USA v. Jonathan Ashley Turner

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-13945
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00327-ODE-GGB-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JONATHAN ASHLEY TURNER,
a.k.a. Big Jay,
a.k.a. Big Gooney,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 12, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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On February 10, 2011, Jonathan Ashley Turner having pled guilty to
conspiracy to possess and sell stolen firearms1 and being a felon in possession of
firearms,2 was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 27 months and a supervised
release term of three years. On August 18, 2015, after Turner repeatedly violated
the conditions of supervised release by refusing to sign a drug treatment referral
and, consequently, for failing to obtain treatment for his drug abuse, the District
Court, following a hearing, granted the Probation Office’s petition to revoke his
supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The court then sentenced
Turner to a term of four months’ imprisonment, a term below the applicable
sentence range under the Sentencing Guidelines. Turner appeals the District
Court’s decision, arguing that the sentence is substantively unreasonable when one
considers his financial obligations, successful employment, and his reasons for
failing drug tests.
The revocation of supervised release is committed to the district court’s
sound discretion. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2008). To revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to
serve time in prison, the court must consider the sentencing factors outlined in 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6) and
(a)(7). These factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 371.
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
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history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed to
deter criminal conduct, the need to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, and the applicable guideline range. Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D). In
the end, the court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Id. §
3553(a).
In reviewing a sentence imposed following the revocation of supervised
release, we consider the totality of the circumstances and evaluate whether the
sentence achieves the sentencing purposes stated in § 3553(a). United States v.
Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11 th Cir. 2009). We ordinarily consider reasonable a
sentence within the Guidelines sentence range. Id. 575 F.3d at 1219.
The four months’ sentence imposed here is substantively reasonable. The
record establishes that the properly court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors.
In doing so, it was within the court’s discretion to give more weight to Turner’s
failed drug tests and refusal to obtain drug treatment than to his financial
obligations and successful employment.
AFFIRMED.
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