Sylvanus Ogburia v. AL A&M University

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 28, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 09-13885
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-02275-CV-5-VEH
SYLVANUS OGBURIA,
Plaintiff-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant,
versus
JESSE CLEVELAND,
in his official capacity
as Trustee of Alabama A&M,
HALL BRYANT, JR.,
in his official capacity
as Trustee of Alabama A&M, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants-
Cross-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 28, 2010)
Before BLACK, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:
The Trustees of Alabama A&M University (Trustees) appeal the district
court’s partial grant of summary judgment and award of injunctive relief to
Sylvanus Ogburia on his post-termination procedural due process claim, asserting
the district court erred in its application of McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th
Cir. 1994) (en banc), in concluding Ogburia suffered a deprivation of his post-
termination due process rights, and in awarding injunctive relief. Ogburia cross-
appeals the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment to the Trustees,
asserting the district court erred in concluding Ogburia was provided sufficient
pre-termination procedural due process.
After reading the parties’ briefs, de novo review of the record, and having1
had the benefit of oral argument, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand
with instructions for the district court to enter judgment in favor of the Trustees.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Adequate State Remedy
In McKinney, we explained procedural due process violations do not
become “complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process. In other
The standard of review on all summary judgment issues is de novo. Menuel v. City of1
Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 994 n.7 (11th Cir. 1994).
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words, the state may cure a procedural due process deprivation by providing a
later procedural remedy; only when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient
to remedy the procedural deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable
under section 1983 arise.” 20 F.3d at 1557 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). However, “[t]his directive is not an exhaustion requirement. Instead,
this directive is a recognition that procedural due process violations do not even
exist unless no adequate state remedies are available.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216
F.3d 1328, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
The district court erred by concluding the state remedies in this case were
inadequate. At the time Ogburia filed his lawsuit, the last action that had been
taken with respect to his termination was the Grievance Committee’s report and
recommendation in his favor, recommending the Davis “case be investigated by a
neutral committee before any final action is taken by the University.” In addition,
the University’s grievance procedures provided the report of the Grievance
Committee should be submitted to the Board of Trustees for final disposition.
There is no dispute that the case had not been re-investigated or that the case had
not been decided by the Board of Trustees as of the filing of this lawsuit. In fact,
the lawsuit was filed approximately one month before the next meeting of the
Trustees, and the Trustees never had the opportunity to act on the Grievance
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Committee’s report and recommendation before the filing of the lawsuit. Thus, at
the time Ogburia filed suit, there was still an adequate state remedy available and
the last decision was in his favor. As there was an adequate state remedy
available, the district court erred in finding that a claim for post-termination due
process existed.2
B. Pre-Termination Due Process
The Supreme Court has explained the minimal requirements for due process
in the context of public employment:
The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an
opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in
person or in writing, why the proposed action should not be taken is a
fundamental due process requirement . . . . The tenured public
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against
him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to
present his side of the story.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1495
(1985) (internal citation omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Ogburia was advised regarding the charges
against him by receiving a letter from Human Resources detailing the charges and
Because we conclude there was no claim for post-termination due process, all other2
issues regarding the district court’s post-termination due process analysis are moot.
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copies of the formal complaints. Additionally, Ogburia provided the Investigation
Committee with detailed written responses, complete with exhibits, denying the
sexual harassment allegations. Ogburia also verbally denied the allegations and
presented his side of the story to the Investigation Committee. Thus, Ogburia was
provided both notice and an opportunity to respond, and the district court did not
err in concluding he received adequate pre-termination due process.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s partial grant of
summary judgment to Ogburia on his post-termination due process claim, affirm
the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment to the Trustees on Ogburia’s
pre-termination due process claim, and remand with instructions to enter summary
judgment in favor of the Trustees.3
REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.
Because Ogburia suffered no deprivation of procedural due process, the injunctive3
relief issue is now moot.
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