Sara I. Garcia v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12889
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
In re:
SARA I. GARCIA,
Debtor.
___________________________________________________
SARA I. GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12889
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-23918-JEM,
Bkcy No. 15-bk-28640-RAM
____________________
Before J ORDAN, B RANCH, and G RANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nearly seven years ago, a bankruptcy court determined that
this controversy between Sara Garcia, a pro se debtor, and Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC did not belong in federal court, and that
Ocwen should be granted relief from the automatic stay. Ever
since, Garcia has contested that decision. We now hopefully put
an end to that dispute. We dismiss Garcia’s appeal in part and
affirm in part.
I.
This appeal arises from Garcia’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy.1
Ocwen objected to Garcia’s plan and moved to be allowed to file a
late claim, alleging that it had a security interest in real property
owned by Garcia in Hialeah, Florida. Garcia asked the bankruptcy
court to find that the Note attached to Ocwen’s claim was a forgery
and to declare that it did not create an enforceable lien. Ocwen
1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with this case’s complex procedural
history and discuss only those portions necessary to resolve this appeal.
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21-12889 Opinion of the Court 3
said that Garcia had already litigated its standing and lost in Florida
state court.
The bankruptcy court denied Ocwen’s motion to file a late
claim, but it found that Ocwen or its predecessor in interest had
obtained a final foreclosure judgment against Garcia in state court
prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. The
bankruptcy court considered it to be an “absolute limitation” on its
authority that it was “not an appellate court to review state court
judgments.” So, on August 23, 2016, it entered an order both (1)
abstaining from consideration of Ocwen’s claim and (2) granting
Ocwen relief from the automatic stay—ensuring that the dispute
between Garcia and Ocwen could continue to be resolved through
the state court system. And it accordingly overruled Garcia’s
objections to Ocwen’s claim as moot.
Garcia—believing that the bankruptcy court should have
declared the Note a forgery and prevented Ocwen from enforcing
the foreclosure judgment—has contested the August 23 order to
this day. Over the next several years, this litigation became a
procedural morass as Garcia filed motions to reconsider, multiple
appeals, a Rule 60 motion, and a motion to reinstate a previously
dismissed appeal. Ultimately, it all led to Garcia simultaneously
having appeals in two separate district court cases—both of which
challenged the August 23 order, and one of which also challenged
the denial of Garcia’s Rule 60 motion. The first district court
dismissed Garcia’s appeal of the August 23 order for lack of
prosecution. The second district court denied Garcia’s motion for
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12889
leave to appeal the bankruptcy court’s orders, finding Garcia’s
arguments barred by res judicata because of the first district court’s
order. It also denied Garcia’s motion to reconsider that decision.
Garcia appealed both district court’s orders to this Court in
a single notice of appeal. We dismissed her appeal of the first
district court’s order as untimely. And we carried with the case the
question of our jurisdiction over Garcia’s appeal of the second
district court’s orders—and the underlying August 23 order, denial
of Garcia’s Rule 60 motion, and denials of her motions to
reconsider those orders.
II.
“In the bankruptcy context, this court sits as a second court
of review and thus examines independently the factual and legal
determinations of the bankruptcy court and employs the same
standards of review as the district court.”
In re Daughtrey, 896 F.3d
1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). We review a
bankruptcy court’s decision to lift an automatic stay and its denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
In re Dixie
Broadcasting, Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 1989);
Lambrix v.
Sec’y,
Florida Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1158, 1170 (11th Cir. 2017).
We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
In re
Feshbach, 974 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020).
III.
We begin by assessing our jurisdiction. Garcia is not precise
in either her appellate briefing or her Rule 60 motion about what
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21-12889 Opinion of the Court 5
portion of the bankruptcy court’s August 23 order she is
challenging—the abstention, the relief from the automatic stay, or
both. For purposes of our jurisdiction, that distinction matters a
great deal. This Court is strictly forbidden from reviewing a
bankruptcy court’s “decision to abstain” under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c).
28 U.S.C. § 1334(d);
see also Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324,
1331–32 (11th Cir. 2000). But an order granting relief from an
automatic stay is a reviewable final order.
Ritzen Grp., Inc. v.
Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020). Such orders are
not covered by § 1334(d)’s text, and the question of whether to
grant relief from the automatic stay is analytically distinct from the
question of whether to abstain.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d); 9 Collier
on Bankruptcy ¶ 5011.02 (16th ed. 2023). So as long as we do not
question the abstention order, we may review the bankruptcy
court’s decision to grant Ocwen relief from the automatic stay.
To the extent that Garcia’s appeal asks us to review the
decision of the bankruptcy court “to abstain” from the controversy
between Garcia and Ocwen, we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
But, liberally reading Garcia’s pro se filings as also challenging the
stay relief order, we face one question: Did the bankruptcy court
abuse its discretion when it granted Ocwen relief from the
automatic stay?2
2 Because we may affirm on any ground in the record, we do not address
whether the district court’s reliance on res judicata was proper.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12889
It did not. Garcia accuses the bankruptcy court of being in a
conspiracy with Ocwen, claiming that the court’s conduct at an
August 16, 2016, hearing and afterward proves that the court was
biased against her. But, having reviewed the record, we see only a
bankruptcy court that conscientiously sought to ensure that the
stay did not interfere with matters that were outside of the scope
of the bankruptcy. We certainly do not see any evidence of a
conspiracy or any other abuse of discretion in granting relief from
the stay.
For the same reasons, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Garcia’s Rule 60 motion or her motions to
reconsider its other orders. And having abstained from considering
Ocwen’s claim, the bankruptcy court was correct to deny Garcia’s
objections to that claim as moot.
That resolves this appeal. The rest of Garcia’s arguments
either raise issues of state law regarding Ocwen’s relationship with
the foreclosure judgment or challenge the bankruptcy court’s
abstention order. But these issues are not properly before this
Court.
* * *
We DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction to the extent
it asks us to review the bankruptcy court’s “decision to abstain,”
and we otherwise AFFIRM.
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