USA v. Michael Canada

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 9, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-13122
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20806-JLK-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL CANADA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 9, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On June 29, 2011, the district court sentenced Michael Canada on a plea of

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guilty to a prison term of 70 months for conspiring, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
963, to import one or more kilograms of heroin, five or more kilograms of cocaine,
and fifty kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952(a). He now
appeals his sentence, contending that the district court imposed a procedurally
unreasonable sentence because it erred (1) in calculating his total offense level and
(2) by failing to consider the two-year sentencing disparity between him and
codefendant Terrell Pratt.
A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court
“improperly calculates the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory
rather than advisory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, selects a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008). The
problem Canada faces is that he invited any error the district court may have
committed in calculating his total offense level. “[A] party may not challenge as
error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.” United States v.
Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying invited error to a sentencing
issue). “The doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party induces or invites
the district court into making an error.” Id. “The doctrine stems from the common
sense view that where a party invites the trial court to commit error, he cannot
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later cry foul on appeal.” United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th
Cir. 2009).
Canada invited any error the district court may have made in calculating his
total offense level and Guideline sentence range because, in his objections to the
presentence report, he explicitly told the district court that (1) the proper base
offense level was 32, (2) he should receive a three-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility, (3) he should receive a two-level safety valve reduction, (4) the
total offense level was 27, and (5) the advisory Guidelines sentence range was 70
to 87 months. Additionally, at sentencing, he agreed that, even once the 6.51
kilograms of cocaine were not attributed to him, the sentence range calculation did
not change. Accordingly, he cannot now claim that the district court miscalculated
his total offense level and resulting sentence range. See Brannon, 562 F.3d at
1306.
As for the alleged sentencing disparity, Canada did not object to the
purported disparity at sentencing; hence, we consider the alleged disparity for
plain error. United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010).
This standard requires the defendant to show “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3)
that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
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We find no plain error here. Both Canada and Pratt were sentenced to the
low end of the Guidelines sentence range calculated for them. They had different
base offense levels, total offense levels, and sentence ranges. Given the
difference in total offense levels, Canada and Pratt were not similarly situated, and
the disparity between their sentences is not plain error, much less error.
AFFIRMED.
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