Nu Pagamentos S.A. - Instituicao de Pagamento v. George Daniel Hudson, Jr.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10673
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
NU PAGAMENTOS S.A. - INSTITUICAO DE PAGAMENTO,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
versus
GEORGE DANIEL HUDSON, JR.,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00069-RWS
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10673
Before R OSENBAUM , BRANCH, and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Nu Pagamentos
S.A.–Instituição de Pagamento (“Appellee”) is GRANTED, and this
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Although the district court’s February 22, 2023, order re-
solved George Daniel Hudson, Jr.’s counterclaims and several of
Appellee’s claims, it did not end the litigation on the merits because
Appellee’s false advertising and Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act claims remain pending. Thus, because the district court
did not certify the order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), it is not final or otherwise immediately appealable. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Supreme Fuels Trading
FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
an order adjudicating fewer than all the claims in a suit, or adjudi-
cating the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, is not a
final judgment from which an appeal may be taken, unless the dis-
trict court properly certifies a judgment on fewer than all claims or
parties as “final” under Rule 54(b)); CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Gar-
den City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A final decision is
one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment.”). Furthermore, despite
Hudson’s assertions to the contrary, the Declaratory Judgment Act
does not provide an exception to traditional finality requirements.
See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-44 (1976) (ex-
plaining that orders granting declaratory relief but leaving other
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23-10673 Opinion of the Court 3
requests for relief unresolved are not final within the meaning of
§ 1291).
The February 22 order is also not appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). The order granted injunctive relief by prohibiting
Hudson from using the “Nubank” trademark. See Alabama v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that to be appealable under § 1292(a)(1), an order granting injunc-
tive relief generally must be “(1) a clearly defined and understand-
able directive by the court to act or to refrain from a particular ac-
tion; and (2) enforceable through contempt, if disobeyed”). How-
ever, the order is not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment because if this Court were to reverse the order,
Hudson could resume use of the Nubank mark. See United States v.
Bowman, 341 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that §
1292(a)(1) allows appellate review of an interlocutory order if the or-
der “(1) has the effect of an injunction; (2) has serious, perhaps ir-
reparable consequences; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on ap-
peal”); United States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968, 973 (11th Cir.
1998).
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