Blessing Obukwelu v. Board of Trustees Florida State University, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-12814
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cv-00055-MW-CAS

BLESSING OBUKWELU,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BOARD OF TRUSTEES FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY,
a public body corporate,
GREGORY TODD
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(November 20, 2020)
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Before GRANT, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Blessing Obukwelu appeals following the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of her retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) against the Board of Trustees, Florida State University (“FSU”) as a
sanction for her misconduct during litigation. On appeal, Obukwelu argues that
the dismissal was in error because she had a good faith belief that she did not need
to disclose certain, irrelevant evidence during litigation, and a lesser sanction
would have been sufficient. FSU, in turn, argues that Obukwelu waived any
challenge to the relevancy of the evidence she failed to disclose by not raising such
a challenge below.
1

We review a district court’s decision to impose sanctions under its inherent
powers for an abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th
Cir. 1998). That standard requires us to affirm unless we find that the district court
made a clear error of judgment or applied the wrong legal standard. Amlong &
Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007). Generally,
we will not consider an issue not raised in the district court. Access Now, Inc. v.
Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).

1
The district court previously dismissed Obukwelu’s claims against Todd with prejudice,
which Obukwelu does not challenge on appeal, and we granted Obukwelu’s motion to
voluntarily dismiss her appeal against Tallahassee Memorial Healthcare, Inc. Accordingly, FSU
remains the only defendant in this case.
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Although the standard of review is abuse of discretion, dismissal of an action
with prejudice is a sanction of last resort and applicable only in extreme
circumstances. Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that
the sanction of dismissal is only appropriate when less drastic sanctions would not
ensure compliance with the district court’s orders).
A district court has inherent powers to manage its affairs in order to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575
(11th Cir. 1995). A court may also impose sanctions for litigation misconduct
under its inherent power. Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc.,
561 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). “The inherent power to sanction is both
broader and narrower than [rule-based] means of imposing sanctions.” In re Mroz,
65 F.3d at 1575. A district court may impose sanctions using its inherent power “if
in the informed discretion of the court . . . the Rules are [not] up to the task.” Peer
v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
To dismiss an action as a sanction, “[t]here must be both a clear record of
willful conduct and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate.” Zocaras v.
Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). Mere negligence or confusion is not
sufficient to justify a finding of willful conduct. Id. The district court must also
consider the possibility of alternative, lesser sanctions, but that consideration need
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not be explicit. Id. at 484. “The key to unlocking a court’s inherent power is a
finding of bad faith.” Barnes, 158 F.3d at 1214. A party demonstrates bad faith
by, among other things, committing fraud upon the court, delaying or disrupting
the litigation, or hampering enforcement of a court order. Id.
In Zocaras, the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s civil action as
a sanction for his misconduct. Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483-84. The court determined
that (1) the plaintiff intentionally filed his complaint using a false name because he
used the same false name to obtain a driver’s license nine years earlier; (2) the
defendants were prejudiced because they were unaware of additional information
that would have been available under the true name, which was not disclosed until
trial and two years after the complaint was filed; and (3) lesser sanctions would not
be effective because the plaintiff’s misconduct harmed the defendants and
undermined the integrity of the judicial system. Id.
As an initial matter, Obukwelu waived on appeal her argument as to the
relevancy of the Morehouse evidence. She did not contest the evidence’s
relevance in the district court but, instead, contested its content. Additionally, at
the evidentiary hearing, she conceded that the evidence was relevant Thus,
Obukwelu waived her argument to the evidence’s relevance. See Access Now,
Inc., 385 F.3d at 1331.
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Regardless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Obukwelu’s retaliation claim with prejudice as a sanction for her litigation
misconduct. Obukwelu demonstrated willful conduct when she consistently failed
to disclose her residency at Morehouse throughout discovery. See Zocaras, 465
F.3d at 483. For instance, in response to an interrogatory asking her to name all
residencies for whom she worked, she did not include Morehouse, and she did not
mention her registration for the Step 3 exam while at Morehouse in response to
another interrogatory requesting such information. Years before she filed her
complaint, Obukwelu similarly failed to list Morehouse on her application to the
Florida Department of Health as required to obtain her medical license. Zocaras,
465 F.3d at 483-84.
Even after the discovery of her residency at Morehouse, Obukwelu
continued to make misrepresentations to the court during her second deposition
that her dismissal from Morehouse was voluntary and she was not informed that
she needed to take and pass the Step 3 exam. Barnes, 158 F.3d at 1214. Not only
did Dr. Rose’s testimony directly contradict Obukwelu’s claims that she lacked
knowledge of the requirement that she take and pass the Step 3 exam and that she
was not dismissed for failing to do so, documentary evidence also directly
contradicted her statements, which were made under oath. Barnes, 158 F.3d at
1214. Thus, the record demonstrates that Obukwelu acted willfully and in bad
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faith when she failed, multiple times, to truthfully respond in interrogatories and
sworn depositions. See Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483-84; Barnes, 158 F.3d at 1214.
Additionally, the district court stated that it recognized the gravity and
severity of a sanction of dismissal, but it expressly found that no lesser sanctions
would have sufficed to properly punish Obukwelu and deter future litigants.
Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483-84. The court had already warned her of the effect of her
conduct and provided her opportunities to cure, such as granting additional time
an d discovery because of her conduct. Her conduct also prejudiced FSU because
her residency at Morehouse was discovered a week before trial and three years
after she filed her third amended complaint. Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483-84. Thus,
Obukwelu has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing her retaliation claim.
AFFIRMED.

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