USA v. Raymond Charles Lee

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11409
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAYMOND CHARLES LEE,
a.k.a. Pete,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:93-cr-00209-SDM-AAS-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11409
____________________
Before N EWSOM , G RANT, and L AGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Charles Lee, a federal prisoner serving life sen-
tences for one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and
two counts of distributing “50 grams or more” of crack cocaine,
appeals the district court’s denial of his
pro se motion for a sentence
reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018.
See Pub. L.
No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). Lee contends
that the district court erred in denying his motion for a sentence
reduction because it relied on a judge-made finding of drug quan-
tity—rather than on the drug quantity charged in his indictment—
to determine that he was ineligible for resentencing under the First
Step Act. Our cases require us to affirm.
“We review de novo . . . whether a district court had the
authority to modify a term of imprisonment.”
United States v.
Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020),
cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Lavell Jackson v. United States, 214 L. Ed. 2d 121,
143 S. Ct. 72 (2022), and
opinion reinstated on reconsideration sub
nom. United States v. Jackson, --- F.4th ---, 2023 WL 1501638 (11th
Cir. Feb. 3, 2023).
The First Step Act allows district courts to reduce a previ-
ously imposed prison sentence, but only if the defendant was
charged and sentenced for a “covered offense.” § 404(b), 132 Stat.
5194, 5222. A “covered offense” is an offense that “triggered a
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22-11409 Opinion of the Court 3
statutory penalty that has since been modified by the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act.”
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301. For these covered offenses, the
sentencing court may “reduce[] [the] sentence as if sections 2 and 3
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the
covered offense was committed.” § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.
Relevant here, the Fair Sentencing Act bumped the quantity of
crack cocaine required to trigger heightened penalties from 50
grams to 280 grams. Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372,
2372. But in deciding whether a sentence for a covered offense is
eligible for reduction, “the district court is bound by a previous
finding of drug quantity that could have been used to determine
the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing.”
Jones,
962 F.3d at 1303.
Lee was sentenced for conspiracy to distribute 654 grams of
crack cocaine, far above the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act’s threshold
of 280 grams. Having been previously convicted of two felonies,
Lee was sentenced to life in prison. Under the 2010 Fair Sentencing
Act, his original sentence wouldn’t change: Sections 2 and 3 still
impose a mandatory life prison term on a defendant who distrib-
utes more than 280 grams of crack cocaine and has two prior felo-
nies. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). So
long as the 654-gram figure is correct, Lee is ineligible for a sen-
tence reduction under the First Step Act.
While Lee seems to concede that the district court is bound
by a previous finding of drug quantity, he claims that the district
court’s reliance on the 654-gram figure was erroneous because a
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11409
judge—rather than a jury—found that amount. Lee contends that
the district court instead should have relied on the 50-gram amount
as charged in his indictment, an amount that would render him el-
igible for a reduced sentence under the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.
In
Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that a
drug-quantity finding that increases a defendant’s punishment
must be made by a jury applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). But whether a court is bound
to a judge-made drug-quantity finding to determine a defendant’s
Fair Sentencing Act statutory penalty range depends on whether
the movant was sentenced before or after
Apprendi.
United States
v. Russell, 994 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.7 (11th Cir. 2021).
If a defendant was sentenced
after Apprendi, the district
court on resentencing “generally cannot look to a drug-quantity
finding made at sentencing because that determination was made
solely for the purpose of identifying the movant’s relevant conduct
under the Sentencing Guidelines, not for setting his statutory pen-
alty range.”
Id. (citing
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301–02). But if the de-
fendant was sentenced
before Apprendi, then the district court may
consider a previous judge-made drug-quantity finding that was
necessary to trigger the statutory penalty.
Id. “[J]ust as a movant
[sentenced before
Apprendi] may not use
Apprendi to collaterally
attack his sentence, he cannot rely on
Apprendi to redefine his of-
fense for purposes of a First Step Act motion.”
Jones, 962 F.3d at
1302 (internal citation omitted).
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22-11409 Opinion of the Court 5
Lee was sentenced for conspiracy to distribute 654 grams of
crack cocaine in 1994, six years before
Apprendi. The district court
was right to rely on that figure. Lee’s 654 grams is above 50 grams
and was thus enough—together with his two prior felony drug
convictions—to trigger the mandatory term of life imprisonment
to which he was sentenced in 1994. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)
(1994). Lee’s sentence would’ve been exactly the same had sec-
tions 2 and 3 of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act applied at the time.
Therefore, the district court properly concluded that it didn’t have
authority to reduce Lee’s sentence under the First Step Act. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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