Roosevelt Davis v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13072
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-00035-WTH-PRL
ROOSEVELT DAVIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - MEDIUM,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(November 16, 2016)
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-13072 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 Page: 1 of 6

-- 1 of 6 --

2
Roosevelt Davis, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Davis argues that
the district court erred in denying Davis’s § 2241 petition seeking credit for time
served while in state custody. After careful review, we affirm.1
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2241 petition. Santiago-
Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471 (11th Cir. 2015).
A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant
is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to
commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). The manner in which a state
chooses to impose and execute its sentences does not affect the sovereign right of
the United States to impose and execute its sentences in the manner deemed
appropriate by the federal courts and federal authorities. See Finch v. Vaughn, 67
F.3d 909, 915 (11th Cir.1995). If a prisoner starts in state custody, serves his state
sentence, and then moves to federal custody, it will always be the federal
government -- whether the district court or the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) -- that
decides whether he will receive credit for the time served in state custody. Setser
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1471 (2012). A defendant will be given credit
toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
1 Nevertheless, Appellant’s Motion to Supplement the Record is GRANTED.
Case: 15-13072 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 Page: 2 of 6

-- 2 of 6 --

3
detention prior to the date the sentence commences that has not been credited
against another sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
The Attorney General, through the BOP, is responsible for computing a
prisoner’s sentence and applying and administering prior custody credits pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992).
The BOP has the authority to retroactively designate where a prisoner will serve
his term of imprisonment, and may assign a prisoner to serve his federal sentence
in a state correctional facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). In making this
determination, the BOP considers, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the prisoner, any statement by the court
that imposed the sentence, and any relevant departmental policy statement. See 18
U.S.C. § 3621(a)(2)-(5). The BOP must also discern the sentencing court’s intent
by considering the Judgment and Commitment Order, the court’s recommendation
of nonfederal confinement in that Order, the court’s determination as to whether
the sentence should be concurrent or consecutive, the court’s indication that it does
not object to the nunc pro tunc designation, and the court’s indication that it has no
objection to the service of the federal and state sentences concurrently. See
Federal BOP Program Statement 5160.05(9)(b) (Jan. 16, 2003). Ordinarily, courts
presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties. Bracy
v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997).
Case: 15-13072 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 Page: 3 of 6

-- 3 of 6 --

4
A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court judgment may proceed
under § 2241 only when he raises claims outside the scope of § 2255(a), that is,
claims concerning execution of his sentence. Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta,
542 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). Collateral attacks on the validity of a
federal sentence must be brought under § 2255. Darby v. Hawk–Sawyer, 405 F.3d
942, 944-45 (11th Cir. 2005). Section 3553 directs sentencing courts to consider
certain factors when imposing a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553. However, the
Bureau is not charged with applying § 3553(a). Setser, 132 S. Ct. at 1470.
Here, the BOP correctly determined that Davis’s term of imprisonment for
his federal sentence began on February 11, 2011 when he entered federal custody.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Even though the state court informed the federal authorities
that they could take custody of Davis prior to the expiration of his Dixie County
sentence based on the Dixie County court’s determination that the state sentence
would run concurrently with the federal sentence, the state has no authority to
order commencement of a federal sentence. See Federal BOP Program Statement
5160.05(7)(g); Finch, 67 F.3d at 915. It is the right of the United States to impose
and execute its sentences in the manner deemed appropriate by the federal courts
and federal authorities. See Finch, 67 F.3d at 915. It was also proper for the
federal government to decide whether Davis would receive credit for the time
served in state custody. See Setser, 132 S. Ct. at 1471. In any event, Davis was
Case: 15-13072 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 Page: 4 of 6

-- 4 of 6 --

5
appropriately not given credit for the time he spent in state detention prior to
February 11, 2011 because it had been credited against another sentence -- his state
sentence imposed in Dixie County. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
While the BOP had the authority to retroactively designate Davis’s state
term of imprisonment as federal imprisonment, it was not required to do so. See
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Rather, the decision fell within the BOP’s discretion based
on multiple factors, including the sentencing court’s recommendation. See 18
U.S.C. § 3621(a)(2)-(5); Federal BOP Program Statement 5160.05(9)(b). In the
letters to the district courts, the BOP indicated its intent to review all relevant
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) before a designation and its intention to
administer sentences in accordance with federal statutes, BOP policy, and the
intent of the sentencing court. Davis has offered no evidence that the BOP did not
follow federal law or its own policy when determining not to grant retroactive
designation. Because the decision was within the BOP’s discretion, courts
presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties, and
there was no evidence to the contrary, the district court correctly determined that
the BOP did not abuse its discretion by denying retroactive designation. See
Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909.
Lastly, Davis’s claim that consecutive treatment of his Dixie County
sentence was a procedural and substantive sentencing violation pursuant to 18
Case: 15-13072 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 Page: 5 of 6

-- 5 of 6 --

6
U.S.C. § 3553(a) fails, regardless of whether he raised it before the district court.
Here, the district court did not impose a consecutive sentence. Rather, the BOP
only administered the terms of imprisonment as imposed by the sentencing court
and determined that it would not retroactively designate Davis’s state
imprisonment as federal imprisonment, as permitted within its discretion. At no
point was the BOP required to consider § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553;
Setser, 132 S. Ct. at 1470. Therefore, any challenge to the imposition of a sentence
based on § 3553(a) factors is necessarily an attack on the legality of the sentence
since only the district court applies them when sentencing. See id. Because the
extent to which the sentencing court considered the § 3553(a) factors does not go
to the execution of the sentence, it cannot be properly raised in the § 2241 petition.
See Antonelli, 542 F.3d at 1352 n.1. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Case: 15-13072 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 Page: 6 of 6

-- 6 of 6 --