment
discrimination statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A, alleging that
Dartmouth (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his
religion and national origin when it denied him tenure, and
(2) retaliated against him for filing a complaint of
discrimination by initiating research misconduct proceedings
against him. The district court entered summary judgment for
Dartmouth, reasoning that no reasonable jury could find in Farid's
favor given Dartmouth's articulated reasons for its conduct. We
affirm the judgment.
I.
We recount the evidence submitted on summary judgment,
"construing the record in the light most favorable to the
non-movant and resolving all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor." Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2008).
A. Tenure Proceedings
In 2015, Farid -- who is Muslim and
Arab-Egyptian -- joined the Thayer School of Engineering at
Dartmouth College as an Associate Professor. Farid expected that,
as an Associate Professor, he would become eligible for tenure

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after just three years of teaching. Nonetheless, he agreed in his
offer letter to become eligible for tenure after six years.
Shortly after Farid joined the Dartmouth faculty, a
Muslim student group invited him to serve as a professor-advisor,
but then-Dean Joseph Helble discouraged him from doing so until he
attained tenure. According to Farid, a non-Muslim professor, Doug
Van Citters, was encouraged to help with the Dartmouth rowing team
even though he had not yet attained tenure.
In September 2019, Farid began advising a group of
students on a project studying the campus energy system. Just one
month later, he received an email from another professor involved
with the project, Solomon Diamond, informing him that Dean Helble
"did not think [] highly of . . . the students' work" and asking
him to "step away from the team." Farid viewed his removal as
"impeding [him] from developing [his] research" because he "was
not allowed to gain access to Dartmouth energy system data or work
on . . . the campus energy system in any way."
In 2018, Dean Helble advised Farid that he would need to
use "the full six years of [his] tenure clock" to improve his
negative "teaching evaluation scores" in multiple classes. Farid
also received two one-year postponements for tenure review, such
that he could have deferred his application until the 2022–23
academic year. During the summer of 2020, however, he met with
Dean Alexis Abramson (who had since replaced Dean Helble) and

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Associate Dean Laura Ray to "get a clear indication" of "when it
[wa]s appropriate to go up for tenure" and "whether [he] still
remain[ed] in danger of termination through a failed tenure
review." Dean Abramson and Associate Dean Ray encouraged him to
apply for tenure that year, but they did not sufficiently warn him
that he could be placed on a terminal appointment if he was denied
tenure. Farid then submitted his application for tenure in the
2020–21 academic year, unaware that an unsuccessful submission
could foreclose his ability to reapply for tenure later.
At the time of his tenure application, Farid had
published a total of forty-five refereed journal articles; these
included twenty-two refereed journal articles since joining
Dartmouth in 2015. Notably, his publications cited his own work
at an unusually high rate. Farid also received approximately
$1.9 million in research funding; of this, $1.2 million was not
competitively awarded through any merit-based selection process.
Farid did not disclose that the largest grant listed on his CV,
from the National Science Foundation ("NSF"), had an "EDGAR"
designation, which signified that it was not a "peer reviewed"
award. Further, Farid taught three courses from 2016 to 2021,1
for which he received below-average course evaluations and
1 Farid taught "ENGS 22: Systems" from 2016 to 2020, "ENGS
175: Energy Systems" from 2016 to 2020, and "ENGS 199: Model-Based
System Engineering" from 2018 to 2021.

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negative comments from numerous students. His teaching scores
slightly improved over his initial years at Dartmouth, but they
declined "precipitously" beginning with the Fall 2020 term, when
he began teaching online for the first time due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Four external reviewers identified by Farid, each of
whom had previously collaborated with him on academic projects,
submitted letters on his behalf, along with six additional
reviewers identified by the committee. Of these, eight reviewers
recommended that he receive tenure, one recommended against
tenure, and one did not specify.
Dartmouth's faculty handbook sets forth "expectations of
performance" for a candidate applying for tenure, including that
the applicant demonstrate "an outstanding record both as a scholar
and a teacher." Review of a candidate's scholarship includes,
among other criteria, the "qualit[y]" of work and "contributions
to the larger scholarly . . . communities" -- which are viewed as
"more consequential than the quantity of work" -- and places
"significant weight" on both the views of "Dartmouth colleagues"
and "the judgment of professionals outside [Dartmouth]." Review
of a candidate's teaching requires "[c]omparative judgment by
current and former students and by faculty colleagues" and
consideration of the applicant's "classroom instruction," "[w]ork
with individual . . . students," and "course and program
development."

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The tenured faculty at the Thayer School of Engineering
met regarding Farid's application on April 7, 2021. They
discussed his qualifications related to his teaching and
scholarship, including student evaluations of his courses,
external review letters from professors, the quality and impact of
his scholarship, and the amount and types of grants he received.
The faculty noted, among other things, that Farid's application
"seem[ed] to be excessively over inflated with respect to his
accomplishments and impacts"; that his scholarship "appear[ed] to
have an unusually high number of self-citations"; that he did not
"g[e]t a lot of grants" or "have an established flow of US
funding"; that his CV failed to note that the listed NSF grants
"[we]re actually one E[DGAR] grant" and "not peer reviewed awards";
that his recent student course evaluations "were . . . abysmal";
and that the reviewers identified by Farid were all former
collaborators of his. Comprehensive minutes of the meeting
contain no mention of Farid's religion or national origin.
The faculty voted by secret ballot, with eighteen
members voting against granting Farid tenure, three members voting
for tenure, and three members abstaining. Dean Abramson
thereafter submitted a letter to the Committee Advisory to the
President (the "CAP") that recommended "reinitiat[ing] the tenure
review process during the 2022–23 academic year." The CAP

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declined to do so, denying Farid tenure and offering him a terminal
appointment for the 2021–22 school year.
The year before, Dartmouth had awarded tenure to Vikrant
Vaze, an Assistant Professor in transportation engineering who "is
of Indian national origin and non-Muslim." Professor Vaze
"routinely" received student course evaluations "in the very good
to excellent range," which "ma[d]e him among the most highly
regarded teachers at Thayer." He had published sixteen journal
articles, three book chapters, and three conference publications
at Dartmouth before applying for tenure. Professor Vaze also had
eight active extramural grants from a diverse stream of sources,
including a $1 million Department of Defense ("DOD") award and the
highly competitive NSF CAREER award, which totaled over
$1.7 million. Finally, his identified reviewers -- including
those who had previously collaborated with him and those who had
not -- provided universally positive feedback.
Farid appealed his tenure denial to an internal
Dartmouth review committee on May 17, 2021, challenging certain
"procedural" issues. In October, the review committee issued a
report finding that "procedural errors occurred that could
reasonably have affected Prof[essor] Farid's tenure case,"
including that Associate Dean Ray "did not appropriately explain
the ramifications" of applying for tenure -- specifically, that a
denial would result in a terminal appointment. The committee also

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noted that although Farid "was appointed as an associate professor
without tenure," the record "indicate[d] that [he] was treated as
an assistant professor." The committee thus reversed the CAP's
tenure decision so that Farid could reapply for tenure the
following year, and it instructed Dartmouth to amend its faculty
handbook to (1) clarify in the "Guide to Candidate" section that
"a candidate gets only 'one bite at the apple' of tenure," and
(2) feature "procedures for individuals hired as associate
professors without tenure . . . more prominently." The committee
disclaimed, however, any conclusion as to "whether Prof[essor]
Farid should have been promoted to Associate (or Full) Professor
with tenure" at that time.
On September 1, 2021, Farid separately appealed his
tenure denial to Dartmouth's Office of Institutional Diversity &
Equity ("IDE") on grounds that it violated Dartmouth's
anti-discrimination policies. The IDE engaged an outside
investigator and denied his appeal on December 2, 2021, based on
the investigator's findings that no evidence showed discrimination
due to his Muslim religion or his Arab-American national origin.
B. Research Misconduct Proceedings
In the fall of 2019, Farid began working with one of his
graduate students, Prabhat Hegde, on a research paper titled
"A Profit-Maximizing Security-Constrained IV-AC Optimal Power Flow
Model & Global Solution" (the "IV-ACOPF Paper"). Hegde

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contributed to the IV-ACOPF Paper from early November 2020 through
February 2021; his work on the IV-ACOPF Paper included research,
drafting, and related correspondence with Farid. Hegde and Farid
drafted the IV-ACOPF Paper through an editing program called
Overleaf, which allowed authors to collaborate in real time and
track historical changes. In January 2021, Farid criticized
Hegde's work and told him that he would have to "relegate [Hegde]
out of the first author position" on the IV-ACOPF Paper if his
work did not improve. Hegde ultimately left Farid's laboratory
in March 2021 but retained ownership of the Overleaf repository
for the IV-ACOPF Paper.
On December 27, 2021, Farid published the IV-ACOPF Paper
in Dartmouth's IEEE Access Journal (the "Journal") and listed
himself as the sole author. On January 7, 2022, Hegde reported
to Associate Dean Holly Wilkinson his concerns about being excluded
as an author on the IV-ACOPF Paper and inquired regarding the
"processes available to him to resolve" the issue. After
consulting with Dean Abramson, Associate Dean Wilkinson referred
Hegde to Dartmouth's Research Misconduct Policy ("RMP"), which
governs the resolution of complaints of research misconduct, and
directed Hegde to submit his allegations to Dean Abramson. Dean
Abramson did not refer Associate Dean Wilkinson to the Journal's
own Authorship Guidelines, which set forth "an internal process

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. . . independent of" Dartmouth for addressing authorship
disputes.
On January 18, 2022, Hegde submitted his allegations to
Dean Abramson in an email titled "Research [M]isconduct
[C]omplaint," which described what Hegde "believe[d] [wa]s an
obvious case of research misconduct" due to Farid's failure to
acknowledge his contribution to the IV-ACOPF Paper. The email
requested that Hegde "be included in the authorship" of the
IV-ACOPF Paper, citing the requirements for authorship set forth
in the Journal's Authorship Guidelines.
Provost David Kotz delegated oversight of the
investigation of Hegde's complaint to Vice Provost of Research
Dean Madden. At the time, although Vice Provost Madden "knew
there was a conflict around . . . some aspect of [Farid's]
appointment," he did not know specifics, and he "stay[ed] out of
discussions relating to any other processes that . . . might not
be relevant to the research and misconduct process." In
accordance with Dartmouth's standard procedure, Vice Provost
Madden first "interrogate[d] the individual policies" to determine
whether the RMP, Authorship Guidelines, or both applied to Hegde's
complaint. Suspecting that both policies applied, Vice Provost
Madden first encouraged Hegde to "reach out and attempt to resolve"
the authorship dispute "through direct discussions" with Farid

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under the Authorship Guidelines.2 In parallel, he considered
whether Hegde's complaint "f[e]ll within the rubric of research
misconduct," and concluded that "an inquiry [wa]s warranted" under
the RMP -- a conclusion with which Dean Abramson
concurred -- because the allegations fell within the definition of
"plagiarism" and were "sufficiently credible and specific so that
potential evidence of [r]esearch [m]isconduct may be identified."3
Dartmouth's Director of Research Integrity, Henrike
Frowein, reported to Vice Provost Madden and facilitated the
research misconduct investigation from start to finish. In May
2022, Director Frowein led the formation of an inquiry panel,
consisting of three faculty members who were not involved in
Farid's tenure case, to determine whether a research misconduct
investigation was warranted. In July 2022, the inquiry panel
determined that an investigation was warranted because the
allegations satisfied the "plagiarism" component of "research
2 The Authorship Guidelines provide that "[a]uthors should
attempt to resolve authorship disputes themselves. If disputes
cannot be settled, they should be referred to a third party
(department chair, Dean, or Provost) for resolution."
3 The RMP defines "research misconduct" as the intentional,
knowing, or reckless "fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in
proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting
research results," with "plagiarism" meaning "the appropriation of
another person's ideas, processes, results or words without giving
them appropriate credit."

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misconduct" and "there [wa]s sufficient evidence" to "indicate[]"
that the allegations "may have substance."
In May 2023, Vice Provost Madden accepted the panel's
recommendation and assembled an investigation committee,
consisting of Andrew Campbell and Prasad Jayanthi -- two professors
in Dartmouth's Computer Science Department -- and Kenneth
Loparo -- a professor in Energy Systems Engineering from Case
Western Reserve University. None of these professors were
involved in Farid's tenure case. At a committee meeting that
month, Vice Provost Madden advised against "open[ing] the frame"
of the investigation to issues that "fall into a different bucket"
than "research misconduct" and "d[o] [not] impact the case," such
as, for example, "unprofessional behavior, bad mentoring, [or]
wasting money."
The RMP requires that Dartmouth "sequester" all relevant
research records during the inquiry and investigation. It also
provides that during the initial inquiry, "[s]upervised access to
the data and/or documents should be available" to the parties, and
that, when a draft report issues after an investigation, the
respondent should receive "a copy of, or supervised access to, the
evidence on which the report is based." Although Farid requested
through counsel "immediate access to all data submitted" by Hegde
in support of his allegations, Dartmouth initially sequestered the
relevant records as evidence, including the Overleaf repository.

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In August 2023, Farid's counsel sent a letter to Hegde's home,
demanding the Overleaf repository and threatening litigation.
Director Frowein suggested that the committee "consider whether
this contact should be treated as retaliation or intimidation,
which the [RMP] expressly prohibits." Dartmouth nonetheless
provided Farid access to the Overleaf repository in September 2023,
a year before the committee issued its draft report.
Director Frowein invited Farid several times to
interview with the committee. Farid declined, claiming his
"medical condition" barred him from participating, and instead
requested that the interview "be conducted via written questions."
The committee declined because a written exchange would deprive it
of the ability to interact with Farid in real time, pose timely
follow-up questions, and assess his credibility. In October 2023,
Farid emailed Director Frowein a 311-page report (the "Overleaf
Report"), which he described as a "definitive analysis of the
provenance of the [IV-ACOPF Paper] through a comprehensive
comparison of the various manuscripts in the Overleaf repository
that Prabhat Hegde controlled between December 8, 2020 and
February 16, 2021, [Farid's] research notes that predate the
repository, and the final manuscript submitted for publication."
The committee reviewed the Overleaf Report but could not make sense
of it due to Farid's "failure to provide clear written explanations
for the hundreds of pages of documents he provided." Although

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Farid noted in his email that he was "happy to answer any questions
about [his] analysis," the committee perceived this offer as
"hollow" due to his "refusal to appear for an interview" or provide
"clear . . . explanations" of its content. The committee
suggested that Dartmouth hire a consultant to review the Overleaf
Report, which Director Frowein approved; ultimately, however, the
committee opted not to hire a consultant because it "felt the right
thing was for the committee to" make its best effort to "understand
and process all of the information" itself "and make a
. . . well-understood judgment based on that," rather than
deferring to the opinion of "external experts."
In January 2024, as "part of [her] responsibilities" in
facilitating the investigation, and without any instruction from
the committee, Director Frowein prepared a shell of the
investigation report so that "the prep work [was] done once the
committee [wa]s ready to move to a decision." Director Frowein
included under the "Conclusion" header that "[t]he Committee
concludes that Research Misconduct did occur."
In January 2024, Director Frowein informed the committee
of Farid's filing of the instant lawsuit related to his tenure
denial. In March, the committee raised concerns about Farid's
"conflat[ion]" of "the misconduct case with the tenure case" and
the "surprising comments" made about the committee in his lawsuit.
Because the committee no longer "s[aw] a way forward in working

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within the normal research misconduct process," each of its members
resigned.
Professor Loparo ultimately agreed to return to the
committee, along with Mark Barnes, the former Senior Research
Officer and Senior Associate Provost for Research at Harvard
University and a faculty member at Yale Law School. Barnes was
also a partner at Ropes & Gray LLP, where he served as outside
counsel to Dartmouth for the research misconduct investigation
until stepping away from that role to join the committee.
On October 18, 2024, the new two-member committee
provided Farid and Hegde for comment a draft report. The draft
report concluded that no research misconduct occurred. It further
stated that the committee found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Hegde's contribution "merit[ed] authorship credit," noted
that Farid's conduct "constitute[d] grossly unprofessional
conduct," and concluded that Farid's behavior toward Hegde was
"reprehensible and his submission of a collaborative work without
proper authorship attribution a breach of professional ethics."
Upon reviewing Farid's comments to the draft report, Director
Frowein wrote to the committee: “Many of the exhibits [attached to
his response] have very little or nothing to do with the research
misconduct matter[, and I'm] seeing many of them for the first
time . . . . Together with the exhibits I interpret this as
another attempt to pull the research misconduct matter prominently

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into the litigation against Dartmouth, and portra[y] it as a
retaliatory move." The next day, after receiving Hegde's
comments, Director Frowein wrote that she "continue[d] to be very
troubled by the retaliatory nature of [Professor] Farid's actions
against [Hegde]" and "wonder[ed] if the language addressing" his
removal as an author on other papers "should be strengthened,"
noting that "[o]f course th[at] [wa]s the committee's decision."
After considering the comments submitted by both Farid
and Hegde, the committee issued a final report on December 12,
2024 (the "Final Report"). Professor Loparo believed that Hegde
"at least [] should have been acknowledged in the [IV-ACOPF] Paper"
but deferred to the authorship-dispute process to resolve
questions regarding authorship credit. Still, both members of the
committee voted to include a conclusion in the Final Report that
Hegde "deserve[d] authorship credit, or an acknowledgment at the
least, for his months of hard work and overall contribution" to
the IV-ACOPF Paper; the Final Report also stated that although
Farid's denial of authorship credit or acknowledgement to Hegde
was "reprehensible" and a "breach of professional ethics," a
preponderance of the evidence did not show that he plagiarized
Hegde's work. The Final Report recommended that "the Provost, as
Deciding Official, review and act on [the committee's] assessment
of authorship credit, or acknowledgement."

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The Final Report also recommended that "Dartmouth not
consider Prof[essor] Farid for any Dartmouth faculty appointment"
and that he "not be allowed to serve as a sub-awardee or
collaborator for any Dartmouth faculty, nor as an advisor,
collaborator, or dissertation committee member for any Dartmouth
student." Professor Loparo did not believe that this discipline
fell within the purview of the research misconduct proceedings,
but he voted with Barnes to allow it "to go in the [F]inal [R]eport"
because the Provost would ultimately "decide what to do" with the
committee's recommendation. The Final Report also referred to the
Provost's Office "the allegation that Prof[essor] Farid retaliated
against [] Hegde" for bringing his research-misconduct complaint
"by removing [] Hegde from additional academic papers on which
[he] contributed."
After the issuance of the Final Report, Provost Kotz
sent a letter to Farid requesting that he "facilitate the addition
of . . . Hegde as an author" to both (1) the IV-ACOPF Paper, and
(2) another paper to which Hegde contributed, titled "The
hetero-functional graph theory toolbox."
C. Procedural History
On November 30, 2021, Farid filed an administrative
charge with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights, alleging
that Dartmouth discriminated against him based on his religion and
national origin. He amended the charge on November 9, 2022, to

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add allegations that Dartmouth retaliated against him through the
research misconduct proceedings. On December 14, 2021, the
Commission forwarded the complaint to Dartmouth.
Farid later withdrew his charge from the Commission and,
on September 11, 2023, sued Dartmouth in federal district court.
He raised claims of discrimination based on religion and/or
national origin in violation of Title VII (Count I) and
New Hampshire Revised Statute Section 354-A:7 (Count II), as well
as retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count III) and
New Hampshire Revised Statute Section 354-A:19 (Count IV). The
district court granted Dartmouth's motion for summary judgment on
all claims.
Farid timely appealed. He challenges the district
court's grant of summary judgment on his discrimination and
retaliation claims. He separately challenges the district court's
order compelling him to produce the metadata associated with his
document production in this case.
II.
A. Standard of Review
"We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,
affirming only if 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

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as a matter of law.'" Brandt v. Fitzpatrick, 957 F.3d 67, 74 (1st
Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pina v. Children's Place,
740 F.3d 785, 795 (1st Cir. 2014)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "That
means we draw all reasonable inferences in [the non-movant's]
favor; but we won't 'draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald
assertions, empty conclusions,' or 'rank conjecture.'" Id. at 75
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Pina, 740 F.3d at 795). "Even in
employment discrimination cases where elusive concepts such as
motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment is appropriate if
the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Id. (quoting
Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 116–17 (1st Cir. 2015)).
B. Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides that "[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual's . . . religion . . . or national origin."4 42 U.S.C.
4 New Hampshire law likewise provides that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful discriminatory practice" for "an employer, because of the
. . . religious creed[] or national origin of any individual,
. . . to discriminate against such individual in compensation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification." N.H. Rev. Stat.
§ 354-A:7. We apply the same standard to Farid's discrimination
claim under New Hampshire law because "the New Hampshire Supreme
Court relies on Title VII cases to analyze claims under RSA 354-A."
Hudson v. Dr. Michael J. O'Connell's Pain Care Ctr., Inc., 822
F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 (D.N.H. 2011) (citing Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821
A.2d 1034, 1042 (N.H. 2003)).

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§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Farid argues that the record contains sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Dartmouth discriminated against him based on his religion and
national origin in denying him tenure. We disagree.
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, we
apply the three-step, burden-shifting framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973), to
determine whether circumstantial evidence supports such a claim.
See Aly v. Mohegan Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 711 F.3d 34, 46
(1st Cir. 2013). Under that framework, "[a] plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence." Id. That requires the plaintiff to show that
(1) he "was a member of a protected class," (2) he "was qualified
for the job," (3) he "suffered an adverse employment action," and
(4) "the adverse employment action transpired under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Ripoli v. Dep't
of Hum. Servs., Off. of Veterans Servs., 123 F.4th 565, 571 (1st
Cir. 2024). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "the
burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by providing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for [its] action." Aly, 711 F.3d at 46. If the defendant meets
this burden, "the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance
that the proffered reasons by the defendant are a pretext for
unlawful discrimination," either by demonstrating that "the

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adverse employment action was (1) 'more likely motivated' by
discrimination than by the explanation proffered by the defendant;
or (2) 'the proffered explanation [was] unworthy of credence'
where the suspect action, coupled with evidence to the contrary,
suggests a discriminatory motivation." Id. (quoting Tex. Dep't
of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
The parties do not dispute that Farid established a prima
facie case of discrimination, or that Dartmouth articulated a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying him tenure.
Their dispute arises at the third step: whether Farid has shown,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dartmouth's proffered
reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination. Farid relies on
three general categories of evidence that he argues show pretext:
(1) disparate treatment, (2) Dartmouth's purported violations of
its tenure policy, and (3) an unfriendly work environment.
Examining each category of evidence in turn,5 we conclude
that Farid has failed to put forward evidence of retaliation -- a
5 For completeness, we note that Farid contends that the
district court improperly applied a formulaic checklist approach
to his discrimination claims, parsing his evidence as discrete
events rather than viewing his evidence in light of the record as
a whole. It did not. As we do here, the district court simply
addressed Farid's evidence in terms of understandable categories.
For the reasons described below, viewing the record as a whole and
in the light most favorable to Farid, there is no genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Dartmouth discriminated against him
on the basis of his religion or national origin. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).

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failure that is fatal to his claim. We do not "sit as [a]
'super-tenure' committee[]," Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930
F.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 1991), and have rightly been "wary of
intruding into the world of university tenure decisions," which
"necessarily hinge on subjective judgments." Brown v. Trs. of
Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 346 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Kumar v.
Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985)
(Campbell, C.J., concurring)). Because Farid has not provided
evidence of pretext "of such strength and quality as to permit a
reasonable finding that the denial of tenure was 'obviously' or
'manifestly' unsupported," we will "not simply substitute [our]
own views concerning the plaintiff's qualifications for those of
the properly instituted authorities." Id.; see Bina v. Providence
Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1994).
1. Disparate Treatment
Farid first argues that Dartmouth's award of tenure to
another professor, Vikrant Vaze, the year before it denied him
tenure reveals pretext through disparate treatment. To establish
disparate treatment, "a plaintiff must show 'that others similarly
situated to [him] in all relevant respects were treated differently
by the employer.'" Garcia v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 535 F.3d
23, 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d
207, 214 (1st Cir. 2003)). "'Reasonableness is the touchstone'
when considering comparators in a disparate treatment case; that

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is, 'while the plaintiff's case and the comparison cases that he
advances need not be perfect replicas, they must closely resemble
one another in respect to relevant facts and circumstances.'"
Ray, 799 F.3d at 114 (quoting Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171
F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999)). "No valid comparison can be drawn
between two incidents for the purpose of proving disparate
treatment if 'differentiating or mitigating circumstances'
distinguish" the material facts. Conward, 171 F.3d at 21 (quoting
Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751 (1st Cir.
1996)).
The record evidence does not permit a reasonable jury to
conclude that Professor Vaze was "similarly situated to [Farid] in
all relevant respects." See Garcia, 535 F.3d at 31. Although
Professor Vaze worked for the same department, and he applied for
tenure in successive years to the same tenure committee and through
the same tenure process as Farid did, he differed from Farid in a
key respect: his qualifications. Dartmouth's faculty handbook
expressly requires that a candidate applying for tenure
demonstrate "an outstanding record both as a scholar and a
teacher." Professor Vaze outperformed Farid in each category. As
for his scholarship, the record shows that Professor Vaze received
more funding for his research and better feedback in his external
review letters; that he received more competitive grants and did
not misrepresent the type of grants he received; and that he did

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not frequently cite to his own scholarship like Farid did.6 As
for his teaching, the record shows that Professor Vaze received
consistently higher evaluation scores and better reviews from
students.
Farid suggests that whether Professor Vaze had a
superior record is irrelevant to the question of whether he is
admissible as a comparator. The question at hand, however, is not
whether Farid's comparator evidence is admissible, but whether it
could support a jury finding that Dartmouth treated him
disparately. And here, the "differentiating" facts preclude any
"valid comparison" between Professor Vaze and Farid "for the
purpose of proving disparate treatment." See Conward, 171 F.3d
at 21; see also Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477, 501 (1st
Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judgment of employment
discrimination claim where plaintiff could not "connect the dots
6 Farid does not dispute these facts but asserts that the
record reflects that he "had comparable funding . . . to Vaze and
a superior scholarship record in terms of publications." But
as already explained, he received less competitive funding than
Professor Vaze did; indeed, he failed to disclose the "EDGAR"
designation of the largest grant listed on his CV. And although
Farid's publications outnumbered Professor Vaze's, the committee
expressed concern with the high rate of self-citation in those
publications. Moreover, the committee that reviewed Professor
Vaze's application justified fewer publications in his case
because "the publication cycle of many of the journals that
Dr. Vaze publishes in follow the economics and management science
norms and are measured in years instead of months and tend to be
significantly longer than a typical engineering or medical
article."

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between her candidacy for tenure and that of her male comparators"
because the record did not support that her proffered comparators
"were in fact similarly situated to her").
Nor, contrary to Farid's arguments, did Dartmouth apply
different standards in evaluating the external reviewers submitted
by Professor Vaze. According to Farid, both professors identified
external reviewers to the tenure committee from former
collaborators, but the faculty only raised concern about bias with
respect to Farid's reviewers. As the faculty noted, however,
Farid's four "letters from recommended reviewers [we]re entirely
from his [former] collaborators," whereas Professor Vaze
identified former collaborators as just four of eight of his chosen
reviewers. The faculty noted an additional difference in Farid's
review letters in that they lacked "detail[] about [his] specific
contributions to the field." These are material differences in
the quality of the external reviews contributed by the candidates.
Farid also insists, without citation, that Dartmouth has
acknowledged that student evaluations are inherently biased. To
the extent this accusation refers to an email from a faculty member
with an attachment titled "Student evaluations of teaching are
deeply flawed," nothing in the record indicates that the email's
author spoke on behalf of Dartmouth or had analyzed teaching
evaluations at the Thayer School of Engineering, including any for
Farid or Professor Vaze. We therefore need not credit Farid's

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speculation that the committee treated him unfairly by comparing
his teaching evaluations to Professor Vaze's. See
Torrech-Hernandez v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir.
2008) ("[T]he . . . [c]ourt is not obliged to accept as true or to
deem as a disputed material fact, each and every unsupported,
subjective, conclusory, or imaginative statement made to the
[c]ourt by a party.").
Farid finally asserts that the district court did not
expressly rule that Professor Vaze is, or is not, a comparator.
To the contrary, the district court concluded that Professor Vaze's
"superior status in terms of funding, student reviews, and
evaluations all undermine Farid's argument that Vaze is an
appropriate comparator" and that Farid had thus "not shown pretext
based on Vaze's success and his own lack of success in the tenure
process." The record supports the district court's conclusion.
2. Policy Violations
Farid next points to other circumstantial evidence that
he claims shows discriminatory intent, including that Dartmouth
purportedly violated or inconsistently applied several of its
policies to his detriment. "'Evidence that [an] employer deviated
from its standard procedure or policies in taking an adverse
employment action against a plaintiff may be relevant to the
pretext inquiry,'. . . if the deviations are otherwise
'inexplicable and troubling.'" Ing v. Tufts Univ., 81 F.4th 77,

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83 (1st Cir. 2023) (first quoting Rodríguez-Cardi v. MMM Holdings,
Inc., 936 F.3d 40, 50 (1st Cir. 2019); and then quoting Theidon,
948 F.3d at 499). Such deviations are "inexplicable and
troubling" when they target an employee with adverse action without
any legitimate explanation. See, e.g., id. (quoting Theidon, 948
F.3d at 499); Harrington v. Aggregate Indus. Ne. Region, Inc., 668
F.3d 25, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that a factual issue
existed as to pretext, barring summary judgment, in retaliation
case where evidence showed employer strayed from "its own drug
testing protocol" by "singl[ing] out" an employee for drug testing
with no explanation "as to when or how the [employee] was chosen"
and discharged employee when he refused to submit to more testing);
Brennan v. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1998)
(concluding there was "thin" but sufficient evidence to create
jury issues on pretext where employer failed to follow layoff
policy giving deference to seniority and, instead, "simply
fill[ed] in names of persons to be laid off" based on a list
compiled a year prior with a different set of criteria, which led
to the termination of a senior employee). A reasonable jury could
not find Dartmouth's actions to be "inexplicable" or "troubling."
See Ing, 81 F.4th at 83 (quoting Theidon, 948 F.3d at 499).
Farid asserts that Dartmouth violated its tenure
policies by failing to advise him that a negative vote on tenure
could result in a terminal year appointment. He cites the finding

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on appeal by Dartmouth's internal review committee that Associate
Dean Ray "did not appropriately explain the ramifications" of
applying for tenure before his tenure clock expired. This issue,
however, is a red herring. Dartmouth did not depart from its
policies at all in not explaining the ramifications of the tenure
vote to Farid (and thus did not disadvantage him individually);
rather, the failure in communication applied to all tenure
applicants. Further, Dartmouth rectified this generally
applicable "procedural error" by revoking its placement of Farid
on a terminal year appointment, thus allowing him to try again for
tenure the next year. In other words, the record shows a
misunderstanding by Dartmouth administrators on how to apply a
policy generally. Nothing suggests that this was anything but an
interpretive error that was corrected by Dartmouth. That is not
evidence of pretext.
We are also not persuaded that Dartmouth violated its
tenure policy by treating him as an assistant professor, requiring
him to wait six years to apply for tenure even though he was hired
as an associate professor. As an initial matter, Farid expressly
agreed to the six-year tenure timeline in his offer letter, even
after negotiating for the "associate professor" title. He
nonetheless speculates that, if he had been treated as associate
professor -- the title he received at appointment -- he could have
applied for tenure after three years, when he had a better trend

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in his student evaluations. But the faculty who ultimately
considered Farid's application recognized that the worsening of
his teaching scores in 2020 "may [have] be[en] attributed to
COVID-related challenges," not his personal performance, and even
suggested that he be given another year to improve his "abysmal"
teaching evaluations "without the C[OVID] situation." In any
event, although his evaluations showed a trend of improvement from
2016 to 2020, he still received worse scores than other professors
who taught the same courses. Indeed, at the time of Farid's
reappointment in 2018, then-Dean Helble advised him that he would
need "the full six years" before applying for tenure specifically
because of his poor "teaching evaluation scores." On this record,
a reasonable jury could not reach the conclusion that Farid would
have been better situated to obtain tenure had he applied after
three years instead of six.
Accordingly, to the extent that Dartmouth deviated from
its tenure policies, the record does not support that it did so in
an "inexplicable and troubling" way, because neither its
insufficient explanation of the consequences of tenure denial nor
its contracting with Farid for a six-year tenure timeline adversely
impacted his chances for tenure. See Ing, 81 F.4th at 83 (quoting
Theidon, 948 F.3d at 499).

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3. Unfriendly Work Environment
As to his third category of evidence regarding
Dartmouth's discriminatory intent, Farid relies upon purported
evidence of an "unfriendly work environment." He claims that
Dartmouth discouraged him from participating as a faculty advisor
for a Muslim student group, while allowing non-Muslim faculty to
participate in extra-curricular activities during tenure-track
years; prevented him from obtaining campus-wide energy systems
data for his research; and removed him as an advisor to a student
project relating to that data. Importantly, however, Farid fails
to connect these actions to discrimination based on his religion
or national origin. See Rodríguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1999). To the contrary, his
testimony confirms that his own poor performance motivated
Dartmouth's actions: namely, Dean Helble advised Farid against
joining the Muslim student group so that he could focus on
improving his tenure case; and Dean Helble directed that Farid be
removed from the student project and precluded from accessing
Dartmouth energy system data due to Helble's dissatisfaction with
the work of the students whom Farid was advising. Farid identifies
no evidence rebutting these explanations; absent such evidence,
the record does not support that Dartmouth's "proffered reason"

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for denying him tenure "was actually a pretext for unlawful
discrimination." Id. at 22.7
C. Retaliation
Title VII also provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees . . . because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 8 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). Farid argues that the record contains sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Dartmouth retaliated against him for bringing his discrimination
claims. Again, we disagree.
7 We also note that Professor Farid provides no link between
Dean Helble and the tenure proceeding; there is no evidence in the
record that Dean Helble was involved in, or influenced, the
faculty's deliberations or vote. Nor is there any apparent
connection between those involved with his requests for energy
data and his tenure case.
8 New Hampshire law likewise provides that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any
activity to which this chapter applies to . . . retaliate or
discriminate against any person because he has opposed any
practices forbidden under this chapter or because he has filed a
complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this
chapter." N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:19. Because "[t]he
New Hampshire Supreme Court looks to and finds 'instructive'
federal standards established under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., in resolving retaliation claims under N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 354-A," we apply those standards to Farid's retaliation
claim under New Hampshire law. Dennis v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.,
549 F.3d 851, 856 (1st Cir. 2008).

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We apply a burden-shifting framework for retaliation
claims similar to the one for discrimination claims. "First, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct, (2) the employer
took an adverse employment action, which was (3) in response to
the employee's protected activity." Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt.,
Inc., 99 F.4th 105, 115 (1st Cir. 2024). If the plaintiff meets
that burden, "the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for its actions." Id.
(quoting Planadeball v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 793 F.3d
169, 175 (1st Cir. 2015)). If the defendant does so, "the
plaintiff [must] show that the defendant's explanation is a
pretext," id. (alteration in original) (quoting Planadeball, 793
F.3d at 175), and "that retaliatory animus was the real motivating
factor," Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 24 (1st Cir. 2013).
The parties again dispute only the third step: whether
Farid has proffered sufficient evidence of pretext for retaliation
and that retaliatory animus was the real motivating factor. Farid
contends that the circumstances as a whole, including Dartmouth's
purported violations of policy, evidence of antagonism, and other
evidence, show pretext and demonstrate that Dartmouth had a
retaliatory animus when taking adverse action by investigating
Hegde's complaint. Farid's retaliation argument fails at a
fundamental level because "a reason cannot be proved to be a

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pretext for retaliation unless it is shown both that the reason
was false, and that retaliation was the real reason." Lang v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 459 (1st Cir. 2016)
(citation modified). We see no basis in the record to conclude
that the protected activity in this case -- namely, filing of a
discrimination claim -- "was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse
action by the employer." Ing, 81 F.4th at 84 n.5 (quoting Theidon,
948 F.3d at 506). There is no evidence permitting the conclusion
that Dartmouth's investigation of Hegde's complaint -- which was
submitted independently by a student -- was carried out to
retaliate against him. The evidence instead requires the
conclusion that the investigation was carried out on a separate
track, by individuals who were not involved in the tenure dispute.
In any event, Farid's arguments as to pretext mischaracterize the
record.
Farid first accuses Dartmouth of withholding essential
evidence for the misconduct investigation -- the Overleaf
repository -- from him until his attorney sent a demand letter to
Hegde. But the record shows that Dartmouth acted in accordance
with the RMP by initially sequestering the Overleaf repository
during the inquiry and investigation phases. Although Dartmouth
did not provide Farid access to the Overleaf repository until the
investigation phase, Farid has not shown that his inability to
access the data during the inquiry was rooted in antagonism towards

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him. And Dartmouth ultimately did provide him access over a year
before the committee issued its draft report and triggered an
obligation to provide "a copy of, or supervised access to, the
evidence on which the report is based." Farid then submitted
extensive analysis of the Overleaf repository. These facts do not
permit a reasonable finding of pretext.
Farid also insists that Director Frowein's comments
about the investigation to the committee demonstrated antagonism.
Those comments included, for example, statements that the
committee "may want to consider whether" the demand letter sent by
Farid's attorney to Hegde at his home "should be treated as
retaliation or intimidation, which the [RMP] expressly prohibits";
that Farid was "making demands and allegations that are neither
true nor acceptable" in connection to his refusal to be interviewed
by the committee; that the Overleaf repository report prepared by
Farid was "irrelevant" and that the committee already "ha[d] enough
evidence" to make a determination; that language in the
investigation report addressing Farid's removal of Hegde from
other papers "should be strengthened"; and that Director Frowein
"strongly prefer[red] a clear statement" in the report that Hegde
"deserve[d] authorship". Director Frowein also prepared a shell
of the investigation report for the committee report so that "the
prep work [was] done once the committee [wa]s ready to move to a
decision," and the shell included a conclusion that "Research

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Misconduct did occur." Farid fails, however, to connect these
statements to animus against him based on his tenure-related
complaints. Further, the record contains no evidence that
Director Frowein acted beyond the scope of her role as Director of
Research Integrity or that she unduly influenced the investigation
committee to find against Farid regardless of the evidence.
Indeed, Director Frowein acknowledged that the committee would
make the final decision, and the committee ultimately did that: it
found no research misconduct and rejected her suggestion to make
more forceful findings about whether Hegde deserved authorship
credit or only an acknowledgement.
The record likewise does not support Farid's claim that
the committee expanded its investigation to cover issues unrelated
to research misconduct. It is true that Vice Provost Madden
initially cautioned the committee against investigating issues
that "d[id not] impact" whether Farid committed research
misconduct -- such as "unprofessional behavior, bad mentoring,
[and] wasting money." But Vice Provost Madden clarified that once
an investigation has begun, it is "not [her] decision," but the
committee's decision, as to whether "a piece of evidence is
relevant." And here, as confirmed by committee member Barnes, the
committee viewed the "totality of the interactions of the parties,"
including Farid's "course of behavior" towards Hegde after the
alleged misconduct, to be relevant because it shed light on issues

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like Farid's "credibility." Farid presents no evidence suggesting
that the committee had another motive in its review.
Farid also misconstrues the record by suggesting that it
includes evidence that the investigation was biased against him.
For example, he claims that the investigation committee refused to
consider his 311-page Overleaf Report that purportedly shows the
changes made to the IV-ACOPF Paper after Hegde left his lab. To
the contrary, the committee did review the Overleaf Report;
however, it could not make sense of it because Farid "fail[ed] to
provide clear written explanations for [its] hundreds of pages."
Farid further hindered the investigation by declining repeated
invitations to interview with the committee due to a purported
"medical condition." Given his lack of cooperation, the committee
perceived his offer to "answer any questions" about his analysis
as "hollow." The committee further considered hiring a consultant
to make sense of the Overleaf Report, but ultimately decided
against outsourcing its fact-finding and decision-making roles to
"external experts." Under the RMP, Dartmouth defers to the
committee's determination as to "whether experts . . . need to be
consulted during the Investigation to provide special expertise
regarding the analysis of evidence." Especially given this
deference, the committee's reasoned -- and
undisputed -- explanations for its investigatory process, coupled

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with Farid's uncooperative conduct, do not support a reasonable
finding that Dartmouth's investigation was biased.
We also reject Farid's contention that a jury could find
bias in the Final Report's dual recommendation that Dartmouth
assess either authorship credit or acknowledgment to Hegde. It
is true that one member of the two-member investigation committee,
Professor Loparo, believed that -- although Hegde should receive
an acknowledgement -- the authorship-dispute process should
resolve questions of authorship. Professor Loparo also believed
that the Final Report's measures precluding Farid's future
collaboration with Dartmouth fell outside the purview of the
research misconduct proceedings. Nevertheless, there is no
dispute that Professor Loparo agreed to each recommendation in the
Final Report, and there is no evidence that he was coerced or
deceived into such agreement. To the contrary, he stated that
Barnes, the other committee member, had no "more of a vote than"
he did. The members of the committee simply reached a compromise
recommendation. The record does not support a finding of bias
where it shows the investigation committee followed standard
procedure to reach its recommendations, which the Provost was then
free to accept or reject.9
9 Farid argues that Dartmouth's order that Hegde receive
authorship credit for another paper titled "The Hetero-functional
Graph Theory Toolbox" also demonstrates bias. Professor Farid
insists that this paper was never submitted for publication, but

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Farid further argues that Dartmouth's choice to apply
the RMP instead of the Authorship Guidelines demonstrated intent
to retaliate. In support of this argument, he claims -- without
record citations -- that "Dartmouth's own expert, Attorney Barnes,
concluded that Hegde raised an authorship dispute and not an
allegation of research misconduct." This conclusory statement
aside, Farid identifies no evidence showing that the Authorship
Guidelines, but not the RMP, applied to his case.
On our review, the record does not support Farid's
argument. Hegde submitted his allegations to Dean Abramson under
the title "Research [M]isconduct [C]omplaint" and described what
he "believe[d] [wa]s an obvious case of research misconduct."
Upon receiving this explicit complaint of research misconduct, the
RMP required Dean Abramson to report it to the Provost, so she
did. Then, in accordance with Dartmouth's standard procedure,
Vice Provost Madden "interrogate[d] the individual policies" to
determine whether the RMP, Authorship Guidelines, or both applied.
The Authorship Guidelines and RMP are not mutually exclusive; they
address separate but related issues and may apply together. Here,
because Hegde's complaint alleged both (1) an authorship dispute,
and (2) research misconduct in potential plagiarism, Vice Provost
he judicially admitted that it was by failing to timely answer
Dartmouth's requests for admission. In any event, he presents
no evidence showing that Hegde should not have received authorship
credit.

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Madden appropriately invoked each policy. On one hand, he
encouraged Hegde to "reach out and attempt to resolve" the
authorship dispute "through direct discussions" with Farid under
the Authorship Guidelines. On the other, he assessed whether
Hegde's complaint "f[e]ll within the rubric of research
misconduct" under the RMP, ultimately determining that "an inquiry
[wa]s warranted" into whether Farid plagiarized Hegde's work. We
see no error in this conclusion; the record does not support a
finding that Dartmouth misapplied these policies to Hegde's
complaint.
Finally, Farid claims that the district court failed to
consider a large portion of evidence that he did not "specifically
cite" in his argument but only in his factual summary. Parties
cannot expect a trial court to do their homework for them. CMM
Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1526
(1st Cir. 1996) ("[C]ourts are . . . entitled to expect
represented parties to incorporate all relevant arguments in the
papers that directly address a pending motion."); McCoy v. Mass.
Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1991) ("[A] party has a duty 'to
spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly . . . [rather than
being] allowed to defeat the system by seeding the record with
mysterious references . . . hoping to set the stage for an ambush
should the ensuing ruling fail to suit.'") (quoting Paterson–
Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990

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(1st Cir. 1988)). Even setting this aside, however, the record
evidence -- when viewed as a whole -- supports the district court's
conclusion that there is no dispute of material fact and that
Dartmouth was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
retaliation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The district court
carefully considered the record in reaching this conclusion.
Accordingly, we agree that Farid's retaliation claims cannot
survive summary judgment.
III.
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment on Farid's discrimination and
retaliation claims under both federal and state law. Because we
affirm summary judgment, Farid's challenge to the district court's
discovery order is moot.

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