Richard Ragali, et al. v. Shell Oil Company, et al.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 1, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-11022
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 9:09-cv-82395-WPD
RICHARD RAGALI,
Individually, and as a Parent and Natural
Guardian of Joseph R. Ragali, a minor,
JOSEPH R. RAGALI,
a minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, LLC,
MOTIVA ENTERPRISES, LLC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 1, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellants appeal the district court’s grant of Appellees’ motion to dismiss
without prejudice. As a condition of dismissal, the district court required
Appellees to reimburse Appellants for filing fees Appellants incurred in removing
the suit to federal court, but refused to impose a condition requiring Appellees to
refile the suit in federal court. Appellants now argue that the district court abused
its discretion in so granting the dismissal because: (1) Appellants were legally
prejudiced by the dismissal, (2) Appellees should have been required to follow the
procedure to join additional defendants set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447, and (3) at a
minimum, the district court should have required Appellees to refile their new
complaint in federal court. After careful review of the parties’ briefs and the
record, we discern no reversible error in the district court’s dismissal without
prejudice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides that “an action may be
dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms the court
considers proper.” We review the district court’s decision to dismiss without
prejudice for an abuse of discretion. McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F. 2d 855,
857 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d
1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A district court enjoys broad discretion in
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determining whether to allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).”). We
have held that “in most cases a dismissal should be granted unless the defendant
will suffer clear legal prejudice, other than the mere prospect of a subsequent
lawsuit, as a result.” McCants, 781 F. 2d at 857. In exercising its discretion, the
district court “should keep in mind the interests of the defendant, for Rule 41(a)(2)
exists chiefly for protection of defendants.” Fisher v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt.,
Inc., 940 F. 2d 1502, 1503 (11th Cir. 1991). The court must “weigh the relevant
equities and do justice between the parties in each case, imposing such costs and
attaching such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate.” McCants,
781 F. 2d at 857. However, “it is no bar to a voluntary dismissal that the plaintiff
may obtain some tactical advantage over the defendant in future litigation.” Id.
In deciding to grant the dismissal in this case, the district court pointed out
that the litigation was at an early stage, and that the parties had not yet undertaken
significant discovery or other preparation for litigation. The court further
determined that much of the preparation the Appellants had already undertaken
would be useful in any subsequent litigation after refiling. Based on these
findings, the district court determined that equity weighed in favor of granting the
dismissal without prejudice.
The Appellants have pointed to no evidence that persuades us that they were
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legally prejudiced by the district court’s dismissal of the case without prejudice as
such an early stage of litigation. Furthermore, we reject Appellants’ argument that
Appellees were bound to follow the procedure set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1447. While
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) provides a permissible method of joining additional
defendants, neither the text of that statute nor any authority cited by the Appellants
leads us to believe that 28 U.S.C. § 1447 bars dismissal in this case. Nor do we
credit Appellants’ argument that the district court should have required Appellees
to refile in federal court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the district court may
“impos[e] such costs and attach[] such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed
appropriate.” McCants, 781 F.2d at 857. We see no reason to disturb the district
court’s decision to require the Appellees to reimburse the Appellant’s for their
filing costs, but to refuse to require the Appellees to refile in federal court.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal without prejudice is
affirmed.1
AFFIRMED.
Appellants’ motion to supplement the record with documents that were not before1
the district court is denied.
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