Erin C. Ryerson v. Jefferson County Commission

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-14684
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-01439-CLS
ERIN C. RYERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(August 17, 2021)
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Erin Ryerson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of her former employer, the Jefferson County Commission, in her lawsuit claiming
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112(a), 12203(a).1 Ryerson argues that the district court erred in finding that
she was not a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA. We disagree,
and we therefore affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment on ADA claims de
novo, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). A district
court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless
there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict in its favor.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.
1995)).
To prevail on her disability discrimination claim under the ADA, Ryerson
must show that “(1) she is disabled, (2) she was a ‘qualified individual’ when she
1 Ryerson included a retaliation claim in her complaint, but she affirmatively abandoned that
claim on appeal.
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was terminated, and (3) she was discriminated against on account of her
disability.” Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016). A
qualified individual is one who, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d
1169, 1182 (11th Cir. 2019). Discrimination under the ADA may encompass the
failure to make a reasonable accommodation to a known physical or mental
limitation of an otherwise qualified disabled individual. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). An accommodation is reasonable, however, “only if it enables
the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.” Lucas v. W.W.
Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).
We assume for purposes of this appeal that Ryerson’s ulcerative colitis is a
disability within the meaning of the ADA, as Ryerson alleges. To prove that she is
a “qualified individual” for purposes of her ADA claim, Ryerson must show that
she can perform the essential functions of the job of a Jefferson County tax auditor
without accommodation, or failing that, show that she could perform the essential
functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation. Davis v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Ryerson contends that she could have performed the work of a tax auditor if she
had been accommodated either by allowing her to work a flexible schedule—
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meaning permitting her to come in late when necessary and make up the time by
staying late or coming in early another day—or by allowing her to work from
home.
Although a modified work schedule may be a reasonable accommodation in
some circumstances, the ADA does not require an employer to eliminate an
essential function of a job in order to accommodate a disabled employee. Davis,
205 F.3d at 1305. The pivotal question for this appeal, therefore, is whether the
essential functions of the job of a Jefferson County tax auditor require the
employee to work on site during regular business hours.
In making this determination, we are required to consider “the employer’s
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). And
“if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job,” that “description shall be considered evidence
of the essential functions of the job.” Id. The written job description for the
position for which Ryerson was hired states, essentially, that an auditor prepares
for and conducts external audits and personal-property appraisals; prepares audit
reports, assessments, and related documentation; assists in the enforcement of
revenue laws; and provides tax advice and responds to questions from taxpayers
and other members of the public. The job description explains that conducting
external audits involves the examination of financial records, operations, and
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accounting systems, as well as verifying, analyzing, and reconciling “receipts,
disbursements, accounts, inventories,” and other records and data, and may require
travel outside the County’s jurisdiction. The County also responded in writing to
questions Ryerson posed by email before she was hired—and before she disclosed
her disabling condition or made any request for an accommodation—explaining
that the audits performed by the revenue department involved “primarily sales and
use taxes and business licenses,” and that the work of an auditor “is performed
primarily in the field at the office location of the business.”
In the County’s judgment, these job functions cannot be performed from the
auditor’s home because of the sensitive, confidential nature of the financial records
involved—the County does not allow its auditors to access its tax software
remotely, and the taxpayers’ records must be reviewed either on site at the
taxpayers’ offices or at the Jefferson County revenue office. The County also
requires its auditors to work during regular business hours so that they can
schedule and dependably perform audits at the taxpayers’ places of business and be
available to provide tax advice and answer questions from members of the public,
who logically would contact the revenue office during its usual hours of operation.
For her part, Ryerson points to no evidence in the record that contradicts or
undermines the County’s assessment that the essential functions of a tax auditor
cannot be performed from home or after hours. Instead, she argues that she was a
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qualified employee because she had the ability to do the work of an auditor, and
that the County failed to show that allowing her to telework would cause it undue
hardship. We are unpersuaded.
As to Ryerson’s first argument, her knowledge and skill as an auditor are
irrelevant to the position of a Jefferson County tax auditor if she is unable to leave
her home to use those abilities. The County’s written job description indicates that
an auditor’s essential duties involve examining the financial records and accounts
of local businesses. The fact that such materials are confidential goes without
saying, and the County’s obligation to either examine the records at the taxpayer’s
business or maintain them in its own secure location is an obvious corollary. And
purely as a matter of logistics, it seems logical that the auditor would need to be on
location to verify and reconcile a business’s receipts and inventory, examine its
accounting systems and operations, and appraise its property.
It is equally clear that Ryerson could not perform any job that required her to
leave home more than occasionally, whether or not she was allowed to work a
flexible schedule. Ryerson’s attendance records showed that she was absent for
the entire day more than 75% of the time during her employment with the
County—coming to work on only 25 of a possible 106 workdays—and she was
generally between 20 minutes and several hours late when she did show up. She
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never worked more than 27.75 hours in a week, and many weeks she did not come
in to work at all.
Ryerson’s argument that the County failed to show undue hardship
overlooks the fact that she bears the initial burden of identifying an
accommodation and showing that the accommodation is reasonable. Frazier-
White, 818 F.3d at 1255. If “she cannot do so, the employer has no affirmative
duty to show undue hardship.” Id. And as we have already explained, an
“accommodation is only reasonable if it allows the disabled employee to perform
the essential functions of the job in question.” Id. Because the only evidence
presented showed that the job of a county tax auditor requires the employee to
spend most of her time either in the field conducting audits at taxpayers’
businesses or at the county revenue office, Ryerson’s proposed accommodation of
allowing her to work from home was not reasonable. And because the evidence
also showed that Ryerson was unable to work a 40-hour week even with a flexible
start time, her requested accommodation of a flexible work schedule was not
reasonable either.
The district court did not err in finding that Ryerson was not a “qualified
individual” within the meaning of the ADA. We therefore affirm the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the County on Ryerson’s ADA claim.
AFFIRMED.
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