Kevin Karpel v. Knauf Gips KG, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10114
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
KEVIN KARPEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
DANIEL BLONSKY,
Plaintiff,
versus
GEBRUEDER KNAUF VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT, KG, et
al.,
Defendants,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10114
KNAUF GIPS KG,
KNAUF PLASTERBOARD ( TIANJIN ) CO., LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-24168-RNS
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL PRYOR , and NEWSOM , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Karpel appeals the district court’s November 30, 2022
order dismissing his action and imposing attorney’s fees as sanc-
tions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) but leaving the amount of fees to
be determined. Karpel filed his notice of appeal on December 29,
2022, before the district court entered its January 3, 2023 order de-
termining the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, and he did
not file a new or amended notice of appeal after entry of the Janu-
ary 3 order. We conclude that the November 30 order was not
final or otherwise appealable and, thus, Karpel’s notice of appeal
was premature.
We generally only have jurisdiction to review final decisions
of district courts that end the litigation on the merits and leave
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23-10114 Opinion of the Court 3
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. See CSX
Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir.
2000). Generally, a pending request for attorney’s fees by a prevail-
ing party is a collateral matter that does not affect finality. See Bu-
dinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 197, 199–202 (1988);
Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 180-81, 183–86, 189–90
(2014). However, orders imposing attorney’s fees as sanctions are
different. In Jaffe v. Sundowner Properties, Inc., we concluded that an
appeal from an order dismissing an action and awarding attorney’s
fees as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) was not final because
the amount of attorney’s fees had not yet been determined. 808
F.2d 1425, 1426–27 (11th Cir. 1987). We reasoned that the award
of attorney’s fees was “not separable from the imposition of the
dismissal sanction.” See id. at 1427.
Jaffe’s reasoning applies with equal force here. Thus, there
was no final order until the district court entered its January 3 order
determining the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, which
Karpel did not appeal. See Jaffe, 808 F.2d at 1426–27. Moreover, the
January 3 order did not cure the premature appeal because the No-
vember 30 order was an interlocutory order that could not be ap-
pealed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d
1378, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing this Court’s precedent to
explain that, when appeals are taken from interlocutory orders not
appealable under Rule 54(b), subsequent entry of final judgment
cannot cure those premature appeals); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10114
(providing that a “court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties”).
Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdic-
tion. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
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