Crystal N. Lamb v. Clayton County School District

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12887
____________________
CRYSTAL N. LAMB,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOLS,
d.b.a. Clayton County Public Schools,
Defendant,
CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12887
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00695-JSA
____________________
____________________
No. 21-14156
____________________
CRYSTAL N. LAMB,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOLS,
d.b.a. Clayton County Public Schools,
Defendant,
CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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21-12887 Opinion of the Court 3
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00695-JSA
____________________
Before J ORDAN, NEWSOM , and E D CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
A jury awarded Crystal Lamb $450,000—later reduced to
$300,000—on her claims against the Clayton County School Dis-
trict for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. After entering judgment on the jury verdict,
the district court awarded Ms. Lamb attorney’s fees and costs. The
School District now appeals from the judgment on the jury verdict
and the order awarding fees and costs.
Appeal No. 21-12887
Appeal No. 21-12887 is the School District’s challenge to the
judgment on the jury verdict. Because the issues that the School
District raises are not reviewable on this record, we affirm.
First, the School District argues that the district court erred
in not granting its motion for summary judgment. We do not ad-
dress this argument because an order denying a summary judg-
ment motion is unreviewable following a jury verdict.
See Ortiz v.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12887
Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 184 (2011);
Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
254 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2001).
Second, the School District contends (1) that the district
court erred in denying its Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law and (2) that the evidence did not support the jury’s ver-
dict. We do not have the authority to set aside the jury verdict,
however, because the School District failed to file a post-verdict
Rule 50(b) motion or a post-verdict Rule 59 motion.
See Unitherm
Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 404 (2006);
St.
Louis Condo. Ass’n v. Rockhill Ins. Co., 5 F.4th 1235, 1245-46 (11th
Cir. 2021).
Appeal No. 21-14156
Appeal No. 21-14156 is the School District’s challenge to the
district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We do not have
jurisdiction to consider this challenge.
The order issued on November 9, 2021, in which the district
court awarded a certain sum of fees and costs, was not final because
it contemplated further calculation of additional fees.
See Morillo-
Cedron v. Dist. Dir. for U.S. C.I.S., 452 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir.
2006) (“Where the amount of the fee award has not been deter-
mined, a district court order granting attorney’s fees is not final.”)
(brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted);
Mekdeci by and
through Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1523 (11th
Cir. 1983) (order announcing intention to award costs was not final
because district court had “yet to fix” the amount of costs). The
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21-12887 Opinion of the Court 5
School District’s notice of appeal from the November 9 order—
dated November 19, 2021—was therefore ineffective.
The order awarding attorney’s fees and costs was not final
until January 3, 2022, when the district court issued another order
determining the amount of interest. The School District was re-
quired to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of January 3, 2022,
but it did not do so.1
The School District asserts that we have jurisdiction because
the calculation of interest was a purely ministerial task, thereby
making the November 9 order final. We disagree. The November
9 order was silent as to two important issues: (1) the rate of interest
and (2) the date from which it was to be calculated. As a result the
determination of the interest amount was not a ministerial task.
See S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 325 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the
judgment amount, the prejudgment interest rate, or the date from
which prejudgment interest accrues is unclear, the calculation of
prejudgment interest is no longer a ministerial act and the court’s
order is not final.”).2
1 The School District’s motion for a protective order regarding post-judgment
discovery, filed on February 2, 2022, was not the functional equivalent of a
notice of appeal.
2 The School District’s challenge is, in any event, meritless. The only argu-
ment the School District makes is that the district court improperly awarded
fees and costs because it should have granted summary judgment in its favor
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12887
Ms. Lamb’s Motion for Sanctions
Ms. Lamb has moved for sanctions under Rule 38 on the
ground that the School District’s appeals are frivolous. Rule 38 is
discretionary,
see Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7
(1987), and here we exercise our discretion to not sanction the
School District. We have rejected the contention that the Novem-
ber 9, 2021, order awarding attorney’s fees and costs was final, but
the School District’s argument that the computation of interest was
a ministerial task was not legally frivolous.
Cf. Carrillo, 325 F.3d at
1272 (explaining that “the calculation of an award of prejudgment
interest may be . . . susceptible to a simple, ministerial arithmetic
calculation” if the “judgment amount, the prejudgment interest
rate, and the date from which interest accrues have been estab-
lished”).
AFFIRMED AS TO NO. 21-12887 AND DISMISSED AS TO
NO. 21-14156.
on the merits. That argument, as we have explained, is not cognizable on
appeal following a jury verdict.
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