Kendra Hall v. Siemens VDO Automotive

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 21, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-15106
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 5:06-cv-01208-SLB
KENDRA HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SIEMENS VDO AUTOMOTIVE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 10-15107
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 5:06-cv-01208-SLB
KENDRA HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SIEMENS VDO AUTOMOTIVE,

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Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(June 21, 2012)
Before EDMONDSON, ANDERSON and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.*
PER CURIAM:
This case involves alleged pay discrimination. Claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) are involved.
Plaintiff -- a black woman -- became an employee of Defendant when
Defendant purchased the plant at which Plaintiff worked. At the time of the
purchase, Plaintiff’s salary was lower than comparable white male employees.
This discrepancy continued even after Plaintiff complained to Defendant, began
receiving raises, and brought this action alleging several pay-discrimination-
related claims. A jury returned a verdict finding gender-based pay discrimination
Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by*
designation.
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in violation of Title VII and the EPA. The district court denied judgment as a
matter of law and entered judgment against Defendant. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kendra Hall (“Hall”) is a black woman hired by DaimlerChrylser in
1998 to work as an engineer at a plant in Huntsville, Alabama. In the Spring of
2004, the Huntsville plant was sold to Defendant Siemens VDO (“Siemens”). At
the time of the sale, Plaintiff was a Quality Planner and was making approximately
$54,000 annually. As part of the Huntsville plant purchase, Siemens agreed to
maintain the salary of all legacy employees at the plant for one year from the date
of transfer. Plaintiff was covered by this promise. Her annual salary remained
approximately $54,000 through the Spring of 2005 when Siemens announced a
plant-wide raise.
Spring 2005 marked the first time Plaintiff complained to Siemens about her
compensation. Plaintiff told Siemens that she was the lowest paid Quality Planner
and complained that she was the only Quality Planner being paid according to
“Grade 8” instead of “Grade 9” on the salary scale.
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Siemens conducted an investigation in response to Plaintiff’s complaints.
That Plaintiff’s pay differential had no reasonable basis in the Spring of 2005 is
undisputed. Shortly after the investigation, Plaintiff was given an almost ten
percent raise and was upgraded to “Grade 9.” (Siemens also began a Performance
Improvement Plan (“PIP”) for Plaintiff that was designed to address alleged
deficiencies in Plaintiff’s performance. The deficiencies carried the potential for
Plaintiff to be terminated. Plaintiff completed the PIP without serious incident or
consequence.) After these steps were taken, Plaintiff was being paid
approximately $61,000 annually.
Even after these corrective acts by Siemens, Plaintiff complained to
management that she was still paid less than other Quality Planners. She then
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) action in
November 2005 and this civil action in June 2006. The parties agree that raises --
approaching ten percent annually -- were given to Plaintiff after the filing of the
EEOC action and were continued after the filing of this civil action. By trial,
Plaintiff’s annual salary was approximately $78,000.
Plaintiff’s civil complaint alleged these discriminatory violations:
discrimination on race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); discrimination based on race in
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violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“section 1981”); and
discrimination in pay in violation of the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The
complaint also alleged other violations: retaliation in violation of Title VII;
intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of Alabama state law; and
negligent training/hiring/retention in violation of Alabama state law. Defendant
moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment to
Defendant on several of Plaintiff’s claims. The discrimination claims were
allowed to proceed.
In preparation for trial, the district court rejected a motion in limine filed
by Defendant that focused on admission of information about the PIP. At trial, the
court sustained Batson challenges to two of Defendant’s peremptory challenges1
of potential jurors.
At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding no race
discrimination, but finding liability for gender-based pay discrimination under
Title VII and the EPA. Defendant’s motions for judgment as a matter of law were
then denied, and the district court entered judgment for $58,000 against
Defendant.
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).1
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DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the district court erred in not granting judgment as
a matter of law on the gender discrimination claims, that the district court erred in
sustaining the Batson challenges, and that the district court abused its discretion in
allowing certain evidence at trial. Plaintiff cross-appeals, contending that the grant
of summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim was error.
I.
Siemens contends that the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law
on the gender discrimination claims was error. Siemens asserts that it is not
responsible for the discriminatory pay differential created by Chrysler and that no
reasonable juror could have found that Siemens discriminated against Plaintiff on the
basis of gender in the light of Siemens’s behavior after taking over the plant,
including giving Plaintiff several raises after she complained about her comparative
pay.
Siemens contends that the differential in pay between Plaintiff and other
personnel continued after the purchase of the Huntsville plant not because of gender
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discrimination on Siemens’s part, but rather because of a “factor other than sex:”
Siemens’s internal raise and promotion policies. These pay and promotion policies2
capped the raise percentage available to personnel -- like Plaintiff -- who did not
change jobs within Siemens: capped at ten percent annually. Siemens argues that,
once the pay differential was brought to its attention, it made concerted efforts within
the constraints of the policies to correct the differential by granting Plaintiff raises
that were at -- or closely approached -- the maximum allowable.
While the corrective process took several years, Siemens stresses that the large
total raise given to Plaintiff over this period and the proximity of the raises to the top
of the allowed range indicate that Siemens, after taking over the Huntsville plant, was
not committing gender discrimination in continuing to pay Plaintiff less than similarly
situated male personnel.
We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.
Russell v. N. Broward Hosp., 346 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). We will reverse
the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law only when no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis exists for a reasonable jury to find against the moving party and the
facts and inferences available in the record point so overwhelmingly in favor of the
The parties dispute when these policies came into effect; 2005 or 2006. The written policies2
carry a January 2006 date, but Siemens contends that the policies were given to the Huntsville
plant and put into effect during 2005.
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moving party that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict. See
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169, 1177 (11th Cir.
2005).
In the light of the facts, Siemens’s position does not require the grant of
judgment as a matter of law to Siemens on either of Plaintiff’s gender discrimination
claims.
A.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to [their] compensation ... because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). We
have established a multi-step burden-shifting method for analyzing Title VII
gender discrimination claims. We have said that “a female Title VII plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that she occupies a
job similar to that of higher paid males.” Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15
F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994). Upon establishment of a prima facie case of sex
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the pay disparity. Id. This burden is not a heavy one;
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and upon articulation of a non-gender based reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer had a discriminatory intent
in perpetuating the pay disparity. Id.
Siemens does not contest that a pay differential existed. For judgment as a
matter of law to be demanded on Plaintiff’s Title VII gender discrimination claim,
Siemens would need to establish that -- based on the record -- no reasonable jury
could have believed that a discriminatory reason was more likely than not the
motivation for Siemens perpetuating the pay differential. The record does not
demand such a conclusion.
Among other evidence in the record, the evidence about the PIP -- including
evidence about the motivation for the PIP -- combined with the conflicting
evidence about the effective date of Siemens’s raise policies, the length of time it
took Siemens to remedy the pay differential, and Siemens’s having hired or
internally promoted several male quality planners at higher salaries than Plaintiff’s
during 2005 and 2006 is sufficient to allow a jury determination that Siemens
acted with discriminatory intent.
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B.
The EPA prohibits gender-based compensation discrimination where men
and women are paid different amounts for equal work, in equal jobs, under similar
working conditions -- except where the discriminatory payments are made
pursuant to seniority, merit, or quantity-based compensation systems, or are
“based on any other factor other than sex[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Unlike Title
VII, “the EPA establishes a form of ‘strict liability’” because it does not require
discriminatory intent and because the burden is on the defendant to prove that the
demonstrated disparity in pay is the result of “a factor other than sex.” See Meeks,
15 F.3d at 1019.
For judgment as a matter of law to be demanded on the EPA claim, Siemens
would need to have established -- based on the record -- that no reasonable jury
could have disbelieved Siemens’s proffered “factor other than sex” explanations
for the pay differential between Plaintiff and male employees performing
equivalent jobs. The record does not demand such a conclusion.
Among other evidence in the record, Siemens’s hiring of male personnel at
higher salaries for equal jobs combined with the evidence discussed in analyzing
Plaintiff’s Title VII gender discrimination claim allows a jury determination that
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Siemens’s “factor other than sex” explanations were not the cause of the
differential treatment of Plaintiff.
II.
Siemens also contends that the district court erred during jury selection by
preventing, on Batson grounds, Siemens from using its final peremptory challenge
-- and a later-provided replacement challenge -- against two black venire
members: only three black people were prospective jurors. Siemens chiefly argues
that the district court did not follow the proper procedure in applying Batson to the
peremptory challenges in question and that these errors demand the grant of a new
trial.
Briefly stated, Batson and its progeny establish a three-step process for
analyzing equal protection challenges to a party’s attempted use of peremptory
strikes during jury selection. See, e.g., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Inc.
v. Lowder Realty Co., Inc., 236 F.3d 629, 636 (11th Cir. 2000). First, a prima
facie case of discrimination must be established to the trial court’s satisfaction.
Second, after a prima facie case has been found, the party making the peremptory
strike has the opportunity to offer a non-discriminatory explanation for the
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challenged strike. Third, the trial court -- looking at any proffered non-
discriminatory explanation and at the facts establishing the prima facie case --
must determine whether purposeful discrimination motivated the challenged
strike. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724; United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 837
(11th Cir. 2011); Lowder, 236 F.3d at 636.
The determinations a district court makes in resolving Batson challenges are
largely based on perceived credibility and context; and so a district court’s Batson
determination “must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Hill, 643 F.3d at
837-38. When reviewing the resolution of Batson challenges, “we give great
deference to the district court’s finding as to the existence of a prima facie case,”
United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 923 (11th Cir. 1995); and once a prima
facie case has been found, the determination on a challenged strike’s actual
motivation is treated as “pure factfinding.” United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d
1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
We keep in mind all the relevant circumstances, including the subject matter
of the case being tried. And we appreciate the trial judge (an experienced fact
finder) watched the jurors as they replied to the questions put to them. We see no
reversible error in the district court’s handling of the Batson challenges in this
case. The establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination to the satisfaction
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of the district court is the chief concern of the first Batson step. The district court
here did find -- explicitly in one instance and implicitly in another -- that a prima
facie case of discrimination was present in both contested strikes. Siemens’s
explanations were rejected. Siemens made no timely objection to the process the
District Court was following: no statement to the district court to assist the court
regarding the best procedure to follow or to highlight the lack (as Siemens sees it)
of a complete explanation provided for finding a prima facie case of
discrimination and disallowing the strikes. No new trial is required on these facts.
III.
Siemens’s final assertions of error are that the district court abused its
discretion (1) in allowing evidence about the PIP to be presented after the
dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and (2) in limiting certain parts of
Siemens’s cross-examination of Plaintiff.
We review district court rulings on admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2007).
The district court was well within its discretion in making the decisions in
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question and committed no reversible error in making the evidentiary decisions
that it made.
IV.
In her cross-appeal, Plaintiff asserts that the grant of summary judgment to
Siemens on Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim was error. Establishment of a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires a plaintiff to show these
things: (1) that plaintiff engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) that
plaintiff suffered an “adverse employment action;” and (3) that the “adverse
employment action” was causally connected to the protected activity. Crawford v.
Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Brown v. Ala. Dep’t. of
Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181-1182 (11th Cir. 2010).
Hall contends that she engaged in protected activity beginning in 2005
when she complained about her pay disparity and that the implementation of the
PIP, her transfer to a different supervisor, being sent on business to Mexico, and
the solicitation of negative comments about her work from co-workers were all
“adverse employment actions” taken in direct response to her protected activity.
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Summary judgment is demanded on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because the record
fails to indicate a sufficient “adverse employment action.”
CONCLUSION
We see no reversible error.
Judgment as a matter of law was properly denied on the gender
discrimination claims, the resolution of the Batson challenges produced no
reversible error, the district court’s evidentiary decisions were no abuse of
discretion, and summary judgment was properly granted on the Title VII
retaliation claim.
AFFIRMED.
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