RJ's International Trading, LLC v. Crown Castle South, LLC

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10453
Non-Argument Calendar
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RJ'S INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CROWN CASTLE SOUTH, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee,
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-25162-CMA
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10453
Before J ORDAN, ROSENBAUM , and G RANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
RJ’s International Trading, LLC, appeals the district court’s
denial of a permanent injunction following a trial at which RJI ob-
tained damages to remedy Crown Castle South’s trespass. The per-
manent injunction would have required Crown Castle South and
non-party Crown Castle Fiber to remove fiber optic cables from
RJI’s property. We affirm.
I
In 1999, the original owners of the property at the center of
this case, Hidden Valley Corporation and their lessee BellSouth
Mobility, Inc., memorialized a nonexclusive easement “for utilities
and vehicular and pedestrian ingress and egress over, across, and
upon the [ ] Property for the purpose of constructing, maintaining,
repairing and replacing utility facilities.” D.E. 1 at 3 (emphasis omit-
ted). When R.J. International Trading, Inc. purchased the property
from Hidden Valley, the conveyance of the property was subject to
any existing easements. R.J. International Trading, Inc. later con-
veyed the property to RJ’s International Trading, LLC (“RJI”).
About six years later, BellSouth entered into a sublease with
Crown Castle South, granting Crown Castle South nonexclusive
rights of ingress and egress, including access to and use of any and
all easements. Pursuant to the sublease, Crown Castle South used
a portion of the property to install and maintain a telecommunica-
tions tower. Soon after, Crown Castle South entered into a licens-
ing agreement with Crown Castle Fiber that permitted Crown
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23-10453 Opinion of the Court 3
Castle Fiber to “install, operate and maintain the [e]quipment at
the [s]ide within the [l]icensed space.” D.E. 100 at 6. The license did
not cover any portion of the easement property.
In February of 2020, Crown Castle Fiber installed the fiber
optic cables under the easement tract, mistakenly believing that it
was complying with the easement. RJI soon thereafter notified
Crown Castle Fiber of its trespass. After multiple unsuccessful at-
tempts to resolve the dispute, RJI filed suit on December 18, 2020,
against Crown Castle South—the company that licensed the cable
installation to Crown Castle Fiber—for breach of easement, unjust
enrichment, and trespass. Crown Castle Fiber was not named as a
party to the suit.
RJI and Crown Castle South filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment in September of 2021. The district court granted
RJI’s motion, ruling that Crown Castle South (1) breached a valid
easement agreement between the two parties; (2) was unjustly en-
riched by the placement of the fiber optic cables; and (3) trespassed
on RJI’s property. It also ruled that RJI was entitled to an injunction
requiring Crown Castle South to remove the fiber optic cables
from the property.
On Crown Castle South’s motion for reconsideration, the
district court vacated the injunctive relief portion of the order be-
cause it would have “effectively enjoin[ed] Crown Castle Fiber, a
non-party, without any determination as to Crown Castle Fiber’s
role . . . in relation to the relevant events and claims in th[e] litiga-
tion.” D.E. 124 at 3. The district court instead permitted RJI to
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10453
move for an injunction at the conclusion of trial, “once the parties
ha[d] addressed with evidence and law whether Crown Castle Fi-
ber’s interests have been represented in the . . . dispute.” D.E. 124
at 4.
At trial, the district court instructed the jury—with RJI’s
agreement—to “award [RJI] . . . money that . . . will compensate it
for its loss, injury, or damage, including any damage RJI is reasona-
bly certain to incur [or] experience in the future.” Jury Instr. 4 (em-
phasis added), D.E. 183 at 4. The jury awarded RJI $40,001.00 for its
losses, both present and future.
After trial, RJI again moved for a permanent injunction on
its trespass and breach-of-easement claims. The district court de-
nied RJI’s motion, reasoning that (1) RJI had already obtained an
adequate remedy at law, (2) RJI could not obtain double recovery
for its injury, and (3) enjoining non-party Crown Castle Fiber was
improper because its rights and interests were not properly repre-
sented and adjudicated.
This appeal followed.
II
We review a denial of a permanent injunction for abuse of
discretion. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1349
(11th Cir. 2009). It appears to be an open question in this Circuit
whether, in a diversity case, federal or state law governs the issu-
ance of a permanent injunction. RJI argues that state law—here,
Florida law—applies. Crown Castle South does not take a position
either way but does cite to both federal and Florida cases. Because
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23-10453 Opinion of the Court 5
the application of either Florida or federal law is not determinative,
we need not decide that issue here.
Under Florida law, a permanent injunction is proper when a
party can show that (1) a clear legal right has been violated; (2) ir-
reparable harm has been threatened; and (3) there is a lack of an
adequate remedy at law. See Liberty Counsel v. Florida Bar Bd. of Gov-
ernors, 12 So.3d 183, 186 n.7 (Fla. 2009). Federal law also weighs
whether the permanent injunction will disserve the public interest.
See W. Va. ex rel Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.4th 1124, 1148
(11th Cir. 2023). Under both Florida and federal law, courts have
broad discretion in deciding to award injunctive relief. See Smith v.
Coal. to Reduce Class Size, 827 So.2d 959, 961 (Fla. 2002); W. Va. ex rel
Morrisey, 59 F.4th at 1148–49.
Even in those cases where the requirements of a permanent
injunction have been met, a court maintains broad discretion to
deny permanent injunctive relief. See Johnson v. Killian, 27 So. 2d
345, 347 (Fla. 1946) (citing favorably principle that “although a man-
datory injunction would ordinarily issue against the maintenance
of an encroachment, thus compelling the removal of it, the remedy
would not be available except when strong reasons were estab-
lished”); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)
(“An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not fol-
low from success on the merits as a matter of course.”). See also
Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 440–41 (1944) (holding that even if the
elements of a preliminary injunction are satisfied, a court has the
discretion to deny injunctive relief ).
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10453
RJI argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying its motion for a permanent injunction for three reasons.
First, it asserts that it will continue to suffer irreparable harm due
to Crown Castle Fiber’s trespass. Second, it contends that a perma-
nent injunction would not constitute “double recovery” because
enjoining Crown Castle Fiber would not force the defendant—
Crown Castle South—to answer to two forms of relief. Third, it
argues that the district court erred in failing to consider “aiding and
abetting” as an adequate basis for enjoining non-party Crown Cas-
tle Fiber.
Even assuming that RJI met the prerequisites for a perma-
nent injunction, we do not believe that the district court, given the
facts of this case, abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief.
We find it significant that RJI both asked for and received monetary
damages—for past and future economic harm—as a remedy for the
continued presence of the fiber optic cables. Had RJI requested
damages to cover the cost of removing the fiber optic cables, the
situation might be different, but that was not the case.
Given the facts, the district court was well within its discre-
tion to deny RJI permanent injunctive relief. See Diefenderfer v. Forest
Park Springs, 599 So. 2d 1309, 1313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (“In a proper
case a mandatory injunction can be refused but some damages or
costs must be assessed to compensate the dominant tenement own-
ers for any loss.”); Lemon v. Kurtszman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (“In
shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad
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23-10453 Opinion of the Court 7
discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow.”).
We find no basis for reversal.
III
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying RJI’s
request for a permanent injunction.
AFFRIMED.
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