USA vs Michelle Morton, et al

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 15, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-11185
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00295-EAK-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHELLE MORTON,
a.k.a. Michelle Crocker,
a.k.a. Michelle L. Crocker-Rodgers,
a.k.a. Michelle Dalton,
a.k.a. Michelle Lynn Dalton,
a.k.a. Megan Michelle Davis,
a.k.a. Michelle Davis,
a.k.a. Michelle Lynn Dunn,
a.k.a. Michelle L. Morton,
a.k.a. Michelle Lynn Morton,
a.k.a. Michelle M. Dalton,
a.k.a. Megan Davis, etc.,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(December 15, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michelle Morton appeals her sentence of 96 months of imprisonment for
bank fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Morton argues that her sentence is unreasonable.
We affirm.
Morton’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The
district court considered the sentencing factors and explained that Morton’s
“absolutely appalling” criminal record required an upward variance. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). The district court stated that a variance of 50 months was necessary to
punish Morton adequately for her “serious[] . . . offenses,” promote respect for the
law, protect the public from future similar crimes, and also to address her “conduct
in [the] past . . . 25 years,” her “lack of conscience” as evidenced by her stealing
her minor son’s identity and defrauding an elderly cancer patient, her lack of
remorse for her crimes, and her need for education and rehabilitation. The brevity
of previous sentences militated in favor of a sentence above the range provided in
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the Guidelines to remedy Morton’s unrepentant recidivism and disregard for the
law. We will not disturb a sentence unless “we ‘are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1191 (11th Cir. 2008)). Morton has been convicted of 54 crimes involving fraud
and has amassed 39 criminal history points, three times the amount required for a
VI classification. Morton’s sentence is reasonable.
We AFFIRM Morton’s sentence.
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