Essienee Jones v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13659
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ESSIENEE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00953-SMD
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Essienee Jones appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her claim for sup-
plemental security income (“SSI”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
Jones argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not
properly evaluate her Rheumatoid Arthritis (“RA”) under Listing
14.09. She also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the
nature of her severe impairments when the ALJ evaluated her re-
sidual functional capacity (“RFC”) and credibility.1 For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
I.
In a social security case in which the Appeal Council has de-
nied review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s
final decision. Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309,
1313 (11th Cir. 2021).
We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is
“supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal
standards.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,
1 Jones also argues that the magistrate judge improperly reevaluated the evi-
dence when he determined that she was not disabled. However, “[o]ur review
is the same as that of the district court, meaning we neither defer to nor con-
sider any errors in the district court’s opinion.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, we do not reach Jones’s arguments on this issue.
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 3
1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). We review de
novo whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. Viverette,
13 F.4th at 1313-14. In reviewing for substantial evidence, “we may
not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute
our judgment for” the ALJ’s. Id. at 1314 (quotation marks omit-
ted). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence, greater than a scin-
tilla, that “a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d 1333,
1338 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). However, a deci-
sion is not based on substantial evidence if it focuses on one aspect
of the evidence while disregarding contrary evidence. McCruter v.
Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986).
“Because a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversarial pro-
ceeding, the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair
record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). The
ALJ must “scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of,
and explore for all the relevant facts.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d
731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks omitted). An ALJ fails
to satisfy this duty not only when the judge fails to elicit facts rele-
vant to the applicant’s claim at the hearing, but also when his deci-
sion omits key information, such as the weight accorded to testi-
mony or the specific jobs that the applicant could perform. Id.
Such procedural defects require a remand for further agency pro-
ceedings. See id. at 735-37.
Eligibility for SSI requires that the claimant be disabled.
42 U.S.C. § 1382a. A claimant is disabled if she cannot engage in
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable im-
pairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted
or can be expected to last for at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.905(a).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of
SSI, the Social Security regulations mandate a five-step sequential
evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); Viverette, 13 F.4th at
1312. “These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claim-
ant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to
perform past relevant work.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,
1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Under the first step, the claimant has the burden to show
that she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At the second step, the claimant must
show that she has a severe impairment. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
The regulations define a severe impairment as an “impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limit[] [the claim-
ant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id.
§ 416.920(c). If the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment
is not severe, the disability claim is denied. Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). If the claimant has a severe impairment,
the evaluation proceeds to the third step. Id.
Step three considers whether the claimant has shown that
she has an impairment “that meets or equals a disability described
in the Listing of Impairments [in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part
404 of the Social Security regulations], which describes
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 5
impairments that are considered severe enough to prevent a per-
son from doing any gainful activity.” Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528,
532 (11th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). “To ‘meet’ a list-
ing, a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings and
must provide medical reports documenting that the conditions
meet the specific criteria of the listings and the duration require-
ment.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). “If
a claimant’s condition meets or equals the listed impairments, [s]he
is conclusively presumed to be disabled and entitled to benefits.”
Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986). Only if a claimant
does not meet a listing does the analysis proceed to step four. Id.
Listing 14.09 contains the requirements for inflammatory ar-
thritis. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 14.09 (2019). In 2019,
Listing 14.09A described that a claimant with inflammatory arthri-
tis, as described in 14.00D6, had to demonstrate that they had per-
sistent inflammation or deformity of:
1. One or more major peripheral weight-bearing
joints resulting in the inability to ambulate effectively
(as defined in 14.00C6); or
2. One or more major peripheral joints in each upper
extremity resulting in the inability to perform fine and
gross movements effectively (as defined in 14.00C7).
Id., § 14.09A (2019). Listing 14.00C8 defined “major peripheral
joints” as that in Listing 1.00F, which defined “major peripheral
joints,” as “the hip, knee, shoulder, elbow, wrist-hand, and an-
kle-foot, as opposed to other peripheral joints (e.g., the joints of the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
hand or forefoot) or axial joints (i.e., the joints of the spine).” Id.,
§ 1.00F (2019). Likewise, Listing 14.00C9 defined “persistent” as “a
sign(s) or symptom(s) has continued over time.” Id.,
§ 14.00C9 (2019).
Listing 14.00D6, relating to inflammatory arthritis, de-
scribed that:
Clinically, inflammation of major peripheral joints
may be the dominant manifestation causing difficul-
ties with ambulation or fine and gross movements;
there may be joint pain, swelling, and tenderness.
The arthritis may affect other joints, or cause less lim-
itation in ambulation or the performance of fine and
gross movements. However, in combination with ex-
tra-articular features, including constitutional symp-
toms or signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, involun-
tary weight loss), inflammatory arthritis may result in
an extreme limitation.
Id., § 14.00D6 (2019). Also, Listing 14.00D6 explains that, in adults,
“inflammatory arthritis involving peripheral joints may be associ-
ated with disorders such as” RA. Id.
In turn, Listing 14.00C6 stated that the claimant had to
demonstrate that they had an “inability to ambulate effectively” as
described in Listing 1.00B2b. Id., § 14.00C6 (2019). Listing 1.00B2b
explained that an:
Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme
limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an impairment(s)
that interferes very seriously with the individual’s
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 7
ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete
activities. Ineffective ambulation is defined generally
as having insufficient lower extremity functioning
(see 1.00J) to permit independent ambulation without
the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits
the functioning of both upper extremities.
Id., § 1.00B2b (2019). Listing 1.00J related to “orthotic, prosthetic,
or assistive devices,” and, relating to hand-held assistive devices,
proscribed that:
When an individual with an impairment involving a
lower extremity or extremities uses a hand-held assis-
tive device, such as a cane, crutch or walker, examina-
tion should be with and without the use of the assis-
tive device unless contraindicated by the medical
judgment of a physician who has treated or examined
the individual. The individual’s ability to ambulate
with and without the device provides information as
to whether, or the extent to which, the individual is
able to ambulate without assistance. The medical ba-
sis for the use of any assistive device (e.g., instability,
weakness) should be documented. The requirement
to use a hand-held assistive device may also impact on
the individual’s functional capacity by virtue of the
fact that one or both upper extremities are not availa-
ble for such activities as lifting, carrying, pushing, and
pulling.
Id., § 1.00J (2019).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
Furthermore, Listing 14.00C7 stated that the claimant had
to demonstrate that they had an “inability to perform fine and gross
movements effectively” as described in Listing 1.00B2c. Id.,
§ 14.00C7 (2019). Listing 1.00B2c defined a claimant’s inability to
perform fine and gross movements effectively as:
an extreme loss of function of both upper extremi-
ties; i.e., an impairment(s) that interferes very seri-
ously with the individual’s ability to independently in-
itiate, sustain, or complete activities. To use their up-
per extremities effectively, individuals must be capa-
ble of sustaining such functions as reaching, pushing,
pulling, grasping, and fingering to be able to carry out
activities of daily living. Therefore, examples of ina-
bility to perform fine and gross movements effectively
include, but are not limited to, the inability to prepare
a simple meal and feed oneself, the inability to take
care of personal hygiene, the inability to sort and han-
dle papers or files, and the inability to place files in a
file cabinet at or above waist level.
Id., § 1.00B2c (2019).
Alternatively, under Listing 14.09B, the claimant could
demonstrate that they had “inflammation or deformity in one or
more major peripheral joints” and:
1. Involvement of two or more organs/body systems
with one of the organs/body systems involved to at
least a moderate level of severity; and
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 9
2. At least two of the constitutional symptoms or
signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary
weight loss).
Id., § 14.09B (2019). Listing 14.00C2 defined constitutional signs or
symptoms as “severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary weight
loss. Severe fatigue means a frequent sense of exhaustion that results
in significantly reduced physical activity or mental function. Ma-
laise means frequent feelings of illness, bodily discomfort, or lack of
well-being that result in significantly reduced physical activity or
mental function.” Id., § 14.00C2 (2019) (emphasis in original).
As to Listing 14.09B, a claimant could demonstrate that they
suffered from an impairment that was sufficiently severe to meet
the Listing by showing “inflammatory arthritis that involves vari-
ous combinations of complications of one or more major periph-
eral joints or other joints, such as inflammation or deformity, extra-
articular features, repeated manifestations, and constitutional
symptoms or signs. Extra-articular impairments may also meet list-
ings in other body systems.” Id., § 14.09(e)(ii) (2019). “Extra-artic-
ular features of inflammatory arthritis may involve any body sys-
tem,” including “musculoskeletal (heel enthesopathy),” “cardio-
vascular, (aortic valve insufficiency, arrhythmias, coronary arteri-
tis, myocarditis, pericarditis, Raynaud’s phenomenon, systemic
vasculitis),” and “mental (cognitive dysfunction, poor memory).”
Id. § 14.09(e)(iii)(2019).
When considering whether a claimant meets the impair-
ments listed in Appendix 1, the ALJ must consider Appendix 1 but
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
need not “mechanically recite the evidence leading to her determi-
nation,” as “[t]here may be an implied finding that a claimant does
not meet a listing.” Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th
Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence to support the finding and infer-
ence must be in the record. Id.
In Hutchinson, we explained that it was clear that the ALJ im-
plicitly found that the claimant did not meet any of the impair-
ments in Appendix 1 because he “was obviously familiar with the
sequential evaluation process,” his decision included a statement of
law recognizing that a finding of a listed impairment would require
a determination of disability at step three, and yet he reached the
fourth and fifth steps of the disability analysis. Id.
Finally, we will not address an argument that has not been
raised in the district court. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Stewart v. Dep’t of Health and Hu-
man Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994). Here, Jones failed
to raise the issue of whether the ALJ applied the correct standard
when finding that she did not meet Listing 14.09 in the district
court. Accordingly, we do not address that argument here.
A claimant could satisfy Listing 14.09 either by satisfying the
criteria of 14.09A or 14.09B. Jones challenges the ALJ’s findings un-
der both. However, her challenge under 14.09A is limited to her
limitations with respect to her weight-bearing joints and
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 11
ambulation. See Listing 14.09A(1)(quoted above).2 As to Listing
14.09A(1), the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence
because Jones did not demonstrate that she needed to use a
hand-held assistive device that limited the functioning of both of her
upper extremities. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing
1.00B2b (“Ineffective ambulation is defined generally as having in-
sufficient lower extremity functioning (see 1.00J) to permit inde-
pendent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive de-
vice(s) that limits the functioning of both upper extremities.”) (em-
phasis added).
Regarding Listing 14.09B (quoted above), Jones did not meet
her burden of showing that her inflammation involved two or
more organs or body systems because she has not provided any
citations to law or authority or evidence that her depression and
anxiety involved the central nervous system. Similarly, Jones did
not demonstrate that her inflammatory arthritis affected her cardi-
ovascular system because she did not demonstrate that she had a
sufficient impairment from any of her cardiovascular symptoms,
her medical records relating to her chest pain repeatedly did not
reveal cardiological disease, and the ALJ did not find that her chest
pain, tachycardia, or venous insufficiency were sufficient impair-
ments. Finally, even if Jones sufficiently established that her in-
flammatory arthritis involved two or more body systems, the ALJ
2 In other words, she does not challenge the ALJ’s decision with respect to
14.09A(2) (quoted above) related to limitations in her upper extremity joints
and her ability to perform fine and gross movements.
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
did not err when she found that Jones did not suffer from at least
two of the constitutional signs or symptoms under Listing 14.09B
because she repeatedly denied feelings of fatigue or malaise and did
not demonstrate that she suffered involuntary weight loss or fever.
Accordingly, we affirm as to the first issue.
II.
If a claimant cannot meet or equal the criteria in one of the
listings, the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC and proceeds to
step four of the sequential analysis, at which she considers whether
the claimant’s RFC permits the claimant to perform her past rele-
vant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If the claimant can perform
her past relevant work, she is not disabled, and if she cannot, the
analysis proceeds to step five. Id. At step five, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to show that significant numbers of jobs exist in
the national economy which the claimant can perform given, inter
alia, her RFC. Id.
The ALJ determines “a claimant’s RFC by considering all rel-
evant medical and other evidence.” Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.945(a)(3) In her RFC finding, the ALJ “must state with par-
ticularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the
reasons therefor.” Buckwalter, 5 F.4th at 1320-21 (quoting Winschel,
631 F.3d at 1179).
When a claimant alleges that she has several impairments,
the ALJ must “consider the impairments in combination and . . . de-
termine whether the combined impairments render the claimant
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 13
disabled.” Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 941 F.2d 1529,
1533 (11th Cir. 1991). However, “there is no rigid requirement that
the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her] deci-
sion, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which
is not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude
that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.” Dyer
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks
omitted, third and fourth alterations in original).
A three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant at-
tempts to establish disability through her testimony of pain or
other subjective symptoms. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225. To meet the
pain standard, the claimant must provide “(1) evidence of an un-
derlying medical condition and either,” (2) objective medical evi-
dence confirming the severity of the claimant’s alleged pain arising
from that condition or (3) “that the objectively determined medical
condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to
give rise to the alleged pain.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221,
1223 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211,
1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). This standard “also applies to com-
plaints of subjective conditions other than pain.” Holt, 921 F.2d at
1223. “The claimant’s subjective testimony supported by medical
evidence that satisfies the standard is itself sufficient to support a
finding of disability.” Id. “Indeed, in certain situations, pain alone
can be disabling, even when its existence is unsupported by objec-
tive evidence.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995);
see also Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Pain
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-13659
alone can be disabling, even when its existence is unsupported by
objective evidence.”).
The ALJ must consider all the claimant’s symptoms, includ-
ing pain, to “the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical ev-
idence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Additionally,
the ALJ considers all of the claimant’s “statements about
[her] symptoms, such as pain, and any description [her] medical
sources or nonmedical sources may provide about how the symp-
toms affect [her] activities of daily living and [her] ability to work.”
Id. However, the claimant’s statements about her pain alone are
not sufficient to establish that she is disabled, and the claimant must
provide “objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical
source that shows [that the claimant has] a medical impair-
ment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain
or other symptoms alleged,” and that could lead to a conclusion
that the claimant is disabled. Id. Social Security Ruling
(“SSR”) 16-3p requires “adjudicators to consider all of the evidence
in an individual’s record when they evaluate the intensity and per-
sistence of symptoms after they find that the individual has a med-
ically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be ex-
pected to produce those symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 81 Fed. Reg.
14166.
When evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, the ALJ
must consider such things as (1) the claimant’s daily activities;
(2) the nature and intensity of pain and other symptoms;
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22-13659 Opinion of the Court 15
(3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) effects of medications;
and (5) treatment or measures taken by the claimant for relief of
symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). “If the ALJ discredits sub-
jective testimony, [s]he must articulate explicit and adequate rea-
sons for doing so. Failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting
subjective testimony requires, as a matter of law, that the testi-
mony be accepted as true.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225 (citation omit-
ted).
Here, substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that
the ALJ considered all of Jones’s alleged impairments and subjec-
tive complaints of pain when she determined that Jones had an
RFC to perform light work. Although Jones’s medical impair-
ments could be reasonably expected to cause her symptoms, in-
cluding pain, the ALJ was not convinced by Jones’s statements re-
garding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symp-
toms; the ALJ found that Jones’s statements in this regard were not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence
in the record. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination.
Accordingly, we also affirm as to this issue.
AFFIRMED.
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