Bo Zou v. Steven R. Ebberts; Teresa L. Watson; Marla Luckert

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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BO ZOU,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STEVEN R. EBBERTS; TERESA L.
WATSON; MARLA LUCKERT,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 25-3148
(D.C. No. 2:25-CV-02231-HLT-RES)
(D. Kan.)
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, MORITZ, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Bo Zou, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against three Kansas state judges—Shawnee County District
Judge Teresa L. Watson, Shawnee County Chief Judge Steven R. Ebberts, and
Kansas Supreme Court Chief Justice Marla J. Luckert. Mr. Zou alleged Fourteenth
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 Because Mr. Zou appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we
will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 26, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 26, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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Amendment violations arising from orders restricting his access to the Shawnee
County Courthouse and denying his state-court appeal. The district court dismissed
his claims as barred by judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Mr. Zou’s claims arise from orders in a landlord-tenant dispute in the District
Court of Shawnee County, Kansas.2 During those proceedings, Judge Watson
entered an order prohibiting Mr. Zou from entering certain parts of the Shawnee
County Courthouse. Chief Judge Ebberts later issued an administrative order
prohibiting Mr. Zou from entering the courthouse entirely. Mr. Zou then petitioned
the Kansas Supreme Court for review and for a writ of mandamus, which Chief
Justice Luckert denied.
Mr. Zou next filed this action in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas seeking damages and injunctive relief. He moved to proceed in
forma pauperis (“ifp”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The magistrate judge granted the
ifp motion and screened the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although the
complaint alleged constitutional violations, it did not specify a cause of action or
indicate whether Mr. Zou was suing the judges in their individual or official
capacities. The magistrate judge liberally construed the allegations as asserting
§ 1983 claims against the judges in both capacities and issued a report and
2 The factual background is drawn from Mr. Zou’s complaint, objections to the
report and recommendation, and public state-court records that the magistrate judge
judicially noticed.
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recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal. The R&R concluded that
judicial immunity barred the individual-capacity claims, the Eleventh Amendment
barred the official-capacity claims, and no exception to either doctrine applied.
Mr. Zou objected to the R&R, arguing generally that immunity does not
preclude actions alleging constitutional violations; the state-court judges acted
outside their jurisdiction; and the magistrate judge lacked authority to review
Mr. Zou’s ifp motion, screen his complaint, and withhold service. After conducting
de novo review, the district court overruled the objections, concluding that
(1) because the challenged orders were judicial acts within the state-court judges’
authority, judicial immunity barred the individual-capacity claims; (2) the Eleventh
Amendment barred the official-capacity claims for monetary relief; (3) the Ex parte
Young exception for injunctive relief did not extend to state judicial officers, see
generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and (4) a magistrate judge has
authority over non-dispositive pretrial matters, including ifp motions and complaint
screening. The court adopted the R&R and dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
On appeal, Mr. Zou does not meaningfully challenge the district court’s
determination that judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment bar his claims.
His opening brief recounts the history of the dispute and largely reasserts the
arguments he presented in his objections. He does not address the district court’s
reasoning for rejecting those arguments. “The first task of an appellant is to explain
to us why the district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Mr. Zou does not do so, we will not
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question the district court’s decision. See Clark v. Colbert, 895 F.3d 1258, 1265
(10th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e will not question the reasoning of a district court unless an
appellant actually argues against it.” (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Having carefully reviewed Mr. Zou’s brief and the record, we conclude that
Mr. Zou has failed to show the district court erred. We affirm for substantially the
same reasons stated in the district court’s order.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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