Leslie Wayne Hill v. Mike Hale, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-13592
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-00457-AKK
LESLIE WAYNE HILL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MIKE HALE, Sheriff,
JACOB REACH, Lieutenant,
JASON ORR, WVTM-TV LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(February 11, 2016)
Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Leslie Hill appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mike Hale, Jason Orr, and Jacob Reach, of the
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department. Hill argues the defendants violated his
right to procedural due process when they erroneously identified him as a sex
offender, issued warrants against him under Alabama’s Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act, and publicized his alleged sex-offender status in a television
news segment. The district court dismissed these claims on immunity grounds.
Upon review, we affirm.1
The defendants are state officials for sovereign-immunity purposes. See
Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990). “A state official
may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity . . . or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity.”
Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal
citations omitted). Neither exception applies in this case. The district court
therefore did not err in dismissing suit against the defendants in their official
capacities.
Moreover, qualified immunity limits suit against state officials in their
individual capacities. A plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation under § 1983
can only overcome qualified immunity if “(1) the defendant violated a
1 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
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constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264
(11th Cir. 2004).
Here, even assuming a due process violation exists, the violation alleged is
not “clearly established.” Reputational injury alone is insufficient to invoke the
due process clause. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th
Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs alleging defamation must also allege a “plus” factor, the
deprivation of a “previously recognized property or liberty interest.” Id. at 1297-
98. Hill argues that erroneously-issued warrants establish such a “plus” factor, but
he cites no authority for the proposition that the mere issuance of a warrant—
absent arrest or prosecution2—amounts to a deprivation of property or liberty. The
district court therefore did not err in dismissing suit against the defendants in their
individual capacities.
AFFIRMED.
2 See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff may succeed in
a § 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in
applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to
the finding of probable cause.”). Here, the warrants at issue were never enforced. The Sheriff’s
Department withdrew them just two weeks after they were issued.
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