Araujo v. US Atty General

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 29, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-13452
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A094-882-570
COROMOTO CATHERINE ANEZ ARAUJO,
GABRIEL JOSUE CUETO SANCHEZ,
lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
lllllllllllllllllllll Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(March 29, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Coromoto Catherine Anez Araujo and her son, Gabriel Josue Cueto
Sanchez, natives and citizens of Venezuela, petition for review of the denial of
Araujo’s application for asylum and withholding of removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231. The Board of
Immigration Appeals agreed with the findings of the immigration judge that
Araujo’s testimony had not been credible and she had failed to present evidence to
corroborate her testimony. We deny the petition.
The government argues that we lack jurisdiction to review Araujo’s petition
because she did not “meaningfully challenge” the finding that she had failed to
present evidence to corroborate her testimony, but we disagree. Araujo argued
before the Board that her testimony had been consistent and credible, there was no
need for corroborating evidence, and she had presented sufficient corroborating
evidence.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that Araujo was not credible, and
the immigration judge provided specific and cogent reasons to support that
finding. Mohammed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 547 F.3d 1340, 1344–45 (11th Cir.
2008). To obtain status as a refugee, an alien must provide “testimony [that] is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),
but Araujo’s testimony was inconsistent and implausible. Araujo gave, for
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example, three different accounts about how she had learned who destroyed the
windows in her living room: she told the Venezuelan police that she had seen
“military men (2 men with military uniforms) with guns”; she stated in her
application that she had been “told by some witnesses that two men in military
uniforms had fired several shots against [her] windows from the street”; and she
testified that a “neighbor [had] told [her] the following day [that] he had seen . . .
two men ride in a van, and one of them fired shots.” Araujo’s accounts also
differed from her brother’s testimony that, a month after the incident, Araujo
“didn’t know” who was the vandal. When asked to explain these inconsistencies,
Araujo responded that the police report contained a “mistranslation.” Although
Araujo argues that the inconsistencies in her testimony are “not . . . material,” they
did not have to relate “to the heart of [her] allegations of past persecution or fear
of future persecution,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), to support the adverse
credibility determination. See Xia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d 1233, 1239–40
(11th Cir. 2010). Araujo also argues that the Board erroneously dismissed her
appeal based on a “per se rule that [she] fail[ed] to address corroboration,” but the
Board “agreed with [the] determination” of the immigration judge that Araujo
“was not credible owing to the lack of corroboration of her claims and an
inconsistency in her submitted evidence.”
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Araujo’s testimony was weak, which created a “greater . . . need for
corroborative evidence,” Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.
2005), that Araujo failed to provide. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Although
Araujo’s parents allegedly witnessed the destruction of her windows, and her
father allegedly repelled four women who attacked Araujo, and her father
allegedly answered a telephone call in which a member of the Venezuelan military
threatened her, Araujo failed to call either of her parents to testify. Araujo could
have provided corroborating testimony from her parents because, in her words, her
parents “spen[t] more time here” in the United States than in Venezuela. Araujo
likewise could have called her son, who accompanied her to the removal hearing,
to testify about the alleged attempted kidnapping of him at his school.
“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary ,” 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B), and we may not reverse those findings unless “‘the record compels
a reversal,” Mohammed, 547 F.3d at 1345 (quoting Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004)). See Xia, 608 F.3d at 1239. Because Araujo’s
testimony was not credible and she failed to provide any evidence that
corroborated her allegations of persecution, substantial evidence supports the
findings that Araujo failed to prove that she suffered past persecution at the hands
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of, or had a well-founded fear of future persecution by, the Venezuelan
government. Araujo “failed to establish eligibility for asylum, [and] likewise
failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.” Shkambi v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 584 F.3d 1041, 1052 (11th Cir. 2009).
Araujo’s petition for review is DENIED.
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