USA v. Corry E. Pearson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 21-11583
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:17-cr-80080-BB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CORRY E. PEARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 20, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2021, Corry Pearson, a federal prisoner serving a total sentence of 124
months, moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Under
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 1 of 8

-- 1 of 8 --

2
that provision, a district court may reduce a sentence “after considering the factors
set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent they are applicable,” if the court finds
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that the
reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2021).
In his motion, Pearson sought a sentence reduction on the ground that the
district court did not properly calculate the loss amount associated with his offenses,
resulting in an “overly harsh” sentence that is disproportionate to the sentence of a
codefendant. He further asserted that the court had discretion to consider
extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those expressly enumerated in
§ 1B1.13, that he was not a danger to society, and that the § 3553(a) factors,
including his rehabilitative efforts and low risk of recidivism, supported a sentence
reduction. He also briefly referenced COVID-19. The government opposed a
sentence reduction on several grounds, including that Pearson had not presented an
extraordinary and compelling basis for a sentence reduction.
The district court denied Pearson’s motion. While the court concluded that it
was not bound by § 1B1.13, it reasoned that Pearson failed to present extraordinary
and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction because “the basis for his request is
not related even remotely to the relevant personal considerations set forth in
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 2 of 8

-- 2 of 8 --

3
§ 1B1.13,” such as age, medical conditions, or family circumstances. Because
Pearson failed to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence
reduction, the court “d[id] not address the § 3553(a) factors” or “whether [Pearson]
poses a danger to the safety of others or to the community.
On appeal, Pearson says that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion because it relied too heavily on § 1B1.13 and failed to
consider the § 3553(a) factors, such as his rehabilitation, low risk of recidivism, and
a sentencing disparity between his sentence and that of a codefendant. In lieu of
filing a response brief, the government has moved for summary reversal of the
district court’s order, stating that the court abused its discretion when it denied
Pearson’s motion without considering the § 3553(a) factors as required by our recent
decision in United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2021).
We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant’s sentence and
may do so “only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes,
803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2015). As amended by the First Step Act of 2018,
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a district court to grant a defendant’s motion and “reduce
the term of imprisonment . . . , after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 3 of 8

-- 3 of 8 --

4
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018). Before the First Step
Act, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) could move for such a
reduction. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1250. Regardless of the movant, any reduction must
be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
While this case was pending on appeal, we held in Bryant that the policy
statement in § 1B1.13 is “applicable” to all motions filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A),
including those filed by prisoners, even though § 1B1.13 was promulgated before
the First Step Act and refers to only a sentence reduction upon a motion from the
BOP Director. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1252. Section 1B1.13’s commentary defines
several circumstances presenting “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” which are
based on the defendant’s serious medical conditions, age, or family circumstances.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(C). The commentary also contains a catch-all
for “other reasons,” but we held in Bryant that “other reasons” are limited to those
determined by the BOP, not the courts. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. So, courts are
required to follow § 1B1.13 when resolving motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
In addition to determining whether a movant has offered extraordinary and
compelling reasons and whether a reduction would be consistent with the policy
statement in § 1B1.13, a district court generally must consider “all applicable”
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 4 of 8

-- 4 of 8 --

5
§ 3553(a) factors when it grants or denies a motion for compassionate release. Cook,
998 F.3d at 1184 (“[A] district court abuses its discretion when it decides a motion
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) without considering the applicable statutory factors.”). A
district court is not required to articulate its findings or reasoning in great detail, but
when we evaluate a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion, we “cannot engage in meaningful
appellate review and must vacate and remand” if the record does not reflect that the
district court considered the applicable factors. Id. at 1185–86 (quotation marks
omitted).
In its motion for summary reversal, the government says that Cook controls
the outcome of this case and requires that we summarily vacate the denial of
Pearson’s motion because the district court declined to consider the § 3553(a)
factors. It requests that we remand for the court to expressly consider the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors “as now required by Cook.” Although we agree with the
government that summary disposition is appropriate, we deny the government’s
motion for summary reversal and instead, acting sua sponte, summarily affirm the
district court’s order.
In Cook, we held that the district court did not provide a sufficient basis for
review where it wrote, “The defendant’s age (47 years) and ailments (hypertension,
obesity, and Latent Tuberculosis) are not extraordinary and compelling
circumstances for a reduction to ‘time served.’” Cook, 998 F.3d at 1183. But in
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 5 of 8

-- 5 of 8 --

6
Cook, unlike here, the government had conceded that the prisoner’s medical
conditions were “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” that made him
eligible for relief, and the district court’s order was ambiguous as to whether the
motion was being denied on eligibility or discretionary grounds. Id. at 1185. In
Cook, therefore, we were called upon to review a discretionary judgment to grant or
deny the motion of an eligible prisoner, which required consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See id. at 1184–85. The question for us was only whether the
court had sufficiently “considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors” for us to review
its weighing of those factors. Id. We found nothing in the court’s order “to “suggest
that the court considered, balanced, or weighed any” of those factors, and we
explained that we could not weigh them for the first time on appeal. Id. at 1185.
Here, in contrast to Cook, we may engage in meaningful appellate review
because the district court clearly and, according to our now-binding precedent,
correctly concluded that Pearson was ineligible for relief (as the government had
argued in opposition to the motion). The court explained that Pearson did not present
an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction because “the basis
for his request”—which was effectively a collateral attack on his sentence—“is not
related even remotely to the relevant personal considerations set forth in § 1B1.13,”
such as age, medical conditions, or family circumstances. Pearson’s argument that
§ 1B1.13 is not an “applicable” policy statement is foreclosed by Bryant, so the
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 6 of 8

-- 6 of 8 --

7
district court was required to follow its terms when resolving his motion and could
not develop “other reasons” on its own. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). And we agree with the court that Pearson failed to present any
ground for a sentence reduction that would even arguably fall within § 1B1.13.
Because Pearson failed to present an “extraordinary and compelling reason”
within the meaning of § 1B1.13, he did not establish that he was eligible for a
sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In these circumstances, remanding for
the court to consider the § 3553(a) factors, such as Pearson’s rehabilitative efforts
and his low risk of recidivism, would be unnecessary because the court lacked the
discretion to grant or deny a reduction without an extraordinary and compelling
reason to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. In other words,
these § 3553(a) factors were not “applicable” to whether Pearson presented an
extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring consideration of the § 3553(a) factors “to the extent they
are applicable”). We do not read Cook to require a remand for consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors where only a prisoner’s eligibility is at issue.
For these reasons, we conclude that summary disposition is appropriate
because “the result is clear as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial
question as to the outcome.” Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.6 (11th
Cir. 2019). Pearson did not present any ground for a sentence reduction under
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 7 of 8

-- 7 of 8 --

8
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) that even approached an “extraordinary and compelling reason”
as defined in the binding policy statement, § 1B1.13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A);
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. It is therefore “clear as a matter
of law” that the district court correctly denied Pearson’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion.
See Brown, 942 F.3d at 1076 n.6.
For these reasons, we DENY the government’s motion for summary reversal,
and instead we summarily AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Pearson’s
motion for compassionate release.
USCA11 Case: 21-11583 Date Filed: 08/20/2021 Page: 8 of 8

-- 8 of 8 --