USA v. Waymon Lynn, Jr.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13303
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00063-SDM-AEP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WAYMON LYNN, JR.,
a.k.a. Waymon Lynn,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 15, 2013)
Before HULL, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Waymon Lynn, Jr. appeals the district court’s partial grant of his 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
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Lynn pleaded guilty in 2010 to possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine (Count 1), marijuana (Count 2), cocaine (Count 3), and hydrocodone
(Count 4), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), as well as possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count 5), in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), and felon in possession of a firearm (Count 6), in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category
VI, Lynn had a guideline range of 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment. The district
court sentenced Lynn to a total of 156 months’ imprisonment: 96 months
concurrently for Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and a consecutive 60 month sentence for
Count 5.
In March 2012, Lynn filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), asserting that he was entitled to a reduction under the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. The district
court then appointed counsel, and Lynn and the government jointly stipulated that
Lynn was eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 750, which
revised the crack-cocaine quantity tables to comply with the FSA and changed
Lynn’s guideline range on Count 1 to 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. The parties
requested that the district court reduce Lynn’s sentence on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6
to 51 months. Lynn also filed a supplement to the joint stipulation, arguing that a
sentence at the low end of the revised range was appropriate because of his post-
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conviction rehabilitation efforts and the continuing sentence disparity between
crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenders. The district court granted the motion
in part and reduced Lynn’s sentence on the relevant counts to 63 months, the top
end of the revised range. Lynn appeals, arguing that this reduction was
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court should have
sentenced him to the low end of the revised guideline range.
We review a district court’s decision to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343
(11th Cir. 2003). We have never decided in a published opinion whether
reasonableness review applies in the § 3582(c)(2) context.1 But even assuming
reasonableness review applies, Lynn has not met his burden of demonstrating that
the district court’s reduction of his sentence was either procedurally or
substantively unreasonable.
For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district court must properly
calculate the guideline range, treat the guidelines as advisory, consider the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), select a sentence based on findings of fact that are
not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall v. United
1 Compare United States v. Brewster, 335 F. App’x 8, 9 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)
(“[R]easonableness review does not apply in the present context because a § 3582(c)(2)
proceeding does not constitute a full resentencing . . . .”) with United States v. Parker, 366 F.
App’x 129, 131 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (applying reasonableness review to an appeal of a
§ 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction).
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States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Lynn contends that the district court’s statement
that “[a]ll other guideline application decisions remain unaffected” demonstrates
that the district court thought it did not have jurisdiction to sentence him to the low
end of the revised guideline range. But the district court was merely quoting an
application note of the sentencing guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), cmt.
n.2. Lynn also asserts that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a)
factors. But the court stated that it considered them and noted that it considered
Lynn’s supplemental memorandum, which discussed several of the factors. See
United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] district
court commits no reversible error by failing to articulate specifically the
applicability – if any – of each of the section 3553(a) factors, as long as the record
demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into account by the district
court.”).
Lynn next contends that his rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated warrant
a sentence at the low end of the revised guideline range. But he cannot
demonstrate that his sentence reduction was substantively unreasonable “in light of
the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237, 1244-
45 (11th Cir. 2012). Lynn’s sentence reduction fell within the amended guideline
range. See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[O]rdinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
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reasonable.”). Moreover, although he did offer some evidence of post-conviction
rehabilitation, Lynn was convicted of six serious offenses, including two firearm
offenses, and has an extensive criminal history, both of which support a sentence at
the high end of the range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C).
Accordingly, Lynn cannot demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion
in reducing his sentence on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to 63 months instead of 51
months.
AFFIRMED.
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