Fabian Moncrieffe v. Broward County State Attorney's Office, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10126
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cv-61883-WJZ
FABIAN MONCRIEFFE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BROWARD COUNTY
STATE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 10, 2013)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 12-10126 Date Filed: 04/10/2013 Page: 1 of 5

-- 1 of 5 --

2
Fabian Moncrieffe, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Moncrieffe alleged
violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and resulting emotional distress. The magistrate
judge concluded that Moncrieffe’s constitutional claims were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2373 (1994), because he failed to
show that his conviction for violating his probation was reversed or expunged
before bringing the instant action. The district court subsequently dismissed
Moncrieffe’s complaint, and adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation.
On appeal, Moncrieffe presented no arguments and merely restated the five claims
found in his complaint. Upon review of the record and consideration of
Moncrieffe’s brief, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), viewing the allegations in the
complaint as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2003).
Section 1915(e) provides that an in forma pauperis action or appeal shall be
dismissed at any time if the court determines that it fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Case: 12-10126 Date Filed: 04/10/2013 Page: 2 of 5

-- 2 of 5 --

3
Under Heck, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his § 1983 complaint
for money damages “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence,” the district court must dismiss the complaint unless “the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512
U.S. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. “[E]ven when the plaintiff does not seek such
damages, his suit may be barred if, for example, he must negate an element of the
offense of which he has been convicted in order to prevail . . . .” Hughes, 350 F.3d
at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). If success on the complaint would not
necessarily invalidate the conviction or sentence, however, then the § 1983 action
should be allowed to proceed, absent some other bar to suit. Heck, 512 U.S. at
487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372–73.
Finally, reputation alone, apart from some other tangible interest, is not a
“liberty” or “property” interest by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural
protection of the Due Process Clause. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–02, 96 S.
Ct. 1155, 1160–61 (1976) (noting that the weight of decisions “establishes no
constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official into a
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment”) (internal citation omitted). “Defamation, by itself, is a
tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation.”
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1794 (1991). Specifically,
Case: 12-10126 Date Filed: 04/10/2013 Page: 3 of 5

-- 3 of 5 --

4
defamation occurring without the termination or significant alteration of some
other legal right or status will not suffice to constitute a deprivation sufficient to
state a claim under § 1983. See Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 582 (11th
Cir. 1990).
Here, the district court did not err by dismissing Moncrieffe’s complaint as
barred by Heck. Viewing all of the allegations in Moncrieffe’s complaint as true, a
judgment in his favor, whether it is an award for damages or an order for his
release, would necessarily imply that his conviction for violating his probation is
invalid. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. While Moncrieffe
rightfully asserts that his escape conviction was vacated and discharged, his
conviction for violating probation is still valid. As noted by the magistrate, until
Moncrieffe files a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to attack his
probation violation conviction, his claims under § 1983 are barred. Additionally,
we note that Moncrieffe’s defamation claims are not actionable in the instant case
because they do not qualify as constitutional deprivations under the law of this
Circuit. See Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 582.
After careful review of Moncrieffe’s complaint, and upon consideration of
his brief, we conclude that he has failed to state a claim for which relief may be
granted. For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Moncrieffe’s § 1983 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Case: 12-10126 Date Filed: 04/10/2013 Page: 4 of 5

-- 4 of 5 --

5
AFFIRMED.
Case: 12-10126 Date Filed: 04/10/2013 Page: 5 of 5

-- 5 of 5 --