USA v. Maurice Daughtry

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12607
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAURICE DAUGHTRY,
a.k.a. Black,
a.k.a. Smoke,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12607
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-00190-MHT-SMD-1
____________________
Before WILSON, BRANCH , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Daughtry pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
pursuant to a written plea agreement containing a sentence-appeal
waiver. The district court sentenced Daughtry to 130 months’
imprisonment to be followed by 3 years’ supervised release.1
Daughtry appeals arguing that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. The government moves to dismiss this appeal
pursuant to the sentence-appeal waiver in Daughtry’s plea
agreement.2 After review, we conclude that the sentence-appeal
waiver is valid and enforceable. Therefore, we grant the
government’s motion to dismiss.
“We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de
novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008).
A sentence-appeal waiver is valid and enforceable if it is entered
into knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451
F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d
1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was
1 The district court granted Daughtry’s request for a downward variance and
varied below the guidelines range of 168–210 months’ imprisonment.
2 Daughtry did not file a response to the government’s motion to dismiss.
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22-12607 Opinion of the Court 3
made knowingly and voluntarily, the government must
demonstrate that (1) the district court specifically questioned the
defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy; or (2) the
record makes clear “that the defendant otherwise understood the
full significance of the waiver.” Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
Daughtry’s plea agreement contained the following appeal
waiver:
Understanding that 18 U.S.C. § 3742 provides for
appeal by a defendant of the sentence under certain
circumstances, the defendant expressly waives any
and all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal
the conviction or sentence. The defendant further
expressly waives the right to attack the conviction or
sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including
proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Exempt
from this waiver is the right to appeal or collaterally
attack the conviction or sentence on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial
misconduct.3
At the change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge
confirmed that Daughtry read the entire plea agreement,
understood it, and signed it.4 The magistrate judge explained that,
by pleading guilty, Daughtry was giving up his “right to appeal or
3 The plea agreement also provided that, “if the government decides to
exercise its right to appeal, the defendant is released from the appeal waiver
and may pursue any appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).”
4 Daughtry consented to entering his plea before the magistrate judge.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12607
collaterally attack all or part of [his] sentence except as to
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct,” and
Daughtry stated that he understood. The magistrate judge then
explained that Daughtry faced a maximum sentence of 20 years’
imprisonment, that his sentence would be determined at a later
date, and that the court could vary from the applicable guidelines
range up to the statutory maximum. Daughtry confirmed that he
understood. Daughtry further confirmed that there were not any
provisions in the agreement that he did not understand and agreed
that he was “willing to be bound by all of the provisions.”
Daughtry also confirmed that he was pleading guilty freely and
voluntarily because it was in his best interest to do so and because
he was in fact guilty. Thereafter, the magistrate judge found that
Daughtry’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
The district court later adopted the magistrate judge’s decision.
Accordingly, the record establishes that Daughtry’s
sentence-appeal waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made and
is enforceable. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351; see also United States v.
Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal
waiver where “the waiver provision was referenced during [the
defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that
she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely and
voluntarily”).
Because Daughtry’s claim that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable does not fall within the limited exceptions to the
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22-12607 Opinion of the Court 5
valid sentence-appeal waiver, the waiver forecloses his appeal.
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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