Julius Trimble v. Fort Valley State University, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13278
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JULIUS TRIMBLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FORT VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY,
Department of Legal and Governmental Services,
VALARIE BASS,
Social and Behavioral Sciences Department Secretary,
KOMANDURI S MURTY,
Social and Behavioral Sciences Department Chair,
GREGORY FORD,
Vice Chancelor for Academic Affairs,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13278
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00070-TES
____________________
Before WILSON , L UCK , and JULIE C ARNES , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff in this pro se action asserts sex discrimination and
retaliation claims under Title VII against his former employer Fort
Valley State University (“Fort Valley”).1 The district court dis-
missed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. After a careful review of the record and the
briefing submitted by the parties, we AFFIRM.
1 In his original complaint, Plaintiff also asserted claims against other individ-
uals who had either supervised or worked with him at Fort Valley. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a motion to amend his complaint, which the district court
granted. The amended, operative complaint names only Fort Valley as a de-
fendant. Accordingly, the district court did not address below, and we do not
consider on appeal, the claims Plaintiff initially asserted against the individual
defendants.
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 3
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff’s employment with and even-
tual resignation from Fort Valley.2 Plaintiff does not specify the
dates or terms of his employment, but we gather from the facts set
out in the complaint that he was hired as a professor in Fort Val-
ley’s criminal justice department sometime before 2014, and that
he worked in that position until he resigned from Fort Valley in
August 2021. Until June 2021, Plaintiff had also been serving as the
program coordinator for the department. In his position as profes-
sor and program coordinator, Plaintiff worked with Valarie Bass,
the administrative assistant for the criminal justice department.
The criminal justice department was itself a part of the larger Social
and Behavioral Sciences Department. Accordingly, Plaintiff was
supervised by the chair of that department, Dr. Komanduri Murty,
who in turn was supervised by Dr. Gregory Ford, the dean of the
College of Arts and Sciences. Both Dr. Murty and Dr. Ford are
male; Ms. Bass is female.
After an instructor in the criminal justice department, Ms.
Barner-Bowman, passed away unexpectedly in March 2020, Dr.
Murty asked Plaintiff to advise the students who Bowman had been
advising, as well as to teach her two online criminal law classes.
Plaintiff alleges that, thereafter, Bass began a campaign of harass-
ment against him that continued until he resigned from Fort Valley
more than a year later. According to Plaintiff, the harassment
2 We restate the facts of this case as set out in the amended, operative com-
plaint, which for simplicity’s sake we refer to as “the Complaint.”
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13278
primarily involved Bass encouraging former students of Bowman
who were now being advised by Plaintiff, to send email messages
to Plaintiff, copied to Dr. Murty and Dean Ford, in which emails
the students requested assistance or asked questions about the
courses they needed to take. Most of the allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint consist of direct quotes from these emails, accompanied
by Plaintiff’s commentary concerning the subject matter of the
email. As described by Plaintiff, the emails seem typical of what a
college professor would expect to receive from students under his
advisement. They generally consist of a polite request for help
with registration or an audit to determine whether a student is on
track to graduate, albeit a few of the emails include pointed com-
plaints about Plaintiff’s failure to respond to a specific request for
assistance.
But, according to Plaintiff, many of these emails reflected
the first time that the student had contacted Plaintiff, and he sus-
pected that Bass had encouraged the students to copy Dr. Murty
and Dean Ford to make it appear that Plaintiff was unresponsive to
students. In short, it is Plaintiff’s theory that Bass orchestrated this
email campaign to undermine his reputation with Dr. Murty and
Dean Ford.
Finally, on June 17, 2021, which was approximately 15
months after Plaintiff claims the email harassment had started, Dr.
Murty telephoned Plaintiff and informed him that Murty was re-
moving Plaintiff from the program coordinator position within the
criminal justice department and that a new coordinator would be
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 5
named for the upcoming academic year. Dr. Murty explained that
he made this decision as a result of Plaintiff’s continuing bad work-
ing relationship with Bass, who had indicated that she found work-
ing with Plaintiff to be difficult and who said that she preferred to
work with Dr. Craig, who was another male professor in the de-
partment. Dr. Murty further explained that Dean Ford had in-
quired whether Murty was going to continue Plaintiff in this posi-
tion, given the issues concerning Plaintiff’s unresponsiveness to
students.
A few minutes after this telephone conversation, Plaintiff re-
ceived a “message” from Dr. Murty indicating that, per their recent
telephone conversation, Plaintiff’s three-year term as program co-
ordinator had ended and that a new coordinator would be named
for the next year. Dr. Murty thanked Plaintiff for his services,
which he said were “much appreciated.” Plaintiff then contacted
Dean Ford who indicated that Dr. Murty had stated that a change
needed to be made given the ongoing tension between Plaintiff and
Bass.
A few weeks later, in July 2021, Plaintiff contacted Dr. Murty
and told him he could no longer work with Bass because of her
continuing harassment. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Murty re-
sponded that if he did not want to work with Bass, who was the
administrative assistant for the criminal justice department in
which Plaintiff was employed, then Plaintiff should resign his posi-
tion. At that time, Plaintiff declined to resign.
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Ultimately, however, in August 2021 Plaintiff did decide to
resign, which resignation was approved by Dr. Murty on August 9,
2021. Plaintiff suggested in a written letter to Dr. Murty that his
resignation was orchestrated by Bass, and he indicated that he
would be pursuing legal action against Fort Valley. Plaintiff re-
ceived a response from Dr. Murty thanking him again for his ser-
vices and stating that his contributions were appreciated “despite
[his] false accusations.”
As to the motivation for Bass’s alleged efforts to undermine
Plaintiff, Plaintiff believes that Bass preferred that Dr. Craig, a male
professor in the department, act as program coordinator because
Bass found it easier to get along with Dr. Craig, whom Plaintiff be-
lieves to have been her friend. Plaintiff also notes in his brief, albeit
not in his Complaint, two other reasons why Bass had developed
personal animosity toward him. Specifically, Bass had once re-
quested that Plaintiff hire a “Mr. Edwards” as an adjunct professor,
but Plaintiff had declined to do so, noting that this decision was up
to Dr. Murty. Second, Plaintiff had declined Bass’s request that her
friend, Ms. Bowman, be allowed to take over the internship pro-
gram.
After he resigned in August 2021, Plaintiff filed an EEOC
charge against Fort Valley alleging sex discrimination and retalia-
tion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff sub-
sequently received his right to sue letter and initiated this action.
Although he identifies several “discriminatory employment ac-
tions,” Plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination claim essentially boils
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 7
down to a claim that he was harassed and constructively discharged
as a result of Bass’s email campaign against him. Secondarily, he
claims that he was retaliated against because he complained about
the email harassment.
The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) after concluding that it failed to state a plau-
sible claim for relief under Title VII. The court noted that Plaintiff
had not alleged any adverse employment action and that his com-
plaint contained no facts to support a reasonable inference that the
mistreatment he complained about had anything to do with his sex,
both of which are required to sustain a claim for discrimination un-
der Title VII. Essentially, the district court concluded, Plaintiff’s
complaint described a “common workplace quibble” between him-
self and Bass that did not constitute actionable discrimination un-
der Title VII. As for retaliation, the court determined that Plaintiff
had not plausibly alleged protected activity, which is an essential
element of a retaliation claim.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. Because we
conclude that Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim for sex-
based discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6),
accepting the facts asserted in the complaint as true and applying
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13278
the same standard as the district court to determine whether those
facts are sufficient to survive dismissal. See Jacob v. Mentor World-
wide, LLC, 40 F.4th 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022). The federal rules
require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim” asserted by the plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In addition
to containing well-pleaded factual allegations, a complaint must
also meet the “plausibility standard” set forth by the Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under that standard, the com-
plaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citation and quotation marks omitted). That is, the complaint
must include facts that permit a “reasonable inference that the de-
fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff’s pleadings “are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,
therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, this leniency does not
give a court “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an ac-
tion.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369
(11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Iq-
bal, 556 U.S. 662. Like any other litigant, a pro se plaintiff must meet
the pleading standards of Rule 8 and the plausibility standard of
Twombly and Iqbal to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 9
II. Analysis
A. Sex Discrimination
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
an employee because of the employee’s “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff’s Title VII
claim here is based on an allegation of sex-based discrimination.
When we evaluate such claims at the summary judgment stage of
a case, the analysis often involves a determination whether the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under
the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
Fla., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting framework generally applies when a Title
VII claim is based on circumstantial evidence). But as the district
court correctly recognized, a complaint “need not allege facts suf-
ficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case” in
order to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Surtain v. Hamlin
Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
marks omitted). Instead, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the complaint
“need only provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
intentional . . . discrimination.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Ap-
plying that standard here, Plaintiff can avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) by plausibly alleging that (1) he “suffered an adverse
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13278
employment action” and (2) the action can be attributed to “inten-
tional [sex] discrimination.” See id.
1. Adverse Employment Action
As to the question whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse em-
ployment action, an adverse action involves a “serious and material
change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” such
that “a reasonable person in the circumstances would find the em-
ployment action to be materially adverse.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am.,
Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (quo-
tation marks omitted). Albeit he sets out several “discriminatory
employee actions” taken against him, Plaintiff essentially identifies
three adverse employment actions: (1) Fort Valley’s removal of
Plaintiff as the program coordinator for the criminal justice depart-
ment; (2) Fort Valley’s failure to stop the harassment of Plaintiff by
the administrative assistant for the department; (3) which harass-
ment became so continuous it constituted a constructive discharge
that forced Plaintiff to resign his professorship following Fort Val-
ley’s refusal of his demand that he no longer be required to work
with the administrative assistant.3
We turn first to Plaintiff’s claim of harassment in violation
of Title VII, which continuing harassment he claims led to his con-
structive discharge. A claim of harassment is actionable when the
3 Plaintiff also alleges as a discriminatory employee action Dr. Murty allowing
the administrative assistant, Bass, to monitor the emails that Plaintiff received
from students. This act can be folded into Plaintiff’s general harassment alle-
gation.
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 11
harassment can be deemed to have created a hostile work environ-
ment. A hostile work environment exists when “the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.” Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148, 1152 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quotation marks omitted). “Constructive discharge occurs when
an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions
intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job.” See Davis v. Le-
gal Serv. Ala., Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff supports his hostile work environment and con-
structive discharge claims with allegations that administrative as-
sistant Bass colluded with students to send emails that created a
false impression that Plaintiff was unresponsive to student ques-
tions; that Bass undermined Plaintiff’s reputation with his superi-
ors, Dr. Murty and Dean Ford, by having the students copy the lat-
ter two men on these emails; that Murty and Ford did nothing to
stop Bass, although Plaintiff had told them the emails were creating
a false impression; and that this continuing conduct for over an 18-
month period rendered his working conditions intolerable. For
purposes of determining whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an
adverse action, we will assume without deciding that the above-
described conduct meets the standards applicable to a hostile work
environment and a constructive discharge claim.
As to Fort Valley’s decision to remove Plaintiff as program
coordinator for the department, the district court concluded that
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13278
this did not constitute an adverse action because Plaintiff alleged
no facts indicating that he suffered a loss of income, prestige, or
other tangible impacts on his employment. It is true that Plaintiff
has failed to allege that his salary was reduced as a result of his re-
moval from the coordinator position, which apparently was a non-
paid assignment. Nevertheless, we need not decide here whether
this removal constituted an adverse employment action because,
as explained below, Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim fails for a
simple reason: he has not plausibly alleged that any of his em-
ployer’s or co-employee’s complained-of actions were taken be-
cause of Plaintiff’s sex.
2. Intentional Sex Discrimination
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII
discrimination claims because the facts set out in Plaintiff’s Com-
plaint fail to suggest that Fort Valley’s actions were motivated by
intentional sex discrimination. To the contrary, both Plaintiff’s
Complaint and his briefing indicate his own belief that Bass’s con-
duct toward Plaintiff was based on personal animus, and not re-
lated to the fact Plaintiff was a man. As to the genesis of her dislike
for Plaintiff, Plaintiff points out that he had disappointed Bass when
he refused to help a friend of hers, a Mr. Edwards, obtain a teaching
position. Notably, Edwards is male. Likewise, Bass was upset with
Plaintiff when he declined to allow another instructor, her friend
Ms. Bowman, to take over the internship program that Plaintiff
ran. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Bass wanted him removed as the
department’s program coordinator because she wanted another
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 13
person to act in that role: Dr. Craig—again a man and someone
who Bass got along better with than she did with Plaintiff. There
is nothing in these facts to suggest that any of Bass’s actions were
motivated by Plaintiff’s sex.
Likewise, there is nothing in the alleged facts to suggest that
Dr. Murty or Dean Ford’s actions were motivated by the fact that
Plaintiff is male. Plaintiff complains that the latter two men did not
treat him fairly because they did not exercise the necessary dili-
gence to realize that the problems between Plaintiff and Bass were
Bass’s fault and that Bass was acting out of personal animosity to-
ward Plaintiff. If that is true, it is certainly unfortunate for Plaintiff.
Yet, Plaintiff adduces no facts to suggest that Dr. Murty and Dean
Ford’s assessment of the situation—even if incorrect, as Plaintiff ar-
gues—was influenced in any way by the fact that Plaintiff is male.
It is well-established that an “employer may fire an employee for a
good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or
for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory
reason.” Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187
(11th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. City of Union,
Ga., 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019). See also Alvarez v. Royal Atl.
Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Title VII does not
require the employer’s needs and expectations to be objectively
reasonable; it simply prohibits the employer from discriminating
on the basis of membership in a protected class. We do not sit as a
‘super-personnel department,’ and it is not our role to second-guess
the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions—indeed the wis-
dom of them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-13278
made with a discriminatory motive.”). As such, the facts set out by
Plaintiff do not plausibly allege a violation of Title VII.
In short, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
sex discrimination claims because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege
that any such discrimination ever occurred.
B. Retaliation
In addition to prohibiting discrimination based on a pro-
tected status, such as sex, Title VII also prohibits retaliation against
an employee who opposes unlawful discrimination in the work-
place. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. To state a claim for retaliation under
Title VII, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) he “engaged in statutorily
protected conduct—that is, conduct protected by Title VII”—by
opposing discrimination, (2) he suffered an adverse action, and
(3) “there is some causal relationship between the two events.” To-
lar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). To support a retaliation
claim, the complained-of action by the employer must be “materi-
ally adverse”—that is, it must be an action that “well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations here clearly do not suffice. Indeed, he
gives an unclear timeline of when he allegedly engaged in pro-
tected conduct and little information about the substance of that
conduct. But parsing his Complaint, we derive the following. On
January 25, 2021, a student named Juanye Samuels sent an email to
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 15
Plaintiff, and copied Dr. Murty and Bass. In that email, the student
indicated that she needed information concerning how many
hours she needed to graduate. She further stated that she had tried
to contact Plaintiff, who was her advisor, but had gotten no re-
sponse from him. She requested that someone speak to her about
her question. An hour later, Samuels contacted Dean Ford. On
that same day, Samuels’ mother complained to Dr. Stuart, the
Vice-President of Academic Affairs to whom Dean Ford reported.
According to Plaintiff, he believed that instead of “de-escalating”
the problem, Bass had encouraged the student to complain to these
higher-up administrators to make Plaintiff look bad.
Then, on February 5, 2021, Samuels emailed Dr. Stuart to
state that she had met with Plaintiff, but she complained that be-
cause he had not earlier given her adequate information, she would
now have to graduate a semester later than planned. She further
indicated that Plaintiff had been unresponsive in the past, requiring
her to contact other faculty and staff members to obtain help. She
noted that several of her classmates were struggling with the same
issue. She closed by requesting a new advisor.
Half an hour later, Dean Ford emailed Plaintiff, stating: “Dr.
Trimble you assured Dr. Murty and I that these issues would not
happen any further and [I] just received another. The complaints
are all about you not responding to students in a timely manner
and that you do not treat them with the attention and respect they
deserve. This has also been an issue with you managing adjunct
faculty with not responding timely and not being very helpful.”
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Dean Ford closed by seeking a meeting with Plaintiff the following
Monday to address this matter.
Plaintiff avers that, upon receipt of this email, he contacted
Dr. Stuart. And it is this contact that represents what Plaintiff
claims was his first act of protected conduct. But Plaintiff nowhere
indicates that he informed Dr. Stuart of a belief by Plaintiff that he
was the victim of sex discrimination. Indeed, he offers no infor-
mation as to the substance of the conversation other than to say he
knew he was being “lied on” by Bass and the complaining students.
In short, the Complaint fails to allege any protected conduct that
occurred in connection with Plaintiff’s call to Dr. Stuart.
As to his second alleged act of protected conduct, Plaintiff
avers that he spoke with Human Resources Director Battle follow-
ing his telephone call with Dr. Murty on June 17, 2021, in which
call Murty had informed Plaintiff that he was being removed as
program coordinator. But again, Plaintiff nowhere mentions ex-
pressing to Battle a concern that he was being discriminated against
on the basis of sex. A reading of the concerns described by Plaintiff
in his Complaint instead suggests that the conversation between
Plaintiff and Battle involved Plaintiff’s denial of accusations made
by multiple students that Plaintiff had been unresponsive to their
questions and needs. Further, the only employment action that
occurred after the June 17 Human Resources meeting was taken
not by Fort Valley, but by Plaintiff when he tendered his resigna-
tion on August 9.
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22-13278 Opinion of the Court 17
In short, Plaintiff does not allege in his Complaint that he
ever complained to his supervisors or to Human Resources about
conduct that potentially violated Title VII or, more specifically,
that he complained about discrimination based on his sex. Absent
such allegations, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks sufficient factual matter
to plausibly state a claim that he opposed unlawful discrimination
in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. s. 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation
against an employee who “has opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice” under Title VII) (emphasis added); cf.
Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“[A] plaintiff is required to show that she had a good faith, reason-
able belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment
practices.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plain-
tiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
dismissing Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims
under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
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