Gregory Kevin Samuels v. WMC Mortgage, LLC, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13901
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
GREGORY KEVIN SAMUELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WMC MORTGAGE, LLC,
GE HOLDINGS INC.,
GQ HOLDING 1329, LLC,
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS,
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13901
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00870-RBD-LRH
____________________
Before GRANT, ANDERSON, and E DMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Samuels, proceeding
pro se,1 appeals the district
court’s dismissal -- for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction -- of Sam-
uels’s civil action. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
In 2021, Samuels filed
pro se this civil action in the district
court. In his amended complaint, Samuels named seven defend-
ants: (1) WMC Mortgage LLC; (2) GE Holdings Inc.; (3) GQ Hold-
ings 1329, LLC; (4) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.;
(5) the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida; (6) Kondaur Capital
Corporation; and (7) Tyler Stiglich. Briefly stated, Samuels pur-
ported to assert claims against defendants for fraud and for viola-
tion of his due-process rights stemming from the state-court fore-
closure proceedings on his home.
The Ninth Judicial Circuit -- as a party defendant -- moved
to dismiss Samuels’s amended complaint on various grounds,
1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by
pro se litigants.
See Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally
pro se
pleadings.
See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998).
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21-13901 Opinion of the Court 3
including for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1).
The district court granted the Ninth Judicial Circuit’s mo-
tion. The district court concluded that it, as a federal court, lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Samuels’s challenges to the
state foreclosure proceedings. The district court thus dismissed
without prejudice Samuels’s civil action as barred by the
Rooker-
Feldman2 doctrine.3 This appeal followed.
On appeal, Samuels argues chiefly that the district court
erred in dismissing his complaint without first addressing his claims
on the merits: conduct Samuels says violated due process and his
right to a jury trial. According to Samuels, “justice” outweighs “ju-
dicial expedience” such that the district court should have exercised
its discretion under Rule 12(i) and deferred ruling on the Ninth Ju-
dicial Circuit’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion until a trial on the merits.
Samuels also asserts that his amended complaint stated a claim for
relief and was, thus, not subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
Construed liberally, Samuels’s
pro se appellate brief chal-
lenges only the
timing of the district court’s ruling on the Rule
12(b)(1) motion. We reject Samuels’s timing argument: a federal
2
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feld-
man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3 The district court also noted that it had already dismissed two substantially
similar lawsuits filed by Samuels against many of the same defendants.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13901
court must “inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction
at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.”
See Univ. of S.
Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).
Samuels raises no substantive argument challenging the cor-
rectness of the district court’s determination that the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Samuels’s claims or that
Samuels’s claims were barred by
Rooker-Feldman. Samuels has
thus abandoned the argument that the district court concluded in-
correctly that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Sapuppo v.
Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A
party fails to adequately ‘brief’ a claim when he does not ‘plainly
and prominently’ raise it, ‘for instance by devoting a discrete sec-
tion of his argument to those claims.’”);
Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by
pro se
litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a
pro se litigant
are deemed abandoned.” (citations omitted)).
Because Samuels has failed to challenge the only basis for
the district court’s order of dismissal, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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