USA v. Kwuan Montrell Baker

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13937
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KWUAN MONTRELL BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cr-14012-AMC-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13937
Before BRASHER , A BUDU , and M ARCUS , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kwuan Montrell Baker appeals his convictions for posses-
sion with intent to distribute fentanyl and possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, challenging the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained follow-
ing a traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. After
thorough review, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence un-
der a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s factfinding for clear er-
ror and its application of the law to those facts de novo. United States
v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2012). We grant sub-
stantial deference to the credibility determinations of the district
court, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the prevail-
ing party. Id. at 1303. We must accept the version of events
adopted by the district court “unless it is contrary to the laws of
nature[] or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no rea-
sonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel,
289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted).
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Under the exclu-
sionary rule, evidence cannot be used against a defendant in a crim-
inal trial where that evidence was obtained via an encounter with
police that violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Per-
kins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). A traffic stop is a seizure
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22-13937 Opinion of the Court 3
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996). The Supreme Court previously
set forth a probable cause standard for determining whether a traf-
fic stop based on a traffic violation is valid. Id. at 810. However, it
has since made clear that an officer needs only reasonable suspi-
cion, not probable cause, to justify an automobile stop that is based
on a traffic violation. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57, 60
(2014); see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 880 n.15 (11th
Cir. 2022) (en banc) (stating that “the Supreme Court has . . . made
clear that reasonable suspicion is all that is required” to justify a
traffic stop based on a traffic violation (citing Heien, 574 U.S. at 60)).
The reasonableness of a seizure, including a traffic stop, “de-
pends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s
right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
[enforcement] officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975). “[R]easonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quotations omitted).
Reasonable suspicion is “considerably less than proof of wrongdo-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence” and less than probable
cause, which is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found.” Id. (quotations omitted). When deciding if
reasonable suspicion exists, we must review the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” to ascertain whether an officer had a “particularized
and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotations omitted). In so do-
ing, we must give due weight to an officer’s experience. United
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13937
States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991). None of the
suspect’s actions, however, need be criminal on their face to pro-
vide a trained officer with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Lee,
68 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 1995).
An arresting officer’s state of mind, except for the facts he
knows, is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. Devenpeck
v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). An officer’s “subjective reason
for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which
the known facts provide probable cause.” Id. “A traffic stop based
on an officer’s incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Chanthasouxat,
342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). Officers may rely on “com-
mon sense conclusions” in assessing the facts. United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Reasonable suspicion is determined
from the collective knowledge of all officers involved in the stop.
United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990).
A pretextual stop occurs when an officer, hoping to find ev-
idence of a greater offense, pursues a lesser offense that he nor-
mally would not. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir.
1986). However, in Whren, the Supreme Court held that an of-
ficer’s subjective motivations have no bearing on whether a traffic
stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 517 U.S. at 813.
So, in United States v. Holloman, we held that, because the officers
had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred in con-
nection with a traffic stop, they did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, “notwithstanding their subjective desire to intercept any
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22-13937 Opinion of the Court 5
narcotics being transported.” 113 F.3d 192, 194 (11th Cir. 1997). In
other words, while the Fourth Amendment requires courts to
“weigh the governmental and individual interests implicated in a
traffic stop,” the “result of that balancing is not in doubt where the
search or seizure is based upon probable cause.” Whren, 517 U.S.
at 816–17. Thus, a detailed “balancing” analysis -- that weighs the
governmental and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop --
is necessary only in “rare” situations that “involve[] seizures with-
out probable cause” or “searches or seizures conducted in an ex-
traordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy
or even physical interests.” Id. at 817–18.
Under Florida law, a person is guilty of driving under the
influence if he is driving or in actual physical control over a vehicle
and is affected by a substance to the extent that his normal faculties
are impaired. Fla. Stat. § 316.193 (2021). In addition, Florida law
prohibits driving with side windows tinted beyond certain limits;
i.e., “[a] sunscreening material is authorized for such windows if,
when applied to and tested on the glass of such windows on the
specific motor vehicle, the material has a total solar reflectance of
visible light of not more than 25 percent as measured on the non-
film side and a light transmittance of at least 28 percent in the visi-
ble light range.” Fla. Stat. § 316.2953 (2021). A suspected violation
of Florida’s window-tint law “provides a valid basis for a traffic
stop.” United States v. Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016).
Florida law also makes it “unlawful for the operator of any
vehicle, having knowledge that he or she has been ordered to stop
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13937
such vehicle by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, willfully
to refuse or fail to stop the vehicle in compliance with such [an]
order.” Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1) (2021). Florida caselaw interpreting
this provision has found that a high-speed chase or other drawn-
out form of fleeing is not required to trigger the attempted eluding
provision of Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1). Steil v. State, 974 So. 2d 589,
589–90 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Moreover, because it is sug-
gestive of wrongdoing, unprovoked flight may serve as the basis
for a reasonable suspicion that the person fleeing is involved in
criminal activity. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
Here, Baker moved to suppress evidence of a firearm, am-
munition, and drugs that were obtained by law enforcement during
a traffic stop of Jordan Kane’s vehicle, in which Baker was a passen-
ger. This evidence was used to charge Baker with possession with
intent to distribute fentanyl and possession of a firearm in further-
ance of a drug trafficking crime. In arguing that the evidence ob-
tained during the traffic stop should have been suppressed, Baker
claims that no alleged traffic violation occurred, that law enforce-
ment otherwise lacked probable cause to stop Kane’s vehicle, and
that the stop was pretextual. Thus, Baker urges us to review the
reasonableness of the traffic stop based on the circumstances that
surrounded it, including the officers’ subjective motivations for the
stop. However, as we’ve explained, an arresting officer’s state of
mind, except for the facts that he knows, is irrelevant to the exist-
ence of probable cause, and an officer’s “subjective reason for mak-
ing the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the
known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153.
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22-13937 Opinion of the Court 7
In other words, so long as officers had a reasonable suspicion of a
traffic violation by Kane, it is irrelevant whether the stop was pre-
textual or that officers did not arrest Kane based on any or all these
grounds. Id.; Holloman, 113 F.3d at 194; see also Campbell, 26 F.4th
at 880 n.15.
The district court found that the officers had reasonable sus-
picion to stop Kane based on three grounds: (1) driving under the
influence, (2) an illegal window tint, and (3) attempting to flee from
officers. As we’ll explain, Deputy Evan Ridle and the other depu-
ties of the St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Office (“SLCSO”) had more
than enough reasonable suspicion to stop Kane based on the first
ground -- driving under the influence -- so we’ll address that issue
in detail, and need not address the others.
As the record reflects, at the time of the traffic stop, Deputy
Ridle had knowledge of Kane from previous arrests for drug cases
in St. Lucie County, some of which he had personally performed,
and Ridle knew that Kane had recently failed a drug test, failed to
show up for a drug test on the day prior to the traffic stop, and had
a roommate believed to be selling narcotics. As for Deputy To-
maszewski, he initially saw Kane stop that day at a smoke shop that
was known to sell detox-related products to help pass drug tests.
After Kane finished an appointment at the courthouse, To-
maszewski observed Kane’s head lean out the side of his vehicle
and saw “the vomit coming down and splattering on the asphalt
there” and reported this over radio to other deputies. Kane then
left the parking lot and drove toward an area known for “gun
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13937
violence, drug sales, prostitution, and gang members” where he
stopped at a residence and remained in the driveway for five
minutes. After Kane departed from the residence, Deputy Ridle
saw Kane drifting over the center line and failing to maintain his
lane. Ridle said that he believed that Kane’s failure to maintain his
single lane was because the narcotics that Kane had consumed
were taking effect.1
Taking into account the collective knowledge the SLCSO of-
ficers involved in the stop and their “commonsense conclusions,”
law enforcement had a sufficient “particularized and objective ba-
sis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing by Kane -- that is, they reason-
ably could have concluded from Kane’s activities shortly before the
traffic stop that he was intoxicated by narcotics while driving and
was therefore in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.193. Cortez, 449 U.S. at
418; Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Tapia, 912 F.2d at 1370. Moreover, noth-
ing in the record suggests that this case amounted to a “rare” situ-
ation involving a “seizure[] without probable cause” or a “search[]
or seizure[] conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical interests.”
Whren, 517 U.S. at 817–18. Rather, as we’ve explained, the officers
1 In considering Baker’s claim, we must give due weight to Ridle’s experience
with users of narcotics as an SLCSO Deputy for approximately five years and
a member of the Special Investigations Section, Narcotics, Vice Division.
Briggman, 931 F.2d at 709. We add that the district court found Ridle’s testi-
mony credible, and we must accept this version of the events because his tes-
timony was not “improbable on its face” and the government prevailed in the
district court. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749; Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1302–03.
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22-13937 Opinion of the Court 9
had reasonable suspicion to stop Kane based upon driving under
the influence, which means that this case “is governed by the usual
rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken ‘out-
balances’ private interest in avoiding police contact.” Id. at 818. Ac-
cordingly, the initiation of the traffic stop of Kane’s vehicle -- which
led to the seizure of the evidence that was used against Baker -- did
not violate the Fourth Amendment, and we affirm the district
court’s denial of Baker’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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