USA v. Sabra Harrison Johnson

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 9, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-14509
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 06-00102-CR-DHB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SABRA HARRISON JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(April 9, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sabra Harrison Johnson appeals his 66-month’s prison sentence, imposed
above the Guidelines sentence range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment, after

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pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. On
appeal, he argues that the district court, in imposing sentence, erred by considering
his religion, in contravention of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 and the due process provisions
of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, Johnson references the court’s statement
that his case presented yet another example of a “charlatan in religious disguise”
perpetrating a fraudulent scheme.
As a question of law, we review “de novo . . . whether a factor considered by
the district court in sentencing a defendant is impermissible.” United States v.
Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
“[T]o succeed on a claim that an impermissible factor affected the sentence, the
party challenging the sentence has the initial burden of establishing that the district
court considered an impermissible factor in fashioning the sentence. If . . . the
district court considered an impermissible factor at sentencing, and if the error was
preserved, the burden shifts to the party defending the sentence to show, based on
the record as a whole, that the error was harmless.” United States v. Williams, 456
F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93, 128 S.Ct. 558, 566, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), as
recognized in United States v Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009).
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The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. V. The sole interest being protected in a non-capital sentencing
procedure “is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or
inaccurate information.” United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 840 (11th Cir.
1984). The religion of a defendant is a constitutionally impermissible sentencing
factor. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235
(1983) (habeas case).
“A sentence based on an improper factor fails to achieve the purposes of
§ 3553(a) and may be unreasonable, regardless of length.” Williams, 456 F.3d at
136 (citation omitted). Under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10, race, sex, national origin, creed,
religion, and socio-economic status are identified as factors “not relevant in the
determination of a sentence.” In United States v. Clay, the government argued that
the district court, in varying downward and imposing a sentence less than one-third
of the low end of the Guidelines sentence range, improperly considered religion
when, after hearing eight witnesses testify about Clay’s post-offense religious
conversion and life changes, it stated: “I do believe that your change is real. And
with God’s help, you will continue on the same path that you are currently on.”
483 F.3d 739, 742-45 (11 Cir. 2007). We held that, although religion is anth
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impermissible sentencing factor, the district court did not rely on religion in
sentencing Clay: “The district court did not consider Clay’s religious belief; the
court credited testimony at the sentencing hearing about changes in Clay’s life that
followed his religious conversion. These considerations of postoffense
rehabilitation are appropriate when a district court evaluates the history and
characteristics of the defendant and the need to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant.” Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
Here, we are satisfied that the district court did not rely on religion in
sentencing Johnson. Specifically, the court did not consider Johnson’s religious
belief, namely, Christianity, express disdain for his faith, or state or imply that it
was holding Johnson to a higher standard because he was a Christian, a Baptist, or
an ordained minister. To the contrary, the court acknowledged that, under the
Constitution, religious matters had no place in the courtroom before noting that
Johnson, like other “charlatans in religious disguise” before him, took advantage of
the trust people quite naturally place in ordained ministers and religious
organizations in order to perpetrate fraud. Similarly, the court’s statement that
Johnson’s case “necessarily brings into focus the distastefulness of a fraudulent
scheme and activity which is concealed, at least for a time, under some figurative
robes of religion” was an objective comment on the offense conduct, not an
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indication that religion would play a role in determining his sentence.
Notably, when the court took notice of Johnson’s apparent contrition and of
his profession that he was on the road to recovery, it did not mention that Johnson
attributed his “reawakened character” to God. Finally, when the court enumerated
the aggravating circumstances justifying an upward variance, it did not include
Johnson’s religion or his religious upbringing or the fact that he was a minister or
his claim that God was redeveloping his character, facts and claims repeatedly
mentioned by Johnson and his counsel in pleadings and mitigation testimony.
Accordingly, Johnson failed to establish that the district court considered an
impermissible factor in fashioning his sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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